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Abstract 
At the end of the nineteenth century the Executive Officer Corps of the Royal 
Navy faced significant challenges as it dealt with social, economic, political and 
technological change. Although rising international tension appeared to benefit the 
service as a whole, changes in force structure and organization presented threats to the 
professional competence of executive officers. Increased expenditure on defence and 
increasing public scrutiny was combined with the growth of other developing professions, 
especially engineering, that challenged older lines of authority. Also, the advance of 
education and skill of ratings and non-executives weakened the traditional claims by the 
executive officer corps to leadership over the lower deck and other branches of service. -
The corps attempted to deal with these issues by asserting its dominance in changing 
career patterns, finding new intellectual justification for the continued "culture of 
command" through the advent of modem naval history, and the institution of new, more 
efficient staff command systems. The corps also attempted to annex engineering functions 
through the Selbome education scheme of 1902. The outbreak of World War I in 1914, 
presented the corps with the hazardous task of justifYing itself and making good on its 
claims to dominance within the establishment. Despite the setbacks and disasters of war, 
the corps largely managed to retain its dominance into the interwar period. 
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Glossary 
Since the structure of this dissertation is thematic rather than strictly chronological and 
due to the fact that many policy changes in the Royal Navy had effects on several levels, 
a glossary has been provided below. Included are the several major education committees 
as well as policy papers and pertinent orders-in-council. A brief explanation is attached to 
each entry. 
1863- Walpole Committee 
Investigated possible systems for the better regulation of the size and composition of the 
executive officer corps. 
1866- Elliot Committee 
Convened by the Admiralty to investigate the possible elimination of the master branch of 
executive officers. The master branch was subsequently merged into the duties of regular 
line officers. 
1870- Order-in-Council on Retirement 
Established the system of promotion and retirement with which the Admiralty managed 
the officer lists for the following half century. It laid down the mechanisms of 
compulsory retirement and promotion systems and divided officers into active and retired 
lists. 
1870- Shadwell Committee 
Investigated the higher education of British officers in comparison to their foreign 
counterparts. Set the path for the foundation of the Royal Naval College at Greenwich. 
1875- Rice Committee 
Investigated conditions at the training ship Britannia. Resulting report says a great deal 
about prevailing conditions and attitudes regarding cadet training. 
1877- Cooper-Key Committee 
Convened to find means to improve the training and the quality of engineer officers in the 
Royal Navy. 
1877- Gordon Committee 
Convened to investigate the workings of the Royal Naval College at Greenwich. 
1885- Luard Committee 
Examined the education and training of executive officers from the time of entry until the 
completion of specialist education as lieutenants. 
Vlll 
1893- Hoskins Committee 
Investigated the impact of fleet expansion on officer requirements. Not only was it found 
that the flow of promotion was not progressing as smoothly as expected but the number 
of junior officers was not keeping pace with fresh intakes into the corps. 
1895- Order-in-Council on Induction ofRNR Officers 
Inducted reserve officers into the regular Navy in order to compensate for shortfalls in 
officer numbers as a result of the Naval Defence Act and the introduction of destroyers 
into the fleet. 
1900- Foundation of the Royal Naval War College, Portsmouth 
Established a permanent training centre to instruct senior officers in the "art of war." 
However, it tended to become a dumping ground for officers approaching retirement. 
1901- Tracey Committee 
Convened to investigate the training of junior executive officers and overhauling the 
system of training. 
1901 -Order-in-Council on Misconduct 
This regulation gave the Admiralty the power to summarily force an officer to retire with 
or without a conviction by court-martial. 
1902 - Goschen Committee 
Investigated the state of flow of promotion in the executive ranks. Recommended against 
promoting officers to flag rank by selection. 
1902- Selborne Memorandum 
Completely altered the system of officer procurement and trammg. Cadets in the 
executive, engineering and marine branches were all to have common entry. After the 
1906 Douglas Committee, it was decided to institute procedures whereby officers could 
switch branches mid-career. 
1904 -Order-in-Council on Distribution of Business 
Concentrated authority over operational matters in the hands of the First Sea Lord 
directly. This assisted in the provision of the groundwork for an effective staff system. 
1906- Douglas Committee 
Committee convened to investigate the workings of the new scheme of training naval 
officers introduced in 1902. Recommended the merger off all combatant officers into one · 
corps. 
1909- Beresford Inquiry 
As a consequent of the two-year feud between Fisher and Beresford, the Asquith 
government decided to convene a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence 
lX 
to investigate charges that Fisher's handling of Admiralty policy was contrary to the 
national interest. 
1912- Order-in-Council on the Naval War Staff 
Established the Naval War Staff at the Admiralty as well as integrated staff training for 
junior naval officers. 
1913 - Custance Committee 
Education Committee convened to examine the results of the results of the Selborne 
Scheme of 1902. 
1913 -Duff Committee 
Critically examined the shortage of deck officers in the Navy. Recommended finding 
alternative sources of entrants than through only Osborne/Dartmouth. 
1913 - Slade Committee 
Investigated the capacity of the Royal Naval War College to prepare younger officers to 
serve as qualified staff officers. Assessed the capacity of the Navy to produce a 
sufficiency of capable officers to perform staff duties ashore and afloat. 
1913 - Order-in-Council on Special Entry 
Established the framework to induct public school boys directly into the Navy. Also 
established an abbreviates training scheme to permit such entrants to be able to serve at 
sea quickly and yet have the same career prospects as regular entry cadets. 
1913- Order-in-Council on the Mate Scheme 
Authorized the promotion of lower deck personnel to commissioned rank. Marked the 
first time in the Royal Navy laid down a policy of regular promotion of qualified men 
from the lower deck. 
1914- Order-in-Council on Naval Promotion 
Authorized the Admiralty to retire any captain it wished as he approached seniority where 
the officer concerned would normally expect promotion to flag rank. In effect, introduced 
promotion by selection while still retaining the trappings of promotion by seniority. 
1915- Order-in-Council on Engineer Officers 
At the urging of Admiral Fisher in January 1915, all old scheme engineer officers were 
made "executive." 
1917 - Dardanelles Report 
Parliamentary inquiry of the decisions leading up to the ill-fated assault on the 
Dardanelles. The investigations of the commission found serious drawbacks in the 
command machinery of the War Cabinet, War Office and Admiralty. 
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Chapter I-
Introduction 
It is on our Officers as much as on our men that the strength of the 
Navy depends; and their increased efficiency is of at least as much 
national importance as an extra inch or two of iron on the sides of our 
ships, or a few additional foot-tons to the striking energy of our shot. 1 
When approaching the pre-1914 Royal Navy executive officer corps,2 the historian must 
empathize with the sentiment expressed in 1903 by Thomas Gibson Bowles, M.P.: 
To many members of this House the sea is a horror, the Navy a 
mystery, and the naval officer an enigma to explain the functions of 
the naval officer how he is produced, and how dangerous it is to 
tamper with the provisions whereby he is brought to a perfect state, is 
a task which might appall even a seaman, and which is doubly difficult 
to me, who am, after all, but a landsman. 3 
Although Bowles was daunted by even the contemplation of personnel policy, it did not 
prevent him making a nuisance of himself to several administrations. It is equally 
daunting for an historian to pick through the remains of Admiralty business conducted a 
century ago. 
The experience of the Royal Navy executive officer corps in the era of the Great 
War appears on the surface to be a collection of unconnected conflicts. The Fisher 
1 J.K. Laughton, "Naval Promotion Arithmetically and Historically Considered," Journal of the Royal 
United Services Institution (RUSI) , XXIV, No. 106 (1881), 535 . 
2 The term "executive officer corps" denotes only those commissioned officers of the seaman branch that 
were entitled to exercise command over warships. These officers bore the titles .of admiral, captain, 
commander, lieutenant and sub-lieutenant. It does not include other specialist commissioned officers such 
as Royal Marines, Engineers, Medical or Paymaster officers. The situation became somewhat muddled, · 
however, after the introduction of the Selbome reforms of December 1902 where newly recruited officers 
of the Marines and Engineers were integrated with the seaman branch. 
3 Great Britain, Parliament, House ofCommons, Debates, 4th ser., vol. CXIX (1903), col. 882. Bowles left 
the service as a Sub-Lieutenant. 
1 
reforms, the dispute over engineering, the feud between Admirals Sir John Fisher and 
Lord Charles Beresford in 1907-1909, the imposition of a naval war staff in 1912 and the 
stresses of World War I all seem disjointed episodes. What connected them, however, 
was a series of adjustments that officers were forced to make in view of changes in 
politics, industry, economics, finance and British society. On almost every level, the 
traditional leadership of the executive officer corps was challenged. 
Executive officers were indeed presented with what in effect amounted to a 
revolution in naval affairs.4 As the Navy was transformed into an industrialized 
workplace, officers were challenged by an alteration in the "culture of command." 
Command arrangements centred on the sailing ship were still being imposed on the steam 
and steel fleet at the turn of the century. Indeed, regardless of scientific or specialist 
knowledge, seamanship remained the ultimate mark of competence. Commissioned sea 
time "in a ship of war at sea" was the prerequisite for promotion. Even shore 
establishments were designated as warships and replicated as far as possible the routine of 
a sailing vessel. 5 The response to this revolution in naval affairs was two-fold and is best 
represented by the so-called materialist and historical-intellectual schools. The 
materialists argued that the practical requirements of a modem navy meant that officers 
4 The expression "revolution in naval affairs" is used in a broader sense than literature surrounding 
Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA) that came to the fore in the 1990s. The revolution in naval matters at 
the end of the nineteenth century encompassed not merely changes in strategic and tactical posture but also 
in the social, cultural and intellectual construction of the naval service. Much of the RMA debate focuses on 
direct employment of force or the threat of force and as Colin Gray warned often provides "a siren call to 
indulge teleology." See, Colin Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence 
of History (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 15. 
5 For instance the cadet-training establishment was H.M.S. Britannia, the gunnery school was Excellent and 
the torpedo school was Vernon. Indeed, in present day Commonwealth navies shore establishments are, in 
effect, ships. For instance the naval reserve establishment in St. John's, Newfoundland is H.M.C.S. Cabot. 
2 
must primarily be technicians. While the intellectuals recognized the importance of 
technological change, nonetheless they were adamant that technical matters were subject 
to the dictates of national policy, strategy and tactics. The staff command system, 
advocated by officers as varied as Charles Beresford, Cyprian Bridge and Herbert 
Richmond, was designed to co-ordinate technology, tactics and strategy. Not only would 
this co-ordinate policy but it would also serve as a way of maximizing operational 
efficiency and reducing cost. 6 
Indeed, even the success that enabled the Navy to extract resources from 
Parliament was problematic. The increase in the size of the fleet impinged on the 
resources of those classes that for the previous three-quarters of a century had supplied 
the service with its officers. Expansion in absolute size was amplified by the growth in 
the infrastructure required to administer the naval establishment. Moreover, increased 
public interest in defence matters during this period spurred the widespread questioning 
of the professional expertise of the officer corps. During the Great War, the dreadnought 
battleships constructed at great cost did little, in the view of the layman; to prevent 
Britain's near starvation in 1917 through the agency of German submarines. Naval 
officers found it increasingly difficult to convince their political and financial masters that . 
they could be trusted to meet the requirements of naval defence. 
6 For example see, Cyprian Bridge, "Material Versus Knowledge in Naval Warfare," The Times, 2 March 
1906. "Until we put the treatment of inert material in its proper place, and make study of naval warfare the 
first demand on a naval officer's attention, our present methods, with all their intolerable costliness, will 
continue. A knowledge of naval warfare cannot be acquired, like a knowledge of Esperanto, by attendance 
at occasional lectures. Instead of spending most of his time dabbling with material, the naval officer should 
devote his attention so thoroughly to considering the problems of war that a knowledge of them will 
permeate his whole being." 
3 
With the work of John Knox Laughton, Alfred Thayer Mahan and others during 
this era, officers and indeed, the general public, increasingly accepted that naval 
leadership needed to become "scientific" and "professional."7 Growing popular interest in 
naval affairs also led to increased public scrutiny to ensure that the officer corps met these 
expectations. The Boer War further reinforced this popular interest, when the Army was 
forced to commit 500,000 troops to subdue a guerrilla force. As a result, assurances by 
those in gold braid were increasingly met with scepticism. Coupled with growing tensions 
in international relations and the increased cost of the British defence establishment, 
growing criticism was directed not merely at the Admiralty but at the very claims of 
leadership advanced by the executive officer corps. Indeed, the aftermath of the South 
African War saw the triumph of the concept of national efficiency that, in the view of 
Geoffrey Searle, transcended political and class lines.8 A widespread concern came to the 
fore that Britain was losing its capacity to compete with rising industrial powers 
(especially Germany and the United States) and hence national and imperial regeneration 
was required to ensure the future prosperity and security of the British Empire. 
The leadership was not only challenged politically but also was confronted by the 
growth of other professions around the fringes of the naval establishment and by the 
engineers, a group that undermined the claims of the executive in a fundamental way. 
7 On Laughton, see especially Andrew Lambert, The Foundations of Naval History: John Knox Laughton, 
the Royal Navy and the Historical Profession (London: Chatham Books, 1999); and Donald M. Schurman, 
The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867-1914 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1968). On Mahan, see Jon Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching 
Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2001); and James Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf (eds.), Mahan is not Enough: The Proceedings of 
a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond (Newport, RI: Naval 
War College Press, 1993). 
8 Geoffrey Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971 ). 
4 
Each of these professions sought not only to control their own work but also to gain a 
more powerful voice in the administration of the Royal Navy and the Board of 
Admiralty. 9 The latter, aside from its political members, was the preserve of the executive 
alone. The aspirations of medical doctors, accounting officers, naval instructors and 
others could be accommodated within the system because Admiralty regulations ensured 
that they could never be anything more than auxiliaries to the core functions of the 
establishment. But the situation was much different with engineers. The triumph of steam 
and rapid technological change from the 1860s onwards destroyed one of the key claims 
of executive leadership at a time when traditional seamanship skills were effectively 
demolished. Further, the development of engineering and the self-confident assertions of-
naval engineers and their allies meant that a significant element of command was 
removed from the direct supervision of deck officers. Although engineers never aspired to 
displace the ship's captain, they did attempt to seize control over key areas of the 
establishment and hence to undermine, if only incidentally, the authority of the executive -
branch. 
The leadership of the officer corps was challenged on yet another level: its social 
status was questioned. With the increased education available to working-class men and 
the need for new technical skills among naval ratings, the "traditional" methods of 
9 The Board of Admiralty was the government department responsible for the naval defence of Great 
Britain. It was made up of a mixed committee of professional naval executive officers, politicians and 
bureaucrats. The First Lord of the Admiralty was a politician, sitting in either the Commons or the Lords, 
and was legally the official immediately responsible to Parliament. Typically there was also a Parliamentary 
Secretary and a Civil Lord who were also civilians. The Secretary of the Board, though not technically a 
member, was the head of the Admiralty administration. The professional members included naval officers 
generally Rear Admiral or above (although there were cases of Captain serving as junior Sea Lords). 
Throughout this period there were generally four professional naval officers serving on the Board. 
5 
command based on class and gold braid were no longer sufficient. Along with the 
increased educational attainments of ratings came pressure for the establishment of 
suitable career paths and, eventually, the possibility of this body of men attaining 
commissioned rank. 10 One of the points of pride of the executive branch, and indeed one 
of its claims to authority, was the close client-patron connection of the corps to ratings. 
Officers knew Jack in all his glory as they disciplined and loved him, admiring his 
positive characteristics while forgiving his drunkenness and indiscretions. In the words of 
Admiral Sir Algernon de Horsey, "[m]y experience is that our men are like good-
humoured children, full of work and zeal, and easily led provided only that they serve 
under strict, tactful, and thoughtful officers. " 11 Advancement based entirely on merit 
regardless of social origin struck at the heart of arguments centred upon noblesse oblige 
and the belief that certain classes were society's "natural leaders." 
With changes in education and technology it became apparent that this 
paternalistic relationship was increasingly unsustainable. This type of relationship was 
rejected by men such as Lionel Yexley, a retired petty officer, who campaigned for the 
improvement of ratings through his magazine, The Fleet, which began publishing in 1907 
10 
"Naval Recruiting," Naval Warrant Officers' Journal, XV (February 1902), 13-14; "The mechanical 
knowledge requires a higher intelligence, a larger mental grasp and a more scientific training, than that 
needed in the days of masts and sails, and consequently the men to be trained ... need to be drawn from the 
best educated among our poorer classes. Mere muscular men, which could be picked up by press-gangs ... 
are no longer the sort of recruits which will win in time of stress and strain." 
11 
"The Naval Barracks Emeute" The Times, 24 December 1906, 6. See also John Moresby, Two Admirals: 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Fairfax Moresby and his Son John Moresby: A Record of Life and Service in the 
British Navy for a Hundred Years (London: John Murray, 1909), 396; and Charles Dundas, An Admiral's 
Yarns: Stray Memories of 50 Years (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1922), 82. 
6 
and launched concentrated attacks on Agnes Weston's sailors' rests. 12 Other outlets, like 
the Royal Naval Warrant Officers' Journal edited by Henry Capper, also tried to improve 
the position of ratings. Petty officers challenged rules that permitted officers to disrate 
them summarily without trial by court martial. Moreover, the officer corps seemed ill at 
ease with those ratings not associated with the traditional duties of seamen. For instance, 
officers had great difficulty dealing with discipline problems among stokers, as were 
illustrated by events such as the Portsmouth Barracks riot of November 1906 and the 
mutiny in H.M.S. Zealandia in the spring of 1914.13 As if this were not bad enough, all 
these affairs were widely reported in the press and debated in Parliament, thus subjecting 
the Navy, and especially the executive branch, to intense criticism. 
Further, the nature of the tasks that naval officers performed had changed 
dramatically. The concentration of the fleet in home waters meant less chance for foreign 
service (where the cost of living was considerably lower than on home stations), an 
increased tempo of operations, heavier loads in regard to training, less leave, and 
comparatively little time on half pay. As well, the traditional semi-independence of the 
corps was under attack as power gradually increased at the Admiralty with the advent of 
the wireless, the staff system of command and the concentration of authority in the hands 
12 
"Charity and the Navy IV: The Naval Officer," The Fleet, VI (April 1910), 80. Yexley wrote upon 
hearing that Agnes Weston was developing a "sailors' rest" for officers: "I wonder what kind of 
'missionary' is going to be brought into existence to cope with these helpless sinners? Think of the large 
number of young officers who are every day are adopting a naval career; think of the squalid homes they 
come from, and think of the squalid surroundings and the horrible temptations of Osborne College into 
which they will be cast!" 
13 Great Britain, Public Record Office (PRO), Admiralty Papers (ADM) 156/77, Disorder in H.M.S. 
Zealandia, 1914; and ADM 1/7895, Incident at Portsmouth Barracks, 1906. 
7 
of the First Sea Lord. 14 In order to "get on" in the servtce, social and political 
connections, though still important, were decreasing in value, albeit only slowly, 
compared with the attainment of professional qualifications, particularly in specializations 
such as gunnery and torpedo. Officers felt harried and increasingly strained as a result of 
the rapid growth of the service. This problem was coupled with a wholesale shortage of 
junior officers for fleet duty that dramatically increased the routine workload of those in 
the lower ranks. In tum, this trend reinforced the already widening gulf between the naval 
officer and his civilian contemporaries. 15 Naval officers were virtually compelled to 
proceed down the well-worn path of concentrating on routine duties with the consequence 
that there was a widespread failure to think "outside the box." Frequent changes in billets 
and rotation in and out of the increasing number of training courses lessened the amount 
of time officers spent at sea. 16 As the fleet concentrated in home waters in response to 
growing international insecurity after 1904, command became increasingly centralized 
and comparatively little scope remained for individual initiative. Less prestigious 
appointments permitted more flexibility but were generally not sought because they 
carried with them considerably lower chances for promotion. 
Hence, on nearly every front the pretensions of the executive branch were 
challenged, and the corps was forced to take drastic steps to ensure that it remained at the 
14 Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers (BPP), "Board of Admiralty - Copy of an Order-in-
Council Showing Designation of the Various Members of, and Secretaries to, the Board of Admiralty, vol. 
XLVIII, Cd. 2416 (1905), 163 ff. 
15 BPP, "Statement by the First Lord of the Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1920-21," val. 
XXVIII, Cmd. 619 (1920), 667. 
16 PRO, ADM 1/8374/96, Memorandum on the Rate of Movement of Officers within the Fleet, 1913. 
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forefront of the naval establishment. fu the first place, the issue of technical competence 
was met. Measures to deal with this stretched as far back as the 1850s with the advent of 
the Britannia cadet training system and the founding of the Royal Naval College at 
Greenwich. While Britannia was to educate cadets just entering the service not only in 
naval discipline but also in mathematics, an increasingly essential tool given the 
mechanization of the fleet, Greenwich was to do the same thing for senior officers whose 
education was deemed to be deficient. 17 Officers were encouraged to take courses in 
steam technology, modem languages, international law and basic maths. 18 Moreover, the 
new specialist schools, H.M.S. Excellent for gunnery and H.M.S. Vernon for torpedo and 
electrical work, trained the best and the brightest to take the most prominent junior 
positions afloat who would eventually be favoured in the race to secure promotion. 
Promotion criteria shifted in favour of officers who specialized in fields closely related to 
applying technology to the use of weapons. Officers like the future Admiral Sir John 
Fisher quickly realized the growing importance of technical matters and built their careers 
around this type of duty. Looking through the roster of the senior flag officers during the 
First World War, it is clear that nearly all who held high command were either torpedo or 
gunnery specialists, with the notable exception of David Beatty. Even if an officer did not 
qualify as a specialist, he was still compelled to take examinations in those fields to 
achieve the rank of lieutenant. And these exams were of more than academic interest 
17 H.M.S. Britannia was a permanently moored training ship that was maintained in Dartmouth harbour 
from the 1860s onwards. After the turn of the century it was replaced by a stoutly built stone college and 
renamed the Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth. 
18 BPP, "Report of the Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Foundation of the Royal Naval College, 
Greenwich," vol. XXI, C. 1733 (1877), 420-421. 
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since they established the relative seniority of officers. In essence, by the tum of the 
century the executive branch had begun increasingly to resemble those of their 
. . 11 19 engmeenng co eagues. 
As sailing ships disappeared from the Navy List and steam became the sole motive 
power of the fleet, the engineer below deck gained increased responsibility. Executive 
officers, however, were expected to have a basic understanding of steam machinery while 
engineers were denied not only a status equivalent to other "executive" specializations but 
also the training provided to watch-keeping officers and the concomitant chance to 
exercise command. Further, certain social disadvantages were associated with 
engineering. 20 The most ambitious method of dealing with this problem was the adoption 
in December 1902 of the Selbome Scheme, which virtually annexed the engineering 
branch to the executive and destroyed the separate avenues of entry?1 Henceforth, all 
combatant officers were to be engineers and have the appropriate training. 22 
Another mechanism that played a role in this redefinition of the officer corps was 
history itself. The rise of "scientific" history and the development of the staff system of 
19 BPP, "Memorandum dealing with the Entry, Training and Employment of Officers and Men of the Royal 
Navy and Royal Marines," vol. LXI, Cd. 1385 (1902), 677. 
20 PRO, ADM 7/931, Engineering Students' Parentage, 1909. This is illustrated by the fact that Engineering 
Students who entered through the old scheme came from less exalted social backgrounds than their 
executive contemporaries. Of the more than 300 students who entered, only four were the sons of retired 
executive officers and only one of those was above the rank ofLieutenant. 
21 BPP, "Memorandum dealing with the Entry, Training and Employment of Officers and Men of the Royal 
Navy and of the Royal Marines," vol. LXI, Cd. 1385 (1902). The Selbome Scheme, introduced in 
December 1902, was intended to streamline the education and training of combatant officers of the 
Executive, Engineering and Marine branches into one system The safeguards that ensured the status of the 
executive officer were not merely retained but extended over other branches of service as well. 
22 Arthur J. Marder (ed.), Fear God and Dread Nought: The Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord 
Fisher of Kilverstone (3 vols., London: Jonathan Cape, 1952-1959), I, 269, Fisher to J.R. Thursfield, 22 . 
January 1903. 
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command placed the legitimacy of the command function of the service on a different 
footing. History offered the corps a unique tool to reassert their competence. First and 
foremost, the study of the past provided a way to bridge the gap between science and the 
imponderables of naval leadership. Hence, the essential characteristics of line officers 
could effectively be modernized by synthesizing the old and the new. Historically derived 
principles placed the new executive branch on a "scientific" basis and yet they still 
provided conceptual space and intellectual, social and political respectability for the 
traditional concepts of command and leadership. History could then be used to regularize 
the training of officers and be useful in the production scientific principles to guide 
command decisions. By fixing the questions to be asked of the available historical 
evidence, and by making the results of these scientific examinations of the historical 
record available, the executive officer corps could use history to cement its dominance of 
the naval establishment. 
This neat conception of the potential use of history foundered, however, on the 
rocks of scholarship. The difficulty was that external experts like Julian Corbett and 
Spenser Wilkinson, and some officers within the service itself, such as Herbert Richmond 
and Cyprian Bridge, took these scientific precepts of modem naval history seriously and 
began to apply them to the formulation of contemporary policy.23 Hence, for the officer 
corps history became a double-edged sword. While it made a convenient tool to reassert 
the dominance of the executive, it became a threat when it began to ask basic "scientific" 
23 Julian S. Corbett, "War Course: Strategical Terms and Definitions used in Lectures on Naval History," in 
J.S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 
307-325; Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of the Navy (London: Constable, 1895); Herbert W. Richmond, 
"Introductory," Naval Review, I (1913), 9-14; Cyprian Bridge, The Art of Naval Warfare (London: Smith, 
Elder & Co., 1907); Sea Power and Other Studies (London: Smith Elder & Co., 1910). Admiral Bridge 
was the Navy's second Director ofNaval Intelligence (D.N.I.) and was born in St. John's, Newfoundland. 
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questions about the education of officers. The problem was that those without extensive 
command experience and even civilians could discern these "scientifically" derived 
principles and could offer reasoned critiques of the actions of officers. 
This bid to apply historical principles to contemporary problems was reflected by 
the foundation of the Naval War Staff under Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the 
Admiralty, in 1912 and the establishment of The Naval Review in 1913 as a vehicle of 
discussion and reform within the service. By systematically attempting to apply historical 
principles to the exercise of command and the culture of the officer corps, these writers 
were trying to ensure that executive officers would be competent to carry out their core 
responsibility: the exercise of military command at sea. The First World War exposed key 
weaknesses in the professional training of naval officers. As in other armed services, total 
war created a crisis of confidence in the professional competence of the established 
leadership of the Royal Navy, with a constant flow of misdirected energy and strategic 
and tactical errors culminating in the dismissal of Admiral Sir John J ellicoe from the 
Admiralty in December 1917. 
Historiography 
To deal with the issue of the Royal Navy officer corps it is necessary to address two 
strands of existing literature. The first comprises material relating to British naval policy 
prior to 1914. The second is a body of literature regarding the issue of military 
professionalization as it relates directly to the experience of officer corps, naval and 
military, in the modem period. 
12 
One of the chief problems with much of the historical literature has been its 
tendency to serve, albeit often indirectly and unintentionally, institutional interests. It is 
not that some naval historians have been intellectually dishonest or have deliberately 
manipulated evidence but rather that many of them have imposed an important conceptual 
constraint on their investigations by failing to ask basic questions about the foundations 
of their sub-discipline. One of the pillars of naval history from the beginning has been the 
expectation that it would reinforce the traditional authority of deck officers and act as a 
guide in the formulation of state policy. Indeed, what was perhaps the seminal work of 
the sub-discipline in its formative stages, Alfred Thayer Mahan's The Influence of Sea 
Power upon History, was purposely written to further the power of the state.24 This 
tradition has imposed a handicap on naval historians and has limited the questions that 
they have asked of the available record. Fortunately, several attempts have been made in 
the recent past to reinvent naval history and reconnect it to broader problems in modem 
scholarship. 25 
These self-imposed limitations have been a marked feature of the historiography 
concerning the Royal Navy during and prior to World War I. The cornerstone, of course, 
has been the work of Arthur J. Marder. Marder, an American and a graduate of Harvard, 
where he studied under William Langer, wrote a five-volume study of the Royal Navy in 
24 A.T. Mahan, The Influence ofSea Power Upon History, 1650-1783 (1890, New York: Dover Public-
ations, 1987), 25-89. 
25 For two examples, see John Hattendorf (ed.), Ubi Sumus? The State of Naval and Maritime History 
(Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1994); and Hattendorf (ed.), Doing Naval History: Essays toward 
Improvement (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1995). 
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the Dreadnought era. 26 Based on exhaustive research in the materials that were then 
available, Marder's study wove together diplomacy, domestic politics, naval policy and 
the experience of global war. As impressive as his scholarship was, however, there was a 
problem with the way he conceptualized his study. For example, as Jon Sumida and 
David Rosenberg have argued, his discussion of naval policy was confined to conceptual 
"black boxes" with no attempt to probe related issues such as personnel policy or 
technology.27 An even graver problem was that Marder was in many ways a "true 
believer" in that he admired the Royal Navy as an institution and, in fact, during the 
Second World War he attempted to join it after being rejected as medically unfit by the 
28 U.S. Navy. 
Although he loved the institution, Marder's liberal views also led him to identify 
with officers who wanted to reform the system.29 In particular, Marder was a profound 
admirer of both Admirals Sir Herbert Richmond and Sir John Fisher and published 
collections of their papers in the 1950s.30 Marder's handling of the latter was problematic 
because he largely accepted without deeper examination the image that Fisher fashioned 
for himself as a reformer facing off against reactionaries. His concentration on Fisher 
26 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Age of Fisher, 1904-
1919 (5 vols., London: Oxford University Press, 1961-1974). 
27 Jon Sumida and David Rosenberg, ''Machines, Men, Manufacturing, Management and Money: The Study 
of Navies as Complex Organizations and the Transformation of Twentieth Century Naval History," in 
Hattendorf ( ed.), Doing Naval History, 31. 
28 PRO, ADM 178/317, "Application of Dr. A. Marder, U.S. citizen, to join the Royal Navy, 1943-44." 
29 Barry Gough, "The Royal Navy and the British Empire," in Robin Winks (ed.), Oxford University of the 
British Empire: Volume V-Historiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 330-331. 
30 Marder (ed.), Fear God and Dread Nought; and Marder (ed.), Portrait of an Admiral: Life and Letters of 
Sir Herbert Richmond (London: Jonathan Cape, 1952). 
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tended to overshadow much else of importance in the naval service; consequently, his 
work provided only a surface explanation of the evolution of the officer corps. 
Nor was Marder alone in this, for others have been enthralled by Fisher's 
personality and energy. One of these writers was Jan Morris, who in Fisher's Face 
claimed to have fallen in love with the Admiral in childhood. The characterization of 
Fisher as a broad-minded, liberal reformer and his opponents as irretrievable reactionaries 
has attracted a number of adherents, such as Geoffrey Penn and Robert K. Massie. 31 The 
fixation on Fisher's dispute with Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, his magnetic 
personality and the extensive reforms he initiated have served to mask a large number of 
continuities in the Royal Navy in the period. It is commonplace to ignore the problematic 
nature of some of the Fisherite reforms and very simple to ascribe opposition solely to 
reactionary conservatism. In fact, it could be argued that Fisher's career was made by 
political connections and hence that his experience as a sea-going officer and his fitness 
for command might be regarded as suspect.32 Moreover, in order to magnify his own 
accomplishments, he and his supporters denigrated the reforms of the pre-1900 era. 
31 Jan Morris, Fisher's Face (London: Viking, 1995), 12. Geoffrey Penn, Infighting Admirals: Fisher's 
Feud with Beresford and the Reactionaries (London: Leo Cooper, 2000); and Robert K. Massie, 
Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War (New York: Random House, 1991 ). 
32 Fisher had only about six or seven years of sea service in the thirty years prior to taking up his 
appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet. This lack of sea service was at one point 
raised in Parliament by Sir John Colomb. See Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 4th 
ser., vol. LXXXVI (1900), col. 339. See also National Maritime Museum (NMM), W. Cowan Papers 
(COW) 13/2, A.H. Pollen to Walter Cowan, 4 March 1932: "I have sometimes thought that one of the 
fundamental troubles with Fisher was that between his promotion to Lieutenant and retirement as Admiral 
of the Fleet, he spent too much of his time in shore billets Half of his time as a Lieutenant; four sevenths 
as a Commander; and four sevenths as a Captain more than half as a flag captain, and hardly 2 'l2 years in 
command of a private ship, so that before hoisting his flag on the Renown in August '97 he had been fifteen 
years ashore as Captain of the Excellent, Director of Naval Ordnance, Director of Dockyards, and 
Controller. What of course used to infuriate the fighting men first when he was in the Mediterranean and 
15 
It is important to understand that Fisher portrayed himself as an ardent reformer 
because it suited his purposes. By attempting to ally himself with the leading edge of the 
Liberal party after 1905, Fisher hoped to secure lasting power over the development of 
the Royal Navy. There was no attempt to introduce a naval staff system until it became 
clear that his days as First Sea Lord were numbered. Fisher advanced members of the 
"Fishpond"33 by methods not unlike those pursued in the nineteenth century, the only 
difference being that those promoted were personally useful to Fisher rather than men 
who possessed extensive social and family connections. This principle also extended to 
many of Fisher's reforms. The Selbome Scheme, which was often viewed as a democratic 
measure, was rather an attempt to annex the Engineering Branch to the executive and to 
centralize power in the Admiralty. As Fisher wrote to Lionel Yexley in 1909, "[t]he true 
secret of successful administration is the intelligent anticipation of agitation!"34 
Some historical studies, however, have proved helpful in exploring the 
development of the officer corps. In particular, the work of Donald M. Schurman has 
been crucial. Schurman's study, The Education of a Navy, was the parallel study to Jay 
Luuvas' s The Education of an Army. 35 Both volumes explored attempts by several writers 
to redefine the intellectual basis of the professional officer corps in Britain in the half 
afterwards when he became First Sea Lord, was his constant howling about readiness for war, when all his 
sea time as Admiral in command was spent in an armed yacht of his own design." 
33 The "Fishpond" derisively denoted officers who were known to be strong supporters of Fisher, 
particularly in the junior ranks. Prominent members of this group included Reginald Bacon, John Jellicoe 
and Herbert Richmond. 
34 Marder (ed.), Fear God and Dread Nought, II, 258, Fisher to Yexley, 1 August 1909. 
35 Schurman, The Education of Navy; and Jay Luuvas, The Education of an Army: British Military Thought, 
1815-1940 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). 
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century before 1914. Schurman systematically evaluated the impact of several historians 
on the development of the intellectual equipment of the officer corps. But he did not 
explore what social and intellectual role these authors played in the renaissance that 
followed. While there were basic changes in Britain's status in relation to the rest of the 
world, when navies became increasingly technologically oriented and organizationally 
complex, a firm intellectual basis was required to place officers and policy on solid 
ground. But history served a social and intellectual role beyond improving professional 
performance by becoming a way to reassert the culture of command and the 
imponderables of leadership and "practical" skill. 
There are other important studies that bear on the development of the officer corps 
in this period. Central are Barry Hunt's biography of Herbert Richmond and Andrew 
Lambert's work on John Knox Laughton.36 Both authors agree that naval history provided 
a basis for the training of officers and that its scientific grounding was crucial to the 
formulation of doctrine. Also of importance is Jon Sumida's seminal reinterpretation of 
the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan, in which he discusses Mahan's efforts to blend the 
scientific and the spiritual to create a new brand of professional officer. Unfortunately, he 
did not extend his study to explore the impact of this conception on either naval officers 
or policy. Finally, in his study of the R.N. in this period, Andrew Gordon discusses the 
culture of command of the executive branch. He argues that there was a division of the 
corps between those officers who favoured centralized or looser tactical control over 
fleets. Gordon also makes a contribution by identifying some key problems of 
36 Barry Hunt, Sailor Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University 
Press, 1982); and Lambert, Foundations of Naval History. 
17 
organization and command, but he is not concerned with examining a profession under 
siege and its attempts to reassert control. 37 
It is thus clear that several historians have had an impact on the way we think 
about the central topic of this dissertation. None, however, has directly engaged the core 
problems that faced the leadership of the Royal Navy: the threat to its autonomy and the 
perception that, as a group, the officers lacked the competence to confront rapid social 
and organizational change. Drastic measures were taken to secure executive dominance, 
as we will see later in this study, and there was also recognition of the need to redefine 
the officer corps that would be credible intellectually, socially and culturally. This 
ferment lay at the root of nearly all the conflicts of the period, including the Beresford-
Fisher dispute and the struggle over the foundation of the naval war staff. Further, it 
offers insight into the crisis experienced during the Great War. 
As Jon Sumida lamented at a 1995 conference, little attention was been directed to 
the administrative structure of the Royal Navy in the era of the Great War.38 This is 
especially surprising since the fleet increased dramatically in size and grew exponentially 
in complexity. Although much work has been done on the construction of the 
dreadnought battle fleet and the disputes over annual estimates, what has been less well 
understood has been the impact on those expected to crew and direct the new fleet. 
Although British industry still possessed the ability to out-build its foreign rivals, the 
37 Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy; and Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British 
Naval Command (London: John Murray, 1996). 
38 Sumida and Rosenberg, "Machines, Men, Manufacturing and Money," 25-39. See also Jon Sumida, 
"British Naval Administration in the Age of Fisher," Journal of Military History, LIV, No. 1 (January 
1990), 1. 
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country's naval strength was limited by other constraints. Both Sumida and Nicholas 
Lambert have done superlative work in illustrating the connections between naval policy 
and financial limitations. 39 But that is only part of the picture. Although physical 
resources may have existed to construct great ships, these behemoths not only had to be 
paid for but also supplied with highly trained and specialized officers and ratings. These 
men had to be paid, provided with equipment, education and, if any recruitment 
programme were to be sustainable, good career prospects. With the evolving complexity 
and size of the Navy such costs began to absorb a growing proportion of the government 
expenditures. As Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote while preparing 
the last pre-war estimates: 
More ships immediately mean more men, and more men 
immediately mean more pay and more charges for training and 
victualling the increased numbers. Then there are more Naval 
stores, more ordnance stores, more establishment charges 
generally. More ships soon mean more charges for refits and 
repairs. Finally, more ships ultimately mean more non-effective 
charges.40 
Although there was a political will to maintain the pre-eminence of the Royal 
Navy, there were also substantial limiting factors that worked to restrain the growth in 
naval expenditure. For one thing there were limitations on the human resources available 
to the Navy. The complex and inflexible system of training officers made it difficult for 
39 Jon Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989); and Nicholas Lambert, 
Admiral Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution (Columbia: University ofSouth Carolina Press, 1999). 
4
° Churchill College, Cambridge, Archives Centre (CCAC), Chartwell Papers (CHAR) 13/20, "Sketch 
Estimates for 1914-15;" emphasis and underlining in the original. Indeed, even a straightforward expansion 
of the intake of the cadet establishments would have ripple effects down even to the number of servants 
required; see PRO, ADM 1/7632, Admiralty to Treasury, 23 January 1902. 
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the Admiralty to respond in a timely fashion to changing demands. Just before the war, 
for example, the Admiralty was forced to poach officers from the merchant service, to 
recruit public school boys without prior training (and socialization) and to promote men 
from the lower deck simply to provide enough officers to perform basic watch-keeping 
duties. The shortage of specialized executive officers in the Navigation, Gunnery and 
Torpedo Branches was particularly pressing. The only systematic attempt to come to 
grips with the training of officers and ratings was the so-called Selbome Scheme of 
December 1902, conceived by then Second Sea Lord, Fisher. The idea was to co-ordinate. 
the recruitment and training of combatant officers into a single system that would 
concurrently reduce administrative complexity and cost while increasing flexibility by 
offering opportunities for engineers and marines (after 1905) to revert to deck duties and 
be eligible for high command. Unfortunately, the scheme suffered from two key flaws: it 
never widened the intake of officers and it did little to improve the flexibility of the new 
"amalgamated" corps. Because of the voracious appetite for officers, the scheme had to 
be introduced gradually, and nearly a decade passed before entries under the old system 
ended. Although successive Boards of Admiralty were fully committed to implementing 
the scheme, they all too often were forced to resort to expedients to find enough 
officers. 41 Three years after the introduction of the scheme, marines were dropped from 
41 PRO ADM 116/ 1213, Special Entry Regulations, 1913; ADM 118370/65, Memorandum by C. Walker on 
Executive Lists, 1913. 
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the system because they had different training needs and there was a complete lack o~ 
marine officers coming out of the Osborne-Dartmouth system.42 
In short, the training system was simply unable to produce sufficient officers to 
meet the needs of the fleet. The most noticeable shortage was of lieutenants, the backbone 
of ship management. For example, the Walpole Committee of 1863 recognized that there _ 
was a need to maintain a close and accurate control over the numbers of this group of 
officers. By the early 1900s the problem became acute as the size of the fleet increased, 
older officers retired and the greater complexity of shore training temporarily took more 
officers out of the available supply for sea duty. As a result, half pay for junior officers 
was in effect abolished because these men were nearly constantly employed.43 
This officer shortage influenced every sphere of naval policy. Staff training and 
the sending of officers to the war course were constrained by the fact that these men were 
required for sea service. Indeed, even selection to the war course did not guarantee that 
officers would be able to complete it: according to the confidential books of the 
commandant of the course, the number of officers taken from their studies to be returned 
to active service was very high.44 
42 On the specific problems with marines, see PRO, ADM 116/1287, Memorandum by Deputy Adjutant-
General, Royal Marines to Admiralty, 15 February 1910; and Donald Bittner, "Shattered Images: Officers 
of the Royal Marines, 1867-1913," Journal of Military History, LIX, No. 1 (1995), 34. In regard to the 
engineers see Geoffrey Penn, Up Funnel! Down Screw! The Story of the Naval Engineer (London: Hollis & 
Carter, 1955); PRO ADM 7/995, Admiral Fisher's Naval Necessities, vol. Ill (1906), 25-27, Memorandum 
by Captain Rosslyn Wemyss; CCAC, CHAR 13/2, G.W. Taylor to Fisher, 23 November 1911. 
43 BPP, "Report from the Select Committee on Navy Promotion and Retirement," vol. X, No. 501(1863), 
73. 
44 
PRO, ADM 203/100, War Course Records, 1902-1911. 
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The Royal Navy has been heavily criticized for failing to place enough emphasis 
on staff training. Moreover, it has sometimes been charged that this reflected a lack of 
intellectual breadth among senior officers or an inability to comprehend the importance of 
on-going education.45 Although hostility to staff training can be found in the historical 
record, there is also evidence that many senior officers strongly advocated a wider 
training of officers.46 The shortage of officers and the fact that many spent an increasing 
amount of time and energy on routine matters meant that there was less time for study; 
junior officers became so immersed in their day-to-day work that they became less 
adaptable once they reached higher ranks. With every new dreadnought that slid down the 
slipways, more crew and officers were required. Nor was it an alternative to draft officers 
from the decommissioned "bug traps" on colonial service that were being scrapped by 
Fisher, since many were unqualified to serve in the main fleet. 47 
Conflicting ideas about education, professionalism and officer development 
buzzed throughout the more literate sectors of British society in the age of the great naval 
reforms. Still, it would be a great mistake to think that concerns over educational and 
professional development suddenly appeared when Fisher became Second Sea Lord in 
1901 or when he returned to the Admiralty as First Sea Lord in October 1904. Fisher 
liked to promote himself as an ardent reformer by contrasting his views with the days 
45 See for example, Arthur Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran: Studies of the Royal Navy in War and 
Peace, 1915-1940 (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 58-59. 
46 PRO, ADM 117712, Minute by Prince Louis of Battenberg, 7 July 1903. Then a Captain, Battenberg 
eventually became First Sea Lord after Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman in 1913. 
47 This became increasingly obvious with the revolutionary changes in the decade prior to the Great War 
when officers were dealing with revolutionary changes in their work environment. 
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when "reactionaries" ran the Navy. 48 Despite such posturing, however, we know that as 
far back as the 1830s elements in the Navy had been profoundly concerned about the 
education and professional development of its officers. 
Nonetheless, even a cursory examination of the available sources demonstrates the 
attention paid to officer development, promotion and training in the early twentieth 
century. One sign of this concern is that officers of stature were placed in charge of the 
training establishments. Commanding officers of Britannia Naval College at Dartmouth 
in the decade before 1914 included Hugh Evan-Thomas, who commanded the 5th Battle 
Squadron at Jutland; William Goodenough, who commanded a cruiser squadron during 
the war; and Christopher Cradock, who was killed at the Battle of Coronel in November 
1914. At Osborne, the first captain was Rosslyn Wemyss, who became First Sea Lord in 
1917; Horace Hood, besides Beatty one of the youngest flag officers on the list, also 
headed the College. The various education committees included a high proportion of 
officers who reached the upper ranks of the service, and those examined, as witnesses 
were generally the most able men in the executive branch.49 
Although the Navy was politically and socially conservative, it was not entirely 
unresponsive to the need for change. The opposition to Fisher was not so much an 
aversion of reform as it was resistance to some of the First Sea Lord's ideas and the 
manner in which he tried to implement them. The dispute with Admiral Beresford of 
48 Sadly, this image of the nineteenth-century Navy has been further perpetuated in Penn, Infighting 
Admirals. 
49 PRO, ADM 116/1288, Custance Committee on Naval Education, 1912, pt. 1. This education committee 
was headed by Admiral Sir Reginald Custance, along with Rear Admiral Rosslyn W emyss and Captain 
Victor Stanley. Officers examined as witnesses included Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge and Captain Herbert 
Richmond. 
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1907-1909 was not based as much on professional differences as on politics. Beresford 
was an Irish Unionist who believed, rightly or wrongly, that Fisher was sacrificing the 
effectiveness of the Navy by trimming the cut of his jib to the Liberal policy of 
retrenchment. Fisher was also in the way of Beresford's elevation to Admiral of the Fleet; 
Fisher could remain on the active list until 1911 when he reached the age of 70, while 
Beresford had to retire earlier. 
Lest it be thought that the Navy was completely dominated by old gentlemen with 
powerful social and family connections, some of the "non-elect" also rose to prominent 
places in the service. The most obvious of the latter was Fisher, who was "penniless, 
friendless and forlorn" when he joined.50 Even officers with the reputation of being 
difficult could find themselves in good positions. Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, for 
instance, was the only member of his Britannia term to reach full Admiral on the active 
list, and the enfant terrible Kenneth Dewar reached Vice-Admiral. Earlier in the 
nineteenth century Admiral Sir Astley Cooper Key had few family connections and, like 
Fisher, reached the top of the service. Percy Scott, the gunnery enthusiast, also reached 
flag rank, with his career only getting sidetracked in an unfortunate incident in 1907.51 
50 Marder (ed.), Fear God and Dread Nought, II, 69-70, Fisher to Arnold White, 5 March 1906. "My family 
are very much annoyed by the frequent allusions apparently made to my mother being a Cingalese [sic] 
princess or something of the sort. Kindly see the enclosed [newspaper cutting], and will you, if you are able, 
dispel the illusion. Personally, I don't care, but as my relatives don't like it, I've promised to see if it can be 
denied." 
51 P.R. Colomb, The Memoirs of Sir Astley Cooper Key (London: Methuen, 1898); Percy Scott, Fifty Years 
in the Royal Navy (London: John Murray, 1919). Scott was involved in a heavily publicized dispute with 
Lord Charles Beresford when he received a dressing-down on the Commander-in-Chief's quarterdeck over 
an inappropriately worded signal. See, "Lord C. Beresford and Sir P. Scott Reported at Variance," The 
Times, 11 November 1907. 
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The Royal Navy was remarkably tolerant of reformers, radicals and assorted 
cranks, and despite the upper-class pretensions of the quarterdeck, the service was 
interested in practical solutions to contemporary problems. Even the staunchest 
conservative recognized that the Navy existed in the final resort to serve the security 
needs of Britain by violent action. In particular, the division between "interest" and 
"graft" that Michael Lewis discussed in his study of the nineteenth-century Navy is apt. 52 
Although in the modem view both are considered the antithesis of liberal democratic 
institutions and sensibilities, the difference is crucial in understanding the Navy in the 
nineteenth century: while graft promotes a person based solely on personal connections, 
interest selects an individual who first holds the qualifications necessary for the post, even 
if the personal factor plays an considerable role in the fmal decision. Like the much-
derided "old boys" network, interest reproduces a certain set of ideals while at the same 
time advances able individuals. Hence, it is entirely possible for an organization to be 
highly effective while at the same time fostering "old corruption" in its ranks. Admiral Sir 
William James was speaking only partly in jest when he argued that the way to advance 
in the Navy was to marry the Admiral's daughter. 53 
Moreover, Fisher was aided in his reforms by those in the derided "Fishpond." 
Although Fisher did not promote individuals on the basis of social origin, he selected 
bright young officers who were personally loyal to him. When Fisher was accused of 
favouritism, however, he was merely using an existing unwritten system for purposes that 
52 Michael Lewis, The Navy in Transition, 1814-1864: A Social History (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1965), 27-28. 
53 William James, The Sky Was Always Blue (London: Methuen, 1951), 82. James married the daughter of 
Admiral Sir Alexander Duff. 
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his opponents did not necessarily approve. As well, after 1890, the officer corps and naval 
policy in general attracted unprecedented and sustained scrutiny from Parliament that 
extended even to the details of officer training and professional development. 54 There 
were two related reasons for this. First, there was the growing uncertainty of the 
international situation. Second, there were financial and economic reasons: both the Army 
and the R.N. had reached the limit of what the British state was willing to fund. Defence 
expenditure in particular was growing much faster than the British economy as a whole. 55 
The implications of growing defence expenditures also threatened the delicate 
political balance in the nation and fostered a debate between two different visions of how 
to pay for Britain's continuing position as a world power. One faction argued that 
government revenues ought to be increased through indirect taxation on the lower orders, 
while its opponents contended that direct taxation of the upper stratum of British society 
through death duties and income taxes was preferable. 56 To avoid having to choose 
between these two alternatives, both Conservative and Liberal governments opted instead 
to limit expenditure on the armed services. The financial crisis also inspired governments 
to demand that the armed services deliver value for money, a requirement that gave 
impetus to unprecedented intervention into the internal arrangements in both fighting 
departments. All of this occurred in the context of a widened franchise, a trend that 
54 For an example, see the debates in regard to the Selbome Scheme of December 1902. Great Britain, 
Parliament, House of Lords, Debates, 4th ser., vol. CXXII (1903), cols. 155-191. 
55 William Ashworth, "Economic Aspects of Late Victorian Naval Administration," Economic History 
Review, 2nd ser., XXII, No.3 (1969), 491; see also my Appendix II. 
56 Sumida, Defence of Naval Supremacy, 6-28; and Volker Berghahn, ''Navies and Domestic Politics," in 
Hattendorf(ed.), Doing Naval History, 63. 
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complicated what had previously been almost predetermined choices. This change in 
voter eligibility gave rise to parties unwilling to toe the traditional aristocratic line, such 
as the Irish Nationalists and the Labour Party, both of which attacked the armed services 
for elitism and demanded democratic reform. In the view of both parties, there seemed no 
logical reason that the executive officer corps should remain the preserve of the rich and 
the sons of officers. This concern was reinforced by demands from the rising professional 
h . 57 classes, sue as engmeers. 
Military Professionalization 
It is impossible to deal with the problems confronting the Navy in this era without 
considering further the notion of professionalization. The term, as used by contemporaries 
and historians alike, is often vague and perhaps could be best described, like imperialism, 
as being "no word for scholars."58 Still, since much of the conflict within the Royal Navy 
in the years preceding the First World War involved debates over the development of 
what would later be referred to as professionalism, it is necessary to draw some 
conclusions from the relevant literature in a military context. 
Since there is a consensus about certain key characteristics of this concept a short 
consideration of what it means to be a "professional" is important. First, and most 
important, an occupational group must be able to demonstrate that it is able to perform 
57 Lewis, Navy in Transition, 26; and Harold Perkin, The Rise of the Professional Society: England Since 
1880 (London: Routledge, 1989, 2002), 359-363. 
58 WilliamK. Hancock, The Wealth ofColonies (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1950), 1. 
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certain essential tasks for the benefit of the wider community more effectively and 
efficiently than any plausible alternative. Once this occurs, members of a group assume 
the mantle of being "professionals" and are able assert primacy in a particular field of 
endeavour. Like other forms of service, the benefit of protection offered to society is the 
essential function that the officer corps provides to the wider community. 59 Like 
insurance underwriters, officers provide protection, but instead of managing actuarial 
tables, these professionals organize the use of violence to further the interests of the 
community (or, at least the interests of dominant social groups within that community). 
However, most models of military professionalization indicate that this progression is 
linear and the end result is a fairly stable organizational structure which is able to 
standardize performance, regulate entrance and offer its members well defined career 
paths and status.60 
In the first instance, it is imperative to understand what we mean by the term 
profession and it is equally important to have a comprehension of professionalization as a 
process, not merely as a static category. Perhaps the best definition of professionalism, as 
it relates to military organizations, is provided by Jacques van Doom. Firstly, van Doom 
argues that for an occupation to be considered professional the bar of expertise is raised 
and the increased status of their expert knowledge is widely accepted in the public sphere. 
59 For an examination of the concept of protection cost, see Jan Glete, War and the State in Early Modern 
Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 15 00-1660 (London: Routledge, 
2002), 54-55 . Glete discusses in his prologue the concept of centralized military institutions as the cost of 
doing business. 
60 For examples see, Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: 
Free Press, 1960); George A. Kourvetaris and Betty A. Dobratz, Social Origins and Political Orientation of 
Officer Corps in a World Perspective (Denver: University of Denver Press, 1973); and Jacques van Doom, 
The Soldier and Social Change (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975). 
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Secondly, the individual member of the occupational group increasingly identifies him or 
herself with that group. Van Doorn wrote: 
The two most important characteristics of a profession, however, 
are the following: (1) a special, well-integrated body of knowledge 
and skill, and a set of standards and norms, handed on by means of 
socialization of new members; and (2) a pronounced autonomy of 
the profession, generally with legal support, repelling the 
interference of others in the recruitment, selection, and training of 
candidates, as well as in the occupational conduct of the 
professionals themselves.61 
Hence, a group aspiring to professional status 1s confronted with two simultaneous 
challenges. On one hand, it must convince a working proportion of civil society and the 
state of the unique nature of the importance of its specialized skill, while on the other it 
seeks to have considerable control over the parameters of that expertise and to secure 
effective dominance over the work process itself. An additional point is that in the case of 
the modern professions, society is the general beneficiary of a professional's loyalty. 
Institutional loyalty takes a secondary role to the interests of wider society. 62 
Morris Janowitz, for example, identified five main changes that marked the 
characteristics of professionalization within military establishments. Firstly, the 
institution begins to change slowly from authoritarian domination to group consensus. 
Command and organizational lines of authority no longer rest upon the dictates of rigid, 
centralized authority but shift to a system where consensus and collective lines of conduct 
are increasingly important. Second, there is a narrowing of skill differential between the 
civil and military elites. As the organizational and technological changes increase the 
61 
van Doom, Soldier and Social Change, 35. 
62 Kourvetaris and Dobratz, Social Origins, 6. 
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complexity of the tasks to be performed by officers, they are forced to draw on the skills 
and expertise of other occupational groups. Officers, accustomed to deference in the 
provision of leadership, find themselves on the defensive in the preservation of the 
exclusive nature of their calling. For instance, Janowitz points out that in the U.S. Army 
before the American Civil War, 93.2 per cent of the personnel were assigned to purely 
"military" occupations, but by the 1950s that proportion had fallen to 28.8 per cent.63 
Thirdly, the corps begins to recruit from wider social groups than hitherto. As the 
education and training required broadens, so too does pressure mount to include social 
groups previously excluded from leadership positions. Traditional leadership based upon 
social status becomes increasingly untenable. Fourthly, as the corps becomes more 
specialized there is a growing diversity of career patterns and experiences. This is 
especially critical in times of rapid change when unique experiences of individuals and 
different specializations may create a critical mass of officers who might be able to steer 
the entire establishment in new directions. Lastly, there is an engagement in the debates 
between politics and the dictates of honour. No longer mere warriors, modem officers 
begin to take on the role of professional managers and technicians. In the upper echelons, 
politics becomes increasingly important. Diversion from traditional codes of honour and 
discipline becomes problematic as it strikes at the heart of the self-image of the officer 
and also impacts upon the public perception of the exclusive nature of military leadership. 
63 J . 
anowttz, Professional Soldier, 9. 
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Officers may become enmeshed in "billet punching" and may be tempted to sacrifice 
"gentlemanly values" for self-aggrandisement. 64 
It would also be instructive to see how far the model proposed by military 
sociologists George A. Kourvetaris and Betty A. Dobratz in the typology of officer corps 
and their relationship to civil authority fits this case.65 Kourvetaris and Dobratz divided 
up the historical experience of officer corps using several models, which may help 
provide insight into the case of the British naval officer corps. One of their concepts that 
is particularly instructive is the feudal/aristocratic model in which officers, although 
trained to arms, were nonetheless amateurs and selection and promotion were through 
kinship and other social connections. With the convergence between domestic politics 
and the officer corps, no serious clash between the interests of the body politic and the · 
officer corps existed. However, as society became more stratified along professional lines 
and as the old certainties became increasingly problematic, officer corps were forced 
along those same lines into bureaucratization and specialization to cope not only with the 
changing social and political framework but also much more complicated technology. 
Promotion and selection was widened socially, and education and merit became the 
method of selection rather than social and political ties. 
Let us test this model in relation to the British naval officer corps. There is no 
doubt that the corps, along with their army brethren, encountered a broad divergence in its 
relationship to the state. The breakdown of aristocratic government in Britain, coinciding 
64 Ibid., 7-16. 
65 Kourvetaris and Dobratz, Social Origins, 3. 
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with the declining economic performance of landed families (particularly those of more 
modest means) after 1870, brought about a divergence in interest within the more 
conservative elements of society, which included both officer corps. This divergence 
came at the same time that there was a perceived crisis in both armed services that 
required the undivided attention of politicians, since the professional officers seemed 
unwilling or unable to provide such. In the years following the Boer War, the Army was 
completely overhauled by the intervention of political ministers. In a similar fashion, 
Fisher's willingness to sacrifice many of the roles of the Royal Navy triggered a revolt in 
the Navy's officer corps. A rearguard defence of the privileges and powers of the 
executive officer corps reflected the revolt in the Navy, most particularly in the senior 
ranks and among those on the retired list. Symbols and titles therefore became the 
battleground for prestige and power in some elements in the service. For instance, there 
were battles over the executive "curl" on the sleeve of officers' monkey jackets and the 
attempt to preserve the titles "lieutenant," "captain" and "admiral" only for those on the 
line. Also, the fight over the preservation of symbols provides an important source of the 
suspicion of the Selbome Scheme, despite its apparent aristocratic origin. 66 
However, the Kouretvaris and Dobratz model, helpful as it is, leaves many 
questions unanswered. Like all models, this one sometimes attempts to impose relatively 
simple concepts on complex realities. First, the naval officer corps in Britain had 
considered itself a professional corps for a very long time. As early as the late seventeenth 
66 Although the First Lord, the Earl of Selborne, was credited with the development of the New Scheme it 
was in reality the brainchild of then Second Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John Fisher. However, the authorship 
was not a well-kept secret, as elements within the Service smelt a rat or, more particularly, the efforts of 
"Radical Jack" Fisher. 
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century, there were printed Fighting Instructions which officers were expected to follow 
and which prescribed sanctions for failure to meet standards. 67 There was a court martial 
procedure that weeded out the inept and the perceived failures. The eighteenth century 
witnesses the introduction of examinations for the rank of lieutenant, and the system of 
half-pay was instituted to retain the services of officers in time of peace. During the 
Napoleonic wars, a naval college was founded at Portsmouth to train new aspirants to the 
quarterdeck. Further, the officer corps was a more "democratic" institution than it became 
later in the nineteenth century: it was entirely possible, as the experience of many officers 
showed, to rise from the lower deck to captain and even admiral, a feat that proved 
largely impossible again until the mid-twentieth century. As Michael Lewis found in his 
social study of the Navy in the nineteenth century, as the memories of the Napoleonic 
wars faded and there was a reduced need for officers, there was a gradual increase in the 
social stature of the service. 68 Indeed, the new stress on greater educational qualifications 
and age limitations upon entry ensured that new officers came from the "right" sort of 
background. Policy-makers and officers themselves also realized that officers were the 
agents of empire who often had to deal with troublesome foreigners, and hence it was 
important that such men met a certain image of a gentleman. 69 
Hence, the Navy was semi-aristocratic and yet professional. No one, not even 
royalty, would be permitted to command a ship or a fleet if he was not qualified, but 
67 See, John Creswell, British Admirals of the Eighteenth Century: Tactics in Battle (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1972). 
68 Lewis, Navy in Transition, 22. 
69 William Goodenough, "The Preliminary Education of Naval Officers," Journal of the Royal United 
Services Institution (RUSI) , XV, No. 64 (1871), 339-340. 
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social position could still assure the best chance of rapid promotion and selection for the 
best billets. With the increased cost of education and the nomination process that 
prevailed in the nineteenth century, the professional stature of the naval officer ensured its 
exclusive nature. Indeed, this concern with the image of the naval officer became so 
prevalent that many were willingly prepared to sacrifice getting the best educated and 
prepared man in order ensure that they got the right sort, and that as long as there were 
sufficient candidates of the sons of gentlemen or learned professionals there was no need 
to widen the intake of officers to include those of more modest social origins.70 It is 
interesting to see how debates over professionalization could seek to limit the intake of 
elements considered less than desirable despite their educational qualifications. Indeed, 
the immersion in professional seamanship at a young age considered so necessary for the 
nineteenth century British naval officer became an effective social barrier since only 
those who had the advantage of family connections and suitable early education could be 
selected. 
As can be seen by the above discussion, the professionalization of the officer 
corps was not merely a simple progression from one model to another. Over time, 
conditions shifted depending on changes in British society and politics. However, the 
concept of officers as gentlemen had not gone away. The officer corps, despite the 
tribulations of the First World War, still remained a gentleman's profession. Officers 
70 Hubert H. Grenfell, "The Best Method of Providing an Efficient Force of Officers and Men for the 
Navy," RUSI, XXVI, No. 115 (1882), 301; "On the whole we do not want a high average of intellect in the 
Navy. The monotonous conditions of a naval life, the long absences from home, the necessary periods 
during peace-time of comparative idleness, are not in favour of intellectual growth and activity... The 
average class we get, make no means on the whole the worst officers. They are contented with their lot and 
possessing the usual qualities of the English gentleman, command the respect and obedience of their men." 
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continued to marry admirals' daughters and continued to foster social and political ties, 
but the service did become much more ruthless in weeding out the inefficient. 
In addition, other military sociologists have examined the impact of 
industrialization on military institutions. In particular, this process broke down the old-
fashioned model of a military structure representing a relatively simple pyramid in which 
the higher the rank, the fewer the personnel. The introduction of new technology and with 
specialized skills outside the traditional executive officer corps muddied the waters of 
authority and the power of the executive branch.71 In the same fashion, the increased size 
and complexity of personnel broke down the traditional role of the executive officer 
because it placed restrictions on his capacity to supervise officers and men of other 
branches. In other words, there was a fraying of control over work and skills. 
A better hypothesis for understanding the professional changes in the Royal 
Navy's officer corps is one put forward by Thomas Kuhn.72 In his study of the scientific 
community, Kuhn argued that scientific revolutions occur when a particular way of 
looking at the world - a philosophy of science, or a "paradigm" - is placed under stress 
when repeated inconsistencies begin to appear and the old paradigm becomes 
increasingly discredited. Eventually, as these inconsistencies grow m frequency and 
strength, the conception of science itself must evolve to account for discordant 
phenomena. So it is with professions. For many years, the officer corps could carry on in 
much the same way throughout much of the nineteenth century. The professional 
71 Van Doorn, Soldier and the State, 19-21. 
72 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962; 3rd ed., Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996). 
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paradigm remained generally accepted. With changes in society and m working 
conditions, the old profession had to alter its "contract" with society. 
Further, professional expertise is only half the picture. Even today, professionals 
rarely identify themselves exclusively with their field. British officers viewed themselves 
as more than executive instruments charged with performing tasks in exchange for 
rewards. Officers regarded themselves as natural leaders and were profoundly affected by 
social change. Falling returns on agricultural produce put pressure on members of the 
gentry to search for careers for its sons. As the gentry were squeezed out economically 
and politically, only one claim was left. The Navy was the logical place because it was 
cheaper than the Army and, most importantly, provided an option in which social position 
still counted. In other words, recourse to the profession of arms could be regarded as the 
last bid of the old gentry to assert moral leadership and the traditional importance of 
command.73 Hence, it was not merely a matter of technological change but a way of life 
that was under attack. The pretensions of the new engineering branch were bitterly 
resisted not because executive officers hated machinery or were particularly distrustful of 
engineers in general. Indeed, most of all bitterness was directed against those challenging 
the traditional command culture through a combination of technological change, the 
growth of Admiralty control and the narrowing of the field of competence for Britain's 
traditional leadership. This argument remains valid even for officers recruited from the 
"respectable" professions, since the semi-aristocratic pretensions of the officer corps were 
the social property of all the members of the executive branch. 
73 D .d C · av1 annadme, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy (New York: Vintage, 1999), 71-86. 
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This conception of professional change over time explains a great deal in relation 
to the Navy's officer corps. As the old paradigm of command based on seamanship, 
honour and intangible personal qualities came under stress, the corps was forced to 
redefine itself. This was especially critical in the late 1890s and the early 1900s, as 
another conception of naval leadership presented itself in the form of technical 
knowledge. The advent of naval history and the Selbome Scheme that attempted to 
synthesize the officer corps into one organic whole were essential efforts to ensure the 
continuation of executive dominance. 
Closely connected to issues of professionalization is the debate surrounding 
innovation in military institutions. This debate is dominated by two American scholars, 
Stephen P. Rosen and Barry R. Posen. Posen argues that changes in doctrine and 
organization within military institutions come about primarily through the intervention of 
civilian authorities in alliance with "maverick" professional officers. Military institutions 
are bureaucracies intent on producing identical results and hence pre-disposed against 
innovation. In his three case studies of Britain, France and Germany in the period 
between the world wars, Posen finds very little internal innovation, since most was forced 
upon the military by outside political authorities.74 On the other hand, Rosen argues that 
military organizations are remarkably self-adaptive and that civilian oversight is a rather 
blunt instrument that must make use of a pre-existing, pre-disposed senior leadership to 
implement desired reforms. Generally, the scope for civilian leadership is often reduced 
74 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 224-225 . 
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to the running of political "interference" for the internal innovators. 75 In the case of the 
Royal Navy in this period, Rosen is quite convincing, although he sometimes understates 
the importance of civil leadership at critical points in time. In times of crisis and national 
stress, civilian leadership can be in a much stronger position, particularly when there is a 
breakdown in the "culture of confidence" and professional mavericks and their allies are 
in a powerful position to implement necessary reforms. When it is demonstrated that 
military leadership is flawed, there is an opportunity for civilian leadership to act as a 
catalyst to initiate or accelerate pre-existing reform impulses. Both Posen and Rosen are 
in that sense right and wrong. Significant reforms can work both ways, but Rosen is 
correct that a general continuum of ideas consistent with the reform must be present in 
order to give it "legitimacy'' in the eyes of the service at large. 
The difficulty with the whole debate between Rosen and Posen in the case of the 
Royal Navy is that at the beginning of the period there was a naval officer corps in which 
there was an indistinct line between the professional and political. Although officers 
talked a great deal about their distrust of politicians, this did not become an issue until 
after the tum of the century. To a large degree, the naval elite had close family and social · 
relations with those running Parliament and those who generated the most income to the 
state. Although the Navy was separate as a profession from the rest of gentlemanly 
society, it still retained close connections to the landed/commercial establishments. With 
the growing weakness of the landed establishment and the gentry after the twin Liberal 
75 
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landslide victories of 1905, the officer corps was for the first time in a long while forced 
to defend its privileges. 
Essentially, the professional/political divide which underpins the assumptions of 
the Posen and Rosen dispute is of limited utility in analyzing the Royal Navy in this 
period. In fact, only during the years leading up the Great War and during the war itself 
did the debate become germane. Naval officers increasingly found the council rooms of 
state unfriendly places, where gold braid was not automatically deferred to, even on basic 
professional questions. It was only during the era of the Great War that the divide 
between the professional and the political became increasingly stark. 
The officer corps was forced to redefine themselves because of the shift in British 
society and politics. The success of the British Navy in securing a significant proportion 
of the resources of the British state became a source of institutional weakness and 
instability. With increased demands on the state for non-traditional areas of expenditure, 
like education and social welfare, the fracturing of the Liberal-Conservative dyarchy and 
the struggle over state finances generated serious questions about where the money went. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the concept of professional refers to an · 
occupational group that self-consciously attempts to monopolize or otherwise effectively 
control the work process for which it claims responsibility. This group constantly strives 
to retain this control over its own area of work (and even over the work of other groups) 
through various levers of power available to it whether political, cultural, and economic · 
or through superior specialist education. At any rate, the occupational group must 
construct standards of conduct and complex organizational structures in order to convince 
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a working proportion of the general population that their claim to authority benefits the 
entire community and not merely the group's own vested interests. 
Outline 
The thesis is divided into ten chapters. The frrst three chapters, establishes the 
background of the officer corps during this period. Chapter II explores the changing 
social and political conditions in Britain in the late nineteenth century. Of particular 
interest are the evolving patterns in British politics and the socio-economic evolution 
affecting the classes that provided leadership for the state and the Navy. The phenomenon 
of middle-class professionalism, which was such a factor in European societies, will be 
explored. All these factors played a role in the changing social relationships in the Navy. 
Chapter ill examines the prevalent culture and development of the executive branch. 
Methods of selection, promotion and discipline will be critically evaluated in order to 
give the reader the sense of a nineteenth-century gentlemanly profession. 
The second section discusses the factors that impinged on the ability of executive . 
officers to dominate the Navy. Chapter IV develops the argument that the impact of social 
change in Britain and the evolving working conditions posed a direct threat to officers' 
conception of a gentlemanly profession. There were various pressures, including the 
relative deterioration of the socio-political elite that provided the bulk of the officer corps; · 
the narrowing of the definition of professional competence; the increasing lobby for 
commissions for ratings; and the pressing shortage of officers. Since one of the threats to 
the line officers was especially serious, Chapter V explores the consequences of the 
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growth in size and power of the engineers. While the executive branch was not comprised 
of Luddites, the rise of the engineering profession threatened to shift the balance of naval 
leadership. 
The third section encapsulates the institutional responses to the threats detailed 
above. Chapter VI examines the attempts of line officers to redefine themselves and their 
self-conscious attempts at professional reform, which culminated in the Selbome Scheme 
of 1902. Chapter VII explores the value of the new discipline of naval history in 
providing an essential synthesis that buttressed the executive's claim to moral, intellectual 
and social superiority. History bridged the essential gap between empirical science and 
random imponderables such as leadership, discipline and the power of command. 
The fourth and final section deals with the conflicts associated with changes in 
command arrangements and the results of the First World War. Chapter VIII focuses on 
the pivotal experience of organizational and institutional change during Winston 
Churchill's tenure as First Lord of the Admiralty. Self-conscious attempts at redefining 
the officer corps began to take shape, with the primary reforms being the institution of a 
naval war staff in 1911 and the foundation of The Naval Review in 1913. Both reforms 
sought to recouple the navy to the experience of the modem professions and represented 
attempts to bridge the divide between organization and reality. Chapter IX is on the crisis 
of war, which exposed basic weaknesses in the naval officer corps and led to various 
attempts to introduce revolutionary changes. These efforts culminated in the dismissal of 
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe as First Sea Lord in December 1917. The conclusion 
demonstrates the strong undercurrents of continuity within the British naval establishment 
despite the plethora of change in naval affairs during this era. 
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Chapter II 
Social Change and the Officer Corps 
Oh, my boys, how can I speak strongly enough to you on this vital 
question! I don't think I can speak too strongly. Not only does your 
own future depend upon it, but the future of Osborne depends upon it, 
the future of the Navy depends upon it, and England depends upon her 
Navy. You are the Navy of the future, and if your character gets 
corrupt and low, decline will slowly set in and be our ruin. In the long 
run everything depends on CHARACTER. My boys, the Navy looks 
to you; England looks to you, to make her strong, to keep her honour 
pure and high. 1 
It is axiomatic that naval establishments in general and officer corps in particular are 
profoundly affected by social, economic, cultural, technological and political change. As 
shifts in British society occurred, it became readily apparent that those possessing power 
and influence would fmd their positions under scrutiny and that new forms of legitimacy 
would be essential. Complex, interlocking social and economic forces compelled elites to 
fmd new foundations on which to base their claims to authority. In the case of the Royal 
Naval officer corps, older methods of selection and education had to be modified rapidly 
to fit the development of modern professionalism. New technology, like cable and 
wireless, enabled central command to exercise closer control over distant forces. 
International pressure and the struggle to extract the utmost fighting power from a given 
fmancial outlay made co-ordination crucial from a political standpoint. The new "mass 
electorate" was informed by the rise of a modern mass media. Further, this electorate had 
to be convinced not merely that a powerful naval establishment was necessary but also 
1 F.S. Horan, A Call to Seamen, and Other Sermons Preached to Naval Cadets at the Royal Naval College, 
Osborne (London: John Murray, 1907), 21-22. 
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that the existing executive officer corps was the most appropriate group to direct it. The 
response to these new mass politics led to a series of crises that afflicted the officer corps. 
One of the most obvious changes in this era was political. With the passage of the 
reform bills of 1867 and 1884, Britain began a process of democratization that gradually 
relaxed the hold of the old patrician families over the state. Lord Salisbury's "Hotel 
Cecil" politics were nearing an end as the Boer War accomplished even the Conservative 
landslide in the so-called "Khaki" election of 1900 only with the mass support of an 
electorate enflamed.2 The process accelerated after 1905 with the election of a "radical" 
Liberal government that faced down the challenge of the Lords over the 1909 "People's 
budget" and effectively destroyed its capacity to stand in the way of the Commons.3 This 
trend had a tremendous impact on the executive officer corps, and not merely on those 
who were members of the peerage. To be sure, officers such as Lord Charles Beresford, 
Lord Charles Scott, Rosslyn W emyss and Hedworth Meux were all closely tied to the 
power of the old order. But whether naval officers were aristocrats was less important 
than that their profession in general shared the same values. By virtue of holding the 
King's commission and wearing the uniform, they were considered gentlemen and had a 
stake in the status quo. Naval officers as well were integrated into the system of honours 
and rewards that held out the possibilities of knighthoods, peerages, honorary postings 
2 David Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy (New York: Vintage, 1999), 711. In 
Balfour's government in 1902, fifteen of twenty members were from the landed establishment. 
3 Ibid., 37-54; see also George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England, 1910-1914 (1935, New 
York: Capricorn Books, 1961), 30-68. Prime Minister Herbert Asquith with the co-operation of the King 
threatened to override the opposition of the Lords to the budget by threatening to create new peers. 
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and entry into the upper echelons of society. 4 Further, since the services tended to attract 
either younger sons or relatively impoverished members of the landed establishment, the 
retention of "gentlemanly" values was especially important in a profession that allowed 
them to maintain an appropriate lifestyle. 
Connected to these political changes was the development for the first time in Britain . 
of a mass media. At the end of the century, Britain was awash in newsprint from such 
papers as The Times and the Manchester Guardian, as well as current affairs periodicals 
such as Blackwood's, The Nineteenth Century and After and The Spectator, which were 
all keen observers on matters related to the public interest. But the most significant 
change was the publication of cheap daily newspapers pioneered by the efforts of the 
Harmsworth brothers, Lords Northcliffe and Rothermere. Northcliffe's Daily Mail, sold 
at Yz d. per copy, catapulted him into immense wealth and influence as its circulation 
reached over half a million shortly after its founding in 1896.5 His influence reached the 
point where it was admitted during the First World War by one cabinet member that 
Northcliffe was virtually a "ministerial colleague."6 With his purchase of the cash-
strapped Times in 1908, Northcliffe also had direct access to a more respectable audience 
that further enhanced his power and influence. 
4 Churchill College, Cambridge, Archives Centre (CCAC), W. Wemyss Papers (WYMS) 2/6, Reflections 
on Trafalgar. "The Services are not like a political career, stepping stones to places of high emolument ... 
and their members have little to look forward to other than the barren satisfaction of having served their 
country. The pay is small and very inadequate to modem life; the honours, which might be looked to as the 
crowning of a successful career, are now so lavishly distributed as to rob them of all value." 
5 R.C.K. Ensor, England, 1870-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), 312. 
6 Great Britain, Public Record Office (PRO), Admiralty Papers (ADM) 116/1805, F.E. Smith to Eric 
Geddes, 31 October 191 7. 
44 
The rise of a mass media had significant consequences during an age in which the 
general public cared about naval affairs. The popular press could question not only the 
competence of the Board of Admiralty but also that of the entire officer corps. As naval 
issues became more pressing and expensive, the entire naval establishment was subject to 
intense scrutiny, even from the officer corps' supposed allies in the navalist press; and 
indeed, the Navy League itself became a thorn in its side.7 During the war years the press 
served to weaken the authority of the executive officer corps, or at least of its most senior 
members. Writers like Colonel Charles a Court Repington in The Times and Arthur 
Hungerford Pollen in Land and Water, as well as the editorials in the Daily Mail, 
subjected the Admiralty to intense criticism through the crucial year of 1917. This 
condemnation was often so severe that it induced Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, then First 
Sea Lord, to seek the advice of the Attorney General, F.E. Smith, about the possibility of 
a prosecution.8 This pressure, coupled with efforts of junior officers and the connivance 
of the Prime Minister, eventually forced Jellicoe's removal from the Board of Admiralty 
in December 191 7. 
7 
"The Navy League and the Navy," The Times, 6 February 1907. In a letter to the editor Admiral Sir John 
Hopkins resigned his membership of the executive committee of the Navy League. "No, Sir, I do not, nor 
can I uphold the carping criticism that too often distinguishes the utterances of that body ... I joined the 
Navy League because it had done good service in putting before the public the necessity for a strong Navy; 
I now leave it because I have long been dissatisfied with its general interference in technical details that 
must and should be left to the Admiralty, and which have nothing whatever to do with the original object of 
the league the absolute necessity of unquestioned strength in our first line of defence." 
8 
PRO, ADM 116/1805, F.E. Smith to Sir Eric Geddes, 31 October 1917. 
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Another important core change that affected the officer corps was the triumph of 
science and the advent of the modem professional ideal.9 Both phenomena became not 
merely methods of introducing new and more efficient work processes but of establishing 
the ultimate claim to expertise in a given area. As the empirical sciences became more 
crucial in the performance of tasks deemed essential by society at large, the new educated 
elites were tempted (and they perceived it necessary) to extend professional "scientific" 
control over wider areas. In the case of engineering, specialization divided up the 
profession into various sub-groups. 1° Further, the authority of science was often used to 
deal with social problems on the assumption that professional "social engineers" were 
uniquely well equipped to look after all of society's ills. The most extreme form of this 
endeavour in relation to naval officers was the call by Americans Charles Davenport and 
Mary Scudder to use eugenics to select the best and brightest to command ships and 
fleets. 11 
The growth of state bureaucratic structures was also important. The absolute growth 
of the British naval establishment, as well as the proliferation of specialized skills, meant 
that the Navy was increasingly difficult to manage. This often required an increase in the 
size and power of the Admiralty that tended to widen the distance between the executive 
officer corps and the civil administration. Although there was a long tradition of distrust 
9 
Harold Perkin, The Rise of the Professional Society: England since 1880 (2nd ed., London: Routledge, 
2002), 116-122. 
10 F . 
or an extensive exposition of this process see: Robert A. Buchanan, The Engineers: A History of the 
Engineering Profession in Britain, 1750-1914 (London: Jessica Kingsley, 1989), 88-124. 
II 
Charles B. Davenport and Mary T. Scudder, Naval Officers: Their Heredity and Development 
(Washington: Carnegie Institute, 1919). 
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between the Admiralty and the sea-gomg fleet in the age of sail, the gulf widened 
significantly during this period. Indeed, one factor that was considered when the 
Admiralty introduced the staff system of command beginning in 1911 was the possible 
opposition and obstruction of the civilian secretariat. 12 Vice Admiral Kenneth Dewar 
complained forcibly in his autobiography about the "civilianism" of the Admiralty and 
the creation of vested interests in the administrative structure of the Navy. 13 
Finally, changes in the British economy including the loss of the nation's competitive 
edge, acted as an accelerant that emphasized the growing insecurity that characterized this 
period. Public discourse was full of references to the increasing difficulty that 
manufacturers had in selling their goods in markets that hitherto had been British-
dominated. 14 Further, Britain was increasingly dependent not merely on imported 
foodstuffs and raw materials but also on external supplies of manufactured goods, 
particularly those associated with the second industrial revolution such as electrical 
equipment and chemicals. 15 The saving grace was Britain's mastery of international 
financial markets and the provision of vital services such as shipping and insurance. 
12 PRO, Cabinet Papers (CAB) 1131, Pt. 3 Memorandum for the Board on StaffWork, 1913. 
13 K.G.B. Dewar, The Navy from Within (London: Gollancz, 1939), 299-300. 
14 D.C.M. Platt, "Introduction: Britain's 'Decline,"' in D.C.M. Platt et als. (eds.), Decline and Recovery in 
Britain's Overseas Trade, 1873-1914 (London: Macmillan, 1993), 5-7. See also, Aaron Friedberg, The 
Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1988), 24-26. 
1s F . 
ran9o1s Crouzet, "Trade and Empire: The British Experience from the Establishment of Free Trade until 
the First World War," in B.M. Ratcliffe (ed.), Great Britain and Her World, 1750-1914: Essays in Honour 
of WO. Henderson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975), 212; Eric Hobsbawm, Industry and 
Empire (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), 178-181. 
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Consistently in the decade before the Great War, this invisible income kept the balance of 
payments account solidly in the black. 16 
The reliance on food imports combined with the relative decline in the importance 
of British manufactured exports left the country in a potentially vulnerable position in the 
event of international conflict. Food supplies could be interrupted which could threaten 
the capacity of the country to function and indeed, foodstuffs before the war became an 
emotive political issue. 17 Further, the limitations of the British economy and state finance 
weakened the capacity to provide naval defence for the empire's lines of communications 
at the same time as the country was increasingly exposed. 18 Even a major international 
conflict in which Britain was not directly involved could have extremely senous 
consequences for the international economy and impair its invisible earnings. 
There were also significant problems in the domestic economy that reinforced these 
trends and impaired the leadership of the classes that managed the British state. The 
landed aristocracy and the gentry were gradually losing ground not merely in the political 
realm but also economically. The dramatic fall in the value of domestic agricultural 
production thirty years after the adoption of free trade severely affected the gentry and to 
a lesser extent the aristocracy. 19 Although it can be argued that the majority of naval 
16 Zara Steiner and Keith Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (2"d ed., Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2003), 14. 
17 BPP, "Report of the Royal Commission on Supply ofFood and Raw Materials in Time of War," Vol. 
XXXIX, Cd. 2643 (1905). 
18 Jon Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914 
(Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 10-28. 
19 E.H.H. Green, The Crisis of Conservatism: The Politics, Economics and Ideology of the British Con-
servative Party, 1880-1914 (London: Routledge, 1995), 11-13. 
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officers did not belong to either group, the profession of arms was closely tied to the 
values of aristocratic rule. The executive officer corps by virtue of its gentlemanly status 
and its close ties to the political and social status quo made it one of the staunchest 
supporters of the old order. Further, the elite members of the executive often were in the 
lower range of these great families and sometimes ranked much higher: after all, King 
George V was a professional naval officer. Hence, the old order of aristocratic rule suited 
the officer corps well since it enabled men of relatively modest means to have a direct 
connection by virtue of a royal commission to the pinnacle of the British social system. 
Politics 
Being closely associated with the landed establishment socially, politically and culturally, 
it would have been surprising if the general run of Royal Navy officers had remained 
unconcerned in the face of reform. Indeed, most naval officers were particularly alarmed 
by the broadening of the franchise, which by 1918 even included active service ratings, 
and by the establishment of a new plutocratic elite. Hence, not only was the political 
power of the older values being challenged but so too was the cultural reach of the elite. 
And persons of doubtful character often peopled the new plutocracy, in their view. Some 
of this distrust was channelled into, among other things, anti-Semitism?0 
British politics were undergoing profound changes as the character of political 
discourse became more ominous in the fifteen or twenty years before the outbreak of the 
20 In this regard, see especially Barry Domvile, From Admiral to Cabin Boy (London: Boswell, 1947), 82. 
Admiral Domvile argued: "For the aim of these international Jews is a World State kept in subjection by the 
power of money, and working for its Jewish masters." 
49 
Great War. Although the debates over imperial policy and topics like Irish Home Rule 
were often loud and bitter, the basic political and social arrangements were largely 
consensual. Both major parties agreed on many key aspects of policy, such as the need for 
naval supremacy and limitations on the size and influence of the central government. Yet 
the growth in the electorate and the increasing appeal of the left-wing Labour Party 
combined with increasing demands for military and naval expenditure to fracture the 
political equilibrium. The demand for a larger role for the state in addressing the needs of 
the downtrodden and the imperative need to pay for imperial defence resulted in a Liberal 
government under Asquith that wanted to reopen the constitutional framework of the 
British state. A "People's Budget" that taxed "unearned incomes" and increased death 
duties on large estates was a more popular option than an attempt to increase indirect 
taxation, which would primarily have affected those with small incomes.21 
Needless to say, the old establishment did not react to such changes favourably and 
attempted to block the government through the Conservative majority in the House of 
Lords. Only Asquith's threat to create as many new peers as necessary to pass the budget 
forced the Lords to capitulate in 1911. This had a deep and lasting impact upon the 
executive officer corps because a significant amount of its prestige and influence rested 
on the same legitimacy as the Lords. Indeed, it was a rare officer who was a whole-
hearted Liberal supporter. For instance, Lieutenant Ralph Seymour caused a stir at a 
dinner party when he expressed admiration for Campbell-Bannerman and Winston 
Churchill. 22 Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Commerell (a serving Tory M.P.) a decade 
21 Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), 335. 
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earlier was reputed to have regarded Gladstone as "an emissary from he11."23 Admiral Sir 
Charles Fitzgerald sardonically commented, "Liberal Governments have a way of being 
very liberal with other people's gear."24 One of the pillars of the authority of the officer 
corps had been rendered impotent. 
Nor was the advent of a "radical" Liberal party the only threat to naval officers. 
Indeed, their authority within the naval establishment was also challenged. As a result of 
the 1884 Reform Act the size of the electorate trebled; by the end of the First World War 
women had received the right to vote (albeit with some restrictions until 1928); and active 
service ratings were able to vote from 1918 onward. By 1910, elements of the electorate, 
having no political home in either the Liberal or Conservative parties, turned to other 
voices that could directly subvert the authority of the officer corps. 25 Although the 
Liberals had gone to considerable lengths to attract working-class voters, there were over 
forty Labour M.P.'s in the House of Commons, and the Irish Nationalists had made 
significant inroads and would continue to be thorns in the side of British governments 
22 Elizabeth Seymour, Commander Ralph Seymour (Glasgow: University Press, 1926), 21. 
23 William Goodenough, A Rough Record (London: Hutchinson, 1943), 18. 
24 C.C.P.Fitzgerald, From Sail to Steam. Naval Recollections, 1878-1905 (London: Edward Arnold, 1916), 
5, 28. "It will be remembered that the grave and earnest warnings of Lord Roberts ... were treated ... with . 
spiteful ridicule by our ruling politicians, who wanted money-not for preparations for the inevitable 
war . .. but for bribing the most ignorant and most numerous section of the community to keep themselves in 
power .. . " See also, "Navy Estimates," The Spectator, 6 March 1909, "It would be little use to provide for 
old-age pensions for four or five years, and then at the end of that period to be so crippled by an 
unsuccessful foreign war that there would be no money left to pay those pensions. National insurance must 
come before any and every other charge." 
25 
The Times, 8 January 1907. In a letter to the editor, Captain F.W. Lowther sounded the alarm to the 
encroaching dangers of socialism: "Now, Sir, I will dismiss the interference of Mr. Keir Hardie as unworthy 
of notice of your readers. That patriot is always to the front with his ignorant arrogance whenever there is 
something to destroy, no matter what it be- country- Church, State, Army or Navy." 
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until the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922.26 Irish Nationalists were not 
regarded with any great favour because it often agitated among Irish Catholic sailors in 
the Royal Navy. For instance, in the naval debates, Mr. Gilhooly, the M.P. for Cork West, 
pointed out the case of a young Irish sailor who was fatally injured in June 1901. 
Although the man lay dying for over two hours, there was no attempt to summon a priest 
to administer the last rites. Gilhooly further noted the case of the Commander of H.M.S. 
Collingwood who referred to Catholic sailors as "Irish pigs. "27 Furthermore, many of the 
senior officers prior to 1914 were either Irish Unionists or had significant family or social 
connections to the Unionist cause.28 Indeed, Herbert King-Hall referred to Home Rulers 
as "enemies of my country."29 To remedy this situation the Admiralty worked with the 
Archbishop of Westminster to ensure that the spiritual needs of Catholics were met. 30 In a 
similar fashion in 1905, a bullied midshipman shot and wounded his sub-lieutenant to 
avoid a gunroom "punishment" and was permitted to withdraw from the service. Swift 
26 Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, 165. 
27GreatBritain, Parliament, House ofCommons, Debates, 4th ser., val. CHI (1902), col. 758. 
28 Ian W. Beckett and Keith Jeffery, "The Royal Navy and the Curragh Incident," Historical Research, 
LXII (1989), 54-62. Officers with Unionist connections included Roger Keyes, David Beatty, George 
Callaghan, Charles Beresford and C.C.P. Fitzgerald. See also CCAC, WMYS 2/5, Lord Charles Beresford 
to Wemyss, 7 April 1914; Beresford argued that the First Lord, Churchill, "ought to be hanged" for 
threatening to send elements of the Home Fleet to deal with the Ulster crisis. Because ofthe sensitive nature 
of the situation, Churchill was forced to resort the services of Lewis Bayly "who is supposed to be a great 
Radical" since other admirals refused point blank any order that would force them to open fire on Ulster 
Unionists. 
29 Herbert King-Hall, Naval Memories and Traditions (London: Hutchinson, 1928), 217. 
30 Although in several occasions there were considerable disagreements between the Archdiocese of 
Westminster and the Admiralty over the financial arrangements of Catholic Chaplains. PRO, ADM 
1/8643/165, Question of Religious Instruction of R.C. Cadets at Dartmouth, 1923. Also, ADM 117915 
where there is another Admiralty file in relation to the pay of the Catholic chaplain at Gibraltar. In one of 
the minutes in the disagreement, one officer expressed the suspicion that the Admiralty would be merely 
making a contribution to enable the R.C. church to proselytize at the Navy's financial cost. 
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McNeill, the M.P. for Donegal, wondered whether "a midshipman [ought] to be allowed 
to shoot his superior officer with impunity while a boy who strikes his officer 1s 
. h d?"31 purus e . 
More serious during the war years was the fear that labour discontent would spread 
from the civilian workforce to naval ratings. Alarm was heightened after the mutinies in 
the French Army and the German Navy in 1917 and 1918 and with the Bolshevik 
Revolution in Russia. Although naval officers were confident they could handle their 
men, there was still uncertainty. Some argued that since British officers, unlike their 
foreign counterparts, had more sympathy for their men; the service was largely immune 
to unrest. However, if the Admiralty and most officers were this assured, they disguised 
the fact quite well. A great deal of concern was expressed by senior officers that the new 
scientific training provided for both officers and ratings destroyed the old paternalism, 
since officers did not know quite what to do with stokers and highly trained ratings.32 
Also, the most serious outbreaks of indiscipline in the service in this period usually 
involved stokers, who had not received training as seamen, entered at older ages and had 
been exposed to the "evils" of trade unionism.33 During the great explosion in union 
membership in 1889-90, trade union ranks swelled to 1.5 million and by the end of the 
Great War peaked at eight million. 34 The growing disparity between service and civilian 
31 Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 4th ser., vol. CXLVII (1905), col. 324. The boy 
referred to above received 24 strokes of the birch in November 1904. 
32 
"The Naval Stoker," The Fleet, III (February 1907), 51. 
33 PRO, ADM 156/157, R.N. Mutinies, 1890-1921. 
34 Eric Hobsbawn, Industry and Empire, 165. 
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pay was exacerbated by high rates of inflation, and this, combined with the drudgery of 
most naval work and poor living conditions afloat, made the Navy vulnerable. 
When the right to vote was extended to soldiers and sailors on active service during 
the last year of the war there was a concern that labour activism would extend to the 
lower deck. When the Admiralty proposed to establish a committee to evaluate working 
conditions and pay in the Navy, Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, the Director of Naval 
Intelligence warned that "[i]t should be pointed out to the Committee that once the right 
of representation through a union is admitted, there must be the necessary corollary that 
such union has some form of control of its members, and that the authority of the 
Admiralty becomes shared with a body responsible to no one."35 During the coal strike in 
1921 dissatisfaction among the men of the 2nd Portsmouth Royal Fleet Reserve (R.F.R.) 
Battalion reached the point where Captain Edward Kennedy asked them to appoint 
deputations to address their concerns. As a result, a court martial convicted Kennedy of 
committing an act prejudicial to naval discipline.36 
Besides being de facto members of the elite, servmg naval officers, whether 
holding appointments at sea, at a dockyard or in the Admiralty, were essentially managers 
of labour involved in preparing for and undertaking naval defence. For this reason it is not 
surprising that they would be affected by agitation for labour reform. 37 Members of 
35 PRO, ADM 1/8539/250, "Proposed Duties of the Jerram Committee," 27 September 1918, minute by 
W.R. Hall. 
36 PRO, ADM 156/157, R.N. Mutinies, 1890-1921. 
37 
Indeed, resistance to the authorities by ratings was vigorously prosecuted, especially so since it was 
generally not acceptable for officers to "lower" their status by striking a rating. In 1895, Able Seaman 
Nicholas Gray struck a lieutenant and a commander and was awarded three years imprisonment and was 
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Parliament carefully monitored the situation in the Navy, and many openly championed 
the cause of the ambitious on the lower deck. It may very well be true that, as Eugene 
Rasor has argued, most of the impetus for reform in the past had come from above, but 
this time the lower deck was the source of much of this unrest.38 The great advocates of 
change were men such as Lionel Y exley and Henry Capper who were themselves former 
members of the lower deck. Although both men were well regarded by officers such as 
Fisher and J ellicoe, and while their message was essentially one of respectful criticism, 
opinion was divided over the validity of their complaints. For example, Stanley Colville, 
Commander-in-Chief Portsmouth in 1918, was less than friendly to Yexley and his ilk.39 
The Admiralty made officers aware of the potential consequences of their conduct in 
relation to the lower deck. Although the Admiralty would generally back officers publicly 
in cases involving breaches of discipline, there were also consequences to the careers of 
officers if they mishandled men or aggravated matters through "tactless" conduct. 
Officers could not only be subjected to court martial but could also face legal action 
initiated by former subordinates. For instance, a former stoker sued Captain Reginald Hall 
of H.M.S. Natal because the man believed that Hall had subjected him to a humiliating 
dismissed from the service with disgrace. "Naval and Military Intelligence," The Times, 5 February 1895. 
See also, CCAC, J.A. Fisher Papers (FISR) 115/204, Hedworth Lambton to Fisher, 12 August 1906. 
Lambton argued that the best method of dealing with ratings who struck their officers was to charge them 
with cowardice since officers were forbidden to respond in kind. 
38 Eugene Rasor, Reform in the Royal Navy: A Social History of the Lower Deck, 1850-1880 (Hamden, CT: 
Archon Books, 1976). 
39 Yexley was a frequent and friendly correspondent with Fisher, see Arthur J. Marder (ed.), Fear God and 
Dread Nought (3 vols., London: Jonathan Cape, 1952-1959), volumes 2 and 3; and Henry D. Capper, Aft 
from the Hawsehole: Sixty-Two Years of Sailors' Evolution (London: Faber & Gwyer, 1927), the preface of 
which was written by Jellicoe. See also, PRO, ADM 116/1603, Sir Eric Geddes to Stanley Colville, CINC 
Portsmouth, 19 September 1918. 
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punishment.40 Officers could be bound over for criminal charges if the Admiralty 
determined they had abused their authority as Commander William Annesley discovered 
in 1890 when he inflicted an unauthorized punishment on a rating.41 
The Press 
Another significant development that had enormous implications for both British society 
and the officer corps was the growing strength of the press. In particular, the development 
of the penny press, perhaps best exemplified by Lords Rothermere and Northcliffe, was 
crucial. The press proved its potency not merely as an advocate (or opponent) of various 
political parties but also as an instrument that could prick the pretensions of the powerful, 
including professional naval and military men. Admiral Sir John Fisher provided an 
example of both facets. Along with several fellow officers Fisher leaked information in 
1884 to W.T. Stead of the Pall Mall Gazette that triggered mass agitation for the rapid 
expansion of the R.N., a growth that culminated in the Naval Defence Act of 1889. On 
the other hand, when Fisher was First Sea Lord, his battles with critics were frequently 
conducted in the pages of newspapers and periodicals.42 
40 William James, The Eyes of the Navy: A Biographical Study of Admiral Sir Reginald Hall (London: 
Methuen, 1955), 11-12. Hall had a placard placed around the neck of a stoker who had claimed to be blind. 
It was suspected at the time that he had been malingering. See also, Barry Domvile, By and Large (London: 
Hutchinson, 1936), 199. "It is not possible to-day to erect golden images in Whitehall and say, 'Behold thy 
Gods' to an admiring Service. The modem bluejacket wants to know a little bit more about these gods 
before he bows down and worships." 
41 "Th T e 1carus Court Martial," The Times, 28 May 1890. 
42 
"I d .. d n lVl ual Puffery," The Times, 19 February 1907. Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge commented on the 
practices of Fisher's Admiralty, "The Treasury is probably the last place in which one would look for 
humour; but even there the joke was passed about that the Admiralty printing bill had in a short time 
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The advent of a mass electorate and the rise of the popular press were both boons and 
curses to the Royal Navy. On the one hand, naval officers were in a unique position to 
offer considerable perquisites to friendly journalists. Such writers were routinely 
welcomed in social settings ashore and afloat and were often given privileged access to 
the details of policy through an informal quid pro quo arrangement. James Thursfield, 
The Times' naval correspondent, was not only fed information but also invited to 
contribute a well-received paper at the Royal United Services Institution in 1900 on the 
training of officers and men.43 Thursfield's son, Henry, through the patronage of Fisher, 
was nominated for a cadetship and became a rear admiral on the retired list.44 Nor was 
Fisher alone in possessing such contacts, as Lord Charles Beresford showed during the 
1882 Egyptian campaign in which he was lionized by the popular press. 45 Contacts also 
existed on lower levels, where even relatively junior officers acted as both sources of 
information and go-betweens for their seniors. For instance, Lieutenant Commander 
Joseph Kenworthy was intimately connected to Lord Northcliffe and became an M.P. in 
the 1920s. 
increased enormously. So numerous were the printed papers spoken of, in some journalistic circles it was 
found necessary, owing to their large number, to give them a kind of trade name, 'X's broadsides.'" 
43 James R. Thursfield, "The Training of Seamen," Journal ofthe Royal United Services Institution (RUSI), 
XLIV (September 1900), 969-1025. 
44 H.G. Thursfield, after retiring from the service became, like his father before him, The Times' naval 
correspondent and also the editor of Brassey's Naval Annual. See also Marder (ed.), Fear God and Dread 
Nought, II, 137-138, Fisher to J.R. Thursfield, 10 August 1897. In a letter to the elder Thursfield, Fisher, 
about to become Commander-in-Chief on the North American station, promised to find a place for the 
journalist's son aboard his flagship, " ... You may be sure I will do my best to get your boy into the Renown 
next spring, and if necessary will 'keel-haul' one of her youngsters to make a vacancy!" 
45 Robert K. Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War (New York: 
Random House, 1991), 498-510. 
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The influence of the print media could force Parliament or the Admiralty to consider 
issues that the Navy would prefer to ignore. For example, after the riot in the Portsmouth 
Naval Barracks in November 1906, public pressure, fanned by the media, compelled the 
Admiralty to try Lieutenant Bernard Collard for giving a tactless order. Even after 
Collard was convicted, the papers jumped on the inconsistency of punishment that only 
reprimanded Collard while giving several stokers prison terms. 46 In the same way, the 
print media acted to restrain the Admiralty in situations where its undoubted legal right to 
act was clear. In 1908, Cadet George Archer-Shee was accused of stealing a postal money 
order at Osborne College. The cadet was compelled to leave the College when the 
Admiralty invoked its right, under provisions of the King's Regulations and Admiralty 
Instructions, to dismiss a cadet for any reason. Press furore and a subsequent court case 
eventually forced the Admiralty to pay compensation.47 The papers could also make the 
Admiralty appear arbitrary and biased, and force it, on rare occasions, to reverse itself. 
Ample cases exist, for instance, of the Admiralty reducing sentences imposed by courts 
martial because of public controversy. 48 
46 Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Parliamentary Papers (BPP), "Admiralty Minute in 
Regard to Disturbances at Royal Naval Barracks, Portsmouth on the 4th and 5th November, 1906," val. 
LXX, Cd. 3275 (1906), 73. 
47 This episode became the title of a play and a film: Terence Rattigan, The Winslow Boy: A Play in Two 
Acts (Toronto: Irwin, 1946); see also, Rodney M. Bennett, The Archer-Shees Against the Admiralty: The 
Story behind the Winslow Boy (London: Hale, 1973); PRO, ADM 116/1085A, George Archer-Shee (Cadet) 
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48 According to Regulations and the Naval Defence Act, the Admiralty was the final court of appeal in 
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At this time, courts martial were conducted solely by executive commissioned officers and were convened 
on an ad hoc basis. The Portsmouth Naval Barracks riot of 1906 was a case in point where the Admiralty 
found it politic to reduce the prison terms handed down by court martial. See, BPP, "Admiralty Minute in 
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Although the King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions officially forbade naval 
officers on active service to write for publication,49 it was common knowledge that a 
close relationship existed between officers and journalists employed by "respectable" 
newspapers. Most of the major dailies had naval and military correspondents who built 
strong bonds with those in authority. Admiral Sir John Fisher in particular had a veritable 
stable of friendly writers, including James Thursfield, Arnold White and Gerard Fiennes. 
Nor was Fisher alone in this regard, for there were plenty of cases where officers 
entertained "respectable" journalists aboard ships. As well, correspondents routinely 
accompanied the fleet on manoeuvres; indeed, at one point even Rudyard Kipling wrote a 
book on this experience. 50 In some instances officers could even try to exercise influence 
over the ownership of papers. In 1908, for example, Viscount Esher introduced Fisher to 
a prospective buyer of The Times to ensure that he was properly "educated" in naval 
policy.51 And in the case of the Fisher-Beresford feud not merely was the naval 
profession split but also the press. 52 
Regard to Disturbances at the Royal Naval Barracks, Portsmouth on the 4th and 5th November 1906 and 
Courts Martial and other Questions Arising Thereon," vol. LXX, Cd. 3275 (1906), 71-73. 
49 PRO, ADM 116/101, "Revision of Queen's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions," article 682. 
50 Rudyard Kipling, A Fleet in Being: Notes of two Trips with the Channel Squadron (Leipzig: Bernhard 
Tauchnitz, 1899). See also, Frank T. Bullen The Way They Have in the Navy, Being a Day-to-Day Record 
of a Cruise in HM. Battleship Mars During the Naval Manoeuvres of 1899 (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 
1899). Bullen was a correspondent for The Morning Leader. 
51 Maurice V. Brett (ed.), Journals and Letters of Reginald, Viscount Esher (4 vols., London: Ivor 
Nicholson & Watson, 1934), II, 199, journal entry for 17 January 1908. 
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1919 (5 vols., London: Oxford University Press, 1961), I, 76-78. 
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It was common for officers on half pay or those who had retired to contribute letters 
and articles to such papers as The Times and the Conservative Morning Post under 
pseudonyms or their real names. Richard Vesey Hamilton, Cyprian Bridge, Gerard Noel 
and Charles Fitzgerald were all regular contributors to The Times. But some retired 
officers, like Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Hay, never lost their distrust of even the 
respectable press and consistently refused to contribute letters. 53 Despite strictures against 
it, active service officers on full pay could sometimes be forgiven for contributing to the 
press if the cause was deemed suitable. Mark Kerr wrote a letter defending those who had 
lost their lives in H.M.S. Victoria in 1893 and was hauled on the carpet by the First Sea 
Lord: "Sir Frederick [Richards]. ... lifted his head and looked at me sternly, and said in a 
clear, hard voice: 'What do you mean writing to the papers? Don't you know it's against 
the Regulations?' 'Yes, Sir, I replied, 'but I was so angry at the injustice done to the 
officers alive or dead who cannot defend themselves, that I wrote it.' To which the First 
Sea Lord replied: 'You had no business to do it, but I'm damned glad you did. "'54 
Commentary by active service officers, and especially by ratings, was generally 
deprecated. For instance, Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson not only tried to prevent the 
distribution of Y exley' s magazine The Fleet while he commanded the Channel Squadron 
but also warned sailors publicly against contributing. He followed this by firing a warning 
shot across Yexley's bows: " ... you must be quite aware that in asking Petty Officers and 
men of the Fleet to communicate information on matters connected with the Naval 
53 PRO, ADM 7/995, Naval Necessities, val. III, 72-74, Lord John Hay to John Fisher, 22 June 1906. 
54 Mark Kerr, The Navy in My Time (London: Rich & Cowan, 1934 ), 29. 
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Service to your paper, you are tempting them to disobey Article 12 of the King's 
Regulations, 1906 ... and thereby to render themselves liable to punishment. "55 A well-
regarded Executive Officer of a battleship stated in a conversation with a Petty Officer 
about The Fleet that "[ w ]hen he returned them [the papers] he expressed the opinion that 
any paper which allowed a lower deck rating to criticise the actions of naval officers was 
a danger to the State and ought to be suppressed."56 Yexley's campaigning for the lower 
deck eventually landed him in court. He was sued for libel in early 1914 and was ordered 
to pay damages in excess of £3,000 (over £160,000 in 2002 currency). 57 
Moreover, some naval officers were well known for playing to the press. Jack Fisher 
in particular was famous, or infamous depending on one's point of view, for manipulating 
the press to further his own ends, especially after he became First Sea Lord. As Lord 
Esher chided Fisher in 1906 regarding his activities: "Therefore pray be Machiavellian, 
and play upon the delicate instrument of public opinion with your fingers and not with 
your feet however tempting the latter may be. "58 But others could use these unofficial 
channels within the service as well. The press campaign orchestrated by the Beresford 
camp and the "Syndicate of Discontent" seriously undermined the position of individual 
officers and of the entire Board of Admiralty. The bickering reached the point where 
Asquith was forced to convene an inquiry into Admiralty policy in 1909 that essentially 
55 
"Editorial," The Fleet, VIII (February 1912), 380, quoting a letter from Admiral Sir Arthur K. Wilson to 
Lionel Yexley, 13 May 1906. 
56 
"More Candid Criticism," The Fleet, IX (April1913), 109. 
57 
"Kemp v. Yexley," The Fleet, X (June 1914), 166-186. 
58 Brett (ed.), Journals, II, 199, Lord Esher to Sir John Fisher, 21 October 1906. 
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finished Fisher and Beresford's active careers.59 During the war a combination of 
operational failures and the howl of the press for blood caused the removal or resignation 
of four First Sea Lords between October 1914 and December 1917.6° Further, younger 
officers attempted to use the press to purge what they called the "Old Gang" from the 
Admiralty. Lieutenant Commander J.M. Kenworthy had extensive contacts with Lord 
Northcliffe; Captain Herbert Richmond had access through his father-in-law, the 
industrialist Sir Hugh Bell; and Commanders Reginald Drax and K.G.B. Dewar were 
known to be friendly with A.H. Pollen, a relentless critic who published in Land and 
Water during the war. As editor of The Naval Review Admiral Sir William Henderson 
used his extensive contacts to bring about drastic reforms in the Admiralty. As 
Commander Drax wrote to Admiral Henderson, "[i]t is a pathetic thing to descend to the 
lowest forms of journalism in our efforts to save the country from disaster. [But] there 
seems to be no altemative."61 
59 BPP, "Report of the Sub-Committee of the Conunittee of Imperial Defence Appointed to Inquire into 
Certain Questions of Naval Policy Raised by Lord Charles Beresford," vol. LN, No. 256 (1909), 295-303. 
Members of the "Syndicate" included the conservative press and included such officers as C.C.P. 
Fitzgerald, Richard Vesey Hamilton, Hedworth Meux (ne Lambton), Gerard Noel, Reginald Custance, 
Edmund Frernantle, Frederick Richards and, of course, Beresford. See, Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa 
Flow, I, 77. 
60 Prince Louis of Battenberg, October 1914; Sir John Fisher, May 1915, Sir Henry Jackson, December 
1916; and Sir John Jellicoe, December 1917. 
61 National Maritime Museum (NMM), K.G.B.Dewar Papers (DEW) 2/, Drax to Henderson, 29 August 
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Professionalism 
While the widening franchise, the press and changes in the British economy played 
substantial roles in the transformation of the naval officer, they were also contributors to 
and amplifiers of the gradual professionalization of the British state and society. As 
Harold Perkin has argued, at the end of the nineteenth century the "professional ideal" 
mounted a fundamental challenge to the older class-based establishment.62 The 
development of a mass society and the widening impact of the second industrial and 
managerial revolutions demanded persons who not only possessed specialized skills but 
also could perform standardized tasks that could be easily integrated into a larger 
organization. Most of all, the increasing scale of both the opportunities and problems 
engendered by this process demanded standardized responses. With the development of 
monopoly capital and the concomitant desire by many to limit the impact of market 
forces, professional administrative structures were required to provide what Alfred 
Chandler called the "visible hand."63 In a similar fashion, social problems created by 
industrial capitalism were to be solved by specialized and regularized services to alleviate 
suffering. The charity of individuals and the Church was no longer capable of meeting the 
vast needs. Municipal socialism in the organization of basic urban services, such as water 
62 Perkin, Rise of the Professional Society. 
63 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1977). 
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and sewer, electricity and transportation, all fed the demand for professional standards 
. . . 64 
and admtmstratwn. 
Professionalism extended beyond administration and the traditional realm of Church, 
medicine and courts with the establishment of agreed upon standards in the various fields 
associated with engineering, although the consensus tended to fragment as each field 
established its own structures. Predictable standards of technical competence became 
extremely important, as the loss of life and property associated with faulty workmanship 
and/or design became higher and the demands on infrastructure and equipment increased. 
With the construction of vast and expensive projects, rule-of-thumb methods of working 
out calculations were not only inefficient in the use of material and capital but also 
downright dangerous. The litanies of railway disasters and bridge collapses were constant 
features of the nineteenth century. Nor was the Royal Navy immune from these demands, 
as the introduction of iron and steam forced a shift in the skills required to build and 
maintain hulls and machinery. 65 Examples of these technical questions literally had life-
and-death consequences; while naval personnel might have to face the dangers of war, 
they definitely would have to face the full rigours of the forces of nature. The loss of the 
experimental turret ship H.M.S. Captain in 1870 brought that lesson home to those who 
64 T.R. Gourvish, "The Rise of the Professions," in T.R. Gourvish and Alan O'Day (eds.), Later Victorian 
Britain, 1867-1900 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 13-35; John Sheldrake, Municipal Socialism 
(Aldershot: Avebury, 1989); and, Asa Briggs, Victorian Cities (1963, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1996), 21-26. 
65 D.K. Brown, From Warrior to Dreadnought, 1860-1905 (London: Chatham Publishing, 2002); and Paul 
L. Robertson, "Technical Education in the British Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering Industries, 1863-
1914," Economic History Review, 2nd ser., XXVII, No.2 (May 1974), 223-225. 
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were inclined to forget that fact. Professional standards and qualifications seemed the 
most efficient way to address the problems of accountability. 
The establishment of a plethora of professional organizations marked the 1880s. 
Professional engineers sought to establish standards of competence and to assert control 
by legislation over certain fields of work. If an occupational group could persuade the 
state to extend charter or legislative recognition it would not only improve its status (and 
its pay) but also the public good. Capitalizing on shortcomings real or imagined, it would 
attempt to convince the state and the public that its core functions and skills were 
indispensable to the well being of the community. Nearly every aspect of public life was 
to be handled by some professional group. 
Indeed, most occupations that today are regarded as professional can trace their 
foundations to this period. For instance, when the British Medical Association began in 
the 1850s it was instrumental in quickly eliminating "quacks" and assumed a leading role 
in ensuring that only those meeting certain educational and practical standards were 
permitted to carry on the business of providing medical services to the general population. 
Other professions soon joined the trend of forming professional groups to further their 
collective interests. In 1880, for example, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England & Wales was granted a Royal Charter. Professionalism extended beyond the 
traditional learned professions to occupations connected with the second industrial 
revolution.66 It seemed that by the end of the nineteenth century nearly every highly 
66 The second industrial revolution occurred in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. It was 
characterized primarily by a change in the scale or industrial enterprises and the vertical integration of 
industrial production. It was also marked by the development of capital-intensive production particularly in 
steel, transportation, electrical equipment and chemicals. For its impact on Britain see Peter Bottecelli, "The 
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skilled body had attempted to orgaruze and establish norms of conduct and 
67 performance. 
Formal educational qualifications were considered essential in an era when university 
and college specialty programmes began to appear. This had the effect of reinforcing the 
status of these new professions. This was a significant shift, since until the mid-nineteenth 
century British universities were structured to deliver a classical education that prepared a 
gentleman for a career in the law, civil service or the Church. In the case of Oxford this 
bias remained ingrained even when universities like Cambridge introduced sciences and 
engineering. Other British universities were faster to introduce specialized programmes in 
engineering and related sciences to meet the demands of the industrial economy. 
The concept of professionals being "class neutral" also gained prominence. 68 In this 
sense, all that mattered in developing a profession was the concept of knowledge for 
serving the public good. Hence, the class association of the officer corps was a problem -
with which other professions in the naval service had to contend. Indeed, class became a 
barrier to the effective and efficient performance of the core tasks of the Royal Navy. 
Education and training became generally more important things in providing a basis for 
social status. As Robert Buchanan has noted, engineers generally conformed to the 
existing economic and political culture because their skills became a mechanism for 
British Engineering Press during the Second Industrial Revolution: Responses to Corporate Capitalism," 
Business History Review, LXXI (1997), 260-286. 
67 W.J. Reader, Professional Men: The Rise of the Professional Classes in Nineteenth Century England 
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68 Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1977), xiv. 
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social elevation.69 For instance, in discussing a paper at the Institution of Marine 
Engineers at Stratford in East London in December 1900, the marine engineer J .R. 
Ruthven stated: "My contention is that if we take a boy, six or seven of whose immediate 
forefathers had followed the profession of marine or mechanical engineering, that boy is 
likely to make a much better engineer than a boy whose parentage has had no connection . 
with engineering."70 If the sons of engineers were ideally suited to become engineers 
themselves, would not the same justification be advanced in defence of the old officer 
class? 
It is very interesting to contrast this comment with that of Sub-Lieutenant Reginald 
Tupper nearly two decades earlier: 
Not very long ago it was almost resolved to throw this branch [the 
Executive] of the Navy open to public competition, but I am glad 
to say we have not yet arrived at that. I fail to see what benefit 
would be derived from such a proceeding; as long as we can get a 
sufficient number of boys, sons of gentlemen and Officers who 
when they become men, show that amongst them are men with 
brains sufficient to satisfy the scientific requirements of the 
Service, what it is the use of introducing a lot of boys whose 
fathers have no claims whatever on their country?71 
The perceived shortcomings in the British education system and the education of Britain's 
skilled elite were matters of deep concern. This was apparent at the end of the century 
69 Buchanan, Engineers, 181. 
70 D.B. Morison, "The British Naval Engineer: His Present Position and Influence on Our Sea Power," 
Transactions of the Institute of Marine Engineers (TIME), XII (1900-1901), 25, discussions at Stratford on 
10 December 1900. 
71 Reginald Tupper "The Best Method of Providing an Efficient Force of Officers and Men for the Navy, 
including the Reserves," RUSI, XXVI {1882), 330; the future Admiral Sir Reginald Tupper commanded a 
cruiser squadron on the Northern patrol during the First War and was a cousin of the Canadian Prime 
Minister Sir Charles Tupper. 
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when Britain was visibly losing ground economically to its continental and American 
rivals. The alleged effectiveness of the German and American educational systems 
spawned the argument that Britain needed to take significant steps to rejuvenate a system 
that could no longer cope with the technological and scientific demands of the time. This 
seemed particularly relevant to the armed services, since Britain's imperial security was _ 
apparently deeply imperilled, particularly with the diplomatic isolation and military 
setbacks of the South African war.72 As Gerard Noel wrote in 1909: 
I would remind you, that the splendid naval policy, which existed in 
1902, had stood the test of centuries, and carried out by Lord Spencer 
and Mr Goschen when at the Admiralty, had raised the Navy to such a 
position by 1899, that the threatening European Powers DARED not 
interfere with us, during our grievous troubles at the Cape, when but 
for the efficiency and readiness of the Navy, we should undoubtedly 
have been attacked .... 73 
Hence, an efficient naval service commanded by efficient professional officers was an 
absolute requirement for national safety.74 
The problem with the armed forces and the Navy in particular was that its officers 
had few visible professional qualifications. At the British defence colleges, unlike those 
in the United States or Canada, cadets still emerge without degrees. Although since the 
1860s every executive officer passed through the Britannia course and was required to 
pass examinations in seamanship, gunnery, pilotage, torpedo and navigation, the system 
was often viewed as ineffective and educationally unsound. Between 1870 and 1913, the 
72 G.R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899-
1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 34-53. 
73 CCAC, Chartwell Papers (CHAR)13/1, Gerard Noel to Reginald McKenna, 12 Februa~ 1909, emphasis 
in original. 
74 See, "National Defence," Blackwood 's , CXLV, No. 881 (March 1889), 436-438. 
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Admiralty carried out no fewer than six full investigations. 75 All these committees, 
comprised of naval officers, schoolmasters and civil servants, attempted to make the 
calling more professional and efficient. The object of these committees was not only to 
ensure that the naval officer was equipped to deal with the changing face of naval affairs 
but also to convince the state and society that gentleman executive officers were still 
specially fitted for the protection of the Empire. The problem encountered, of course, was 
that the military profession often depended upon distinctly pre-modem values and the 
intangible characteristics of the officer.76 The theoretical education required to maintain 
the status of a modem profession conflicted with the practical training required for a 
competent sea officer. 
The professionalization of British society at the end of the nineteenth century 
confronted the British naval officer corps with a series of complex and interlocking 
problems. First, there was an intense desire to avoid what were regarded as the pitfalls of 
specialization. On the contrary, many officers believed it to be crucial that their 
profession should be able to maintain considerable detachment even from such important 
75 BPP, ''Report of the Committee on the Higher Education of Naval Officers, vol. XXV, C. 203 (1870); 
Report of the Committee Appointed by the Admiralty to Inquire into the System of Training Naval Cadets 
on Board H.M.S. Britannia," vol. XV, C. 1154 (1875); "Report of the Committee Appointed by the 
Admiralty to Inquire into and Report on the Education of Naval Executive Officers," vol. XIII, C.4885 
(1886); ''Report of the Committee Appointed by the Admiralty to Inquire into and Report on the Training 
and Examination of Junior Naval Officers," vol. XLII, Cd. 508 (1901); "Reports of Departmental 
Committee Appointed to Consider Certain Questions Concerning the Extension of the New Scheme of 
Training for Officers of the Navy," vol. LXX, Cd. 2841 (1906); "Reports of the Committee appointed to 
Inquire into the Education and Training of Cadets, Midshipmen and Junior Officers of H.M. Fleet," vol. 
XLIII, Cd. 6703 (1913). 
76 CCAC, CHAR 13/26, Memorandum by Lieutenant General Douglas Haig on the Slade Committee 
Report on the Naval War College, February 1914. "Again, almost all aspects of the art of war are 
'theoretical' in time of peace; they only become 'practical' when the actual killing begins. The practical 
man is the man who has a strong imagination, able to realise the difference between the artificial conditions 
of peace and the (probably) real conditions of war. .. " 
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specialties as gunnery and torpedoes because of the central needs to exercise the 
command function, maintain the widest possible view, and be able to discern the essential 
from the trivial. 
On the other hand, naval officers had to demonstrate that their claims to leadership 
rested on more than mere tradition or class prejudice. They were forced to take 
considerable steps to reassure society that they were the most efficient suppliers of 
protection. This meant that a considerable amount of specialization had to be risked in 
order to deal with the dramatic changes in naval affairs. This was especially critical in the 
years leading up to the Great War. 
A problem with the Navy was that it often appeared to be promoting people through 
graft and patronage, a system that was offensive to the sensibilities of many of those who 
footed the bill and whose sons were not so favoured. Promotions, especially those seen to 
be furthering the sons of the nobility and the gentry, began to be questioned m 
Parliament. As early as 1867, questions were raised about the rapid promotion to 
Commander of four Lieutenants, and the Admiralty was compelled to issue a return 
listing the service of these four officers (three of whom were "Honourables"). The 
average length of their service was 4 Y2 years, less than half the duration that most 
promoted officers endured.77 
Another target was the system of special promotions such as the advancement of 
officers serving in the Royal Yachts. Several other avenues of promotion that survived 
77 BPP, ''Navy (Promotions) Return of the Services and Sea Time of Commanders Wood, Graham, 
Fitzclarence, and Yorke," vol. XLIV, No. 179 (1867), 559. These officers were Commanders the Ron. 
Francis Lindley Wood, James S. Graham, the Ron. George Fitzclarence, and John Manners Yorke. 
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from the eighteenth century were attracting considerable opposition by the end of the 
nineteenth. Although the Admiralty also had gradually centralized control over officer 
entry by taking away the authority of captains and admirals to enter new officer 
candidates without Admiralty approval, considerable leeway remained. For instance, 
admirals were still entitled to "haul-down" promotions when they were relieved of their 
appointments. By custom, such promotions were conferred upon flag lieutenants.78 
Further, Commanders-in-Chief on foreign stations were granted the authority to confirm 
special promotions due to the death of officers on active service. Further still, when the 
Admiralty received promotion reports from Commanders-in-Chief and other senior 
officers about the promotion of officers, it was careful to ensure that the interests of each 
officer were served. Although promotions were made in the name of the political First 
Lord, the interests of serving officers could not safely be ignored. In addition, the Naval 
Lords on the Board of Admiralty, who often returned to sea and desired that their 
proteges be treated with the same consideration, had a direct interest in ensuring that the 
interests of the admirals afloat were served. Yet as time went on the process became 
increasingly bureaucratized and intrusive for officers. 
But the move toward a different professional style also came from pressures within 
the naval service. Officers began to be forced to justify themselves, as did the rising 
professional classes of late nineteenth-century Britain. As the Navy expanded and 
demands on personnel increased, promotion prospects dimmed for officers; many of these 
men began to demand that their education provide a reasonable prospect of a second 
career if they never were selected off the lieutenants' list. As the traditional appointments 
78 Flag lieutenants were officers assigned to flag officers to act as their personal assistants . 
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associated with the landed elite began to dry up, officers cast about for alternative 
employment. While some could still count on returning to estates and a significant private 
income, they were increasingly becoming a minority. Besides, often they were the ones to 
make the jump to higher rank rather than their poorer compatriots. 
Naval officers also expressed concern that retired officers were not getting their fair 
share of employment in the civil service. Similarly, they worried that officers were 
lagging behind their social peers because they spent too much time immersed in the daily 
activities of service life. Over time they realized that many officers would not finish their 
working careers in the Navy but would seek employment elsewhere. This problem was 
unique to the armed services since the Admiralty found it impossible to promote 
everyone, and it was equally impossible to keep over-age officers in subordinate positions 
that required considerable physical exertion. By contrast, in professions such as the law 
there was always space for mediocre people to find an honourable place until old age 
without becoming King's Counsels or Heads ofChamber.79 
This was complicated by the form of education received by naval officers of the 
period. Officers undertook a portion of their general education under the control of the 
Admiralty. Unlike the Army or even the Royal Marines, the Navy did not wait for boys to 
complete their secondary education for a couple of interrelated reasons. First, the 
curriculum offered at most schools did not teach mathematics and related subjects with 
sufficient thoroughness. The concentration on the classics was believed to be entirely 
inappropriate for naval officers, who required practical skills not merely to fight but to 
79 P.H. Colomb, "Principles of Retirement in the Services, RUSI, XXXV (August 1891), 844. 
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navigate a ship safely. Second, the Navy as a whole believed that in order to train seamen 
officers properly it was important to recruit them young and get them to sea early enough 
to become accustomed to the hardships of shipboard life. 80 
The problem the service encountered with this system was the confusion of general 
and professional education. Since the navy entered boys at an age when their general 
education remained incomplete, considerable difficulty remained in fashioning cadets into 
' 'well-rounded" men while simultaneously fitting them to practice the profession. Writers 
such as Herbert Richmond, one of the most intelligent and capable officers in the Navy, 
wrote in 1913 while submitting suggestions for the training of Special Entry cadets that "I 
want him, in fact, when he goes to sea to have no instruction at all. The sea is not the 
place for instruction, it is the place for training; so soon as he comes on board a ship he 
should be an officer at once."81 Hence, Richmond touched the Gordian knot on an issue 
the Navy struggled over for fifty years: the difficult position of midshipmen being tom 
between their role as schoolboys and officers. This conflict widened to encompass 
questions about the naval officer's self-perceptions. The question was whether the officer 
was a holdover from feudalism where military command was paramount or was he to 
become a manager and technician? 
The essential problem for naval officers of this period was that the old certainties 
were ruthlessly pruned by dramatic changes in the structure of the British state and the 
80 BPP, "Report of the Committee Appointed by the Admiralty to Inquire into the System of Training Naval 
Cadets on Board H.M.S. Britannia," vol. XV, C. 1154 (1875), 357. 
81 Just prior to the war, the officer training system was unable to cope with the demands of the fleet and it 
was decided in 1913, to enter cadets directly from the public schools. See Chapter IV and PRO, ADM 
116/1213, "Report of the Committee on the Training of Naval Cadets entered from Public Schools and 
Elsewhere, 1913." See also H.W. Richmond, "A Suggested Training for Naval Cadets," Naval Review, I 
(1913), 139. 
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near-systemic attack on the professional culture of the corps. The socio-economic 
changes in Britain undermined the classes from which officers were largely drawn. The 
extension of the franchise and the growing weakness of the landed gentry conspired to 
weaken the authority of the traditional executive branch as welL At the same time, a new 
paradigm of middle-class professionalism was undercutting the "traditional" culture of 
command. But the gravest challenge and the bitterest expression of this change in the 
R.N. was the growth of the engineering profession. 
This was particularly pressing because the Navy (aside from private contractors) was 
one of the largest industrial concerns in Great Britain. It ran dockyards from Sydney to 
Halifax, as well as the home yards at Portsmouth, Devonport and Chatham. These 
dockyards employed thousands of men who built and maintained modern warships. 82 The 
Admiralty employed its own Corps of Constructors and over one thousand marine 
engineers. It also ran its own Engineering Schools at Keyham and Greenwich and was 
involved in procurement. Further, as the Navy took up an increasing share of national 
expenditure, the Admiralty was compelled to find methods to streamline administration 
and operations. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Admiralty was at the centre of 
controversy over rules of work and professional space between competing occupational 
groups. In the active fleet alone (exclusive of civil staff and dockyards), the Admiralty 
employed 128,000 men and cost the Exchequer over £31 million in fiscal year 1907-08.83 
82 Indeed, it has been argued that Naval Dockyards were among the most efficient builders of warships in 
the world. The Portsmouth Dockyard constructed the revolutionary all-big-gun battleship Dreadnought in 
just over fifteen months from laying down to completion. See, Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, I, 44. 
83 Lower Deck, The British Navy from Within (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1916), 11. The administrative 
history of the Navy in this period has not yet been tackled unlike the age of sail with the work of Daniel 
Baugh and N.A.M. Rodger. See, Daniel Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole 
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At the tum of the century, public disquiet mounted over Britain's international 
position. It was apparent to policy makers and the wider public that in key economic 
indicators such as steel production, Great Britain had been overtaken by both the United 
States and Germany. 84 Further, the failure of military organization in South Africa 
exposed serious shortcomings in the British defence establishment. If the Navy thought it 
was immune from such pressures, it was very quickly disabused of that notion. The 
whirlwind of reforms triggered by John Fisher and the changes in professional training of 
officers were indicative of the impulse to provide the British state with the maximum 
return on its defence expenditures. The reinvention of the executive officer corps was part 
and parcel of these spending reviews. 
The advent of modem professionalism was not confined to the executive officer 
corps but also influenced the development of the Engineering Branch. Engineers, in the 
view of many executives, were not as much a problem as were the professional 
engineering organizations, most especially the Institution of Marine Engineers. In that 
body (along with several others) was to be found the centre of agitation for the disruption 
of working relationships. Other professional groups also demanded recognition of their 
importance within the service as the navy faced increasing demands from surgeons, 
paymasters and others for improved status and prospects for advancement. 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965; N.A.M. Rodger, The Wooden World: The Anatomy of the 
Georgian Navy (London: Collins, 1986). Jon Sumida wrote a 1990 article that addressed the issues 
surrounding such work, and his In Defence of Naval Supremacy of 1989 touches on issues surrounding 
technology, finance and administration in the years before the Great War. See, Jon Sumida, "Naval 
Administration in the Age of Fisher," Journal of Military History, LIV, No. 1 (1990), 1-26 and Sumida, In 
Defence of Naval Supremacy. 
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Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), 224-232; 
Steiner and Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the Great War, 63-83; and Searle, Quest for National 
Efficiency, 5-15. 
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The pursuit of education as a form of improvement extended further within the 
service as the concept of a "career" began to reach further down the ranks. As teclmical 
sciences multiplied in the service, ratings required training on a much different basis than 
in the age of sail. Warrant and Petty officers pressed for changes in pay and working 
conditions, and elements from the lower deck aspired to middle-class respectability. As 
one writer put it: 
[t]he mechanical knowledge requires a higher intelligence, a larger mental 
grasp and a more scientific training, than that needed in the days of masts 
and sails; and consequently the men to be trained in the use of dozens of 
fighting machines .... need to be drawn from the best educated among our 
poorer classes. Mere muscular men, which could be picked up by press-
gangs ... are no longer the sort of recruits which will win in time of stress 
d . 85 an stram ... 
Confident in the importance of their technical skills and leadership, ambitious 
enlisted sailors wished for further avenues of advancement, and there were even strident 
demands for commissions. Lionel Yexley's journal, The Fleet, as well as other 
publications such as the Naval Warrant Officers' Journal, campaigned not only for better 
conditions but also for an eradication of older paternalistic views of ratings. Such 
attitudes filtered through the fleet and served to limit the freedom of action of the 
executive officer by curtailing his power to exercise punishment and control over certain 
types of work. 
The most critical task for any professional group was to convince not merely the state 
but also a significant proportion of the population that it serves a particularly important 
and pressing social need. In other words, the group must have legitimacy in the eyes of 
85 Naval Warrant Officers' Journal, XV (February 1902), 13. 
76 
the public. The most readily available tool to such groups in Britain during this period 
was science and scientific training. If a group could identify scientific principles behind 
its work, it could attain a much better position. 86 
However, engineers found the ground more difficult when they encountered other, 
older groups with pre-existing mechanisms for eliminating the unqualified, that possessed 
high educational standards and that had the legitimacy of centuries of development. The 
R.N.'s executive officer corps comprised a profession with considerable power and 
exalted political connections. Naval officers were aides de camp to the monarch; retired 
or unemployed officers often served as members of Parliament; and the executive branch 
had powerful allies in both houses of Parliament, in the Press, at Court, and in industry 
and finance. 
This was the situation faced by marine engineers as they attempted to assert control 
over their sphere of expertise aboard ship. In the merchant marine, engineers were 
gradually asserting more authority over the machinery of vessels as steam replaced sail. 
They encountered opposition not so much from ship owners or even the masters of ships 
as from deck officers who saw the encroachment of the engineer as not only a threat to 
their authority but also to their continued employment.87 In the Navy the question took on 
86 Larson, Rise of Professionalism, 2. 
87 For instance, in 1899, in steam vessels over 2000 tons, the average first engineer earned about £18/10 per 
month while the fust officer in the same ship would earn £12. See, BPP, "Tables Showing the Progress of 
British Merchant Shipping," val. X:X:Vll, No. 218 (1900), 38-9. In regard to conflicts between deck and 
engineer officers see, H. Campbell McMurray, "Technology and Social Change at Sea: The Status and 
Position on Board of the Ship's Engineer, circa 1830-60," in R. Ommer and G. Panting (eds.), Working 
Men who Got Wet (St. John's, NL: Maritime History Group, 1980), 44-45; and Comad Dixon, "The Rise of 
the Engineer in the Nineteenth Century," in G. Jackson and D. Williams (eds.), Shipping, Technology and 
Imperialism (Aldershot, Rants: Scolar Press, 1996), 231-242. 
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a different meaning because in many ways the authority of the ship owner was vested in 
the Board of Admiralty, which was dominated by executive officers. Some were reluctant 
to accept the propaganda of the professional engineering organizations and openly 
doubted their overarching pretensions: "One might even hazard the suggestion that the 
doctrine is a mere piece of trades union bounce, by way of disseminating exaggerated 
notions of the importance of the engineering cult, and the attainments of its devotees."88 
Deep and extensive changes in British society had a significant impact on the 
professional executive officer corps. Most importantly, the second industrial revolution 
with its concomitant changes in materiel, organizational and administrative structure 
forced a fundamental readjustment of the corps' functions, education and claims to 
authority. These adjustments acquired urgency and scope through electoral reform, the 
rise of the popular mass press, an apparent increase in international tensions and a 
growing financial crisis. In light of these dramatic changes, the executive officer corps 
was systematically forced to redefine itself at an unprecedented pace. For the first time in 
a century the professional competence of the corps was under attack, not only from the 
politicians but also by elements within the service. During the Great War these tensions 
within the service triggered several responses by which the executive branch moved to re-
assert its primacy by, among other techniques, the virtual annexation of the engineering 
branch and the use of history as a form of social control. 
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"The Role ofthe Naval Engineer Officer," United Service Magazine, XLII (January 1911), 355. 
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To argue that Great Britain underwent dramatic social, economic and political changes in 
the closing decades of the nineteenth century is to state the obvious. These shifts played 
out in nearly all spheres of British national life, and the naval establishment was not 
immune. In naval affairs, changes on the surface were obvious as the Royal Navy was 
transformed from a fleet based upon the wooden walls of the ship of the line to steel and 
steam. Below the technological surface lay a host of social and political transformations. 
For instance, in the case of shipbuilding the nature of the skills required to build and 
maintain iron and steel hulls required vastly different training than those associated with 
the craft system of constructing wooden vessels. Similarly, the advent of steam machinery 
quickly showed that the use of "rule of thumb" and pragmatic reworking was not only 
wasteful but also often dangerous. 89 
The next chapter will discuss the Royal Navy's executive officer corps at the 
beginning of the period under review. The methods of selection, education and training of 
officers was particularly well suited to the experience of empire in mid century. However, 
the key changes that were occurring in Britain soon upset this satisfactory arrangement. 
89 Brown, Warrior to Dreadnought, 5. 
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Chapter lll 
The Nineteenth Century Officer Corps 
I regarded the commanding officer of Her Majesty's men of war as 
something quite apart from the ordinary run of human beings. I think I 
imagined them as fierce ogres whom one approached on one's hands 
and lrnees like the gilded image of King Nebuchadnezzar. 1 
I lrnow the Queen's Regulations and the Admiralty Instructions from 
clew to earring, and I tells [sic] you all that the Admiralty can do what 
they like with us. They can hang us, they can shoot us, and they can 
drown us. There's only two things they can't do to us: they can't boil 
us in the coppers and they can't put us in the family way. 2 
It is tempting to regard the nineteenth-century Royal Navy officer corps as a group 
of eccentrics in a surreal version of Gilbert & Sullivan's H.MS. Pinafore. The literature is 
full of irascible characters, from "Pompo" Heneage, who sent laundry home from the 
Pacific, to Prothero "the Bad," who kept his men in abject terror of his ferocious temper, 
to "Uncle Bill" Fisher, who while in the Mediterranean was the "commodore" of the 
"fishing fleet" where young ladies could find suitable respectable husbands.3 This portrait 
has been reinforced by an historiography that has accused the corps of incompetence and 
unbending conservatism. 4 
1 Taffrail, The Sub (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1940), 6. 
2 Humphrey H. Smith, An Admiral Never Forgets: Reminiscences of Over Thirty-Seven Years on the Active 
List of the Royal Navy (London: Seeley, Service & Co., 1936), 31-32. A Coxswain informs young 
midshipmen of the realities of the Service in the 1890s. 
3 For an example of this, see Geoffrey Lowis, Fabulous Admirals and Some Naval Fragments (London: 
Putnam, 1957). See also R.S. Bacon, A Naval Scrap Book, 1877-1900 (London: Hutchinson, 1940), 16-23; 
William James, The Sky was Always Blue (London: Methuen, 1951), 40; Andrew Cunningham, A Sailor's 
Odyssey (London: Hutchinson, 1951), 19; and James, Admiral Sir William Fisher (London: Macmillan, 
1943), 5. Admiral James commented that the service was leaving the "eccentric age." 
4 For an extreme example, see Stanley Bonnet, The Price of Admiralty: An Indictment of the Royal Navy, 
1805-1966 (London: Hale, 1966). 
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The Navy has appeared in this historiography as a musty organization officered by 
men more concerned with social activities than their work as seamen.5 Perhaps the most 
prominent example has been Arthur Marder, who argued that Admiral Sir John Fisher was 
the necessary catalyst of institutional change as he crusaded against class prejudice and 
inefficiency. This image has been reinforced by the literary efforts of disgruntled reformers 
like Admirals K.G.B. Dewar and Percy Scott and further buttressed by memoirs such as 
William Kennedy's that thoroughly detail the author's sporting adventures while serving at 
sea. 6 Contemporary commentators also provided ample grist for the mill. 7 
An example of this type of distortion has been the treatment of Sir John Fisher. 
More than eight decades after his death, books are still appearing that encapsulate the 
image the Admiral fashioned of himself.8 Indeed, Fisher's personality has continued to 
exert considerable influence over historians who have attempted to grasp his impact on 
5 Herbert King-Hall, Naval Memories and Traditions (London: Hutchinson, 1928), 112. "For, after all, no 
man can be proud ofbelonging to a dowdy ship any more than to a dowdy woman." 
6 K.G.B. Dewar, The Navy from Within (London: Gollancz, 1939); Admiral Sir Percy Scott, Fifty Years in 
the Royal Navy (London: John Murray, 1919); and William Kennedy, Sport in the Navy and Naval Yarns 
(Westminster: Constable, 1902). Memoirs, of course, were written for the wider market and were intended 
to entertain as well as inform. As Admiral C.C.P. Fitzgerald wrote, " ... but it would be a great mistake to 
suppose that we have nothing else to do, or even that shooting occupied any large proportion of our time. 
The explanation is that we naturally dwell upon the pleasant incidents in our naval careers, and skip over 
and try to forget the unpleasant ones." See C.C.P. Fitzgerald, From Sail to Steam: Naval Recollections, 
1878-1905 (London: Edward Arnold, 1916), 15. 
7 Indeed one officer was so exasperated by such a writer he was compelled to respond. A Simple Sailor, 
"Our Naval Officers: A Reply to Nauticus," United Service Magazine, VIII, No. 785 {1894), 726. "This is a 
very, very sad state of things. That we had neither ships that would swim, guns that would shoot, nor men 
that would fight, was already known. That the British Admiralty was a very hot-bed of jobbery has been 
proved over and over again. Does not every schoolboy know that once an officer enters its portals he parts 
company with his brains and ceases forthwith to conduct himself like a sane person, or even after the 
manner of an Englishman?" 
8 Geoffrey Penn, Infighting Admirals: Fisher's Feud with Beresford and the Reactionaries (London: Leo 
Cooper, 2000). 
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policy. At least one of the reasons is not hard to discern: Fisher's correspondence is fun to 
read; his papers are full of pungent commentary; and he was supremely confident in his 
views.9 Also, Fisher's leadership at the Admiralty was pivotal in the development of all 
aspects of policy in response to changing circumstances. His revolutionary reform in 
response to and, in some cases, in anticipation of the changing demands on the Royal 
Navy became a lightning rod for discontent within the officer corps. 
Unfortunately, the result is a distorted image of the nineteenth-century Navy. 
Consequently, historians have tended to paint officers who challenged Fisher as 
reactionaries. What is forgotten is that while Fisher was busily engaged in presiding over 
reforms to the officer corps, he was striking at the heart of the unwritten pact between the 
state and the officer, often in a method that appeared to be arbitrary. Officers who had 
invested their lives in the service had grave misgivings about some of Fisher's policies. 
Furthermore, in the wake of the two world wars, historians have also tended more 
frequently to evaluate the Victorian Navy in relation to great power conflict. While 
strategic deterrence was always important, the Navy also existed for other purposes. 
Naval historians have insufficiently addressed the R.N.'s support of the British imperial 
9 It is interesting to note that many people still claim that Fisher is a neglected figure in British history 
despite four biographies, two published collections of papers and a multiplicity of studies examining the 
central role he had in policy. For an example of the flavour of Fisher's own writing, see Churchill College, 
Cambridge, Archives Centre (CCAC), J.A. Fisher Papers (FISR), 1/4/123, Fisher to Haldane, 3 May 1904: 
"Ten years experience of the Admiralty and fifty in the navy .. . has convinced me that for Reform in the 
Navy to be effective it must not be previously ventilated. This is contrary to the practice and experience of 
you shore-going people ... You can agitate about it till you are black in the face, it's no use! The First Sea 
Lord is the only man in creation who can effect the reduction of the Income Tax to 3d. in the pound! And 
you must let him alone to do it himself! But you must hang on to him like grim death and shout like blazes 
'Great is Diana ofthe Ephesians! ' so as to give him the prestige to carry it through."9 
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enterprise. Still immersed in a Mahanian paradigm, many naval historians seem unable to 
comprehend that navies exist for more than just fighting battles. 10 
Barry Gough and others have demonstrated, however, that the Navy underpinned 
the political economy of Pax Britannica. 11 Indeed, Roger Morriss has gone so far as to 
argue that the foundations of the modem British state rested on the provision of naval 
protection. 12 The Navy was vital for duties as diverse as the suppression of the slave trade 
and piracy, the enforcement of unequal treaties with "lesser" peoples, and the carriage of 
valuables. 13 These activities required officers to have skills beyond combat. 14 Officers, 
particularly on distant stations, had to respond to varied conditions that called for political 
judgment, diplomacy and decisions about the use of force. Mistakes on the periphery that 
10 A move in the right direction has been made, for instance, in the work of John Beeler, British Naval 
Policy in the Gladstone-Disraeli Era, I866-I890 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 1-5; and 
Bernard Semmel, Liberalism and Naval Strategy: Ideology, Interest and Sea Power during the Pax 
Britannica (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986). 
11 Barry Gough, "Profit and Power: Informal Empire, the Navy and Latin America," in R.E. Dumett ( ed.), 
Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism (London: Longmans, 1999). See also Gough, Gunboat 
Frontier: British Maritime Authority and North West Coast Indians, 1846-1890 (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 1984); Mark C. Hunter, "The Political Economy of Anglo-American Naval 
Relations: Pirates, Slavers and the Equatorial Atlantic, 1819-1863" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Hull, 2003); 
and Basil Greenhill and Ann Giffard, Steam, Politics and Patronage: The Transformation of the Royal 
Navy, I815-I85 4 (London: Conway Press, 1994 ). 
12 Roger Morriss, Naval Power and British Culture, I760-I850: Public Trust and Government Ideology 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 1-2. Linda Colley has gone even further in suggesting moves in defence against 
an identifiable "other" was a feature of the foundation of"Britishness." See Linda Colley, Britons: Forging 
the Nation, 1707-I837 (London: Pirnlico, 2003), 1-9. 
13 Barry Gough, "Specie Conveyance from the West Coast of Mexico in British Warships," Mariner 's 
Mirror, LXIX, No.4 (1983), 419-433. Naval Officers collected three-quarters of one percent of the amount 
of valuables carried which was split between the commanding officer, commander-in-chief and Greenwich 
Hospital. For an example, see Great Britain, Public Record Office (PRO), Admiralty Papers (ADM) 1/6557, 
where Lieutenant M. Seymour in 1880 received £37/10 for freighting gold between Accra and Lagos in 
West Africa. 
14 Gerard NoeL "Arma Pacis Fulcra," Journal of the Royal United Services Institution (RUSI), XXII, No. 95 
(1878), 477. "An executive naval Officer to be perfect must indeed be a marvel. He should combine 
wisdom with prudence, energy, and decision. He should possess nerve, coolness, fearlessness, and the 
strongest sense ofhonour." 
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necessitated the deployment of reinforcements at a cost to the Exchequer were 
deprecated. Still, naval forces were inexpensive relative to alternative means of power 
projection; they were reliable; and they were omnipresent. As the Radical Parliamentarian 
W.S. Lindsay wrote in 1870: 
We possess elements of power not enjoyed by any other country; 
these and our wealth are in a great degree the true measure of our 
strength. Let us then consider how we can best utilise them in the 
emergency of war, so as to render less necessary the maintenance 
during peace of an expensive standing force, which interferes with 
our industry the source of our wealth, and by increased and 
permanent taxation curtails our means and subsequently our power 
in the time of need. Voting supplies for war during the time of 
peace, so far from resembling the premium of insurance which 
prudent men pay for the protection of their property is a too 
common argument in favour of extravagant estimates, should, I 
think, rather be considered as depreciating the value of the stock 
which we ought to husband. 15 
Lindsay argued that large fleets were an expensive luxury that did not square with 
Britain's peacetime requirements. The R.N. was an essential part of the liberal imperial 
order that provided the essential armed support at the lowest cost. 16 
The Royal Navy also served to preserve the political status quo and gentlemanly 
values. As well, it provided a competence for gentlemen at relatively little expense and a 
career commensurate with their social status. Entry fees and education for aspiring naval 
officers were comparatively inexpensive compared with the public schools and the 
15 Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers (BPP), "Navy Officers and Seamen- A Memorandum 
by W.S. Lindsay," vol. XLIV, No. 238 (1870), 695. Contrast this to later pronouncements where naval 
strength was "merely a matter of peace insurance." Archibald Hurd, "Coal, Trade, and the Empire," 
Nineteenth Century, XLIV (November 1898), 719. 
16 P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000 (2nd ed., London: Longmans, 2002), 385-
386. 
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Army. 17 The sons of the elite (or those who aspired to the elite) were therefore not only a 
safe and reliable source of supply for naval leadership but also were subsidized by their 
families. Hence, the national interest could be upheld at the lowest cost to the state. Only 
at the end of the century that this paradigm was fundamentally challenged. By then, too, 
the process of transition to the modem battle fleet and Mahanian doctrine was largely 
completed in the decade before 1914. 
The Contract between the Officer and the State 
As Jan Glete has postulated, the basis of the establishment of permanent armed forces in 
early modem Europe was a set of interlocking contractual relationships between the state, 
society and the officer. 18 The essence of this in the case of the late nineteenth-century 
Royal Navy was as follows: the state offered commissions that were limited to select 
elements of society. 19 These commissions in tum opened the door to command, rank and 
social position. Naval officers were also given certain visible marks of authority, such as 
the right to wear a uniform?0 The state also subsidized the officer's education as a cadet 
17 David Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy (New York: Vintage, 1999), 265. See 
also Douglas J.C. Compton, "Shortage of Officers in the Army," Journal of the Royal United Services 
Institution (RUSI), L, No. 340 (1906), 787-788. 
18 Jan Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-
Military States (London: Routledge, 2002), 4-5. This analysis holds despite the arguments of the Admiralty 
that no effective contract existed as in the arguments in response put forward by the parents of George 
Archer-Shee, who had been summarily dismissed from Osborne College in 1910. "Petition of Right: Naval 
Cadet," The Times, 13 July 1910. See also, PRO, ADM 118370/65, Memorandum on Retirement and 
Promotion of Officers, 1914. 
19 Scott W.H. Gray, "On Entry and Training of the Naval Executive," RUSI, XXXV, No. 165 (1891), 1153. 
20 Great Britain, Parliament, Public General Acts, "An Act to Regulate and Restrict the Wearing of Naval 
and Military Uniforms, 24 August 1894," 121. Section 3 of the Act imposed sanction on improper use of 
the uniform. A person not so entitled who wore the uniform "under such circumstances as to be likely to 
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and bore the costs of subsequent training. Honourable employment and a retaining fee in 
the form of half pay for unemployed officers were provided. Further, the state held out 
reasonable chances of promotion, the possibility of distinction and the chance to be 
knighted or even ennobled. At the end of their active service life, officers also received a 
pension for life. 21 Moreover, the naval profession was a career where an officer could 
exercise judgment in the formation and execution of policy. It also confirmed his 
gentlemanly status and bound him to the British political structure. 22 This was reinforced 
by giving officers the power in effect to be lawmakers and judges within their own 
service and to rule ratings with semi-feudal authority. There was also the power of 
patronage that enabled influential officers to find places for their sons or those of their 
friends. Naval officers generally regarded themselves not as servants of the state but as 
semi-independent gentlemen providing an essential service to the community in exchange 
for fees. 
Benefits included the opportunity to pursue gentlemanly activities such as hunting 
and to travel the world at public expense. In the words of Admiral Sir William James, "I 
bring contempt upon that uniform or dress" committed an act punishable by a £10 fine or thirty days 
imprisonment. 
2 1 Retirement pay for a lieutenant with maximum seniority amounted to about £300 per annum, which was a 
substantial amount considering that the average British skilled worker might at best receive £100 per 
annum; E.J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire (London: Penguin, 1969), 154. Considering the expenses 
required to reflect the status of a commissioned officer meant that it was difficult to make ends meet, 
particularly if the retiree was placed in the situation of having to pay for the education of children and had 
to maintain a "suitable" home. Indeed, this benefit was regarded as the foundations of the capacity of the 
officer corps. "Admiralty," Reasons for an Inquiry into the Position of the Executive Officers of the Royal 
Navy (W estrninster: Thomas Brettell, 1861 ), 3. "In order to secure zeal and efficient, it will be necessary to 
ensure to officers reasonable promotion, frequent promotion, suitable pay, and an adequate retirement." 
22 See Henry T. A. Bosanquet, "Advantages of the Service," in Ernest J. Felix, How to Enter the Royal Navy 
(London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co., 1899), 1-3. The author of the article was a naval 
lieutenant and son of Admiral Day Bosanquet, who served as Commander-in-Chief of the Channel 
Squadron. 
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do not think such a perfect balance of work and play could have been maintained in any 
other profession. Officers and men were always busy as bees during working hours but 
their interludes for relaxation were frequent and they were carried free of charge, to 
places beyond the reach of any one but a millionaire yacht-owner."23 Officers also had the 
privilege of duty-free liquor.24 A naval life was adventurous, and officers epitomized the 
self-confidence of British imperialism.25 Officers were not only officials of empire but 
also members of the elite aboard ship. As well, they were able to experience status and 
power that would not otherwise have been available. On the eve of the Great War, when 
not even the landed aristocracy could have their workers flogged, officers still had this 
power in the Navy (albeit restricted to non-whites).26 
In exchange for these benefits, the naval officer had to accept a specialized 
education that limited opportunities for outside employment.27 The junior officer had to 
endure low pay relative to the mandatory mess fees, uniforms and incidental fees such as 
23 James, Sky Was Always Blue, 3. 
24 PRO, ADM 1/8204, Customs and Excise to Admiralty, 3 May 1910. 
25 For an example, see Emle Chatfield, The Navy and Defence (London: Heinemann, 1942), 37. In company 
offoreign officers, a groups ofRN officers boisterously sang the following: 
"We are getting it by degrees, we are getting it by degrees, 
We get a bit here, we get a bit there, 
The Union Jack is everywhere, 
And now and then we give it a gentle squeeze. 
We haven' t got the whole world yet but we're getting it by degrees." 
26 PRO, ADM 118404/450, "Refusal of Arabs and Somalis to work, 1914." On the Cape Station Arab and 
Somali stokers refused to serve in the Atlantic as they argued that their terms of service bound them for 
employment in the Indian Ocean. Admiralty approval was quickly obtained to employ the cat. Furthermore, 
a pattern of cat o' nine tails was kept aboard H.M. Ships in 1879; ADM 116/183, "Corporal Punishment, 
the Cat - Pattern and Supplies, 1879;" and ADM 1/7918, Abolition of Flogging in Naval Prisons, 1906. 
27 For an example see, J.K. Laughton, "Naval Education," RUSI, XXVI, No. 115 (1882), 362, comments by 
Commander Dawson. 
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laundry and those associated with "gentlemanly" pursuits?8 Overseas commissions and 
financial strictures meant that for junior officers, marriage was generally unaffordable. 
Officers were also expected to risk their lives in the service. For instance, of the January 
1885 Britannia term of fifty-two cadets, twelve were killed in action or died while on 
active service. Rear Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot was killed at Jutland, another man lost 
his life at Coronel in November 1914, a third perished when his ship blew up at Scapa 
Flow in 1917, two others died by drowning, and the remainder passed away due to illness 
or other causes.29 Similarly, in the Victoria disaster of 1893, eight out of fourteen 
embarked midshipmen were lost.30 There was also risk ashore. For example, during the 
Egyptian intervention of 1882 Colonel Arabi's forces captured Midshipman Dudley de 
Chair.31 Mundane duties such as coaling were also fraught with risk to junior officers, as 
several were killed or severely injured. 32 Nor were senior officers insulated from danger; 
Commodore James Goodenough who was killed in a scuffle with Pacific islanders while 
serving as Commander-in-Chief on the Australian Station.33 Indeed, the danger involved 
28 A.B. Tulloch, "The Education and Professional Instruction of Officers,'' RUSI, XVII, No. 74 (1873), 767. 
"It is certainly impossible to appreciate too highly that peculiar training at public schools which develops 
those qualities so requisite in an Officer, viz, gentlemanly feeling and manner, and a love of amusements 
requiring physical strength and skill ... " 
29 Royal Naval Museum (RNM), Naval Review Papers (NRP), Record of January 1885 Britannia Term. 
30 Dudley de Chair, The Sea is Strong (London: Harrap, 1961), 99, Lieutenant Morgan Singer to de Chair, 
27 June 1893. A mistaken order issued by Vice Admiral Sir George Tyron resulted in the collision of his 
flagship Victoria and the Camperdown off the coast of Lebanon. 
31 Ibid., 55. 
32 BPP, "Particulars of the More Serious Accidents Which Have Occurred During Coaling ofH.M. Ships in 
the Years 1910, 1911, and 1912," vol. Lill, Cd. 6634 (1912-1913), 433-435. 
33 William Goodenough, A Rough Record (London: Hutchinson, 1943), 10. 
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in a naval career was seen as a justification of the status of the commissioned officer.34 
Moreover, there was no guarantee of promotion after lieutenant: there was perhaps a one-
in-three chance of selection to the rank of commander, and another gauntlet was faced in 
the race for the rank of captain. Once an officer became a captain, he would advance 
automatically to flag rank through seniority provided he obtained command experience. 
In short, there was a bargain between the state and the officer (or his family) who 
subsidized his own service in exchange for prospects for advancement and prestige. 35 It 
should not be surprising that officers who had endured hardships and still managed to 
secure promotion were deeply concerned about changes in the conditions of service. This 
was exacerbated because the social prestige of rank carried into retirement and also 
affected their power of patronage to advance the careers of those in whom they were 
interested. 36 
Self-Perception 
Nineteenth-century naval officers perceived themselves as professional seamen. But the 
professionalism they asserted was neither narrow nor overly specialized. They did not 
34 Lionel Dawson, Sound of the Guns: Being an Account of the Wars and Service of Admiral Sir Walter 
Cowan (Oxford: Pen in Hand, 1949), 3. Indeed, Captain Edmund Fremantle had to admonish his 
subordinates for risking their lives in attempts to rescue those who had fallen overboard. PRO, ADM 
1/6557, Fremantle to Admiralty, 10 February 1880, "I have at the same time pointed out to the Ships' 
Company that wild and reckless risk of their own lives by jumping overboard is as reprehensible as it is 
useless, and that only under certain circumstances should a good swimmer throw himself into the water, 
when he should do so at the right time without any hesitation." 
35 Gray, "On the Entry and Training of the Naval Executive," 1153. 
36 E.A. Inglefield, Words of Advice to Young Naval Officers (Liverpool: Webb & Hunt, 1864), 100, "When 
a man toils for an object when his hair has become sprinkled with gray [sic], and his eyes dimmed by long 
service .. . he thinks highly of the prize he has won; he guards it carefully, and having long watched for it, he 
knows all its value and attributes." 
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think of themselves merely as warriors but also as representatives of their country. One 
historian's commentary seemed to compare the nineteenth-century Navy to Starfleet in 
the popular television series, Star Trek. 37 Like Captain Kirk, Royal Navy officers were to 
be men of the world who were equipped to deal with questions of war and peace. For this, 
professional standing was obviously required, as was a level of social refinement. Status 
was needed to deal with diplomatic problems. Indeed, much of Britain's stature in the 
wider world was based on what Admiral Fitzgerald called " ... that very real but rather 
indescribable thing we call British prestige. "38 The naval officer was the embodiment of 
that standing on the world stage. 
Wide knowledge of the world and assurance of position were vital. In a lecture 
before the Royal United Services Institution in 1871 Captain James Goodenough 
protested against what he saw as the over-specialization of naval officers through a 
narrow concentration on the study of mathematics on board Britannia. He also expressed 
concern that the same thing would happen at the new Royal Naval College at Greenwich, 
which was then under discussion. 
It is weakening the desire for knowledge and self-improvement in 
naval Officers; it is tending to narrow and circumscribe the idea of 
responsibility of a naval Commander for all things coming within 
his ken, and to lower his conception of his own position from that 
of a representative of his country in all parts of the world, an agent 
of her policy, and a guardian of her commerce, to that of being a 
mere executive tool whose only argument is force. 39 
37 Andrew Gordon, "Discussion of the Papers Written by Geoffrey Till and Eric Grove," in James Goldrick 
and John Hattendorf ( eds.), Mahan is not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir 
Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1993), 260-262. 
38 Fitzgerald, Sail to Steam, vii. 
39 James Goodenough, "The Preliminary Education of Naval Officers," RUSI, XV, No. 64 (1871), 339-340. 
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Hence, the characteristics required of naval officers were of a different order than merely 
the ability to employ violence. The executive branch conceived of itself as the 
embodiment of British sea power and almost had a sense that professionalism and the 
amateur ideal of the English gentleman could co-exist there. 
The personal qualifications expected of British naval officers broadly matched 
those of "gentlemen." According to Admiral A.P. Ryder, these included cheerful 
submission to superiors; self-respect; independence of character; kindness and protection 
of the weak; readiness to forgive offence; desire to conciliate the differences of others; 
and unflinching truthfulness.4° Current fashion is to scorn such pronouncements, but there 
is little doubt that officers, for the most part, were convinced of their validity. Admiral 
Sir Astley Cooper Key, speaking to a RUSI meeting in 1874, reinforced the importance of 
such intangible qualifications: 
I should be very sorry if young Officers should take away from 
this theatre the idea that 'the honour of our flag' is a mere 
sentiment .... The real meaning of that expression in time of war is 
far deeper; it is the first thing to be considered. The first thought of 
a Commanding Officer in any difficult situation should be, What 
will be for the "honour of our flag?" Having considered that, and 
having provided for it, he may look for the safety of his ships, and 
after that the safety of his men's lives.41 
In this way gentlemanly characteristics could be perpetuated and a balance struck 
between the individual and the collective. While an officer was required to submit to his 
40 Ryder, "Higher Education," 738. 
41 J.K. Laughton, "The Scientific Study of Naval History," RUSI, XVIII, No. 79 (1874), 535-536, 
comments by Admiral Sir Astley Cooper Key. 
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superiors, he was required to be aware of his position as a holder of the Queen's 
commission. He was expected to exude certain qualities, to have a strong sense of 
personal honour and to possess physical and moral courage. 42 H. W. Richmond once 
quoted an old admiral to the effect that "an officer who don't [sic] value his own honour 
is not the likeliest man to defend the honour of his country. "43 The example of a 
Lieutenant Brand was a case in point. In the 1860s, Mr. Buxton, M.P. publicly attacked 
Brand's role in a court martial proceeding. In response, Brand dashed off a threatening 
letter to the M.P. and was compelled to explain his actions by the Admiralty. Brand 
wrote: 
In the report of Mr. Buxton's speech, I read statements respecting 
myself which stung me to the quick, accusations of inhumanity, want 
of personal honour, and suggestions of levity and unfairness of my 
conduct as president of the Court Martial, which, spoken in the most 
public place in the world, where I could not answer him, in my 
absence, and under the circumstances of great public excitement, 
wounded and irritated me to such an extent, as to make me overstep 
the bounds of propriety, and to resent what I should have left 
. d 44 unnotlce . 
Also important was that these gentlemen who inhabited the quarterdeck had at 
least the trappings of "independence." This standing was established by the financial 
requirements of a naval career, which acted as filters to ensure that only suitable persons 
were recruited. Indeed, for the most important posts private income was a virtual 
42 Edward Bradford, The Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Knyvet Wilson (London: John Murray, 
1923), 97. On the day that Admiral Wilson received the Victoria Cross for his gallantry in action, his diary 
read: "June 6- Docked ship, received VC." 
43 National Maritime Museum (NMM), H.W. Richmond Papers (RIC) 7/1, Richmond to Henderson, 18 
February 1919 
44 BPP, "Lt. Brand- Copy of Recent Correspondence Between the Admiralty and Lt. Brand, R.N.," vol. 
XLIV, No. 108 (1867), 513. 
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requirement. Heavy costs associated with social duties and hospitality could make deep 
inroads into an officer's pay. This was institutionalized in the form of monthly mess fees, 
uniforms, kit and equipment. In many cases officers even rented cabin furniture from the 
Admiralty.45 Until1903, they were also required to pay stamp duty on their commissions, 
not just upon promotion but also on every occasion they were posted to a new vessel.46 
Further, there were extraneous expenses if an officer engaged in sport ashore. Fees, 
especially in the junior ranks, could easily exceed an officer's total pay. Throughout the 
period, there were several cases where officers turned down highly prized billets because 
they could not afford to fulfil the associated social obligations.47 
This capacity to celebrate both the collective and the individual provided 
considerable scope for the exercise of personal initiative. This, however, eroded rapidly 
when the organization of the Navy shifted by the turn of the century to a concentration on 
great power conflicts and the consequent centralization of control under the leadership of 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby. Clockwork-like tactics, combined with 
the mechanization of the fleet, disturbed many officers. Together with the importance of 
fitting a certain social profile, the result was a disease that Admiral Godfrey called "Very 
Senior Officer Veneration" which, in his view, resulted in all sorts ofstupidity.48 
While having a sense of position gave officers considerable confidence, it 
unfortunately also could lead to considerable arrogance. One story that circulated about 
45 PRO, ADM 116/315, Mess Articles and Furnishing of Officers' Cabins, 1890; and ADM 116/326, 
Furnishing of Officers' Cabins, 1891. 
46 PRO, ADM 1/7712, Treasury to Admiralty and War Office, 9 July 1903. 
47 E.R. Fremantle, The Navy As I Have Known It, 1849-1899 (London: Cassel, 1904), 142. 
48 CCAC, GDFY 111, Autobiography of J.H. Godfrey, 41. 
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Rosslyn Wemyss concerned his rejection in rather forceful terms of First Lord Reginald 
McKenna's offer to make him his private naval secretary.49 When the First Lord hauled 
Wemyss on the carpet, McKenna informed him that he could be broken. Thereafter 
"Wemyss drew himself up and surveyed little McKenna as if he were some curious 
insect. 'You dirty little lawyer ... how dare you speak to me like that? I shall certainly 
report your insolence to the king. "'50 Whether or not the story was accurate (most likely it 
was not), it still reflects the attitudes of many officers. Lesser mortals such as colonial 
governors could also be handled roughly. Reginald Bacon recalled one admiral refusing a 
governor's invitation to dine on the Queen's Birthday on the pretence of having a 
headache. While in the ordinary course of affairs a headache might impede someone from 
fulfilling their social obligations, it is doubtful if even a person as exalted as a flag officer 
could determine that he would have such a condition two weeks in advance. 51 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century the prestige of the service increased 
dramatically as public attention became increasingly dominated by the "new imperialism" 
and the significant place that fleets played in advancing the influence of states. Further, in 
Britain the Navy capitalized on the growing prestige of the monarchy. As the executive 
officer corps became increasingly identified with the Crown and the aristocracy, however, 
it proved more difficult to sell the image of professionalism to the general public.52 
49 Reginald McKenna was First Lord of the Admiralty between 1908 and 1911. 
50 A. McDermott, "Some Naval Characters I have Known," Mariner's Mirror, XLV, No.4 (1958), 284. 
51 Bacon, Naval Scrap-Book, 18. 
52 David Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 
264-280. 
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Although many changes had occurred, the service remained a conservative force in 
British society. On the other hand, it attempted to centre itself on a deliberately defined, 
in some ways invented, tradition that suited those who dominated the Navy. This asserted 
the authority and prestige of the officer corps in the restless closing decades of the 
century. 
One of roots of this prestige resided in the concept of service and personal loyalty 
to the Crown. As the actual power of the ruler continued to wane, the social prestige of 
the monarchy was elevated as a supposedly unifying element in a diverse empire. David 
Cannadine examined the scope of this shift in a recent book in which he argued that social 
class was at least as important to imperial policy-making as race. 53 Regardless, the corps 
was part and parcel of the concept of imperial prestige. By the end of the century the 
possession of a naval education was considered normal for royalty, and the connection to 
the officer corps was cemented. For example, Prince Louis of Battenberg, a relation by 
marriage to the Royal Family, became an admiral and First Sea Lord before being 
hounded out of office during World War I. 54 Even more important was the education in 
the 1870s of Princes Albert Victor and George at Britannia, where they received the 
standard education of an executive officer. Prince George, who became second in line to 
the throne upon the death of his older brother in 1892, pursued an active naval career. 
When he became King in 1910, he was deeply interested in the Navy and maintained a 
professional connection with it throughout his reign. His two sons, Edward and Albert 
53 David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire (London: Allen Lane, 2001). 
54 The family name was changed to Mountbatten in 1917 and Prince Louis took the title Marquess of 
Milford Haven. His son, Lord Louis Mountbatten also became an Admiral of the Fleet and First Sea Lord in 
the 1960s. PRO, ADM 118490/132, Prince Louis of Battenberg- Relinquishing of Titles, 1917. 
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(the future Edward VIII and George VI), also entered the Navy.55 This royal connection 
did much to cement the prestige of the officer corps. This was enhanced further by the 
creation of the post of Naval Aides-de-Camp (A.D.C.) to the monarch. Promising 
captains were made A.D.C.'s, and a senior admiral, if not the First Sea Lord himself, was 
usually granted the title of First and Principal A.D.C. These court appointments required 
considerable private means, and officers who were less well off were often given the 
option of accepting a G.S.P.56 The benefit of this system was obvious: the officers 
involved had direct access to the monarch, whose influence in matters relating to the 
service remained considerable as late as World War I. The support of Edward VII to some 
degree underwrote the reforms introduced by Fisher in the first decade of the twentieth 
century. George V prevailed in a battle with Winston Churchill in 1912 when the First 
Lord attempted to have two dreadnoughts of the Queen Elizabeth class named Pitt and 
Cromwell. When the King refused to countenance a ship named after a regicide, Churchill 
backed down. 57 The monarch also had some influence in distributing commands in the 
higher echelons of the service and could help foster the careers of those he favoured. 58 
55 Indeed, the future George VI was a Midshipman in the Grand Fleet during the Battle of Jutland in 1916; 
for a record of the future monarch's service, see PRO, ADM 1/24712. 
56 PRO, ADM 1/8385/119, Good Service Pensions, Memorandum by C. Walker, Head of CW Branch, 
Admiralty, 18 December 1913. "It is understood that Captains are allowed to express their wishes privately 
as to their choice between a G.S.P. and an A.D.C., and therefore, other things being equal a G.S.P. 
generally falls to the Officer who is less well off." 
57 CCAC, CHAR 13/11, Lord Starnfordham to Winston Churchill, 4 November 1912; and ibid., Minute by 
Prince Louis ofBattenberg on the naming ofBattleships, 6 November 1912. A ship named Cromwell might 
also have inflamed Irish public opinion. 
58 Gordon, Rules of the Game, 215-243. 
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Personal loyalty often tended to be conflated into support for the monarchical 
form of government. While he was First Lord, Churchill, after prompting from the king, 
refused permission for the Training Squadron to visit Lisbon, since Portugal had just 
undergone a revolution that had included the assassination of a monarch. "I think it very 
insulting to the Officers and Men of His Majesty's Navy," Churchill wrote, "that they 
should be forced to interchange courtesies and hospitalities with a Government of ruffians 
who have murdered one King and driven out another."59 Personal connections to the 
monarch permitted officers to think of themselves as above politics and as guardians of 
. 1 . 60 the natwna mterest. 
The rising importance of the navies of other countries permitted the corps to feed 
off its prestige, since it would have been intolerable for British officers to have lesser 
status than foreigners. With the publication of Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power upon 
History and the growth in importance of imposing battle fleets, other navies began to try 
to emphasize their own prestige. Kaiser William II, in particular, doted on his navy and 
often invited Royal Navy officers to dine aboard his yacht. Taking advantage of his 
honorary rank as a British Admiral of the Fleet, the Emperor sometimes carried out snap 
inspections of British warships. This enhanced image of the Navy served a multiplicity of 
59 CCAC, CHAR 13/13, Winston Churchill to First Sea Lord, 10 September 1912. 
60 In practice, naval officers generally gravitated toward the Conservatives and Unionists rather than to the 
Liberals. A considerable number of retired naval officers served in Parliament throughout this period, 
including Commander Carylon Bellairs, Rear Admiral Edward Field and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Hedworth 
Meux. Lord Charles Beresford, the darling of the Unionists and the Navy League, was the only officer still 
on the active list who served in Parliament between commissions; with the exception of Bellairs, all were 
either Conservatives or Unionists. After the war, political activity became somewhat varied for retired 
officers from Vice Admiral Kenneth Dewar running for Independent Labour to Admiral Sir Barry Domvile 
being friendly with Nazis in the 1930s. 
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purposes for the executive branch, but most important it gave them elevated prestige 
within the naval service and increased their hold on the levers of power. 
Connected to patronage was the conception of naval officers as semi-independent 
contractors. Officers never viewed themselves as employees of the state or mere 
executive agents of government policy. Rather, they believed that they represented the 
elite of British society and took considerable pride in being "above" the ordinary. The 
very structure of the service helped to foster the illusion of officers being independent of 
the government that employed them. Although most officers were forced to live for the 
most part on their pay, the illusion of independence from state interference was preserved 
by a number of traditions. Officers continued to pay mess fees, to pay for their own outfit 
and kit and even to rent cabin furniture while at sea. As well, their parents or "friends" 
paid a substantial share of the cost of their education and training. All this helped to 
maintain an aura of independence. 
Indeed, one of the chief obstacles that the Admiralty encountered in regulating the 
officer corps was the common perception that officers were not merely employees of the 
state. Officers could resign their commissions or refuse appointments, and they enjoyed 
considerable latitude while serving at sea. In exchange for tolerating sometimes 
infrequent employment, poor pay and indifferent living conditions aboard ship, they came 
to value other non-tangible rewards. These included a suitable education, the opportunity 
for promotion, independent command, prize and freight money, duty-free liquor, a good 
pension and prestige. The Navy, although a hard life that offered little financial reward, 
provided a form of honourable employment. Altering terms of service and playing with 
the rules of retirement were delicate tasks. Since the Navy was dependent on persons of 
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semi-independent means to provide sons to serve as officers, it had to balance the needs 
of the service, the expectations of the officer corps and financial considerations. The 
constant need to balance these forces acted as a brake on the Admiralty's ability to alter 
the working conditions of naval officers. Even as late as the First World War one of the 
major impediments to the effective introduction of lower-deck commissions was the 
inability of the Treasury to increase the pay of junior officers. The Royal Navy could not 
compel the sons of gentlemen to serve but had to extend certain financial and psychic 
rewards to entice suitable men. 
Selection, Promotion and Patronage 
Entry into the executive officer corps, to use a Victorian turn of phrase, was by 
appointment only. The obvious qualification was that a proposed candidate should be a 
British subject. But according to the 1893 Queen's Regulations and Admiralty 
Instructions he was also to be of pure European descent. 61 Further, candidates for a 
cadetship had to be nominated by either the First Lord or a senior naval officer. The 
difficulty of obtaining a nomination was a constant problem even for prominent families 
attempting to place their sons in the Navy. For instance, when Oswald Frewen, a cousin 
of Winston Churchill, joined a naval crammer without a nomination his mother was 
61 PRO, ADM 116/10, Revision ofQR&AI, 1893. This rule was not relaxed even during the pressing times 
when in 1916 an Eton- and Oxford-educated Indian attempted to obtain a temporary RNVR commission; 
ADM 118545/313, Question as to whether British Subjects of Parsee Origin are eligible for temporary 
Commissions, 1916. However, a white American, whose parents had been British subjects prior to 
becoming American citizens, was considered eligible for Dartmouth in the regular system of entry; ADM 
118653/258. 
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forced to intervene with the First Lord directly. 62 There were also places reserved for the 
sons of officers who died on active service, colonial gentlemen recommended by the 
Colonial Office and promising cadets from the merchant service training ships on the 
Thames and Merseyside. For the most part these special appointments were exempt from 
the provisions of the competitive examinations introduced in the 1870s. 
Prior to that time, officers could nominate cadets who, after a cursory 
examination, were entered directly to the training ship Britannia and then sent to sea to 
prepare for their lieutenant's exam. Yet even after passing out, they would have to wait to 
gain promotion until a vacancy opened on the lieutenants' list through death, promotion 
or retirement. In the 1870s it became apparent that closer management of the executive 
list was required, and the Admiralty searched for a way to reduce the numbers of entrants 
so that they did not languish as subordinate officers for indefmite periods. Another 
concern was that whatever was put in place should not interfere with the capacity of 
officers to advance the careers of their friends. The mechanism eventually adopted was 
the use of a competitive examination set by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which 
managed the entry system from 1886 to 1902.63 While candidates still had to be 
nominated, the Admiralty was permitted to set the number of cadets to be recruited based 
upon calculations of future requirements. Hence, executive privilege was preserved, and 
the needs of the service were met. The system permitted the nomination of as many as 
62 Frewen, A Sailor's Soliloquy, 35. 
63 The Civil Service Commission was established in 1855 to regularize entry and promotion with the British 
civil service. It laid down standards and managed the system of competitive examinations. See Great 
Britain, Reference Division, Central Office of Information, The British Civil Service (London: H.M.S.O., 
1974), 3-4. 
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140 candidates every six months, but since over half in practice were made by the First 
Lord the process soon aroused the disapproval of many officers because, in their view, it 
politicized the selection process. 64 
One "problem" with the system was the advent of the "crammers," private 
institutions (often run by former naval instructors) where boys desiring a naval career 
were sent to prepare for the competitive examinations. Although the crammers were 
expensive, they were viewed as necessary evils because most schools did not provide the 
necessary background in the sciences and applied mathematics. 65 A love-hate relationship 
with these establishments soon developed that lasted until the introduction of the Selbome 
Scheme of 1902. In the opinion of many officers who passed through this system, the 
crammers emphasized learning by rote and set young cadets into a "mental groove" that 
limited adaptability to changing professional circumstances.66 Despite such criticisms, the 
Admiralty was willing to accept the system since the exams conferred legitimacy by 
making it appear that officers were being recruited on merit in a visible and open 
64 A.P. Ryder, "The Higher Education of Naval Officers," RUSI, XV, No. 65 (1871), 736. It would be 
laughable to presume that politics had not played a role in the selection previously. For instance, John 
Fisher received his nomination from Admiral Sir William Parker, the last of Nelson's "band of brothers." 
He was then required to write a simple examination involving notation and basic arithmetic. R.S. Bacon, 
Lord Fisher of Kilverstone (2 vols., London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1929), I, 5-6. Further, promotion and · 
selection for desirable billets was also on the basis of patronage. Admirals and captains had considerable 
latitude to select their staff and subordinate officers, a practice that was somewhat restrained later in the 
period. 
65 Indeed, in 1890, crammers could cost upwards of £210 per annum. N. Bowden-Smith, "Entry and 
Training ofNaval Officers," RUSI, XXXV, No. 155 (1890), 7. 
66 BPP, "Report of the Committee Appointed by the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty to Inquire into 
and Report on the Education ofNaval Executive Officers," vol. XIII, C. 4885 (1886), 339. 
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process. 67 Executive officers still exercised control, but candidates had to demonstrate 
that they were worthy of the appointment. 
While parents were still forced to make a fmancial contribution, officers became 
self-supporting at a fairly young age (presuming they remained unmarried).68 After entry, 
cadets spent only fifteen months to two years at formal schoolwork and could reach 
commissioned rank as early as age nineteen or twenty. Hence, the Navy's financial bar 
was set lower than that of the public schools and in most cases that of the army while still 
offering an honourable profession. Nonetheless, the cost was substantial enough to 
prevent most families from sending their sons to be naval officers. Given the improved 
prosperity of the Victorian period and the multiplicity of developing professions, a naval 
career was a way to dispose of a son that would enhance social respectability but still 
restrain costs. In other words, the Admiralty provided a form of social capital in exchange 
for a financial investment by parents. Despite the fact that this investment was relatively 
modest, it was not inconsiderable: between 1863 and 1882, such contributions more than 
paid for all the capital costs of the establishment of Britannia as a training ship.69 
After the advent of the Selborne Scheme in 1902, these fees increased. In the nine 
years it took the Navy to shape a young boy into a finished watch-keeping lieutenant in 
67 Indeed, it was nearly a quarter of a century later before the crarruner system was eliminated through the 
Selbome Scheme. 
68 E.M. Moore (ed.), Adventure in the Royal Navy: The Life and Letter of Admiral Sir Arthur Moore, 1847-
1934 (Liverpool: E.M. Moore, 1964), 24. Midshipman Moore wrote that "[i]n two years from now I pass 
for sub-lieutenant, and shall earn £95 per annum- and when I get my promotion 18 months or two years 
after I shall get just double that- which will be a tidy sum to get at 22. Better than a poor curate in a small 
village." 
69 BPP, "Return of Naval Cadets," vol. XL, No. 311 (1882), 457. Parents' contributions amounted to 
£120,832, and the total capital cost of the college was £101,374. 
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the Osborne-Dartmouth system, the cost to parents was over £560. The training fees at the 
Colleges amounted to £75 a year plus £25 personal allowance for four years, and 
Midshipmen required an allowance until reaching lieutenant of at least £160 over three 
years; if it took longer to reach lieutenant, it would be that much more expensive. In the 
1913-14 financial year, parents contributed over £65,575 in training fees, £20,881 in 
personal expenses and £30,656 in private allowances for a grand total of £117,112 to 
subsidize the Admiralty training programmes for executive officers.70 
Boys became naval officers for all sorts of reasons. Many claimed to have been 
"born to the sea," including Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, for whom it was a "family 
heritage."71 Dudley de Chair and his brother Ernest determined to become naval officers 
after reading a novel by W.H.G. Kingston at boarding schoo1.72 Cyprian Bridge had a 
father who was too nearsighted to become a naval officer himself; young Cyprian's career 
was in some respects the fulfilment of a father's ambition.73 Others had older family 
members in the Navy whom they wished to emulate. Such was the case with Admiral Sir 
Frederick Fisher, whose older brother, the future Lord Fisher, casually invited him to 
join.74 Oswald Frewen joined the navy class at Eton as a way of avoiding "tiresome 
fagging."75 J.H. Godfrey recalled that he had never been consulted about going into the 
70 PRO, ADM 1/8402/422, Minute by Mr. Ryles, Accounting Branch, Admiralty, 22 May 1914. 
71 Bacon, Naval Scrap Book, 2. 
72 De Chair, The Sea is Strong, 16. 
73 Cyprian Bridge, Some Recollections (London: John Murray, 1918), 17-18. 
74 F.W. Fisher, Naval Reminiscences (London: Frederick Muller, 1938), 33-34. 
75 Oswald Frewen, A Sailor's Soliloquy (London: Hutchinson, 1961), 33-34. 
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Navy and that if had been asked he probably would have said no. 76 In the words of the 
Earl of Dalhousie, himself a flag officer: 
They entered the Navy, some because in their simplicity they fancy it 
offers the nearest escape from lessons and from school; others because 
their imaginations have been fired by Peter Simple and Midshipman Easy; 
but the greater number because their parents are anxious to get their 
children off their hands - and the Navy offers the earliest and cheapest 
opportunity of being rid ofthem.77 
Even if a young gentleman considered himself unsuited to a naval career, he often 
was presented with little choice. Bertram Chambers recalled the time when he had to 
apply himself to the sub-lieutenant's course at Greenwich: 
It was now necessary to settle down to a year of hard work if I was to 
remain a naval officer. The question was, did I want to so remain, and, 
if not, was there any alternative? I loved and still love the sea. I loved 
exploration, but I found certain phases of naval life distinctly 
repugnant to my nature. Still I was at least in an honourable profession 
and for the first time I was keeping myself. I knew that my parents 
were having rather a hard time to educate the younger ones, so there 
was no good increasing their difficulties by asking them to let me try 
another profession. 78 
The Royal Navy had a clear idea of what it wanted in terms of raw material for 
the officer corps. "The bookworm, the boy who is constantly day-dreaming and building 
castles in the air, would be quite out of place in such a practical hard-working service as 
76 CCAC, J.H. Godfrey Papers (GDFY) 1/1, Memoirs of J.H. Godfrey, 3; see also Patrick Beesley, Very 
Special Admiral: The Life of Admiral JH Godfrey (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1980), 4. 
77 Great Britain, Parliament, House of Lords, Debates, 3'd ser., vol. CCLXI (1881), col. 1932. The Earl of 
Dalhousie was a retired naval officer and had served as the commander of Britannia. See also, J.K. 
Laughton, ''Naval Promotion Arithmetically and Historically Considered," RUS/, XXIV, No. 106 (1881), 
555, comments by Vice Admiral Selwyn; Bowden-Smith, "Entry and Training," 6. Admiral Bowden-Smith 
contended while ordinary public schools charged no less than £150 per annum while Britannia charged 
only £75. 
78 Bertram Chambers, Salt Junk: Naval Reminiscences, 1881-1906 (London: Constable, 1927), 125. 
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the Navy."79 Boys who were good at sports and considered of good character were ideal. 
Since officers were to be gentlemen, those boys who exuded "gentlemanly" qualities 
were considered first. For instance, in praise of a lower-deck applicant for commissioned 
rank, Captain Mark Kerr commented to J ellicoe about a young Frederick Boswell who 
was terribly good at games and boat handling " .... & is a thorough little gentleman in 
& . d ,so manners mm . 
The influence of patronage did not end once a cadet entered naval service between 
the ages of thirteen and fifteen; in fact, it continued until an officer retired or died. 
Patronage was like a medium of exchange: as an officer advanced in the service he 
progressively moved from being a net consumer to becoming a net supplier. Patronage 
played a vital role not only in promotion but also in the selection to favoured postings, 
which enabled an officer ''to seek the fierce light that beats round the flagship ... "81 Upon 
passing out of Britannia, new men found it to their advantage to seek profitable 
surroundings by serving in close proximity to the stars of the service who were in the best 
position to assist their careers. Another source of advancement was, as mentioned by one 
officer, to marry the Admiral's daughter. 82 Some areas of the service were to be avoided 
79 P. Hislam, The Navy: Shown to the Children (London: T.C. & E.C. Jack, c.1920), 9. 
80 British Library, Jellicoe Papers, Add. MSS. 49036, Vol. XLVIII, Mark Kerr to Jellicoe, 12 November 
1917; see also, CCAC, Chartwell Papers (CHAR) 13/19, Admiral Sir Hedworth Meux to Winston 
Churchill, 30 May 1913: "I think you will agree that provided that a young officer is devoted to his career 
the more brilliant he is at games requiring skill & pluck & quickness the better officer he is likely to make." 
For an exposition on the games ethic in British education, see J.A. Mangan, The Games Ethic and 
Imperialism (London: Viking, 1985). 
81 CCAC, GDFY 1/1, "The Naval Memoirs of Admiral J.H. Godfrey," 55. 
82 James, Sky Was Always Blue, 82. 
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if advancement was desired, as Herbert Richmond found when he joined the 
Hydrographical Branch. He quickly transferred to Torpedo. 83 
Midshipmen were often placed in various fleets according to personal 
connections. When David Beatty passed out of Britannia in 1885, his mother was so 
aghast that he had been ordered to the China Station that she immediately stormed off to 
London to persuade Lord Charles Beresford to have her son transferred to the 
Mediterranean. 84 Beatty was then posted aboard the Alexandra, the flagship of the Duke 
of Edinburgh, which was noted for the high proportion of its junior officers to reach flag 
rank. 85 This was the golden opportunity for a midshipman to gain the patronage of 
seniors. Connections made in the gunrooms served not only to gain patronage for 
advancement but also to cement relationships with future comrades in the senior ranks. 
Education and Training 
The officer corps always had an ambivalent attitude toward education and held to the 
belief that character was more important than scholastic achievement. fudeed, many 
officers insisted that over-education was undesirable since this would deter a man from 
being "practical" in the execution of his duties. 
On the whole we do not want a high average of intellect in the 
Navy. The monotonous conditions of a naval life, the long 
absences from home, the periods during peacetime of comparative 
idleness, are not in favour of intellectual growth and activity. 
83 Arthur Marder, (ed.), The Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Letters of Admiral Sir Hebert Richmond 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1952), 16. 
84 W.S. Chalmers, Life and Letters of David, Earl Beatty (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1951), 7. 
85 Ibid., 11. 
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Many men of marked talent find a sea life insupportable, and leave 
it for more congenial work on shore. Without on the other hand 
accepting the tradition that the "fool of the family;" finds his 
proper place in the Navy, the truth is, that a high range of 
intellectual power is not, as a rule, desirable. The average class we 
get make by no means on the whole the worst officers. They are 
contented with their lot and possessing the usual qualities of 
English gentlemen, command the respect and obedience of their 
men. It is by no means certain that men of a much higher average 
of intellect would possess the same amount of tact and skill in their 
dealings with their inferiors; the evidence is rather the other way.86 
Further, Captain Gerard Noel wrote: 
No one doubts for a moment that it is desirable that our Service 
should produce men of highly scientific qualifications in the 
gunnery, torpedo and surveying branches; but whatever may be 
their other merits, the most valuable man in time of war will be 
those who can best command, handle and fight their ships, in fact, 
the best seamen the aim of all training of the Executive should 
be to this end. 87 
This was reflected in the tests to which potential cadets were subjected. Fisher indicated 
that he merely had to jump over a chair, read a passage of Scripture and recount the rule 
of three. 88 Edmund Fremantle openly admitted that the test was an utter sham and a waste 
of time. 89 Since a fellow officer had nominated the candidate, a rigorous test was not 
required. Moreover, since most senior officers knew each personally, everyone was out to 
confirm their fellow's patronage to protect their own. The examinations for lieutenant 
86 Hubert H. Grenfell "The Best Method of Providing an Effective Force of Officers and Men for the 
Navy," RUSI, XXVI, No. 115 (1882), 298. See also Ryder, "Higher Education," 796, comments by Admiral 
Sir George Sartorius. 
87 Gerard Noel, "On the Training of the Executive Branch of the Navy," RUSI, XXXTII (1889), 806. 
88 Ruddock McKay, Fisher of Kilverstone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 3. 
89 Fremantle, Navy As I Have Known It, 4. 
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were more exacting, but until the mid-nineteenth century they were taken orally before a 
board of captains. A naval instructor who conducted classes between watches and duties 
provided what education was available. 
The basic problem was that the Admiralty never resolved the dichotomy between 
training and education.90 The best way to train a young man to become an officer was to _ 
put him in charge of a boat or a station in a ship and make him perform the duty 
associated with the position. In this way, confidence and leadership qualities, such as 
quickness of thought and ingenuity, would be fostered. On the other hand, the necessity to 
handle more complex equipment and the fear of falling behind other professions required 
officers to have a solid theoretical grounding in mathematics and the physical sciences. 
The result was a system that performed neither task very well. As Dr. James Soley 
wrote in 1880, "the system of training in England has a tendency to grasp the shadow 
while losing the substance."91 Midshipmen went to sea with an incomplete general 
education in part because the Admiralty could never quite resolve whether they were 
officers or schoolboys. There was a constant tussle between the ship's executive officer 
and the naval instructor over the division of time between schoolwork and practical 
duties.92 Even then, the education afforded them often was not of sterling quality. 93 The 
90 Indeed, this criticism was levelled shortly after the introduction of the Britannia system. See, NMM, G. 
Noel Papers (NOE) 29A; and Pontifex, Our Future Admirals (Portsmouth: J . Griffin & Co., 1876), 3. 
91 United States, Congressional Papers, Senate Executive Documents, 46th Congress, 2nd Session, US Serial 
Set # 1884, Executive Document No. 51, Professor James Russell Soley, "Report on Foreign Systems of 
Naval Education" (1880), 89. 
92 Bacon, Naval Scrap Book, 59; BPP, "Report of the Committee on the Higher Education of Naval 
Officers," vol. XXV, C. 203 (1870), 985, testimony of Naval Instructor, Rev. Thomas Main. BPP, "Report 
of the Committee Appointed by the Admiralty to Inquire into the System of Training Naval Cadets on 
Board H.M.S. Britannia," vol. XV, C. 1154 (1875), 357. The ... presence of naval discipline is in our 
opinion antagonistic to the work of the schoolmaster." 
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handling of boats, for example, was more interesting to the young men than being cooped 
up in class. Moreover, it exposed them to the scrutiny of their seniors, and the opinion of 
senior executive officers was more important to their future careers than performance on 
examinations. As long as a midshipman scraped through it did not matter as much as 
whether his intangible qualities were up to scratch. 
Examinations for the rank of lieutenant were held irregularly even though they 
were supposedly the hallmark of modernity. Each midshipman endeavouring to become a 
lieutenant had to present himself for an oral examination before a panel of officers. Often 
these exams were manipulated, and not until late in the century were controls placed on 
them. Starting in the 1870s all aspiring officers had to pass through the Royal Naval 
College at Greenwich to take written examinations that were intended to ensure that they 
possessed at least a minimum of scientific education. 
Regardless of the changes that affected other evaluations, the oral seamanship 
examination continued. Most senior officers deemed it essential that a midshipman obtain 
a first- or second-class certificate. This rite of passage was more or less a mark of 
professional competence and a judgement on the acceptability of a young officer. 
Edmund Fremantle recalled his disappointment that he had only received a second. 
I have given the above details, because the seamanship examination 
was then and still is far too much of a fluke, though it is true it is 
conducted in much more systematic manner than formerly; but it 
depends entirely on the examining officers, and their standards are 
different, while often the 'exigencies of the service,' or possibly the 
93 Charles Dundas, An Admiral 's Yarn : Stray Memories of Fifty Years (London: H. Jenkins, 1922), 53 . 
Admiral Dundas recalled the experiences of one Naval Instructor's efforts: "He just let us do as we liked, so 
we had school in the gunroom. We did about a half an hour's arithmetic, then decided that we had had 
enough, cut for a cocktail all round and close the shop. It sounds very dreadful now, but amid those 
surroundings some splendid characters were developed." 
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private affairs of the examining officers, cause the time at their 
disposal [to be limited] and the examination is hurried through. 94 
Fremantle was particularly bitter at being deprived of a first and spent several pages in his 
memoirs denouncing the system. He gave a further example of a vessel (which he 
declined to name) that was known as a "family ship" where everyone seemed to be 
related to everyone else and where officers were under considerable pressure to pass 
favoured candidates. 95 
Unfortunately, one consequence of this system was that many midshipmen were at 
a considerable disadvantage in taking the lieutenant's exam, even though they had 
secured the good opinion of their officers. The establishment of sub-lieutenants' courses 
at Greenwich in 1874 was designed to provide instruction to enable young officers to pass 
these examinations. While the seamanship examination was performed at sea, the 
midshipmen undertook a series of exams in pilotage, gunnery, navigation and torpedo 
work. The preparatory courses were all based on the same type of cramming that had long 
been the plague of officer education; all the work was directed toward passing the 
examinations. Nor did it help that young officers were so far removed from the fleet and 
so close to the temptations of London that discipline proved difficult.96 For instance, the 
94 Fremantle, Navy As I Have Known It, 98. 
95 Ibid., 97. The captain of the ship was determined to have a happy commission. When the Admiral's 
nephew came up for his examination it was found that his knowledge was inadequate and the commander 
wished to fail him. The Captain refused that verdict and hauled the commander aside "Now L. you 
promised the admiral when you came to this ship that there should be no rows, and if this young fellow is 
rejected there must be rows and unpleasantness ... " 
96 C.C.P. Fitzgerald, From Sail to Steam: Naval Recollections,/878-1905 (London: Edward Arnold, 1916), 
132. 
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diary of Bryan Godfrey-Faussett recounts that he spent nearly every afternoon in 
London.97 David Beatty and his friend Walter Cowan spent considerable amounts of time 
cruising in London hoping to run into someone who would treat them to dinner. 98 As 
well, the expectation of having a private tutor at Greenwich lured many midshipmen into 
neglecting their studies while at sea. 
There was much criticism of naval education, not least from its victims. Kenneth 
Dewar (entered 1893) excoriated the learning-by-rote system at Britannia and the 
associated "crammers" that prepared young boys for the entrance examinations. Even 
though Dewar did not attend a crammer, he could "remember learning Euclid's theorems 
off by heart at the age of twelve with very little understanding of their meaning. Like the 
child who interpreted certain passages in the Lord's Prayer as 'Harold be Thy Name' and 
"Lead us not into Thames Station' ... "99 Cyprian Bridge likewise expressed dissatisfaction 
with the entire system in a letter to his friend John Knox Laughton: 
I quite agree with what you say, as to the deplorable ignorance of 
our naval youth, in spite of all that has been done for education 
within the last twenty years. There can be no question that 
foreigners e.g. Americans, are far better educated. It is even more 
certain that nevertheless our ships are in infinitely better order than 
those of any other navy ... This is, however, no reason why we 
should be ignorant. The vice of the present system of education is 
in the attempt- foredoomed to inevitable failure- to put every one 
through the same mill. Raise the age of entry, do away with all 
special schools like the Britannia ... keep your youngsters at sea as 
much as possible and when there let them do seaman's work .... " 100 
97 CCAC, Bryan Godfrey-Faussett Papers (BGGF) 111, Godfrey-Faussett diaries . 
98 Chalmers, Beatty, 13. 
99 Dewar, Navy From Within, 14. 
100 Andrew Lambert, (ed.), The Papers of John Knox Laughton Papers (London: Navy Records Society, 
2002), 27, Bridge to Laughton, 26 July 1880. 
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For an ambitious officer the benchmark of a successful career was promotion. 101 
Promotion meant increased pay, status and a better opportunity to establish a household. 
Not only was active service pay higher but so too was half pay, which meant that an 
officer would be more likely to have the leisure to pursue other interests and to participate 
in social activities. Promotion also meant progressively more prestige and an increased 
chance of gaining suitable rewards, such as knighthoods, entry into "society" and 
influence. A career could serve as a springboard into political life, as many officers 
became MP's and several became peers. After making it past the twin hurdles of 
promotion to commander and captain, an officer was practically guaranteed eventual 
promotion to flag rank, if only on the retired list. Even if an officer never served as a flag 
officer, he would still retain the title and uniform of a rear admiral. 102 Further, while on 
the active list there was the opportunity of quasi-political service in the Admiralty. 
Promotion also meant a chance to become a naval attache or to secure some other plum 
appointment. Most such positions, however, were in practice reserved for those with 
101 Indeed, adequate promotion was regarded as essential to the well-being of the service and the wider 
community. See, J.K. Laughton, "Naval Promotion," RUSI, XXN, No. 106 (1881), 535. "The interest 
which attaches to the subject of naval promotion is by no means merely personal, or even technical; it 
belongs equally to everyone who has the good of his country at heart; for it directly affects the well-being 
of that service which has been ... 'the wall and fence of the Kingdom.' It is on our Officers as much as on 
our men that the strength of the Navy depends; and their increased efficiency is of at least as much national 
importance as an extra inch or two of iron on the side of our ships, or a few additional foot-tons to the 
striking energy of our shot." 
102 The Admiralty was very reluctant to impinge on this "right" and refrained from reforming the system by 
making promotion to flag on the basis on selection rather than seniority despite solid actuarial reasons for 
doing so. PRO, ADM 116/996, Goschen Committee on Executive Lists, 1902. 
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significant private means smce official pay rarely covered the attendant expenses. 103 
Indeed, financial considerations could be of considerable importance since it might be 
difficult to afford appointments or even promotion because of the financial outlay 
required. 104 In the case of promotion to commander and captain, an officer could spend 
enough time on half pay to make it financially embarrassing, especially ifhe was married. 
Unfortunately, the Admiralty was unable to promote everyone since the Navy 
required more junior officers than senior. An average ironclad, for instance, might need 
five or six lieutenants, but there was only one commander and one captain. And since it 
was necessary to employ the best officers in the senior posts for considerable lengths of 
time, a high proportion of the executive branch would never be promoted beyond 
lieutenant and would be compelled to retire at the age of forty-five. In the 1890s about 
forty-five percent of lieutenants reached the rank of commander and perhaps half would 
be promoted further. 105 Of course, the failure to gain promotion on the active list was of 
particular importance, for as John Knox Laughton wrote: "To each individual the evil 
becomes a personal one; and he is unable to take a calm and philosophic view of the 
inexorable rigour of arithmetic."106 To induce officers to retire, the Admiralty instituted a 
system of promotion on the retired list that not only gave retired officers higher pensions 
103 PRO, ADM 1/7793, Naval Attaches - Memorandum by Captain Charles Ottley, 23 June 1904; and 
ADM 118204, Allowances for Naval Attaches, Captain Aubrey Smith to Rear Admiral Edmond Slade, 
D.N.I., 15 January 1909. 
104 Henry Norton Sulivan (ed.), The Life and Letters of the Late Admiral Sir Bartholomew Sulivan (London: 
John Murray, 1896), vii. Captain Thomas Sulivan refused a knighthood because he could not afford the 
associated fees. 
105 ADM 116/88 1, Goschen Report on Executive Lists, 1902. 
106 J.K. Laughton, "Naval Promotion Arithmetically and Historically Considered," RUSI, XXIV, No. 106 
(1881), 536-537. 
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but also assuaged the disappointed with more prestigious titles. If an officer served his sea 
qualifications, he was generally retired with a step in rank. This also happened to captains 
who retired before they reached the top of the list: assuming they had served their time in 
command they would receive promotion to flag rank. In the case of officers who through 
no fault of their own did not acquire enough command time before they reached the top of 
the captains' list, the Admiralty could seek Treasury approval for special Orders in 
Council. For instance, David Beatty and Rosslyn Wemyss, both future First Sea Lords, 
were saved from forced retirement in this fashion. 107 
The trick was to reach captain. As the fleet increased in size, serving lieutenants 
had an advantage since their chances for promotion became much higher. Lieutenants 
with less seniority, however, were among the first on the receiving end of the Geddes 
axe. 108 It is also important to note that despite the expansion, most officers had limited 
chances to get promoted. If a man had few social connections, he was compelled to 
"make interest" by attracting the attention and patronage of influential senior officers. 
Further, the glut in the number of officers on the active list aggravated the 
situation. Unless an officer received timely promotion, he had little chance of becoming 
an active flag officer. Hence, the Admiralty and senior officers were under pressure to 
advance able men quickly to captain. This practice was questioned in the press and 
107 PRO, T 1111192, Admiralty to Treasury, 17 November 1909, application to promote Captain David 
Beatty to Rear Admiral; and ADM 1/8028, Sanctioning Promotion of Certain Officers to Flag Rank, 26 
June 1908; file concerning the elevation of W emyss, S Gough-Calthorpe, Ernest Troubridge, Thomas 
Jerram, Douglas Gamble, Doveton Sturdee and others. 
108 In the years following the Great War, economies in government spending resulted in a drastic draw 
down of Royal Navy strength. As a result, many officers were forced to leave the Service through no fault 
of their own. 
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parliament since it appeared that these young men, in the words of Admiral Fremantle, 
'jobbed up" in rank prematurely. Questions had been raised about the promotion of 
Commanders the Hon. F.L. Wood, J.S. Graham, the Hon. J.M. Yorke and the Hon. G. 
Fitzclarence in 1867. These officers had spent an average of only 4Yz years as lieutenants 
before being selected for promotion. The Admiralty claimed that 
[a]ll these officers were promoted by the Admiralty in the usual way, 
under the regulations of having served the time required by the Queen's 
Regulations to render a Lieutenant eligible for a Commander's 
commission, viz., "two complete years as Lieutenant in one or more of 
H.M. Ships in Commission."109 
Evidence of favouritism is not difficult to find, since the officer corps tended to be 
a close-knit community. But this system, which our modern minds would deem to be 
corrupt, did not render the Navy ineffective in the pursuit of its primary task. On the 
contrary, the gentlemanly origins of its officers were assets. Representing the cream of 
British society, the Navy carried a tremendous amount of prestige, not just in home 
waters but also in the outer marches of empire. This prestige often gave British 
gentlemanly capitalists a comparative advantage in overseas markets. As one officer put it 
rather bluntly in 1909: 
The exact meaning of the word "prestige" is difficult to define, but 
whatever way we look at it, there can be no doubt that there is "money 
in it." ... And the moral influence of our past success has undoubtedly 
been one of the most potent factors in the creation of a mercantile 
marine which in steam tonnage as nearly equal to that of the whole of 
the rest of the world put together. 110 
109 BPP, "Navy (Promotions) Return of the Services and Sea Time of Commanders Wood, Graham, 
Fitzclarence and Yorke," vol. XLIV, No. 108 (1867), 562. 
110 
"Our Manacled Fleet," Blackwood's, CLXXXV (January 1909), 144. 
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Further, naval officers had the prestige to resist the entreaties of local merchants and 
consuls and to avoid taking potentially embarrassing actions. An officer serving on the 
periphery had to balance local interests with the reputation of the Royal Navy and the 
requirements of Whitehall. Charles Fitzgerald recalled a consul in Beirut who was " ... a 
very grand man, who somehow had got it into his head that I was under his orders, and 
that he could order me about whenever he thought proper a strange delusion, 
. hi h I h d d . h" "Ill concemmg w c a to un ecetve tm. 
As for promotion, the system was problematic since the size of the active list was 
strictly limited by Order in Council, and no officer could be promoted onto that list 
without a special order being obtained with the concurrence of the Treasury. Promotions 
were sometimes granted for meritorious service under fire, as in the case of those after the 
intervention in Egypt in 1882. 112 Hence, before the expansion of the fleet at the end of the -
century promotion was slow. Admiral Fitzgerald recalled one incident in the 1890s where 
a fire in a ship was bad enough for the captain to order the magazines flooded. "Though, 
as there were two Rear Admirals and three Post Captains on board, we should have made 
some welcome vacancies."113 The flow of promotions was a constant concern as the 
111 Fitzgerald, From Sail to Steam, 19-20. See also University of California, Irvine, Arthur J. Marder Papers, 
MS -F2, box 25, folder 2, Admiral of the Fleet the Marquess of Milford Haven to Cecil Fisher, 25 August 
1921. While Conunander in Chief, Mediterranean Fleet, Fisher warned his subordinate flag officer to steer 
clear of being seen to be at the beck and call of consuls. "The Consul of every Maritime country loves 
having at least one [of] his nation's ships in port. He gets a salute and then when he meets his colleagues at 
the club he boasts of all the important 'orders' he is about to give 'his ship'." My thanks to Professor David -
Facey-Crowther for this reference. 
112 PRO, Treasury Papers (T) 1/14075, Treasury Correspondence regarding special promotions, 1882. 
Promotion in this fashion, however, was no guarantee of the particular competence of the officer involved. 
See, G.A. Ballard, "Admiral Ballard's Memoirs: Part Four," Mariner 's Mirror, LXII, No.3 (1976), 251. 
113 F. 1tzgerald, From Sail to Steam, 126 
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Admiralty struggled to find a balance between the needs of the service and the interests of 
officers while minimizing the cost to the Treasury. 114 
Regardless, most officers would have to wait their turn with the understanding 
that they might finish their careers as lieutenants. The reason is not hard to see, since in 
the third quarter of the nineteenth century there were just over 1000 lieutenants and at 
most sixty active flag officers. By the end of the century, with the massive expansion of 
the Navy, the rate of promotion temporarily reached the unprecedented level of two-thirds 
of lieutenants reaching the rank of commander. 115 Commanders faced a second test after 
they attained five or six years of seniority and entered the zone for promotion to captain. 
Although patronage could gain promotion or a choice appointment, an officer still had to 
have the respect of his superiors and demonstrate his competence. While a flag 
lieutenant's billet was a ticket for promotion to commander, it was a challenging job to 
manage the social, diplomatic and professional affairs of his admiral. Hence, admirals had 
good reason to ensure that the individual selected would be to his credit. 
One of the ways to advance a favoured officer was by "haul-down promotions" 
which permitted an admiral who was relinquishing his appointment to promote his flag · 
lieutenant. This was a convenient way of promoting nephews and sons of friends. A list 
of officers receiving such preferment reads like a Who's Who of the late Victorian Navy. 
Such men included Algernon Lyons, Frederick Richards, Michael Culme-Seymour, 
114 PRO, ADM 116/881, File on the Management of Executive Lists, 1889-1913. This file contains 
information pertaining to the Admiralty's efforts for over a quarter of a century to manage the officer 
recruitment problem. See Chapter IV for a more expansive discussion. See also, Donald Chisholm, Waiting 
for Dead Men's Shoes: The Development of the US. Navy's Officer Personnel System, 1793-1941 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 29-32. 
115 PRO, ADM 118370/65, Memorandum on Executive Lists by Charles Walker, 1912, 20. 
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Edmund Fremantle, John Hopkins, Edward Seymour, William Kennedy, Robert Harris 
and Lord Charles Beresford, all of whom reached active flag rank. 116 Several officers 
argued that although this could advance them faster than their fellows, such advancement 
was a double-edged sword because an officer promoted in this way had to demonstrate 
that he was worthy. 117 Indeed, Philip Colomb defended patronage. During a lecture 
presentation by Rear Admiral A.P. Ryder at the Royal United Services Institution in 
1871, "If I had my choice, I should extend the patronage very much more to Naval 
Officers, for the reasons stated by the lecturer, that is, that naval Officers as a rule will 
take the precaution to see that their proteges are such as would likely to do them 
credit." 118 
Another special promotion was available to those who served in the Royal Yacht 
Squadron. For instance, Lord Charles Scott, Harry Rawson, Day Bosanquet, Archibald 
Berkeley Milne, Prince Louis of Battenberg, Stanley Colville, Colin Keppel, Christopher 
Cradock, Rosslyn W emyss, Gerard Noel, William May, Richard Poore and George 
Warrender all received such promotions. 119 Close ties to Court and the possession of 
private means were mandatory. Senior captains, especially those considered "deserving," 
116 James Bramble, Promotion and Retirement of Flag Officers and Captains of the Royal Navy, 1899 
(Portsmouth: Holbrook & Son, 1899), 25. 
117 Fremantle, Navy As I Have Known It, 459. 
118 Ryder, "Higher Education," 793-794. 
119 Bramble, Promotion, 26. All these officers had prominent careers on the flag list, including two who 
became First Sea Lord, Battenberg and Wemyss . 
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were awarded a G.S.P. or offered the post of a naval A.D.C. to the sovereign. Officers so 
selected were those likely to be employed on the active flag list. 120 
Officers who appeared to have exceeded their competence were either relegated to 
half pay or appointed to positions that made it clear that their chances of further 
promotion were slim. In his autobiography Admiral James referred to many commanders 
who were not up to the requirements of the position and ended their careers at that rank. It 
is also likely that such officers would not serve the sea time required to receive a step in 
rank on reaching retirement age. 
While patronage was an enormous asset in advancing the careers of officers, it did 
not mask incompetence. Promotion was underwritten by patronage since no one could 
gain advancement without the support of his captain and observations of the performance 
of his duties. As one officer quipped, " ... an Officer with friends & ability will go a long 
way, with friends and no ability will also go a long way but with ability and no friends he 
won't get a look in." 121 
Promotion and advancement was by merit, but some men gained it more easily 
than others. This tended to cement norms that could be viewed as contrary to the spirit of 
liberal democracy. The view from outside was that in the Navy a privileged elite could 
promote the interests of their sons and friends at public expense. The reality, however, 
120 PRO, ADM 116/4500, ADC's and GSP's Appointments and Awards to Officers, 1912-1942. Generally 
selected captains were given the choice between receiving a G.S.P. or an A.D.C. Those with little of no 
private means usually selected the G.S.P. since it entitled them to several hundred pounds additional to their 
regular rate of pay. Receiving an A.D.C. was generally a money loser as social obligations were not only 
more frequent but also expensive. 
121 NMM, A.E.M. Chatfield Papers (CHT), 8/1, Lieutenant Commander Albert E. Way to Chatfield, 29 
December 1942. Way was an embittered officer who, from his rank on the retired list, had never been 
selected for promotion and finished out his career as a lieutenant commander. 
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was not so clear-cut. For instance, of the cadets entered in 1886, only seven of fifty-seven 
were the sons of naval officers, and each candidate had to compete in a rigorous series of 
examinations supervised by the Civil Service Commission. 122 Many officers without 
connections prior to entering the service were able to attach themselves to rising stars like 
Fisher. Their skills and energy in performing their duties as junior officers substituted for 
influence, and there were many senior officers who valued this ability far more than an 
able man's antecedents or the connections. 123 
Patronage could also cause problems, since preferment for one man necessarily 
excluded others. "But though this patronage is large, it is sometimes only five barley 
loaves and two small fishes to the hungry multitude; and the happy one selected leaves a 
crowd of discontented aspirants behind him."124 This was particularly a concern for the 
Naval Assistant to the First Lord (usually a junior rear admiral) who had the prickly task 
of overseeing promotions and appointments. As the social position of the Navy increased 
towards the end of the century, along with closer connections to the monarchy and 
increased public interest, it became more difficult to demonstrate that promotion was 
based solely on merit. Nor did it help that there were officers like Fisher who, while 
associating with the elite, derided much of the officer corps as "aristocratic holdovers." 125 
122 PRO, ADM 116837, Correspondence with Civil Service Commission, 1886. 
123 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, I, 84. 
124 Colomb, Memoirs, 414. 
125 Marder (ed.), Fear God and Dread Nought, I, 314, Fisher to?, 3 May 1904, "Now remember an Admiral 
is about the most self-satisfied type of being on the earth! ' Such and such a thing did not exist when he 
came to sea; then why the devil should it exist now? ' 'The Service has been going to the dogs ' ever since 
he ' s known it... 'He'll d--d if he will be any party to these new-fangled notions! ' 'Fight tooth and nail 
against it!"' 
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Officers were also constantly under observation by their supenors, and the 
successful execution of duties or lapses in judgement could make or break an officer 
easily. As Admiral James wrote: 
A naval Captain, seeing a brother Captain pass by on his way to 
his trial by court-martial on a charge of running his ship on to a 
sandbank, remarked, 'There go I but for the grace of God.' During 
my fifty years in the Navy I saw ample evidence of the truth of 
that remark And so I feel that every officer who hoists his 
Admiral's flag should be humble and remember his 
contemporaries, of professional ability and powers of command at 
least equal to his own, who, but for a human error or being saddled 
with the responsibility for other men's mistakes, might have been 
hoisting their flags instead ofhimself. 126 
Another officer remarked that he had by chance run to the bridge to find his officer of the 
watch about to put the ship on the rocks. 127 
Courts Martial and Judicial Power 
Reforms, however, did not significantly affect one aspect of the power of executive 
officers: they remained in effect judge, jury and executioner under the Naval Discipline 
Acts. Only executive officers could sit on courts martial and only they could inflict 
summary punishments. Although the authority of captains to flog was essentially 
eliminated in the 1870s, other punishments remained available. Naval courts martial had 
126 James, Sky Was Always Blue, vii. 
127 Lewis Bayly, Pull Together! The Memoirs of Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly (London: George G. Harrap, 
1939), 114. 
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the authority to award punishments up to and including the death penalty and to impose 
prison sentences subject only to appeal to the Board of Admiralty. 128 
The executive branch not only had this power over ratings but also over every 
other branch, including engineering. Furthermore, in courts martial the authority of the 
executive was rigidly maintained, even in situations where a panel considered that a 
commissioned officer was largely at fault, while ratings who challenged the authority of 
officers were rigorously prosecuted. For example, in the case of 1906 Portsmouth 
Barracks riots, Lieutenant Bernard Collard received a reprimand while the stokers 
. 1 d . . t 129 mvo ve were gtven pnson erms. 
Officers convicted of an offence were treated much differently than were ratings. 
The former rarely received prison sentences; in general, the harshest punishment was 
dismissal with disgrace. 130 Even in the event of negligence or improper conduct resulting 
in death, sentences were mild. 131 In the words of Jack Fisher, "[a] Court Martial is all 
right when the exasperated able seaman knocks Lieutenant Buggins into the 'lee 
scuppers'! but read the Court Martial on the Theseus grounding ... as a specimen of mild 
128 Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 349. Death penalties were rarely 
imposed even during wartime, whereas the Army executed over 300 soldiers during the First World War. 
Although my research has failed to uncover the execution of any naval personnel by the Admiralty during 
that conflict, it is likely that members of the naval service subject to the War Office's authority (members of 
the Royal Naval Division) did receive death sentences. 
129 PRO, ADM 1/7895, Portsmouth Incident Court Martial, 1906. 
130 PRO, ADM 7/929, Confidential Commanders' Book; case of Commander Frederick Maxwell-Heron 
who was dismissed from the service for fourteen counts of misappropriation of stores where a rating or a 
warrant officer would have received a prison sentence. 
131 Charles Dundas, An Admiral's Yarn: Stray Memories of 50 Years (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1922), 29, 
recounted that a group of officers, tired of the food prepared by the wardroom's Chinese cook, convened a 
fake "court martial" in which the unfortunate man was sentenced to "death." Although the group meant 
only to give the man a dunking, he accidentally drowned. The ringleader was dismissed from the Service 
with disgrace and imprisoned for twelve months while the other participants were severely reprimanded. 
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incapacity to serve out justice!"132 This imbalance was justified on the grounds of social 
position: 
An officer sent to prison loses in social degradation far more than the 
man, he is put to unaccustomed manual labour with people of an 
entirely different class and is deprived of any intellectual pleasures or 
recreations which he may have been in the habit of enjoying, besides 
suffering that which is common to both, the deprivation of liberty and 
the loss of the mere bodily pleasures, and in addition it is far more 
difficult for a man in the officer's position to make a fresh start in life 
than for a man who works with his hands. 133 
Furthermore, in cases where it appeared likely that an officer would be convicted of a 
serious offence, he might be given the option to retire under the provisions of the 
Misconduct Order-in-Council that enabled him to maintain a modest pension. 134 Officers 
of more senior rank might be quietly invited to retire "at their own request," often with a 
step up in rank to avoid embarrassment. 135 During this period, courts martial were public 
and widely reported in daily newspapers. 136 
The Admiralty could also run interference for officers involved in mmor 
disagreements. For instance, the Admiralty refused to supply the addresses of officers to 
132 Marder (ed.), Fear God and Dread Nought, I, 256, Fisher to Selbome, 24 July 1902. 
133 PRO, ADM 178/ 11, "Equalisation of Sentences Panel, 1914," memorandum by Masterman-Srnith, July 
1914. 
134 On the other hand, officers showed little restraint in the prosecution of crimes committed by ratings 
unless there was an allegation of "unnatural" offences. PRO, ADM 156/9, Case of Sodomy aboard H.M.S. 
Gloucester, 1913; significantly, this file remained sealed until1997. 
135 PRO, ADM 1/8569/276, Order in Council re. Misconduct, 1901; "An Officer, who, in the opinion of the 
Admiralty, by reason of an act or acts of misconduct, or through intemperate or irregular habits of life has 
become unfit for, or in the, opinion of the Admiralty, is for any reason unworthy of, further employment, 
may be placed on the Retired or Pensioned List irrespective of Age or Service, whether he has been tried by 
Court Martial or not." 
136 
"Court Martial," The Times, 7 April1910. Not only was the complete exposition of the court martial of 
Lieutenant F. Hastings Thomas, R.M.L.I. recorded but so too was a letter he wrote to a close friend while 
on the run from the law. 
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tradesmen seeking payment of outstanding accounts. Even so, to avoid such disputes 
many officers had mail forwarded to their clubs. 137 Influence could be used to get an 
officer out of a scrape by shipping him overseas. Indeed, Fisher recalled that as Second 
Naval Lord he had shipped out a lieutenant inside twelve hours at the request of a 
. t t 138 prommen paren . 
Courts martial also investigated incidents where a vessel was damaged or lost. 
Sentences generally were rather mild, with the worst being a severe reprimand. A career 
could survive a conviction as long as the event in question was not too embarrassing and 
the officer received a caution or a simple (rather than a severe) reprimand. There were 
also a significant number of administrative penalties open to the Admiralty, including the 
ability to assign an officer to a post that indicated that his chances for further promotion 
were slight. There were there other hazards. One of these was drink. 139 Drunkenness was 
a court martial offence and was punished with severe reprimands and even dismissal from 
a ship. 140 A career could generally survive one such incident, but a second or third 
conviction generally resulted in dismissal from the service. 141 
137 PRO, ADM l/8363, Treasury Correspondence, file on debt, 1913. The Admiralty refused to supply the 
name of a dead Petty Officer to a tradesman to collect on a debt from his estate. 
138 Marder (ed.), Fear God and Dread Nought, I, 312, Fisher to Arthur Loring, 26 April 1904. 
139 Bacon, Naval Scrap Book, 40-41. However, there were cases of individuals who chronically abused 
alcohol and were compelled to retire. PRO, ADM 7/930, Summary of Commander's Records, 142, case of 
Commander F.G. de Lisle, "Indifferent conduct ... not temperate- From all I can gather this officer has 
done nothing in his ship & has passed his time drinking in his cabin." See also, J.K. Laughton, "Naval 
Education," RUSI, XXVI, No. 115 (1882), 350. "No account can be taken ofthe number of failures: but of 
those through ignorance, drink, and immorality went wholly to the dogs, the number was extremely large: 
and many of those who did not thus utterly break down, there were a very great many who dragged on in 
the Service, as ignorant of sea as of everything else that was reputable." 
140 An example of this is to be found in The Times, 5 January 1900, where Lieutenant M.E.L. Thompson 
was convicted of drunkenness and sentenced to the loss of six months' seniority and dismissed from his 
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Political Power 
Finally, the executive branch was largely permitted to regulate the entire naval 
establishment through its effective domination of the Board of Admiralty. Although the 
First Lord was a government minister, he was not a Secretary of State like the political 
heads of the Foreign and War Offices. 142 Though he was the only member of the Board 
directly responsible to Parliament and had unquestioned constitutional authority, the First 
Lord 's power was constrained because in practice he had to possess the confidence of its 
naval members. Resignation, or even its threat, by the naval members could in the right 
circumstances make the First Lord's position untenable and even bring down 
governments. For instance, the rupture between Fisher and Churchill in May 1915 
threatened the stability of the Asquith government. 143 Hence, the professional heads of the 
service possessed a considerable amount of political power, although it had to be 
exercised sparingly. 144 In the words of Vice-Admiral P.R. Colomb, "(t]he sole power in 
his hands is resignation; and he must gravely consider whether there will be loss or gain 
ship. Charges for drunkenness reached epidemic proportions during the war when over one thousand courts 
martial were conducted against officers; see PRO, ADM 1/85565/110, Memorandum ·by R.B.D. Acland, 
Judge Advocate of the Fleet, April 1919. 
141 PRO, ADM 178/11, Naval Courts Martial-Equalisation of Sentences Panel, May 1914, minute by Mr. 
Masterrnan-Smith. See also ADM 1/9509, Charges ofDrunkenness Against Officers, 1891-1892. 
142 Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 4th ser., vol. LV (1898), col. 341. See also, 
Fitzgerald, Sail to Steam, 165 for an interesting viewpoint on the complex relationship between the First 
Lord and his naval colleagues; and Michael Culme-Seymour, "The Admiralty and the War Office," 
Nineteenth Century, LIV, October 1903), 558-560. 
143 Paul Halpern, A Naval History of World War I (London: University College London Press, 1994), 117. 
Fisher and Churchill, then First Lord, came to blows over the Dardanelles fiasco. 
144 Beeler, British Naval Policy, 38-48, and Rodger, Admiralty. 
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to the servtce and the public by his exerctse of it."145 This political power not only 
enhanced the influence of senior officers but also reinforced the importance of the entire 
corps. 
Officers also enjoyed a tradition of independent command in which flag officers 
and captains possessed considerable latitude. Although First Naval Lords and the 
Admiralty as a whole were directly responsible to Parliament, their authority on the 
periphery was necessarily limited. As A.J.L. Blond has argued: 
[n]aval officers often pursued individual interests, ideas and 
theories. The wide discretion and personal responsibility of 
officers on foreign stations followed from the lack of any means of 
direct supervision from the Admiralty. Yet even on home stations 
independently minded officers had considerable autonomy within 
broad Admiralty parameters. The Victorian Navy was full of 
colourful characters who did not fit into conventional society or 
conform to typical images of establishment figures. Service life, 
far from requiring conformity, often bred great individualists and 
eccentricity. 146 
Conclusion 
Even before the Fisher reforms, mechanisms were in place to try to ensure the 
professional competence of the executive officer corps. In the nineteenth century the 
Royal Navy was expected to do more than fight wars against other Great Powers or put 
down colonial revolts. The Navy was to provide a presence to further British commerce; 
to exercise imperial influence; and to represent what was the best of the British social 
145 P.H. Colomb, The Memoirs of Admiral Sir Astley Cooper Key (London: Methuen, 1898), 411. 
146 A.J.L. Blond, "Technology and Tradition: Wireless Telegraphy and the Royal Navy, 1895-1920" (Ph.D. 
Diss ., University of Lancaster, 1993), 137-138. 
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elite. The task of every British naval officer was to be a gentleman, smce it was 
imperative that he be able to deal with foreign officers as social equals. Further, with the 
confidence of social position came independence of judgment that permitted an officer to 
evaluate a situation and not be pushed into ill-considered action by consuls or commercial 
interests. Hence, tight social and political connections between the state and the officers 
served to further the interests of both Whitehall and the City. 
The other restraint that factored into every decision made by successive British 
governments was financial. While_ the aristocracy, gentry and professionals produced 
more sons than they could place, the state was able to offer honourable positions at 
comparatively little cost to itself. Social prestige, the right to wear a uniform and a chance 
to achieve prominence was held out to parents who, in effect, subsidized the training and 
upkeep of young officers. This system worked well in the context of limited government 
while the Navy extracted smaller amounts of resources from the community. 
Yet, as will become apparent, this satisfactory relationship broke down when the 
Navy made increasing demands on the British Treasury at the same time that the Reform 
Bill of 1884 and the relative decline of landed income eroded the foundations of 
aristocratic government. Social reform, coupled with increasing naval expansion, required 
the officer corps to transform itself if it wanted to retain its powerful influence over naval 
policy. Moreover, changes associated with the second industrial revolution increased the 
specialized skills required to construct, manage and operate modem warships. These 
circumstances threatened to tum the executive officer corps into just one professional 
group among many within the naval establishment. And even worse, it raised the spectre 
of the existing corps having a comparatively weak claim on the state's resources. 
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Chapter IV 
Secundis Dubiisque Rectus- Threats to 
Professional Status 1 
But we are naturally a conservative service. We do not like change ... 
but the whole condition of service at sea is changing; the nature of the 
weapons we have to fight with is changing; the ship herself is changed; 
and unless the Officers change with these, they will find themselves in 
the background ... If we do not keep pace with the times, we shall lose 
the high position of naval Officers, capable of advising the 
Government in the management and control of naval affairs. We want 
men of smart intellects, of good education, and knowledge of affairs, 
which can only be got by opening up to naval men spheres of 
responsibility outside mere professional routine ... 2 
Introduction 
At the end of the Victorian era, the executive officer corps entered a period of profound 
change. This change went beyond mere advances in technology, complexity of warship 
design or even the advent of the new imperialism. Instead, the essential contract that 
bound the officer to the state was revised in such a way that it became distinctly 
uncomfortable to many officers and to the families that supplied the corps with its 
recruits. As Jan Glete has postulated, the state bureaucracy was to be at the heart of the 
double contractual relationship that bound it to the general population and the military 
establishment. 3 In this way the state became a legitimized "protection racket" as it "sold" 
security to the populace while simultaneously restraining and regulating the military. The 
1E.C. Talbot-Booth, The Royal Navy- Some Account of Her Manners, Customs and Privileges (London: 
Sampson, Low & Co., 1942), 499, motto ofH.M.S. Duncan, "Upright in Prosperity and Peril." 
2 J.K. Laughton, "Naval Promotion Arithmetically and Historically Considered," The Journal of the Royal 
United Services Institution (RUSI), XXN, No. 106 (1881), 558, comments by Commander W. Dawson. 
3 Jan Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-
Military States, 1500-1650 (London: Routledge, 2002), 5-8. 
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dynamic described by Glete, however, did not end once the modem ship of state left the 
metaphorical dockyard, since as this vessel encountered storms it was refitted, 
modernized and sometimes completely rebuilt. When social, economic and cultural 
changes occurred, this double contractual relationship was constantly subject to 
renegotiation and revision as the needs of each party altered. 
In the case of the Royal Navy, this relationship was undergoing drastic change. 
The sources of recruits, military and naval families, the landed gentry and the 
professional classes, were no longer providing the numbers of officers required to man 
the growing battle fleet according to the old provisions. As a result, the Admiralty was 
forced to find alternative sources and to raise the prestige of non-combatant officers while 
still attempting to restrain growing naval estimates that were under intense scrutiny by 
Parliament and the public. Further, changes in naval affairs and the international situation 
limited the non-monetary compensation that officers received in exchange for service. 
The heart of the issue was simple arithmetic. As was mentioned in one study of 
the European officer corps, the old elite maintained effective control over the armed 
forces until their numbers were exhausted.4 In the Royal Navy, this occurred in the 
aftermath of the Naval Defence Act of 1889 that expanded the fleet and committed 
Britain to the maintenance of the two-power standard. Increased vessel strength required 
more officers. At the same time, families were expected to make an even higher financial 
4 George A. Kourvetaris and Betty A. Dobratz, Social Origins and Political Orientations of Officers Corps 
in a World Perspective (Denver: University of Denver Press, 1973), 4. See also V.H.G. Bernard, "The 
Supply and Training of Officers for the Royal Navy," RUSI, LXIX (1924), 65, comments by Vice Admiral 
Sir William Goodenough. "If we cannot get the requisite numbers of candidates for the Navy from the class 
we wish to get it from, we shall have to go to other places ... " 
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investment after the tum of the century to place sons in the service. 5 The opportunity 
costs of a naval career no longer seemed to many to be worth the investment. 
As a result of the Admiralty's failure to recruit a sufficient number of "suitable" 
officers, alternative sources of officer recruitment were required. The most logical supply 
involved the direct entry of public school boys. This caused resentment because some 
people saw these boys as interlopers who threatened the prospects of those entering in the 
traditional way through the Royal Naval Colleges.6 Concern over this source was minor, 
however, in comparison to complaints about an alternative. The lower deck provided a 
reservoir of experienced warrant and petty officers fit to stand watch (as indeed some 
already were). 7 Considerable pressure had been placed on the Admiralty to expand the 
opportunity for warrant and petty officers to advance onto the quarterdeck. Although 
suitable individuals sometimes did advance, and while lieutenancies were bestowed as 
retirement gifts to long-serving warrant officers, the Admiralty resisted offering a regular 
form of promotion off the lower deck.8 Even when it did offer it with the Mate Scheme of 
1913, it was structured in such a way that the possibility of high command was nil. 
5 Great Britain, Public Record Office (PRO), Admiralty Papers (ADM) 1/8402/422, Memorandum by 
Account General, 22 May 1914. 
6 
"The Public Schools and the Navy," The Times, 10 January 1914. 
7 Henry T. Capper, Aft From the Hawsehole: Sixty-Two Years of Sailors' Evolution (London: Faber & 
Gwyer, 1927), 94. Capper relates performing the duties of a commissioned officer while being firmly put in 
his place as a warrant officer by Captain Lewis Beaumont. See also, John Wells, The Royal Navy: An 
Illustrated Social History, 1870-1982 (Stroud: Sutton, 1994 ), 35. 
8 
"Naval Efficiency," Naval Warrant Officers' Journal, XV (May 1902), 51. "A ranker in the navy may be 
qualified to occupy with distinction, commissioned rank in the fleet; but the bogey of a past century, call it 
what you will, musty old regulations or prejudice, steps in and says, No! a ranker! the idea! And the 
unfortunate, though perchance, brilliant ranker, having reached the rank of Warrant Officer at a 
comparatively early age, tmds his pathway barred to any further promotion and wallows in the 'Slough of 
Despond' until he is 55 when he retires a soured and disappointed man, practically a Warrant Officer still 
after serving all his life under the flag." 
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However, the precedent had been established, and this brought into question the status of 
the officer corps as an exclusive elite. In this way, such schemes constituted an eccentric 
attack on the executive officer corps. 9 
Other forms of long-available psychic and social benefits that to modem eyes 
seem silly and even reactionary were called into question. Naval officers resisted granting 
military titles to non-combatants and the adoption of the executive "curl" to engineers. 10 
Similarly, they aspired to maintain the exclusivity of the wardroom mess. These positions 
were not regarded as foolish at the time because these officers had been dedicated to the 
service of the Navy since they were thirteen, and their parents had made a bargain with 
the state to provide their sons for service in exchange for certain benefits to be accrued in 
the future. The Admiralty seemed to be reneging on that bargain while doing virtually 
nothing to relieve the financial burdens on naval officers. As the Navy concentrated in 
fleets and in home waters there were fewer opportunities for travel and adventure. There 
was also less of a chance that an officer would distinguish himself in battle on the 
periphery. The combination of fewer watch-standing officers and the increased tempo of 
operations meant less time for leisure, less time on half pay and more time on duty. 11 The 
increased "scientific" tone of naval training meant more time for classroom instruction 
9 W. Hunt Grubbe, "Should Commissions be Given by the Queen to Naval Warrant Officers?" United 
Service Magazine, II (1891), 479. "I think the experiment, if tried, would be unsatisfactory; it would 
certainly tend to keep parents from sending their sons into the Navy; it would, in time, republicanise the 
Navy, a most undesirable thing to do." 
10 The executive curl was a piece of looped gold braid worn on the last ring of the sleeves of officers' 
jackets. It signified that the wearer was of the command line rather than merely a civil branch officer. See 
PRO, ADM 116/1708, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Hedworth Meux to Admiralty, 6 December 1913 : "It hardly 
required an acquaintance with !Esop to realise the folly of masquerading in other people's attire." 
11 Indeed, this became further justification for the advancement of lower deck men to commissioned rank. 
See "A Naval Need," Naval Warrant Officers' Journal, XV (May 1902), 59. 
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when not at sea. In short, naval life, already arduous and uncomfortable, was becoming 
even less attractive. 
Other conditions forced the corps and the Admiralty to rework the essence of the 
contractual relationship. Although pay was a problem for the executive branch, other 
intangible social and psychic rewards seemed under concerted attack. Having a vested 
interest in prestige and the non-monetary aspects of the service, executive officers 
understandably reacted strongly to attempts to water down these benefits. This did not 
make them reactionaries, merely defenders of vested interest. Nor were they snobs, in the 
Edwardian sense, since they were defending what they were, not aspiring to something 
12 they were not. 
Despite the fact that the Victorian era was the heyday of privilege and patronage, 
and notwithstanding the considerable social prestige accorded the executive officer corps, 
unresolved issues remained that served to constrain the professional space of officers. As 
the century progressed, these inconsistencies between the corps and wider British society 
became increasingly stark. One of these challenges was the growth in the importance of 
engineers. Although naval officers approved of engineering as an occupation, they were 
more ambivalent about the engineering profession. In particular, they were alarmed about 
attempts to seize control over important aspects of the naval establishment and reluctant 
12 
See C.C.P. Fitzgerald, "The Admiralty Scheme: The New Regulations for the Entry and Training of 
Naval Officers," United Service Magazine, XXVI (March 1903), 588; and Churchill College, Cambridge 
Archives Centre (CCAC), H.P.A. Hankey Papers (HNKY) 5/3, Hankey to Arthur Marder, 4 December 
1959. 
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to countenance the extension of executive command to engineering officers. This issue 
was so vital to the officer corps that it has been assigned its own chapter. 13 
However, other issues challenged the corps in this period with increasing 
frequency and forced adjustments in its professional culture. Firstly, the executive branch 
had to come to terms with the loss of its apparent economic independence, which in any 
case was a polite fiction by the late nineteenth century. Yet as professionalism became 
redefined it became imperative to improve the conditions for officers in order to get the 
right sort in Her Majesty's uniform while officers became increasing dependent on their 
pay. Although serving officers largely controlled the Admiralty, increased pay or benefits 
were subject to Treasury and Cabinet approval. 14 
Secondly, naval officers experienced the gradual erosion of their authority, not 
only on foreign stations but also within individual ships. From the 1850s, the press and 
Parliament carefully scrutinized conditions of the lower deck. The ability of officers to 
exercise personal initiative was also being constrained by changes in technology, 
command and deployment patterns. Many viewed this narrowing with alarm, and this 
fuelled much of the opposition to Jack Fisher after he became First Sea Lord in 1904. 
Thirdly, naval officers were confronted with the challenge to promote warrant 
officers and ratings into the wardroom. Yet even when this became reality, specific 
obstacles still existed that prevented ex-ratings from achieving high rank. Indeed, even 
receiving a step in rank to commander was extremely unlikely. Rear Admiral Thomas 
13 See Chapter V. 
14 
PRO, ADM 1/8318, Treasury Communication regarding a combined Army and Navy Journal, 1911. The 
Admiralty and Treasury wrangled over £50 in the projected compensation for a naval editor for the journal. 
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Lyne, who made flag rank in the late 1920s, was the first man in nearly a century to make 
the leap to Rear Admiral. 15 Promoting such men was regarded as a method to deal with 
the problem of lower deck ambition. 
The fourth major difficulty was the critical shortage of junior commissioned 
officers. The problem was two-fold: first, the system of training officers was expensive · 
and took nearly nine years (after the advent of the Selbome Scheme in 1902)16 from the 
time a boy became a cadet until he was commissioned as a lieutenant; and second, if too 
many officers were recruited, a higher proportion could not be promoted, would retire as 
senior lieutenants and would thus distort the flow of promotion.17 The shortage of officers · 
was a direct consequence of the expansion triggered by the Naval Defence Act of 1889. 
The Admiralty attempted various schemes to fix this problem and before the outbreak of 
war was forced to resort to several expedients to find enough junior officers. 18 
Finally, public interest combined with the higher estimates to compel the Navy to 
justify its policies as it had never done before. With the advent of the popular press, the 
increasing size of the British electorate and the dramatic growth in the naval 
establishment, the opinions of the so-called "chattering classes" could not be ignored. 
15 PRO, ADM 1/8687/179, Promotion to Flag Rank of Capt Thomas Lyne, 1931. Indeed, regulations had to 
circumvented to achieve this, as a Commissions and Warrant Branch clerk minuted: "To advance him out 
ofhis turn would be contrary to the traditions of the service which have been jealously guarded for the best 
part of two centuries." 
16 Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Parliamentary Papers (BPP), "Memorandum Dealing 
with the Entry, Training and Employment of Officers and Men of the Royal Navy and of the Royal 
Marines," val. LXI, Cd. 1385 (1903), 677. 
17 
PRO, ADM 116/881, Hoskins Report on Naval Lists, 1897, xiii. 
18 
PRO, ADM 116/881, Findlaison Actuarial Report, 1892. 
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Centralization of Power 
Other threats to professional space were also important. The advent of new technologies 
and centralized command arrangements reined in the independence and initiative of naval 
officers on distant stations and even in home waters. The Admiralty possessed increasing 
access to levers of control through the telegraph and, after the tum of the century, the 
wireless. 19 Access to such means of communication gave central authorities in London 
greater effective control over activities at sea.2° Closely related to the extension of control 
from the centre, a similar situation was occurring in the various squadrons and fleets. 
Greater tactical control was at the fingertips of senior admirals as steam replaced sail and 
other forms of signalling were brought to the fore. Admirals could co-ordinate their fleets 
in mathematically calculated manoeuvres that permitted little initiative to subordinate flag 
officers and captains. Andrew Gordon has examined this change when he connected the 
loss of H.M.S. Victoria and the consequent death of Vice Admiral Sir George Tyron in 
1893 with the disappointing results of the Battle of Jutland in 1916.21 Tyron ordered a 
manoeuvre that resulted in a disastrous collision. As the Royal Navy became more and 
more oriented toward fighting a possible Great Power conflict rather than continuing as 
an imperial police force, ships and officers were increasingly sent to organized, 
homogeneous squadrons. Junior officers had even less scope for initiative and fewer 
19 
PRO, ADM 116/3018, "Wireless Telegraphy in War", 4 August 1908. In the case of the Army, see Ian F. 
W. Beckett. The Victorians at War (London: Hambledon & London, 2003), 5-7. 
2° C . B .d ypnan n ge, "The Re-Distribution of the Fleet," Cornhill Magazine, XVIII (1905), 602. 
21 
Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command (London: John Murray, 
1996), 567-569. 
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chances for overseas appointments. The ultimate symbol of this concentration of control 
was the advent of the Naval War Staffunder Winston Churchill in 1912.22 
Throughout this period, the Admiralty was able to assert an increasing level of 
administrative control over the officer corps. It had worked throughout the nineteenth 
century to limit the patronage available to senior officers and had laid down specific _ 
regulations for the education and training of officers?3 Although patronage continued to 
be a factor, promotion was under increasing scrutiny from a political culture that became 
aware of concepts of professionalism and promotion by merit. The other end of an 
officer's career was also becoming tightly controlled out of financial and operational 
necessity. An Order in Council of 1870 prescribed universal rules for the retirement of all 
officers regardless of seniority, and the Admiralty became the agency of these retirements 
from the active list.24 Admiralty control over careers reached its apogee under Fisher and 
Churchill. As the major fleets became concentrated in home waters after 1910, this 
control was further heightened. 25 
22 BPP, "Appendix to the Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 
1912-1913," vol. LII, Cd. 6106 (1912-1913), 306. 
23 Christopher Dandeker, "Patronage and Bureaucratic Control: The Case of the Naval Officer in English 
Society," British Journal of Sociology, XXIX (1978), 300-301. 
24 BPP, "Navy (Officers) Order in Council on Retirement," vol. XLIV, No. 247 (1870), 715. 
25 See PRO, ADM 116/881, File on the Control of Executive Lists, 1894-1913. This file contains the results 
of several attempts by the Admiralty to control the flow of promotion and career paths of executive officers. 
Because of financial stringency and the growth of the fleet, it proved impossible to adequately forecast 
required officer strength. 
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Financial Independence? 
Naval officers as gentlemen and professionals were constrained in their ability to agitate 
for increased pay and benefits since they were compelled to act as if they were semi-
independent contractors providing a public service in exchange for a retaining fee. 26 To 
maintain respectability the Admiralty considered it necessary to maintain the polite 
fiction that officers were not dependent on their pay and that financial affairs were 
comparatively unimportant in relation to the intangible and psychic benefits of wearing 
the uniform and carrying out the duties of an officer.27 Nor was this unique to the 
military, for as Lord Brassey advised, "living within one's income, whatever it may 
be ... is the foundation of all true respectability."28 
Parents, however, did not send their sons into the Navy expecting that they would 
become millionaires. Although the financial compensation was not high, the Navy did 
provide honourable employment. As one author advised the parents of a future cadet, 
"[ d]o I want my boy to make money? If the answer is in the affirmative, close the book 
and take steps to destroy it before your son can read it."29 On the other hand, the author 
recounted the other benefits of naval service: "In the first place, it is an honourable 
26 National Maritime Museum (NMM), D. Beatty Papers (BTY) 8/7, Memorandum by Beatty, 27 January 
1925. 
27 PRO, ADM 118592/129, Pay of ex-rating officers, 1919. After receiving a complaint regarding pay from 
Lieutenant Ernest Ovenden, an Admiralty clerk minuted: "He [Ovenden] also complains that his expenses 
are greater as a result of his acceptance of a commission, but against this must be put, not only the higher 
status enjoyed by him as a Lieutenant, but also the considerable prospective benefits, both as regards full 
and retired pay which that rank confers." 
28 Thomas Brassey, "Education and Training," Brassey's Naval Annual (1887), 52. 
29 G. , 1eve s Ltd., How to Become a Naval Officer (Portsmouth: Gieve's & Co., 1942), 2. 
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service, and the first line of defence of the greatest Empire the world has ever seen ... It is 
a profession in which the first essential ... is ... 'conduct becoming an officer and a 
1 ,,30 gent eman. 
Generally speaking, officers without private income found it difficult to make 
ends meet, especially if they were married. Although officers received far greater pay 
than the average British worker, the lifestyle they expected (and were expected) to lead 
carried with it heavy expenses. Even as late as the 1920s, after the Jerram Committee's 
findings had significantly raised the pay of junior officers, it was difficult to meet all the 
obligations associated with a naval career.31 Chronic debt was a problem, especially in the 
junior ranks. This was associated in particular with the sub-lieutenants' courses at 
Greenwich, where officers seemed to gravitate to the "evils" of London. A full 
investigation of such debts was carried out in 1894 under the direction of Captains Lewis 
Beaumont and Robert Stopford. The former suggested that if mess debts got too high, 
extras such as games and other entertainments should be stopped. Stopford dissented, 
however, arguing that "[t]o enforce such a rule would in my opinion have the effect of 
causing the Officers to seek recreation denied to them in College, outside and locally 
where, to say the least of it, the moral status is not high."32 
30 Ibid., 3. 
31 PRO, ADM 116/1728, Jerram Committee Report, 1917-1919; PRO, ADM 1/8559/139, Order in Council, 
17 May 1920 on Jerram Committee Report, 1920. See also Molly Passmore, In his Wake: Memoirs of a 
Naval Officer's Wife in the 1930s (Braunton, Devon: Merlin Books, 1988), 31. Passmore's husband on full 
pay as a Lieutenant at about £6 per week spent nearly £4 on mess fees, uniforms and other assorted 
expenses. See also "Editorial," Emmanuel Naval Review, March 1919, 4, where one officer commented 
tartly that "[t]he coming increase in Naval pay is so great that the Rolls-Royce Co. is simply snowed under 
with orders." 
32 PRO, ADM 203/6, Report on Mess Expenses, 8 May 1894; and ADM 203/5, Admiralty to Admiral 
President, Royal Naval College, 21 June 1890. Sub Lieutenants William Macdonald and William Barkley 
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Other expenses, especially uniforms, were also high. Outfitters like Gieve's found 
it extremely profitable to extend credit to officers because it ensured their loyalty. 33 
Officers were obligated to purchase at least ten different patterns of uniforms from full 
dress to tropical whites.34 Those in responsible positions also paid out of their own 
pockets for extras such as gold leaf, tampions for the guns, and extra paint. Even 
midshipmen were tacitly expected to provide special decorative fittings in their boats. The 
cleanliness of vessels was also taken extremely seriously. One officer complained bitterly 
about being shelved as a captain as the result of an unfavourable report while he had 
commanded a battleship.35 As the social status of the naval service increased this problem 
was exacerbated. 
Indebtedness might induce an officer to evade debts or even to "liberate" funds 
from mess accounts or public sources.36 Disputes over unpaid accounts, for instance, 
forced the Admiralty to refuse to furnish collectors with the private addresses of officers 
when they began to use their clubs as mail drops, thus making it difficult for the 
were found guilty of misconduct for "introducing women of immoral character into the Royal Naval 
College." 
33 David Gieve, Gieve's & Hawke's, 1795-1985 (London: Gieve's & Hawke's, 1985), 23. 
34 PRO, ADM 116/1459A, Committee to Adjust Uniforms, 1915-1916. 
Jj PRO, ADM 118383/176, Captain P. Nelson Ward to Admiralty, 17 April1916. " ... and that for one mis-
take it is a grievous penalty to reduce the pension of a man only 49 years of age, and to fling him out, 
without a word of sympathy or explanation, from the service to which he has devoted his life, and in which 
he has won the approbation of his seniors on all other occasions." 
36 
"Naval Lieutenant Dismissed the Service," The Times, 9 February 1907. Lieutenant Charles M. Foot was . 
found guilty of desertion and fraudulent conversion of ship's money and sentenced to six months 
imprisonment and dismissal from the service with disgrace. 
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Admiralty to despatch mobilization orders.37 Fraudulent conversion of mess or public 
monies was punished severely and usually resulted in dismissal from the service. Fleet 
Paymaster Lowry received a three-year prison sentence for the theft of £13,000 in 1913.38 
In 1901, Lieutenant and Commander G.S.Q. Carr ofH.M.S. Circe was convicted by court 
martial and dismissed from the service for the improper supervision of mess accounts. 39 
Chronic debt might also lessen an officer's chances of promotion and might result in him 
being socially ostracized by being removed from the wardroom mess.40 One junior officer 
who wrote a bad cheque to cover a debt to the Union Club at Malta was subsequently 
hi d 41 cas ere . 
Other expenses associated with the status of commissioned officer included 
entertainment, travelling, sport, hunting and even mundane items such as housekeeping, 
laundry and stationery. Especially in the lower ranks, but also among high-profile senior 
appointees, pay often failed to meet expenditures. Sub-Lieutenant Gordon Campbell 
found that mess fees cost him £8 per month when his pay amounted to only £7; to make 
37 PRO, ADM 1/8363, File on Debts, 1913. 
38 PRO, ADM 178/11, Equalisation of Sentences Panel, 1914: See also, "Fleet Paymaster's Downfall," The 
Times, 10 February 1913, 10. 
39 PRO, ADM 116/125, Court Martial on Lt and Cdr. G.S.Q. Carr, 1902; the Admiralty commuted the 
sentence to retirement under the provision of the Misconduct Order in Council and was given a 
compassionate allowance of five shillings p er diem . 
40 
E.R. Fremantle, The Navy As I Have Known It, 1849-1899 (London: Cassel, 1904), 17. See also PRO, 
ADM 7/929, Confidential Commanders' Book, case of Commander Laurens Malet who was denied 
promotion in 1883 for chronic complaints about debt; and ADM 203/2, Admiralty to Admiral Fanshawe. 
Fanshawe was reminded that he was "fully authorized to call on Officers to pay their Mess Debts out of 
their monthly advance and that should they fail to do so, they will be liable to be tried by Court Martial for 
disobedience ... " 
41 
CCAC, John M. de Robeck Papers (DRBK) 3/5, de Robeck to Admiralty, 22 April 1907. 
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up the difference he pawned his telescope and sextant.42 Walter Cowan related similar 
tales about his time as a sub-lieutenant at Greenwich. 
Always impecunious, every now and then we journeyed to London in 
search of adventure; once we found ourselves with but 9d between us 
and a long time to go before we had to return. Very hungry, we 
decided we would walk the length of Piccadilly and back in the hope 
of meeting someone we knew well enough perhaps to feed us ... 43 
One of the trends that began to undermine the independent status of naval officers, 
particularly in the lower ranks, was the changing pattern in marriage. In the closing years 
of the nineteenth century officers were actively discouraged for a number of closely 
related reasons from marrying before reaching a certain age and rank. First, pay for junior 
officers, especially lieutenants, was too low to provide adequately for a family . Second, 
for related social reasons marriage was considered inadvisable since a family would have 
to be provided for in a style consistent with the status of commissioned officers, and this 
would leave little income for shipboard expenses. 44 Third, an officer could expect to serve 
extended overseas commissions away from his family for up to three years. Finally, there 
were social and professional pressures. As one writer commented sardonically, 
Judging by the entire absence of encouragement given to British 
sailors and husbands and fathers it would appear that they were 
originally intended for a celibate life. The endeavour to keep them 
single may have been prompted by the desire, at once humane and 
42 G . ordon Campbell, Number Thrrteen (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1932), 40. 
43 W.S. Chalmers (ed.), The Life and Letters of David, Earl Beatty (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1951), 
13 . 
44 
"Sailors ' Wives," United Service Magazine, Vll (May 1893), 807. " In turning to the matrimonial affairs 
of naval officers, the first point to notice is that the official rank of the husband is of considerable 
importance in detennining the amow1t of discomfort and separation to be endured by him and his wife. To 
marry as a sub-lieutenant is as hopelessly silly and undesirable as it is fortunately rare." 
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economical, to limit the annual number of State-made widows and 
orphans.45 
Married officers were called "bundle men," a nickname earned by a reputation for being 
no fun aboard ship. Indeed, many senior officers thought them less efficient than their 
single counterparts.46 Many such officers finished their careers in the Coast Guard, where 
they could expect steady pay and yet remain in home waters. 
This situation meant that ambitious officers generally delayed marriage until they 
reached their mid-thirties. For instance, Ernle Chatfield did not marry until 1909 at the 
age of thirty-five, as a freshly-promoted captain. However, there were exceptions to this 
rule: Fisher, for example, married as a lieutenant while others, like Arthur Wilson, 
remained bachelors.47 As early as 1859 concerns were raised that the naval profession 
was not replacing itself. W. Farr noted that while 71 per cent of males between the ages 
of thirty and thirty-five were wed, only 44 per cent of naval officers were.48 Moreover, 
Farr argued that late marriage tended to produce bad morals and disease. This argument 
was certainly borne out by the returns of sexually transmitted diseases in the naval 
service.49 
45 Ibid., 806. 
46 A.E.M. Chatfield, The Navy and Defence (London: Heinemann, 1942), 29. 
47 Ibid.; and Ernie Bradford, The Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson (London: John Murray, 
1923). 
48 W. Farr, "The Application of Statistics to Naval and Military Matters," RUSI, III, No. I 0 (1859), 212. 
49 Returns of the medical service were provided to Parliament annually. While it is impossible to determine 
the proportion of officers infected, it is difficult to believe that they were immune. Naval figures were high, 
however. For instance, the rate of treatment for syphilis was 43.42 per thousand in 1879; see BPP, 
"Statistical Report on the Health of the Navy for 1879," vol. XLIV, No. 375 (1879), 23. 
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Still, the situation changed by the time of the Great War, as more officers 
disregarded the unwritten injunction against marriage. Gordon Campbell was about to 
marry as a lieutenant in October 1910 when his commanding officer indicated he would 
not have a married officer in his ship. Campbell "pointed out that I did not consider that 
the Navy had any claim on one's personallife."50 The wave of officers joining the service 
just before the First World War led to considerable public pressure on the Admiralty to 
institute a wage scale that would enable them to meet their mess fees and support a wife 
and family. In the ensuing years large numbers of younger officers demanded more 
flexibility in their family circumstances. In the context of wartime inflation in 1914-1918, 
the Admiralty was hard pressed to meet their demands. 
Prejudice against married junior officers continued after the war despite 
improvements in pay and allowances. Molly Passmore, who married her husband when 
he was a freshly minted lieutenant in 1929, had a conversation with an unnamed admiral 
who tactlessly stated his belief that juniors who married were less efficient. Passmore 
responded: 
Now may I present the other aspect of the picture, which 
naturally I know from my own experience. With the exception of 
the Captain, Peter [her husband] is the only married officer in his 
ship. He is the last to come ashore in the evening, as the 
bachelors all dash off in their cars to London as soon as possible. 
He is usually the first back on board in the morning, not having 
so far to go, and with a clear head having soberly gone to bed at 
1 Opm. Also, he puts everything he has into his work, and with the 
added rewonsibility of a wife to maintain, he does not make 
mistakes. 
5
° Campbell, Number Thirteen, 51. 
51 . Passmore, In Hzs Wake, 31. 
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Indeed, many officers were close to rebellion after the war. Molly Passmore 
recalled how difficult it was for she and her husband to make ends meet after their 
marriage. While her spouse's income amounted to £6 per week, more than £2 went 
towards his mess fees, regardless of the cost of uniforms and kit. And neither partner had 
any private income. In 1921, Admiral Boardman, the Commander-in-Chief at 
Portsmouth, coldly refused to meet with a Government M.P. on the grounds "that I had no 
wish to hear a Member of the Government so long as marriage allowance was withheld 
from Naval Officers."52 At the time, Beatty and Bridgeman, the First Lord, were engaged 
in a struggle with the Treasury over the extension of marriage allowances to officers. In a 
memorandum Beatty wrote that: 
The officers have been very patient and have behaved exceedingly 
well. They have made no efforts by sub rosa methods or otherwise 
to air their troubles in public, in the press, or in any other way, but 
the fact that they have refrained from giving publicity to their 
grievances does not mean that their feelings are less strong .... The 
loyalty, which has been strained unduly in doing justice, cannot be 
taxed much more, and I feel I cannot remain responsible for the 
discipline of the Navy if the question is ruled out in face of the 
overwhelming evidence which has been produced. 53 
The Admiralty was forced to offer marriage allowances and to recognize the fact that 
large numbers of officers elected to marry during the war years. Whitehall found it 
difficult to dismiss out of hand an officer's wish to marry while he was risking his life for 
his country. 
52 NMM, BTY 8/7, Admiral Boardman to Frank Spickemell, 22 February 1927. 
53 NMM, BTY 8/7, Memorandum by Beatty, 27 January 1925. 
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The situation was further aggravated by the introduction of commissioned officers 
promoted from the lower deck. The Admiralty found itself in a bind over their promotion 
because it had to make it worthwhile financially for them to exchange a situation where 
they could meet their financial obligations for one as an inferior commissioned officer 
with little chance of further promotion. Many of these men were older and were already 
married. At the same time, there was a problem in that officers entering in the usual way 
had to foot the bill themselves. It seemed to smack of favouritism to foster these 
prospective officers while the others, some of them no better off financially than enlisted 
personnel, were left to fend for themselves. 54 Officers, taking on the values of the wider 
professional world, demanded that they should have the same opportunities and similar 
pay as other professions. 
Command 
When asked by General Sir John Maxwell why naval officers seemed to be much more 
self-reliant than their army brethren, Admiral Mark Kerr put it down to early entry and -
early responsibility. 
I replied that the naval officer has a great advantage, on account of the 
early age when he is first put in a position of responsibility. At fifteen 
years old he is put in charge of a boat, and is responsible for the lives 
54 
PRO, ADM 116/1692, Hyde Parker Committee on Promotion and Conditions of Service of Warrant 
Officers, 1918-1919. "These anomalies [in benefits between regular and ex-rating officers] have been 
patiently and silently endured by direct entry Officers up to date without official protest. We think that they 
hold back because of their high sense of loyalty to the Admiralty, inbred in them by the rigid disciplinary 
ideas and the traditions of the Service which were impressed on them through out the whole of their early 
training." See also NMM, H.W. Richmond Papers (RIC) 7/4, Commander Harrison-Smith to Richmond, 8 
August 1912. 
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and safety of the crew and any damage that may be done to the boat... 
During all his youth he is in a position of trust, where he is responsible 
for the lives of the crew and the safety of his vessel. 55 
One of the intangible benefits of possessing a commission in the Royal Navy was 
a combination of subordination and independence. At every stage of an officer's training 
and education, attempts were made to balance strict subordination to superiors with 
celebrations of individual achievement. Officers were expected to do more than merely 
obey the orders of superiors; they were also expected to gain experience in handling men 
and exercising command. Despite the narrowness of the groove that all officers were 
supposedly forced to pass through, there was not merely a toleration of the idiosyncrasy 
of senior officers but a belief that those who had such personalities were particularly able 
to extract the best results from subordinates. The Royal Navy had been very tolerant of 
men like Lord Charles Beresford, and there seemed to be a great deal of room for prickly 
but able individuals like Robert Arbuthnot, Kenneth Dewar and Herbert Richmond. Even 
the "Young Turk" rebels who caused no end of trouble for the Admiralty managed to find 
themselves on the flag list. Individuality among ratings was also valued as long as a strict 
subordination to the quarterdeck was maintained. As Beresford argued before a Royal 
United Services Institution meeting about the Admiralty's policy regarding "bad hats," 
I was rather a scamp myself, I am afraid; but depend upon it a great 
number of men of this kind ... who have been sent out of the Service 
are the very men you want to fight. .. As a rule, the best boy in the 
school is the biggest "pickle" he has the pluck to get into, and the 
scamps are very often the best men you have got. A scamp is a good 
chap, always was, always ready for a fight. 56 
55 
Mark Kerr, The Navy in My Time (London: Rich & Cowan, 1934), 25-26. 
56 
Gerard Noel, "On the Training of the Executive Branch of the Navy," RUSI, XXXIII (June 1889), 817, 
comments by Beresford. 
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Another officer exhorted his professional readers to "Distinguish between the genial 
blackguard and the common or garden type."57 
Sail training and early responsibility were believed to develop the spiritual aspects 
of command, whereas mechanistic factors seemed to limit the boundaries of executive 
action. Along with the complete mechanization of the fleet, uncertainties in British 
economic and political security and the experience of the Boer War served to convince 
many in the wider society and the political elite of the value of efficiency and the need to 
extract the most power from every farthing expended by the state. This was especially the 
case with the armed forces after the British Army had been exposed to criticism even 
more devastating than that experienced at the close of the Crimean War. 
The Boer War convinced the British electorate that efficient management of the 
armed forces was vital and that the word of generals and admirals could not necessarily 
be trusted. 58 Hence, centralized management and control were required not merely over 
the great fleets but also to limit the liability on Westminster's resources both financially 
and militarily wherever Britain's imperial rivals were extending their control on the 
periphery. Realizing the problems associated with leaving the imperial enterprise to the 
57 A Watchkeeper, Five Minutes to One Bell: A Few Hints to Junior Watchkeepers (Portsmouth: Gieve's, 
1916), 14. 
58 For an example see, Linesman, "The Mechanism of War IV The Officer's Officer," The Spectator, 1 
March 1902. 
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man on the spot, British governments moved to rein in his independence and initiative.59 
The Boer War demonstrated the need for centralized control and increased the apparent 
need to impose tighter direction over the armed forces. In essence, a political need to 
tighten the bounds of control fed into the technical and organizational capacity to 
centralize executive action and the command functions at Whitehall.60 
In the aftermath of the Boer War, the Balfour government established the 
Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.) to confirm the primacy of Cabinet in this area. 
Senior officers were assigned as advisers, and a Secretariat was established to coordinate 
policy. The reorganization of the War Office and the establishment of a General Staff 
were triggered by a full Committee investigation under Viscount Esher and Admiral Sir 
John Fisher. 61 Yet not until Fisher's retirement 1910 and the abysmal failure of his 
successor, Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, to enunciate a coherent strategy for a potential war 
with Germany in 1911 was Admiralty re-organization regarded necessary.62 
Nonetheless, steps were already in train even before the Fisher years to limit the 
independence of commanders-in-chief and the authority of senior officers relative to the 
Admiralty. The collision between the Victoria and the Camperdown abruptly ended the 
59 Mike O'Brien, "A School of Manliness: British Officers on the Frontiers of the Empire, 1898-1914" 
(Unpublished seminar presentation, Department of History, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 15 July 
2003) . 
6
° Franklyn Johnson, Defence by Committee: The British Committee of Imperial Defence, 1885-1959 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 40-47. 
61 Ibid., 59-70; and John Gooch, "The Creation of the British General Staff, 1904-1914," RUSI, CXVI 
(1971), 50-53 . 
62 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 (5 
vols., London: Oxford University Press, 1961), I, 239-246. Indeed, the resulting pressure for change not 
only triggered a flurry of Admiralty activity but also attracted the intense attention of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence. See PRO, Cabinet Papers (CAB) 1/31, Memoranda on naval war staff, 1911. 
148 
experiments with decentralized battle tactics and showed, as Andrew Gordon has 
demonstrated, the importance of the need to rigidly control subordinate officers in tactical 
evolutions.63 The quest for "smartness" reached the level where it distorted and 
invalidated the purpose for having such drills in the first place. As Admiral Fitzgerald 
argued, 
. . . the more one looks, or tries to look, at this question from an 
impartial and unprejudiced point of view, the more one fails to 
appreciate the logic of the "sail drillers," and the more it appears to 
partake of that method of argument which Professor Huxley is so fond 
of calling the a priori method a which assumes that because such and 
such a process has produced so and so in the past, therefore it will 
produce so and so ... in the future, notwithstanding that the conditions 
have totally changed.64 
Indeed, Herbert Richmond complained bitterly in his diary after an unsatisfactory 
discussion with Admiral Sir William May's Chief of Staff, Captain Archibald Moore: 
The fact is, of course, that people like Moore, and unfortunately the 
Service is made up of them, have been so occupied all their lives in 
making their ships "smart", burnishing bollards or over-reaching 
other people in the Fleet so as to get out a bower anchor before 
another man, or swindling at drill, or making record shooting under 
conditions utterly different from action conditions, that they have 
never had time to ready & study.65 
Competitive drill led many officers to pursue shortcuts and "cheats" to beat 
squadron mates, but it also had an aura of unreality that was difficult to dispel even when 
63 Gordon, Rules of the Game. 
64 C.C.P. Fitzgerald, "The War Training of the Navy III: A Reply to Sir G. Hornby," United Service 
Magazine, II (November 1890), 125. 
65 Arthur J . Marder (ed.), Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1952), 50, diary entry 2 May 1909. 
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the gunnery revolution swept the fleet. 66 Battle practice and prize firing increasingly bore 
little resemblance to reality and may have, for instance, played a role in the rejection of 
the Pollen system of fire control before the war.67 This reached its extreme when 
individual captains were ordered to follow the evolutions of the flag ship in matters as 
minor as the hanging of laundry and the hoisting of boats while individuality was driven 
out of the cadet by the nature of life afloat where nothing was done without direct 
orders. 68 Admiral Sir Arthur Moore recalled the fury of the senior captain in the squadron 
(the admiral was ashore) when he, as a junior captain, had ordered the sails brought in 
before being ordered to do so because of a rapidly approaching typhoon. "This was the 
only time in the whole of my service that I disobeyed the order of a senior officer, but the 
safety of my ship was my first duty and before I could acknowledge [the signal] the 
typhoon struck. "69 
While cultural values and the nature of executive command became increasingly 
centralized, the tools at the disposal of the Admiralty to effect direct executive command 
66 St. Barbara, "Fool Gunnery in the Navy," Blackwood's, CLXXXIII, No. 1108 (1908), 308-309. See also, 
Brian Schofield, '"Jacky' Fisher, H.M.S. Indomitable and the Dogger Bank Action: A Personal Memoir." in 
Gerald Jordan (ed.) , Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century, 1900-1945: Essays in Honour of Arthur 
Marder (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 69. Admiral Schofield recounted the remarkable ascent of a ship's 
commander due to tricks of winning such competitions. 
67 Jon Sumida, In Def ence of Naval Supremacy (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 333-334. Alfred H. Pollen 
offered the Royal Navy a mechanical computer that enabled a continuous fire control solution to be 
maintained on a moving target regardless of the movement or course change of the firing vessel. It offered 
a solution to intractable problem of calculating changes in the rate of change of range, or range rate. The 
system adopted was that developed by Lieutenant (later Admiral Sir) Frederic Dreyer that proved inferior in 
that it was not helm free . In other words a steady course had to be maintained in order to achieve an 
accurate solution. 
68 Dewar, Navy from Within , 23 . 
69 E. M. Moore (ed.), Adventure in the Royal Navy: The Life and Letters of Admiral Sir Arthur William 
Moore (Liverpool: E.M. Moore, 1964), 65. 
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over the movement of ships and squadrons became greater. Not surprisingly, there was an 
almost incredible temptation from the centre, especially to men who had commanded 
squadrons and fleets, to interfere with the man on the spot. AB Cyprian Bridge wrote: 
Interference with officers on the spot and many thousands of miles 
away by fussy personages at headquarters has been greatly 
facilitated by the improvements in means of communication, and 
an admiral or divisional senior officers whom Nature has not 
endowed with the gift of self-reliance finds it difficult to resist the 
temptation to use the facilities for "requesting instructions" placed 
within his reach by the rapid steamer and the telegraphic cable.70 
Such interference had a more subtle influence over the prerogatives of officers 
afloat as the Admiralty increased its ability to restrict the freedom of action of 
commanders in chief. In particular, the centralization of command under way during the 
Fisher years led to the clash with Lord Charles Beresford who commanded the Channel 
Fleet. Under the impression that he was to be "Admiralissimo" in home waters in the 
event of a major war, Beresford was determined to resist Admiralty dominance. 
Furthermore, the re-distribution of the fleet in 1904-1905 and again in 1912 lessened the 
status of foreign stations. Indeed, an Admiralty memorandum argued that wireless 
communications and the use of flying squadrons of fast battle ships or armoured cruisers 
would provide imperial defence more effectively than tying down significant resources 
around the globe.71 Senior officers resented the re-distribution, and Admiral Sir Gerard 
70 Bridge, "Re-Distribution of the Fleet," 602. 
71 PRO, ADM 116/3108, Admiralty Memorandum on Wireless Telegraphy, 1908. 
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Noel had to be restrained from striking his flag on the China station when the last 
battleships in his squadron were sent home.72 
Such centralization led to problems between the Admiralty and its previously 
semi-independent Commanders-in-Chief, particularly in Home Waters. As a 1908 
Admiralty memorandum put it: 
The ordering of the strategic movements of the fleet is dependent on 
the information that comes in from time to time from the various 
sources. In former days, before the advent of wireless telegraphy, the 
system was that the Admiralty issued certain general orders indicating 
the general line to be followed, and the Admirals at sea acted on these 
instructions to the best of their ability, and they were dependent solely 
for their information on the very slow and imperfect means then 
existing for obtaining news by means of cruisers and visual 
. 11" 73 s1gna mg. 
While wireless telegraphy greatly enhanced the capacity to issue executive orders, 
the Admiralty lacked the administrative arrangements to co-ordinate movements in an 
efficient and timely fashion. The Naval War Staff, which was established in 1912, 
represented an attempt to centralize command decisions. Also, the Admiralty mandated 
that staff officers should be specialists and that the structure of a staff in active commands 
should exactly mirror the structure in London.74 This had the result of circumscribing the 
freedom of flag officers to select their own staffs. 
72 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, I, 85; See also National Maritime Museum (NMM), G. 
Noel Papers (NOE) 20E, Fisher to Noel, 3 March 1905, where Fisher attempted to calm Noel by asking him 
"please not [to] mind the raid we have made on your fleet." 
73 PRO, ADM 116/3108, Wireless Telegraphy in War, 4 August 1908. 
74 PRO, ADM 1/8377/120, "Memorandum - The Necessity for Co-ordinating Staff Work Afloat," 18 
October 1911; and CAB 17/8, Memorandum by G. Ballard, 1 November 1911 ; "Prior preparation is not 
only the most effective but is also THE CHEAPEST form of defence - money not spent according to the 
closely investigated needs for security is money and resources wasted." 
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Even worse was that Admiralty control was tightened without the development of 
an effective system to ensure that an activist First Lord like Winston Churchill could not 
hijack (in the view of professional officers) operational control from the First Sea Lord 
and whatever staff existed at the Admiralty. 75 In the spring of 1914, Churchill ordered 
elements of the Atlantic Fleet under Rear Admiral Lewis Bayly to prepare to intervene in 
the Ulster crisis, thus bypassing the Commander-in-Chief and threatening to provoke the 
resignation of several officers with important connections to the Ulster Unionists, like 
Admiral Sir George Callaghan, who commanded the Home Fleet (soon to be renamed the 
Grand Fleet).76 This tendency to usurp the authority of the executive officers in the 
Admiralty resulted in the resignation of Fisher and Churchill's subsequent downfall as 
First Lord in the spring of 1915. Furthermore, since orders to the Fleet at this time passed 
through the hands of the civilian Secretary's Department at the Admiralty, it was entirely 
possible that orders could be generated without reference to the professional members of 
the Board. 
Centralization of authority at the turn of the twentieth century was not unique to 
the Admiralty; similar trends were visible in the War, Colonial and Foreign Offices. The 
experience of the Boer War finally discredited many of the swashbuckling efforts of 
empire builders on the periphery of Empire. 77 In response to financial crisis and re-
75 BPP, "First Report of the Dardanelles Commission," vol. X, Cd. 8490 (1917-18), 431; Barry Hunt, 
Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, 1871-1946 (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University 
Press, 1982), 44-45. 
76 
Ian F.W. Beckett and Keith Jeffrey, "The Royal Navy and the Curragh Incident," Historical Research, 
LXII ( 1989), 54-69. 
77 O'Brien, "A School of Manliness." 
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orientation of its focus, the Admiralty felt compelled to take part m day-to-day 
management at a level that hitherto had not been attempted. 
During this time a change in the culture of command was occurring. Command 
decisions over even relatively minor details were not only being centralized in the 
Admiralty but also down the line in individual admirals and commanders-in-chief. This 
left a decreasing zone of independence for other subordinate ranks. This process was 
aided by the development of the wireless and the redeployment of the fleet into squadrons 
of evolution and concentration in home waters. As the Royal Navy faced increased global 
competition, it was forced to integrate even its overseas detachments into homogeneous 
squadrons to insure that these detachments could fulfil imperial and trade defence 
duties.78 Individual commanders-in-chief were under increasing pressure to keep tabs on 
their subordinates. 
Shifts in the culture of command also affected the latitude given to officers to 
discipline their men. Although the flogging of ratings was abolished before this period, a 
pattern of the cat-of-nine tails was kept on board ships. While the flogging of non-
Caucasians was still permitted as late as 1914, such practices now had to be approved by 
the Admiralty. For instance, the Commander-in-Chief at the Cape of Good Hope was 
forced to request permission from London to have Arab and Somali stokers flogged. 
While this permission was granted with the observation that "Discipline must be 
maintained & you should take whatever steps are necessary in dealing with Arab and 
78 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, I, 38-45. 
154 
Somali mutineers" the point is that in the nineteenth century no commander overseas 
k 79 would have had to as . 
As a result of social and political changes, the Admiralty and naval officers in 
general had to be careful when managing personnel. In the case of courts martial, the 
head of the Naval Law Branch warned that "[t]he proceedings at a Home Port in a case 
likely to excite general interest are published at great length in The Times and there are 
always lying in wait naval and Legal Experts who would be prepared to pounce upon any 
Finding which appeared to them to have flaw in it."80 
Therefore, the rights and privileges of the executive officer corps were becoming 
increasingly circumscribed as the influences of financial limitation, the assertion of the 
battle fleet doctrine, technology and organizational changes took place. Moreover, the 
very importance of the growing fleet offered a more direct challenge to the status and 
professional space of executive naval officers. 
Crisis in Numbers 
Throughout the nineteenth century one of the constant problems faced by the Admiralty 
and the executive officer corps was the flow of promotion and the supply of new recruits 
to its ranks. In the half century after 1815, the difficulty was not a lack of commissioned 
79 
PRO, ADM 1/8404/450, Admiralty to CINC, Cape, 30 November 1914. 
80 
PRO, ADM 118100, Memorandum on Courts Martial by George Hoste, 8 February 1909. 
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officers but a flooded market of ageing men with little prospect of employment. 81 At the 
same time, non-effective charges in the form of half pay and pensions made steady 
inroads into Navy Estimates. However, from the passage of the Naval Defence Act of 
1889 to the outbreak of the Great War, the problem was a dearth of deck officers 
concurrent with the naval service increasing not merely in absolute size but also in 
complexity of required skills. The shortfall in officer numbers by 1914 forced the 
Admiralty, despite being largely dominated by senior line officers, to redefine the 
informal contract that bound the executive officer corps to the state. 
The induction of officers into a naval service is an exercise in "social calculus." 
Administrators are faced with difficult choices, as they must navigate between the 
competing demands of equity, economy and efficiency. 82 The first requirement of officers 
was that they should be in sufficient quality and quantity to provide effective and efficient 
leadership in the event of international complications. As Admiral Lord Charles 
Beresford wrote: 
The fighting efficiency of the Royal Navy depends first of all upon the 
quality and the ability of its officers. Therefore the selection, the 
education and the training of officers are matters of paramount 
importance. And not only do they affect the Navy, but they intimately 
affect those hundreds of families who give their sons to the service of 
their country. 83 
81 Steward Ross, Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman: The Life and Times of an Officer and a Gentleman 
(Cambridge: Pearson, 1998), 28. Ross comments there were plenty of Admirals "well past their 'sell-by 
date." 
82 Donald Chisholm, Waiting for Dead Man's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S Navy's Officer 
Personnel System, 1793-1941 (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 28-32. 
83 Charles Beresford, The Betrayal (London: P.S. King, 1912), 2. 
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The efficiency of these officers had been a preoccupation of the Admiralty throughout the 
nineteenth century when it attempted to assure that officers were young and fit enough to 
take up active command.84 Moreover, the various education committees from 1870 
onwards attempted to ensure that officers were adequately prepared for active service. 
Second, in view of the vital importance of morale and zeal, administrators had to 
demonstrate due regard for the interests of its servants. This was especially the case with 
commissioned officers, who were specially trained from childhood to provide executive 
leadership and had certain expectations regarding appointments and promotion. In the 
case of an officer class that possessed considerable social and political power, this proved 
especially difficult. As the Admiralty solicitor wrote in 1913 while considering the 
virtually unlimited power of the Board in personnel matters : 
The assumption underlying the legal position is of course that the 
Crown will observe in its dealings with its servants the highest degree 
of good faith - subject only to this, that the public interest is 
paramount, and the every officer holds his position upon the footing 
that the Crown has the right to deal with him as the public interest 
requires. 85 
Even though the Admiralty, as the agent of the Crown, possessed virtually unlimited 
power to regulate personnel matters, in practice that power was constrained by political 
and practical realities. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, a firm appreciation of the financial cost 
associated with the maintenance of the corps was required. Rapid variations, in both 
84 John Beeler, " 'Fit for Service Abroad': Promotion, Retirement and Royal Navy Officers, 1830-1890, 
Mariner 's Mirror, LXXXI, No.3 (1994), 300-312. 
85 PRO, ADM 1/8370/65, Minute by Admiralty solicitor, 3 June 1913. 
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absolute size and proportion in each rank, were to be avoided since they increased the 
burdens on budgets. Augmentations to the permanent officer corps, or any increase in 
promotion imposed costs, were felt well beyond the immediate fiscal year. Indeed, 
contemporary policy decisions could continue to affect the Navy's finances for a half-
century or more. For instance, in 1912 the Accountant General calculated that the 
addition of one hundred Royal Naval Reserve (R.N.R.) officers into regular service would 
incur a £750,000 liability on future estimates from 1913 to 1958, when Mr. Ryles 
calculated that these officers would no longer be collecting pensions.86 Already in 1905 
the Admiralty was spending almost £1 million per year on pensions. 87 Further, even if the 
Admiralty decided that such charges were warranted, Treasury approval had to be 
obtained. Ever wary of Admiralty attempts to wrestle concessions, the Treasury put up 
substantial resistance to any programme or policy that seemed too costly or set, at least in 
its view, a bad precedent. For instance, attempts by the Admiralty to lower entry costs to 
cadets and to offer incentives for lower deck officers were vigorously opposed and 
triggered a direct exchange between the First Lord and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 88 
Managing a rapidly expanding naval service in an uncertain international climate, 
the Admiralty had to struggle constantly with these problems. When this expansion was 
coupled with the new skills required to build, maintain and fight a modern steel navy, this 
management issue was even more critical. Other branches of service, such as engineering, 
86 PRO, ADM 1/8363; see also ADM 7/994, Naval Necessities, vol. II, 73. 
87 PRO, ADM 1/7858, Admiralty to Treasury, 7 December 1905. 
88 PRO, ADM 1/8402/422, Chancellor of the Exchequer to First Lord, 17 July 1914. 
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accounting and administrative servtces, took a greater and greater share of the 
Admiralty's time and resources. Further, the skills and training required by executive 
officers increased dramatically at the same time as heavier demands for commissioned 
personnel took place. This problem grew geometrically, as Churchill alluded to in the 
sketch estimates for 1914-1915.89 
Executive officers had the responsibility of command and were expected to 
provide the leadership that would secure the safety of the empire. Before the 1860s, 
without a system of retirement beyond the provision of half pay, the Navy was glutted 
with literally thousands of officers, most of whom had no realistic hope of employment. 
Nor was there incentive for officers to remove themselves from the list, especially for 
those who had reached the rank of post captain. Even if such an officer were never to see 
further sea service, he would automatically become an admiral by seniority. The starkest 
example was Admiral of the Fleet Sir Provo Wallis, who died at the age of 100 having 
been on the active list for 94 years. 90 
The problem was not a simple matter of mindlessly adding more officers. Rapid 
expansion of the intake of officer candidates was first of all expensive. The training 
system would have to be expanded, more berths would have to be found in gunrooms of 
the fleet, increased demand for the services of naval instructors and finally the costs of 
employing the midshipman when he became an officer all needed to be considered. 
Further, expansion in the intake of officers would take too long to have immediate effect. 
89 CCAC, CHAR 13/20, "Sketch Estimates for 1914-15. 
90 William C. Heine, Ninety-Six Years in the Royal Navy (Hantsport, NS: Lancelot, 1987). Wallis had been 
entered onto a ship's books at the age of six. 
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Prior to the advent of the Selbome Scheme in 1902 it took the Navy more than seven 
years to produce a competent deck officer, afterwards it took nine. Finally, rapid intake in 
a short period of time would distort the normal flow of promotion that was considered the 
foundation of the efficiency of the officer corps. As one officer wrote: 
Most of us are very human; some few are impelled to do their duty in 
spite of everything, and even at times, and in rare cases, to their own 
detriment; but in the minds of most of us the EGO looms very large 
indeed, and our incentive to work is the reward to be gained. Some 
strive for pieces of ribbon, and others for pounds, shillings and pence; 
but the main idea of all is to obtain promotion, and this is their primary 
incentive to zeal. It follows logically that when promotion is barred, 
zeal, which at the best is more or less exotic, becomes an attenuated 
plant.91 
The blockage in promotion caused by the heavy intake of new officers in a few very short 
years caused considerable difficulties as George King noted in a memorandum prepared 
for the Admiralty. 
This congestion is due to the abnormally large entries of Naval Cadets 
in 1896 onwards, which were first made to met the actual 
requirements on the Lieutenants' List as laid down by Order in 
Council of291h November 1898- that is 1,550- but were subsequently 
maintained to provide for the anticipated needs of a rapidly expanding 
fleet. This would not have presented difficulties if the expansion was 
spread over twenty years ... but compressed as they were into a period 
of a few years, it was inevitable that at a later period large numbers of 
Lieutenants would come into the promotion zone together, with a 
consequent block in promotion.92 
91 Telescope, "Zeal in the Navy," United Service Magazine, vol. XXVI, no. 890 (January 1903), 331. 
92 PRO, Treasury Papers (T) 1/11192, Memorandum by George King, 1908; see also ADM 116/2462, 
Memorandum by Captain Hugh Tweedie; and BPP, Report of the Select Committee on Navy Estimates," 
vol. XII, No. 142 (1888), 545, testimony of Admiral Sir John Hopkins. "Exactly so, and therefore we are 
very little desirous of increasing the lieutenants' list if it can possibly be avoided, because that would only 
lead to there being a greater number of discontented men." 
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King, an actuary from the National Debt Office, calculated that the promotion prospects 
for these officers were "totally inadequate" and would not reach equilibrium until1923.93 
In the years following 1889, the solution to the shortage of deck officers in the 
near term was to offer regular commissions to R.N.R. officers. Known as the "Hungry 
Hundred," these officers would be followed by the "Famished Fifty," who would serve as 
a stopgap.94 The 1893 Hoskins Committee discovered that the Navy would be short of 
considerable numbers of lieutenants in the coming years. This problem was especially 
vexing because of the need to man the new torpedo boat destroyers then entering service 
and the requirements of the expanded battle fleet. At the time an Admiralty study 
calculated that a smooth and orderly programme to expand officer intake through 
Britannia would take until 1911 !95 This was unacceptable to the Admiralty. Although 
these officers were to have the same privileges as regular officers, their prospects of 
advancing beyond lieutenant were virtually nil. Hence, they would not block the 
promotion of ex-cadet officers.96 Still, there were drawbacks to this mechanism because it 
93 Ibid. 
94 PRO, ADM 1/7727, Admiralty to Treasury, March 1895. 
95 PRO, ADM 116/881 , Hoskins Committee, 1893. 
96 This could be justified on the grounds that merchant officers were not necessarily competent in the 
application of force at sea. See, J.K. Laughton, Naval Promotion Arithmetically and Historically 
Considered," RUSI, XXIV, No. 106 (1881), 555, comments by Vice Admiral Selwyn. "Day by day the 
naval Officer is varying more and more widely from the seaman of the mercantile marine. I have made may 
passages backwards and forwards in the American liners. Now what has an Officer to do there? They have 
often told me themselves that practically all they have to do is to take a floating hotel from one side of the 
ocean to the other." 
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was merely temporary, removed officers from the pool of available reserves in the event 
of war, and faced a gauntlet of Treasury criticism.97 
The Treasury balked particularly at the Admiralty request that these commissions 
be long term, desiring instead that they be merely temporary and that the supplementary 
R.N.R. officers be ineligible for pensions or half pay.98 Realizing that there were few 
incentives for reserve officers to trade the merchant marine for "hard lying"99 service in 
destroyers, where they would be second-class commissioned officers, the Admiralty 
argued successfully that these men must be offered benefits identical to those given to 
regular entry officers. 100 This recruitment inaugurated a fairly regular trend. A further 
fifty of these new officers were recruited in 1898, for example. When another crisis in 
officer numbers came in 1913, the Admiralty looked for an additional 100 reserve officers 
for regular service and by the end of the year sought another forty. 101 
The problem with this supply of officers was that they were entered so that they 
would not compete with regular entry officers either in obtaining premier appointments or 
promotions. Consequently, the Admiralty found it extremely difficult to attract officers in 
this fashion. Moreover, the system also in essence "relocated" the shortage. In the event 
97 Indeed, this proved a problem during the war. See PRO, ADM 1/8478/5, Report on Conference on 
R.N.R. officers, 1917. 
98 Short service commissions were granted with the understanding that the individual was contracted to 
provide service for a number of years with severely reduced or even non-existent pension benefits. Further, 
such men were virtually debarred from further promotion. 
99 
"Hard lying" was a term denoted for service that was considered particularly arduous. Considering the 
discomforts of serving in early destroyers, officers were granted special allowances. 
100 PRO, ADM 117277, Memorandum on RNR officers, 1895. 
101 PRO, ADM 1/8363, Distribution of Officers for Mobilisation, 1913. 
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of war, taking officers away from the R.N.R. would simply create another gap in the 
available resources. 102 
Another step, though one that is often missed, was part of the Selbome education 
reforms of December 1902. This entailed the more efficient use of officer resources. 103 
The idea was that all three combat arms were be integrated into one corps that would not 
merely enable engineer and marine officers to obtain executive command but would 
provide the Admiralty with an officer corps able to adjust to changing requirements. 104 
The intention behind the Selbome Scheme was to solve a series of interlocking 
problems that had plagued the Navy for several decades. First, it was designed to deal 
with the long-standing dispute between deck and engineering officers and to properly 
integrate technical education into the training programme for the former. Second, it was 
intended to permit a more flexible use of officer resources by the Admiralty. Considering 
the cost of the employment and training of Marine and engineering officers, the Selbome 
Scheme and the modifications proposed by the Douglas Education Committee of 1906 
envisioned that officers could at several points in their career revert to the line. 105 Hence, 
considering the uncertain future, it made sense to have officers firmly grounded in all 
aspects of deck duties early in their careers. As Fisher estimated in 1906, the Admiralty 
102 PRO, ADM 1/7714, Report on Naval Reserves, paragraph 17. 
103 BPP, "Memorandum dealing with the Entry, Training and Employment of Officers and Men of the 
Royal Navy and of the Royal Marines," vol. LXX, Cd. 1385 (1902), 675. 
104 Arthur J. Marder (ed.), Fear God and Dread Nought: The Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord 
Fisher of Kilverstone (3 vols., London: Jonathan Cape, 1952), find reference to efficient use of officer 
resources. See also, "The New Admiralty Scheme," The Times, 8 January 1903. 
105 BPP, "Reports of Departmental Committee Appointed to Consider Certain Questions Concerning the 
Extension of the New Scheme ofTraining for Officers of the Navy," vol. LXX, Cd. 2841 {1906). 
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would be short approximately 900 combatant officers in the event of a major war, while 
there were some 500 Marine officers who could be, under the provisions of the New 
Scheme, trained to stand watch, thus making the most of existing officer resources. 106 
Unfortunately, this plan could not be realized for at least two decades until these 
new officers reached the fleet in significant numbers. As Donald Bittner has 
demonstrated, the effects of the Scheme were merely to reduce the regular supply of 
Marine officers to the point where the Admiralty was forced to revert to former recruiting 
and training practices. 107 The same held true in the case of engineering officers because 
the Osborne Dartmouth system was biased toward keeping the quarterdeck supplied as 
opposed to the engine room. 108 Finally, the scheme exacerbated the already difficult 
problem of lead-time in the preparation of young officers by extending it to nine years 
and erecting further fmancial barriers. As early as 1895 Admiral Sir Frederick Richards 
had found that predicting officer requirements fifteen months in advance was practically 
impossible. 109 In light of the rapid expansion of the fleet, the supply could not coincide 
with demand even in peacetime. 
Early entry was again emphasized and extra requirements were added in the 
colleges. Cadets were entered at Osborne at thirteen, where they undertook a two-year 
106 CCAC, J.A. Fisher Papers (FISR) 1/15/198, Fisher to Prince ofWales, 15 April1906. 
107 Donald Bittner, "Shattered Images: Officers of the Royal Marines, 1867-1913," Journal of Military 
History, LIX, No. 1 (1995), 34. 
108 PRO, ADM 1/8451/281, McKenna Report on Naval Engineering, 1918. See also ADM 7/995, Naval 
Necessities, vol. Ill, Memorandum by Rosslyn Wemyss. "I have observed a tendency on the part of the 
parents of some of the cadets at Osborne to hope at least their sons might never become Lieutenants (E), 
with no chance of commanding ships or fleets, and I have a suspicion that, for this reason, they have in 
some cases even discouraged their sons in their engineering studies." 
109 PRO, ADM 1/7277, minute by Richards, 1895; see also T 1/11129, King Actuarial Report. 
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course, followed closely by a further two at Dartmouth. They went to sea in training ships 
at the age at seventeen. That was followed by active service in the fleet for approximately 
three years. After passing the required examinations, young officers served as sub-
lieutenants and generally received their commissions as lieutenants at the age of twenty-
two. This lengthy process complicated the existing problem because the expansion of the 
fleet required the Board of Admiralty to project nearly a decade ahead. As of April 1914, 
the Admiralty was looking forward to requirements for 1920. 110 
Further, the rapid expansion of the fleet seriously (and perhaps irreparably) 
damaged the principle of common entry enshrined in the Selborne Scheme. Entrants from 
the lower deck, the public schools, or the merchant service would not possess the 
technical education and engineering background that regular line officers did. Indeed, the 
Admiralty was so short of engineering officers in 1913 that candidates destined for the 
engineering branch departed from the standard year at sea as deck officers to begin their 
specialized education immediately. 111 Moreover, the extension of the mate scheme to 
engine room artificers obviously meant that these men would not qualify as deck officers. 
Although the Second Sea Lord recognized that this undercut the principles of the new 
programme of training, he accepted that there was little choice. "On the other hand we are 
faced with a serious shortage of Engineer Officers in the near future and there is no 
method that I can see of meeting this shortage except the step I now propose."112 The 
110 PRO, ADM 116/3486, Requirements of Officers for 1920, April 1914. 
Ill Ibid. 
112 PRO, ADM 1/8366/13, Promotion of Engine Room Artificers to Commissioned Rank, 1914; 
Memorandum by Second Sea Lord, August 1913. 
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result was a series of different classes of officer, each with various types of experience 
and training. 
By 1912-13, the expansion of the fleet and the heavy demands for officers for the 
new Dominion navies, the Royal Naval Air Service (R.N.A.S.) and the submarine service, 
coupled with the increased needs of the dreadnought battle fleet, left the Admiralty 
critically short of executive officers. Further, the Director of Naval Ordnance had issued 
manning requirements for the 1912 construction programme. 113 The R.N.A.S. alone was 
to account for nine commanders and 160 lieutenants by 1920. Projections on the strength 
of the officer corps for 1920 called for no fewer than 3073 lieutenants (with at least 240 
allocated to [E] duties), nearly double the figure from a decade earlier and half again the 
authorized figure for 1913. Even with the projected addition of ninety lieutenants from 
the R.N.R., eighty Special Entry cadets, and 185 promoted through the mate scheme, the 
service was still destined to be short over 500 fully qualified lieutenants. 114 As Admiral 
Bridge commented: 
Now we are getting to a set of conditions that requires serious 
consideration where education is being discussed; and it is this: that 
this is the first attempt that has ever been made anywhere to maintain 
in a period of prolonged peace a naval force on a war footing. It is the 
first attempt. We have absolutely no experience to guide us. 115 
11 3 PRO, ADM 116/881, Duff Report, 1913. "The large increases in the requirements of lieutenants is due 
principally to the fact that the complements of ships of the Queen Elizabeth class and later are based on the 
requirements given in the provisional Quarter Bill supplied by the DNO, which shows an increase in 
Lieutenants from five to ten per ship." 
114 PRO, ADM 118370/65, Memorandum on Officer Requirements. 
11 5 PRO, ADM 116/1288, Custance Committee Report 1912, testimony of Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, 11 
April 1912. 
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As the Table 4.1 demonstrates, even with a maximum effort with existing infrastructure, 
the Navy was going to be left seriously short of junior officers. 
Table 4.1 Projected Shortages of Executive Officers 
Table 4 lA P . t d Offi R t . ro.1ec e Jeer eqmremen s 
Rank 1916 1918 1920 
Commanders 436 444 458 
Lieutenants 2289 2406 2523 
Officers required for 50 70 100 
dominion service 
Sub Lieutenants 393 389 ·411 
Table 41B P . roJecte dR esources o fL' t t 1eu enan s 
1916 1918 1920 
Old Scheme 1600 1450 1150 
New Scheme 500 760 1250 
Minus Officers for (E) -40 -60 -120 
duties 
Totals 2060 2150 2280 
Ta bl 41C P . e roJecte d Sh f ll ort a s 
Date 1916 1918 1920 
Requirements (Lts) 2339 2476 2623 
Resources 2060 2150 2280 
Projected Shortage of Sub -50 -40 -60 
Lt's 
Deficit 329 326 343 
Source: PRO, ADM 118363, Memorandum by C. Walker, 15 August 1912. 
Even with Osborne and Dartmouth operating at maximum capacity, the gap 
between supply and demand was becoming greater. In response, the Admiralty was 
forced to resort to expedients. First, it sought more R.N.R. officers to serve in the regular 
forces. Second, it decided to exploit the same sources of recruits as the Army and the 
Marines by taking boys who had just completed public school. 116 These candidates were 
to enter at the age of seventeen or eighteen and go through crash training at the former 
116 As early as 1875, such a system had been examined and rejected. BPP, "Report of the Committee 
Appointed by the Admiralty to Inquire into the System of Training Naval Cadets on Board H.M.S. 
Britannia," vol. XV, C. 1154 (1875), 360. 
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Royal Naval Engineering College at Keyham to prepare them to take a commission in 
two and a half years. These future officers were to have the same career prospects as 
those passing through Osborne and Dartmouth. 117 Although this enabled the selection of 
another group of young gentlemen, there were drawbacks. 118 
The assertion of the equality of status of Special Entry cadets with their Osborne 
comrades presented difficulties. Firstly, it undercut all the assumptions regarding the 
value of the Selborne Scheme. Special Entry cadets did not receive the calibre of 
engineering and scientific training that their regular entry contemporaries did and yet they 
were to have the same opportunities. This further damaged the prestige of engineering as 
a specialization and made those officers inclined toward technical subjects suspicious of 
the Admiralty's intentions about their freedom to revert to deck duties. Further, it also led 
parents to question the wisdom of entering their sons into a restrictive educational system 
through Osborne and Dartmouth if the few prizes were apparently to be snatched out of 
their sons' mouths by public school entrants at a later age. One concerned parent wrote in 
a letter to the editor of The Times: 
Surely the questions for parents to decide are the following. If 
schoolboys turned into the Service at 17 years of age make as good 
naval officers as boys trained at Osborne and Dartmouth from 13 
years of age, what is the advantage of Osborne and Dartmouth? If 
they do not make as good officers, what is the advantage to the 
schoolboys or the Service? Is the experiment to be tried at the risk to 
the parents, the Osborne boys, the schoolboys, or the Service? It must 
117 PRO, ADM 116/1213, Regulations for Special Entry Cadets, 1913. 
118 Duke of Montrose, "The Navy and the Public Schools," RUSI, LXXI No. 484 (1926), 749. Admiral Sir 
Richard Phillimore argued after the presentation of the Duke's paper that Special Entry was beneficial since 
"[t]he Admiralty can keep their hand on the throttle." 
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be to one of the four. Let these questions be clearly faced before the 
parents decide. 1 19 
Another problem of the Special Entry scheme was that it did not supply the 
service with the anticipated numbers. For instance, of the sixty cadets expected in the 
1914 batch, the Admiralty obtained only thirty-one. 120 Public school headmasters seemed 
reluctant to place much emphasis on recruitment for the Navy since the public schools 
were widely perceived that they would merely be pulling the Navy's chestnuts out of the 
fire and consigning their boys to becoming inferior types of officers. Further, some 
officers argued, the inducting lower-deck boys into Keyham College along with the 
Special Entry boys, would further hamper efforts to recruit from the higher class. Captain 
Mansell, the commander of Keyham, argued that the use of the College to train both 
Special Entry and lower-deck candidates would act as a brake on the recruitment of 
public school boys. "I am sure if the Special Entry Scheme were more widely known, and 
the idea that its [sic] a sort of scran bag eliminated, it would attract the right boys -it 
certainly can't stand any handicap at present." Officers such as Mansell also expressed 
concern regarding the social conditioning of future deck officers: 
This College is in the middle of a town-the youngsters are only 
allowed into the town on Saturday afternoon and Sunday- they are 18 
years old, and one of our difficulties has been to stop their going about 
with girls not of their own class-we have practically no cases of it 
now, but should the Lower Deck Boys come, the ground is cut from 
under our feet, if the Special Entry Cadet says the girl was introduced 
by the Lower Deck Cadet. 121 
119 
"Public Schools and the Navy," The Times, 10 January 1914. This also reopened the debate over the 
ideal age of entry of officers, see "The Age of Entry of Naval Cadets," The Times, 20 January 1914. 
120 PRO, ADM 116/1734, Captain Mansell to Captain J.C. Ley, DTSD, 24 January 1918. 
121 Ibid. 
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The most difficult of the proposed solutions was to offer lower-deck commissions. 
Not only was it difficult to get executive officers to accept such entrants but also there 
was considerable disagreement among the ratings about how the system should function. 
For instance, long-serving warrant officers argued that the best method was for them to 
receive lieutenancies. 122 By virtue of long service and distinguished conduct, they 
regarded themselves as the most deserving candidates for commissioned rank. With the 
development of regular career paths for lower-deck personnel in the form of warrant rank, 
there was little opportunity for advancement once a man at reached that position. 123 On 
the other hand, Lionel Yexley argued that for an ex-lower-deck officer to gain 
advancement beyond lieutenant it was imperative that sailors be offered a regular route 
for commissions at a young age. 124 Indeed, The Fleet argued that promotions granted to 
senior warrant officers were insults, since these individuals still performed the duties of a 
warrant officer despite their exalted rank. 125 Generally speaking, regular line officers 
were more comfortable with advancing older warrant officers for a number of 
interconnected reasons. First, these men were no threat to their own advancement. The · 
last thing executive officers wanted was competition in the race against the age limits in 
122 See, Henry Capper, Aft From the Hawsehole: Sixty-Two Years of Sailors' Evolution (London: Faber & 
Gwyer, 1927), Capper had been raised from the lower deck and was the founder of the Naval Warrant 
Officers' Journal. 
123 
"Naval Efficiency," Naval Warrant Officers' Journal, XV (March 1902), 35. 
124 
"Promotion from the Ranks- II," The Fleet, III, No. 26 (June 1907), 192-193. 
125 !bid. 
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the vanous ranks. 126 Nor did such officers generally fill the wardrooms of sea-going 
vessels, as they were largely kept out of the mainstream and were posted to reserve and 
dockyard billets to wind up their time on the active list before mandatory retirement. 
Lastly, long-serving warrant officers would be experienced in the exercise of command 
and would be discouraged by a plan that would not let them exercise it. 127 At the end of 
the nineteenth century, commissions were available, albeit rarely, for long and 
distinguished service or for distinguished conduct. 
The system was structured so that ex-lower-deck officers, like their R.N.R. 
colleagues, would stand virtually no chance of promotion beyond Lieutenant 
Commander. The first promotions of such officers m 1913 were designed to give the 
appearance of promotion by merit. Lieutenant Thomas Lyne was advanced to 
Commander on the direct intervention of the First Lord: "the road is open for all who are 
worthy to tread it." 128 Ratings presenting themselves for commissions had to serve for 
seven years, a rule that was not relaxed until after the war. 129 
126 C.S. Forester, Brown on Resolution (London: John Lane, 1929), 68. 
127 PRO, ADM 116/1734, Goodenough Committee on Training, dissenting report of H.W. Richmond, 
March 1918. "But to take a boy wholly untried,- except by exam in elementary mathematics and a general 
appearance of smartness, - would appear to me no compliment to the lower deck, on which he will hardly 
have served at all, no reward for good services, and one wholly disproved by the experience of all fighting 
organisations with which I am acquainted, and by the efficacy of exams as a means of testing fitness to 
perform a certain duty." 
128 CCAC, CHAR 13/13, Churchill to Second Sea Lord, 1 September 1912; see also, Thomas Lyne, 
Something About a Sailor: From Sailor Boy to Admiral (London: Jarrold, 1940); PRO, ADM 1/8687/179 
where a special Order in Council was obtained to promote Lyne to Rear Admiral despite not having put in 
his qualifying sea time. 
129 BPP, "Statement of the First Lord ofthe Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1920-21," vol. 
XXVIII, Cmd. 619 (1920), 667. 
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One of the chief difficulties besides the issue of social class was pay. By taking up 
a commission, a warrant officer might have to take an effective pay cut. Although his pay 
would be higher in absolute terms, the increased expenses associated with a commission 
could impose considerable hardship. One such officer complained at the close of the war 
that: 
As a married officer with a wife and four children and with the 
prospect of loss of children's allowance at the end of this year I would 
submit that 17/- per day is totally inadequate to maintain a position of 
a Lieutenant R.N. on board and on shore. My reasons for this 
statement is [sic] that after deducting compulsory charges on board to 
the extent of between £6 and £7 per month minimum, it leaves but a 
small amount to maintain a wife and educate and clothe four children 
in accordance with my position as a Lieutenant." 130 
Further, any increase in pay or allowances for ex-lower-deck officers would excite 
the jealousy of regular junior officers who were in many cases no better off and had not 
received such financial assistance. One officer commented in a letter to Captain Herbert 
Richmond: 
The present lower deck Lieutenant was called into existence by a much 
lauded if not laudable desire for improved social status. When he gets 
it, what does he do? He pleads the expense of his new position and asks 
for lodging and provision money to live out in the sphere into which he 
cried to be called. 131 
In the crisis years of 1913-1914, Churchill engaged in a running battle with the 
Treasury to reduce the education fees at Osborne and Dartmouth and to increase the level 
of support for subordinate officers. This was intended to reduce the financial burdens on 
130 PRO, ADM 118592/ 129, Lieutenant Ernest Ovenden to Admiralty, 12 August 1919. 
131 National Maritime Museum (NMM), H.W . Richmond Papers (RIC) 7/4, Commander Harrison-Smith to 
Richmond, 8 August 1912. 
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parents that had increased with the advent of the Selbome Scheme. At the conclusion of 
an officer's training, parents would have shelled out nearly £600 for training fees, 
allowances, outfits and uniforms. 132 
As early as September 1911, the Admiralty was pressuring the Treasury to widen 
its authority to increase the number of cadets eligible for reduced fees. Discretionary 
authority already existed to permit the sons of officers to pay £40 per year compared to 
the regular £75. Citing the fact that attempts to establish private scholarships had failed 
and that only twenty-seven percent of applicants were eligible for reduced fees, the 
Treasury predictably refused to budge. 133 In the spring of 1913, the Parliamentary 
Secretary, Dr. Macnamara, concluded that the situation was becoming grave in regard to 
the qualifications of candidates coming forward for selection for Osborne. This time the 
Admiralty wished not to have discretionary reductions at its disposal but to offer every 
cadet substantially reduced fees. 134 
This reached the point where the First Lord harassed the Treasury based on the 
experience of Midshipman E.L.B. Damant, whose stepfather was no longer able to 
support him financially. Citing several other examples, Churchill appealed to the 
Treasury that the Admiralty be permitted a discretionary fund to support a selected group 
of officers to ensure their retention. In the case of Damant, who had passed out of 
Dartmouth at the top of his class, it would cost nearly £1200 to replace him while his 
132 PRO, ADM 118402/422, Statement by Accountant-General, 1914. 
133 PRO, T 1/11326, Admiralty to Treasury, 22 September 1911. 
134 PRO, T 1/ 11948, Admiralty to Treasury, 22 April1913. 
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support until he reached commissioned rank would cost but £250 at the most. Churchill 
argued: 
... [A]nd this at a time when we are strammg every nerve to find 
officers for the Navy, and to make good the serious shortage with 
which we are faced. And this is not all; we shall be compelled further 
to enter two Naval Cadets to fill their places, and to ask the taxpayer 
to contribute a further sum of £1,000 to train them."135 
The Treasury contended, however, that bailing out subordinate officers who could no 
longer meet the costs associated with entering the naval service would establish a bad 
precedent, not only for the navy but also for the civil service and the army. 
The increased tempo of operations and the greedy demands of the fleet for more 
officers often entailed revisions to the training programmes, especially to meet the 
demand for specialists, such as in signals. Demands for such training and their importance 
to the careers of officers also had a severe impact on the assignment of officers to billets. 
A report in 1913 demonstrated that the dearth of officers dangerously decreased the time 
served by officers filling assigned positions. Pointing out that in some cases officers were 
serving mere months at sea, Churchill argued that "[ t ]his incessant movement would be 
appropriate to a kaleidoscope, to the casual ward of a work house, to a very large 
American hotel in the height of the seasons. It must be fatal to the development of a 
fighting organisation." 136 Further, reductions were made in the length of commissions to 
ameliorate shortages of personnel (see Table 4.2). 137 
135 PRO, ADM 1/8402/422, First Lord to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 6 July 1914. 
136 PRO, ADM 1/8374/96, Minute by Churchill, 30 July 1912. 
137 CCAC, CHAR 13/29, Churchill to Battenberg, 2 February 1914. 
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Table 4.2 Average Time in Billet of a Sample of Officers Changing Appointments in 
1913 
No. of Officers Rank Time in Billet 
10 Captain 1yr 
15 Commander 1yr, 5 mths 
99 Lieutenant 1 yr 2 1h mths 
35 Sub-Lieutenant 7lh mths 
Source: CCAC, CHAR 13/29, Churchill to Battenberg, 2 February 1914. 
Charles Beresford in the Commons in 1898 pointed out that there were only 
thirty-eight lieutenants on half pay available for recall. 
It shows that the country is so short of Lieutenants that they are 
obliged to employ every one of them. It is a very bad thing for the 
Service that a Lieutenant should always be on board ship, and always 
employed, without having some opportunity of getting a knowledge of 
the world. It is very necessary that he should have some acquaintance 
with political affairs, both at home and abroad, for he may be sent to a 
foreign station, where a gun boat will settle a matter involving peace 
and war. There, I think, Lieutenants ought to have a great deal more 
liberty than they are allowed in the interests of the Service." 138 
In 1904, Admiral Sir Edmund Fremantle lamented that few lieutenants were on half pay. 
He criticized the system but wished greater liberty for officers to take up other 
interests. 139 Sir Charles Walker recalled in his memoirs that in 1904, when he was 
assistant to the Second Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Archibald Douglas, he had only four 
lieutenants available after he had completed the roster of officers: one was on permanent 
half pay and the other three were on foreign service leave. This difficulty was 
138Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 4th ser., vol. LV (1898), col. 277. 
139 Fremantle, The Navy As I Have Known It, 459. 
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compounded by the fact that all large ships were supplied with one lieutenant R.N.R. in 
lieu of a regular officer. Furthermore, only ships with midshipmen in the gunroom were 
supplied with sub-lieutenants, which increased the strain in other vessels (see Table 
4.3).140 
Table 4.3 Officers Employed, 31 December 1901 
Captain Cornman Lieu ten Supplementary Sub- Midship 
der ant Lieutenants Lieutenants men 
(RNR) 
Serving in ships 101 145 718 112 154 679 
Shore duty 54 116 192 18 - -
On passage 3 2 26 2 - -
At college 12 10 73 - 190 -
Govt Service - 2 4 - - -
Leave and 29 29 23 1 7 15 
unemployed 
Not wishing 5 5 35 1 3 11 
employment 
Total 204 309 1071 134 354 705 
Source: Great Britain, Parliament, House of Lords, Debates, 4th ser., vol. CIII, Appendix I, Statement 
Explanatory ofNavy Estimates, 1902-1903. 
Total 
1909 
380 
33 
285 
6 
104 
60 
2777 
When D.N.I. in 1900, Louis Battenberg was so deeply concerned about the 
shortage of executive officers in the event of war that he recommended that the Admiralty 
look to former officers who had for various reasons resigned their commissions. Under 
the scheme put forward by a special Order-in-Council, some twenty-five officers regained 
their commissions. The list of resigned officers was closely scrutinized to ensure that no 
one who had resigned for misconduct or "to suit their own conveniences or from other 
selfish motives" would be reinstated. 141 At least one reinstated officer, Alfred Carleton, 
140 Walker, Thirty-Six Years at the Admiralty, 27. 
141 PRO, ADM 116/120 Emergency Officers Scheme, 1900-1902. 
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was grateful for the chance to make a contribution to the service. "I wish to add my 
respectful thanks to Their Lordships for this opportunity of again serving in the Royal 
Navy. Nothing but circumstance of an imperative nature would have made me resign my 
Commission and I did so with great regret." 142 Yet there was still a reluctance to reinstate 
active commissions for officers who had resigned. 
With the foundation of the Naval Staff system just prior to the war, it became 
imperative to train staff officers specifically to fulfil that function, not just in the 
Admiralty but also in the operational commands ashore and afloat. Attempts to institute 
effective staff training for every deck officer foundered on the reality of officer shortages. 
As Battenberg noted in the spring of 1914, "I fear the dearth of Officers will only permit 
of a very small beginning to be made in short courses for Lieutenants." 143 
Also, accomplished officers were frequently withdrawn from the War Course to 
take up active commands. 144 Even insofar as reading and considering wider policy, 
officers were constrained by the increased pace of activity and the conflicting demands on 
their time, as Captain William Kennedy put forward upon receiving an invitation to 
subscribe to The Naval Review: 
I am ever so sorry not to have replied to your note about the Naval 
Review before this - The fact is I have been considering the matter & 
the conclusion I have come to is that officers on the active list & 
employed already have all their time taken up with the work & study 
that there is little time for anything further - I know I find myself 
trying hard to keep pace with their reading I have to do & yet to dive 
142 PRO, ADM 116/120 Emergency Officers Scheme, 1900-1902; Alfred Carleton to Admiralty, 12 July 
1901. 
143 PRO, ADM 118377/118, Minute by Battenberg, 9 May 1914. 
144 PRO, ADM 203/100, Records of War College, 1901-1914. 
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into history, so I am afraid I cannot go in for the Review, not that we 
have not an enormous amount to learn but the trouble is we have 
only 24 hours in the day- .145 
The apparent shortage of competent watch-keeping officers forced the Admiralty 
to make difficult decisions about the entry and training of executive commissioned 
officers. This shortage of critical personnel prior to the First World War had a significant 
impact on policy. In the first place, the rapid expansion of the Navy ensured the 
promotion of many more officers to positions of responsibility than would have otherwise 
occurred. As early as 1904, Admiral Sir John Fisher complained about the lack of 
selection of officers in the upper ranks. 
Mr Childers was our Attila! He was the "scourge" of the Navy in 
many ways, but most of all by his disastrous and frightfully costly 
retirement schemes. The secret of efficiency lies in large lists of 
Officers! You have then a large field of selection, and a great flow of 
promotion, and also no Officer considers it a stigma to be passed over 
in company with forty others, and so not to pose as a solitary 
monument of ineptitude as he appears at present to himself and his 
friends when passed over with the present small lists of Flag 
Officers. 146 
Perhaps the justifiable lack of confidence in the senior officers of the Grand Fleet led 
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe during the Great War to impose strict centralized control in the 
form of the Grand Fleet Battle Orders. Evidence also demonstrates that the competence of 
the senior ranks was in doubt, a condition that caused immense frustration and 
145 Royal Naval Museum, Naval Review Papers, Captain William Kennedy to Admiral W.H. Henderson, 30 
April 1913. 
146 PRO, ADM 7/993, Naval Necessities, vol. I, 1904, 26. 
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embarrassment to the officer corps. 147 This officer shortage also reached the point where 
the Admiralty could not find a suitable officer on the active list to send to Greece to assist 
the development of its navy. 148 This dissatisfaction with the quality of candidates began to 
alarm Admiralty leadership seriously. 149 
Besides the availability of fmance and the limitations of technology and shipyard 
capacity, the ability of the Admiralty to maintain the burgeoning fleet was also 
constrained by the lack of executive officers. Moreover, the lack of this crucial resource, 
particularly in the junior ranks, forced the Navy to experiment with several different 
pathways to the wardroom. In the process it was also forced to reopen the unwritten 
contract that bound the executive officer to the state. 
Conclusion 
In the years before 1914, the executive officer corps experienced increasing constraints to 
the exercise of their rights and privileges. The polite fiction of independence was 
pitilessly stripped away while officers' financial affairs became more pressing. The 
culture of command underwent dramatic revision as the scope for individual initiative 
retracted. Finally, the "traditional" supply withered in the surge of naval expansion. This 
directly impinged on the status of the officer corps because the traditional assertion that 
seamen were made from childhood was eroded as Special Entry entrants took their place 
beside comrades from Osborne. Officers from the lower deck threatened the basis of the 
147 For an example, see, Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command 
(London: John Murray, 1996). 
148 CCAC, CHAR 13/22B, Churchill to First Sea Lord, 27 May 1913. 
149 PRO, ADM 116/1288 Pt. 11, Memorandum on Custance Report by Churchill, 20 June 1913. 
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exclusiveness of the quarterdeck despite mechanisms put in place to prevent competition 
for promotion. Finally, the pressure of numbers and the need to regulate promotion 
effectively destroyed what Admiral Sir George Mundy described as "[t]he first of all 
advantages, certainly, and the greatest," promotion to flag rank on the basis of 
seniority. 150 Advancement to the highest ranks in the service, though still technically by 
seniority, became in reality based on selection. Further, the shortage of officers and the 
attempts to shore up the exclusivity of Britannia- and Osborne-trained cadets also 
increased workload, placed a further strain on officer resources, and contributed to the 
inability to train sufficient number of men fit to serve as command staff officers. 
150 BPP, "Report from the Select Committee on Navy Promotion and Retirement," val. X, No. 501 (1863), 
173. 
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Chapter V 
"Oh, These Magicians and Necromancers, They are Ruining Us" 1 
The Clash of Sailors and Engineers 
That the Navy is "going to the dogs" has been a favourite thesis from 
the days of Drake and Frobisher; and this canine goal never seemed 
nearer of attainment than when steam and iron came to stay in the 
fleet, and wrested from the old sea-dogs what they had come to regard 
as their own particular heritage. 2 
Our sails are gone, and instead we have now 
A screw sticking out on each quarter; 
Grape, canister, chain, we have none of these shot, 
But "Maxims" will add to the slaughter. 
And better than all we have moved with the times 
From foc'sle to ward-room this ranges, 
Our bluejackets hearts are of steel, not of oak, 
They've followed the ships in their changes. 3 
One of the most widespread phenomena of the late nineteenth century was the 
development of professional engineering. As a result of the increasing complexity of 
industrial economies and the need to limit transaction costs, standardization of certain 
functions in both the state and developing corporate bureaucracies depended in part on the 
creation of organizations that granted qualifications to persons working in specific fields. 4 
1 H.J. Woodward, "The Atrophy of the Lieutenant," Naval Review, II (1914), 42; also quoted in National 
Maritime Museum (NMM), K.G.B. Dewar Papers (DEW) 33/, Dewar to Richmond, 8 August 1916. 
2 Henry Shore, "A Fin-de-Siecle Tragedy: or, The Death and Burial of Seamanship," United Service 
Magazine, XXIII (1901), 573. 
3 
"Navy Changes," United Service Magazine, IX (1894), 104. 
4 See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business 
(Cambridge. MA: Belknap Press, 1977); and Chandler, "The Growth of the Transnational Industrial Firm in 
the United States and the United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis," Economic History Review, 2"d ser., 
XXXIII, No. 3 (August 1980), 396-410; and Robert A. Buchanan, The Engineers: A History of the 
Engineering Profession in Britain, 1750-1914 (London: Jessica Kingsley, 1989). 
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One of the most important of these groups was professional engineering, which not only 
elevated the social and economic position of specialists but also served the public good. 5 In 
regard to engineering, the benefits seemed obvious, since investors and the general public 
could be assured of the safety of transport at limited costs associated with the former "trial 
and error" methods.6 In the process of educating, cajoling or otherwise convincing the 
general public of their expertise, engineers saw it a matter of course that other methods of 
working or practitioners of the craft outside the professional circle must be either attacked 
or subjected to their authority. In their bid to assert their power, professional engineers 
fought on two fronts: first, to raise the social status of their members and second, to 
attempt to suppress those who had difficulty with their "haitches."7 
Given the revolution in naval affairs, it seemed entirely logical for professional 
engineering to make great headway into the naval service. Indeed, by the 1840s engineers 
were already gaining Royal Navy commissions, albeit in the Civil Branch. By the end of 
the century, with the massive amounts of money being spent on the Navy and its 
enormous popularity as an institution, and with naval defence being the most visible 
"public good" provided by the state, naval engineers argued that in a steam-powered navy 
5 J.D. Churchill, "Marine Engine Governors, and the Benefits derived from Them," Transactions of the 
Institute of Marine Engineers (TIME), I (1889), 5. 
6 As early as 1839, there was considerable concern over the safety of steam navigation. See Great Britain, 
Parliament, House of Commons, Parliamentary Papers (BPP), "Report on Steam Vessel Accidents," vol. 
XLVII, No. 279 (1839), 14, testimony of Mr. Gibson. "Steam navigation has advanced more rapidly than 
men of experience and knowledge of machinery have been found to conduct it; hence we often fmd, in river 
packets in part, men advanced to the post of engineer who are mere automatons, ignorant of the first 
principles of the machine over which they preside, and who, in case of any derangement, do, from 
ignorance of the result, the very thing which they ought to have avoided, thereby creating, rather than 
averting danger, or accident." 
7 J. MacFarlane Gray, "Annual General Meeting: Remarks by the Vice-President of the Institute," TIME, II 
(1890-1891), 20. 
182 
they should have recognition of their specialized skills. It is here, however, that the 
engineering branch encountered another evolving profession that had successfully 
commanded and managed naval defence for nearly two centuries, the executive officer 
corps. Like any group with a vested interest, this one was not likely to surrender ground 
easily, particularly when it was under pressure from various other sources discussed in the 
last chapter. 
One of the first explanations for the failure to recognize the importance and status 
of professional engineers is the argument that British social and cultural values placed 
more importance on the "gentlemanly ideal" in which obtaining a living from financial 
services or landowning was deemed one of the most respectable ways. 8 Occupations 
associated with physical labour, on the other hand, were denigrated. 9 The British landed 
establishment and their associates in the civil service and the armed forces sought to 
uphold these values by marginalizing those responsible for the management of "unclean" 
things. Further, this attitude has been conflated into explanations for British economic 
decline after 1945. For instance, Carelli Barnett in his Audit of War explained how the 
cultural values that elevated the liberal arts over the industrial sciences weakened the 
8 Alan Sked, Britain's Decline (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); and P .J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, 
British Imperialism (2nd ed., London: Longmans, 2001), 43-50. 
9 T .W. Fish, "The Status of Engineers of the Mercantile Marine," TIME, V (1893-1894), 36-37, comments 
by J. Milne. "Of course an Engineer on board ship has to get very dirty, and you know very well that in the 
world dirt never commands respect. If, for instance, after going down into the bilges, or dealing with a 
warm bearing, an Engineer comes on deck, the passengers will not care to come near him; but it is not 
because they do not respect him, for after he has changed they are very glad to come round and have a chat 
with him." See also, M. Loane, "Class Hatred," The Spectator, 22 April 1911 , "One reason why we are too 
ready to believe in class-hatred is because we think that, as the poor are constantly engaged in a struggle 
with hard material conditions, they are inevitably materialistic in their views." For an interesting view of the 
nature of "cleanliness" in Victorian Britain, see Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and 
Sexuality in the Colonial Contest (New York: Routledge, 1995). 
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basis of British claims to global influence. 10 Other historians have attempted to backdate 
this problem to 1870, by which time it had became apparent that Britain was losing 
ground to its American and German rivals. 11 
Lord Melville, in a letter to the Colonial Office, explained that he also frequently 
based this argument on an infamous 1828 statement 
regretted the inability of My Lords Commissioners to comply with the 
request of the Colonial Department, as they felt it their bounden duty 
to discourage to the utmost of their ability the employment of steam 
vessels, as they considered that the introduction of steam was 
calculated to strike a fatal blow at the Naval Supremacy of the 
Empire. 12 
Other examples are also cited, such as a decision in 1829 by the Royal Yacht Squadron to 
deny membership to gentlemen who owned steamboats. 13 Superficial analysis would 
seem to indicate that there was a powerful prejudice against steam power and, by 
extension, to the men who drove and maintained that machinery. 14 This interpretation 
does not take into account the expense of steam machinery and its supporting 
1
° Correlli Barnett, The Audit of War: The Illusion & Reality of Britain as a Great Nation (London: 
Macmillan, 1986). 
11 Martin Weiner, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 157-166; and Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall ofthe Great Powers 
(New York: Random House, 1987), 224-232. 
12 John Briggs, Naval Administrations, 1827-1892 (London: Sampson, Low, Marston & Co., 1897), 9; also 
quoted in Geoffrey Penn, Up Funnel, Down Screw! The Story of the Naval Engineer (London: Hollis & 
Carter, 1955), 13-14. 
13 K.T. Rowland, Steam at Sea: A History of Steam Navigation (New York: Praeger, 1970), 65-66. 
14 Indeed, this argument is subject to dispute as cases of deep and abiding interest in steam propulsion by 
line officers are readily found. See The Times, 26 January 1903, Rear Admiral Victor Montague failed to 
see the difference between specialist officers in gunnery and those in engineering. See also The Times, 9 
January 1903, where an anonymous naval officer expressed the same sentiments; and The Times, 27 
January 1903, Admiral Sir Thomas Ward. Indeed, as early as 1851, the Admiralty issued instructions that 
line officers should be compelled to study aspects of marine engineering. John Beeler (ed.), The Milne 
Papers: The Papers of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Alexander Milne (2 vols., London: Navy Records Society, 
2004), I, 300-303. 
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infrastructure and fails to understand the limitations of steam power until the last decades 
of the century. Early steam engines were grossly inefficient, and a Navy with global 
commitments could not count on obtaining a reliable and inexpensive supply of coal 
abroad. Moreover, the use of warships would be affected by limited range, and the space 
required for early machinery would dramatically alter the design and manning of vessels 
and limit their utility. 15 Further, all of this cost money that the Navy was unlikely to be 
able to justify to Parliament. Fortunately, recent work by Andrew Lambert, John Beeler 
and David K. Brown has questioned the foregoing assumptions and demonstrated that the 
Royal Navy was far more favourable toward innovation than has previously been 
thought. 16 
Most officers were realistic in their assessment that steam, hydraulic and electrical 
machinery were part of their working environment and were crucial to the Navy's future. 
In disposing of the argument that a sense of danger and enterprise were unique to sai·l 
training and could not be experienced by those trained in steam, Captain Charles Penrose 
Fitzgerald wrote derisively in 1887 that: 
Intricate steam tactics at high speed, and in very close order, ought to 
strengthen the nerves of our Officers; and as to the men, they could be 
given so many hours a day to fiddle with the live heads of Whitehead 
torpedoes with the detonators in; or they could be set to work to 
hammer sensitive fuzes into filled shell. At any rate I feel sure that the 
15 Indeed, as late as 1887, Charles Fitzgerald, a strong advocate of steam engineering, argued for the 
retention of rigged vessels on distant stations. See C.C.P. Fitzgerald, "Mastless Ships of War," Journal of 
the Royal United Services Institution (RUS/), XXXI (1887), 116. 
16 D.K. Brown, From Warrior to Dreadnought: Warship Development, 1860-1905 (London: Chatham, 
2002); John Beeler, The Birth of the Battleship: British Capital Ship Design, 1870-1881 (London: Chatham, 
2001); and Andrew Lambert, "Responding to the Nineteenth Century: The Royal Navy and the Introduction 
of the Screw Propeller," History ofTechnology, XXI (1999), 1-28. 
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staffs of the Excellent and Vernon will find no difficulty in suggesting 
dangerous employment of some sort, if that is all that is required. 17 
Similarly, Admiral Sir Michael Culme-Seymour, formerly Commander-in-Chief, 
Mediterranean, stated in 1900 "[a]ll my commands have been in masted ships, I have 
loved the sea, and I am devoted to sail drill and sailing-ships. But the conviction has 
forced itself upon me- much against my will-that masts and sails are gone forever. The 
world goes ronnd; and it will go round: you cannot stop it."18 Also, promotion criteria had 
changed significantly by the turn of the century so that officers specializing in gnnnery or 
torpedo work had a significant advantage in the race for promotion and billets. These 
specialist branches were in reality a form of engineering. A perusal of the appendices of 
the histories of the gunnery and torpedo schools demonstrates that a high proportion of 
technical specialists reached the highest ranks in the service. 19 For instance, of the nine 
officers who passed through the torpedo course in 1887, at least five became admirals on 
the active list, a much higher proportion than of ordinary lieutenants who became 
commanders. 20 
17 Fitzgerald, "Mastless Ships of War," 121; Excellent and Vernon were respectively the Royal Navy's 
gunnery and torpedo schools located at Portsmouth. 
18 James R. Thursfield, "The Training of Seamen," RUS/, XLIV (September 1900), 988, comments by 
Culme-Seymour. 
19 E.N. Poland, The Torpedomen: H.MS. Vernon's Story, 1872-1986 (London: E.N. Poland, 1986), 380-
392; and Robert Oliver, HM.S. Excellent, 1830-1930 (Portsmouth: Charpentier, 1930), appendix I. 
20 Poland, Torpedomen, 381; officers passing this course in 1887 included Charles Madden who became 2nd 
in command of the Grand Fleet and a future First Sea Lord, Alexander Duff headed the Anti-Submarine 
Division of the Naval Staff, Herbert Heath commanded a Battle Squadron in the Grand Fleet and Reginald 
Bacon was Flag Officer, Dover during the war. 
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If, therefore, the Admiralty and the Navy as a whole did not have ingrained 
prejudices against engineering, what was behind the bitter reaction of many executive 
officers against the extension of the rights and privileges of engineer officers at the tum 
of the century? Executive officers had little difficulty with the concept of engineering but 
did have a problem with the profession itself. The engineering branch comprised an 
increasing proportion of total naval personnel, and commissioned engineer officers began 
to assert greater control over their own sphere with the aid of allies such as the Institute of 
Marine Engineers. 21 The status and working conditions of professional engineers was of 
deep concern to such organizations, particularly as they related to the merchant service. 
Since engineers and merchant officers could often be Royal Naval Reserve (R.N.R.) 
officers, professional engineers considered it imperative to put pressure on the Admiralty 
to improve their status because the concept of command and the skills of seamanship 
were strongest among the Navy's deck officers. Further, the prestige of the ship's captain 
and the command function were highest in the Royal Navy, and the capacity to negotiate 
professional space and responsibility for engineers would provide enormous leverage in 
dealing not only with shipowners but also with deck officers in merchant vessels. 22 As 
well, the Admiralty was a public department, and thus were established avenues to 
increase the status of engineering through political agitation and the efforts of the 
professional and public press. Several engineers, including Sir Edward Reed, were able to 
21 Indeed, a deputation of representatives of several engineering institutions met with the Earl of Selbome, 
the First Lord of the Admiralty, in 1901 to secure assurances that the status of naval engineers would be 
addressed. 
22 Tony Lane, Grey Dawn Breaking: British Merchant Seafarers in the late Twentieth Century (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1986), 161-162. Lane discusses this tendency for merchant officers to affect 
the attitudes of regular R.N. officers in carrying out their duties. 
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enter politics and subject the Admiralty to questions and criticisms that could not be 
easily ignored.23 Moreover, many of the professional marine engineers had trained at the 
Navy's establishments at Keyham and Greenwich Colleges, and the Admiralty therefore 
was an important contributor to the professionalization of marine engineers. 
Table 5.1: Personnel in the Royal Navy, 1838-1898 
Date Executive Engineering Royal Marines Other Total 
1838 30,809 3,831 14,919 5,559 55,138 
Percent 56 7 27 10 
1868 31,981 5,391 15,970 11,052 64,394 
Percent 49.7 8.4 25 17.2 
1878 27,911 5,627 13,727 8,508 55,773 
Percent 50 10.1 24.6 15.3 
1888 28,232 8,536 12,845 8,914 58,529 
Percent 48.2 14.6 22 15.2 
1898 44,336 22,289 17,099 11,816 95,540 
Percent 46.4 23.3 17.9 12.4 
Notes: Percentages do not always equal 100 due to rounding. This return was used as the starting point for 
further agitation for the increased status and prospects of engineers; see D.B. Morison, "The British Naval 
Engineer: His Present Position and Influence on Our Sea Power," Transactions of the Institute of Marine 
Engineers (TIME), XII (1900-1901), 7. 
Source: BPP, "Navy Return ofNumbers Borne," vol. LVI, No. 288 (1898), 637. 
Naval officers began to react strongly against engineering when that profession 
threatened the overarching authority of deck officers. As warships became more complex 
and more reliant on machinery, the demand for technical personnel increased. Further, by 
23 BPP, "Report from the Select Committee on Navy Estimates," vol. XII, No. 142 (1888), 582. During the 
life of this committee Sir Edward Reed grilled Admiral Sir Anthony Hoskins: "But, as representatives of 
the constituencies of this country who have to pay these present charges and to face the contingent ones, we 
are obliged to ask ourselves whether a ship that is worked by steam from one end to the other in all her 
details can do with one engineer officer, and yet requires five officers of another class to keep watch and 
navigate her?" 
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the late 1860s steam was gradually superseding wind as the prime motive power of the 
fleet. As Table 5.1 demonstrates above, the growth in the Engineer Branch both in 
absolute numbers and share of total strength was dramatic. 
This trend accelerated toward 1914 as the Dreadnought revolution, the advent of 
submarines, the increasing engine power required to drive 20,000-ton vessels at high 
speed, and the growing array of auxiliary appliances increased the size and complexity of 
engineering departments. For example, the Grand Fleet's battle cruisers required more 
than a third of the entire crew to be in the engineering department. 24 Further, if prolonged 
high-speed steaming were to be maintained, seamen ratings had to be taken from deck 
duties to assist in the trimming and supply of coal to the boilers?5 With the increased 
responsibilities and supervisory authority of engineer officers, it seemed illogical, 
churlish and even snobbish to deny them the necessary authority to perform their 
functions. Indeed, some engineer officers concluded than the denial of rank and position 
was a deliberate strategy to keep them in their place. "Because if they permitted the 
engineer department to grow to its legitimate proportions - proportions corresponding to 
the multifarious duties which naturally and properly belong to it - it would quickly equal 
in numbers, if it did not surpass, the sailor element."26 
24 Even in battleships, the demands for stoker personnel were heavy. For instance in the case of Admiral Sir 
John Jellicoe's flagship H.M.S. Iron Duke, while all ranks in the seaman branch numbered 420, there were 
over 230 in engineering. James Goldrick, "The Battleship Fleet: The Test ofWar, 1895-1919," in J.R. Hill 
(ed.), The Oxford lllustrated History of the Royal Navy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 309. 
25 See Brian Schofield, "'Jacky' Fisher, H.M.S. Indomitable and the Dogger Bank Action: A Personal 
Memoir," in Gerald Jordan (ed.), Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century, 1900-1945: Essays in Honour of 
Arthur Marder (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 68. Regarding the difficulty of supplying coal see, D.K. 
Brown, The Grand Fleet: Warship Design and Development, 1906-1922 (London: Chatham, 1999), 22; 
Great Britain, Public Record Office (PRO), Admiralty Papers (ADM) 116/996, Douglas Report, 16. 
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Moreover, some argued that the working conditions and status of engineers had 
not kept pace with the Navy's growing reliance on machinery. Nor did they reflect the 
increasingly "scientific" nature of the management of power plants. 
This condition of things has to a great extent never been altered. With 
the march of engineering science, naval engineering has kept good 
pace, and the "working engineer" has necessarily given place to the 
highly trained managing engineer, with subordinate mechanics, and 
hosts of labourers, more or less skilled stokers. Still the old insularity 
of the department is strong.27 
As professional engineering became increasingly divided from the "mere engine drivers," 
there were demands to improve the social stature of engineer officers. Commissioned 
engineering officers were largely the sons of middle-class professionals who deeply 
resented being treated as "engine drivers." The Admiralty agreed, and the Cooper Key 
Committee of 1877 expressed discontent over the quality of students entered in previous 
years. Ifthe Admiralty, they argued, were to inquire more closely into the antecedents of 
candidates and impose fees, 
it may be expected that a larger proportion of the sons of professional 
men will be induced to enter as Students. We have received evidence 
that the indiscriminate admission of lads from the lower ranks of 
society deters Officers, and other professional men from allowing their 
sons to compete for these appointments. 28 
To deny that there was class prejudice or that social considerations were important 
would be idle, since there was still a divide between the social origins of engineering and 
26 Charles Johnston, "The Doom of the Naval Engineer," Engineering Magazine, XXIII (September 1902), 
826. 
27 
"The Status ofEngineers," The Fleet, VI (January 1910), 10. 
28 BPP, "Report of the Committee to Consider the Best Means of Securing the Highest Mechanical Skill 
and Scientific Knowledge for HM Navy," vol. XXI, C.4647 (1877), 5. 
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that of executive officers. For instance, of the 317 engineering students entered into 
Keyham College between 1897 and 1905, only four were the sons of executive branch 
officers and only one of those fathers had been promoted beyond lieutenant. 29 Further, 
there is a considerable amount of contemporary anecdotal evidence that executive officers 
often put their perceived social inferiors in their place. Fisher, for instance, liked to tell 
the story of a lieutenant who, when forced to give way to a more senior engineer officer, 
told the man to keep in mind that " ... my rna will never invite your rna for tea."30 
The fight for social status was a constant battle that was reflected in popular 
literature. In a Francis Burton novel the main character, a young engineer from a socially 
prominent family (his fictional father was the Dean of Exeter cathedral), encountered the 
rough-and-ready older engineer officer who was frequently drunk, used disgraceful 
language and was little more than a glorified workman. When invited to dinner at an 
officers' mess at Gibraltar, the young engineer experienced social exclusion for the first 
time when he was informed that the mess did not normally invite engineers. Since this 
fictional engineer's brother was in a cavalry regiment and his father was a prominent 
churchman, however, the Army officers felt an exception could be made in his case. 31 
Another, this time non-fictional, engineer reacted bitterly when told in a patronizing 
fashion that he behaved rather well at a social function ashore: "What did you expect? 
29 PRO, ADM 7/931, Engineer Students, Parentage, 1909. See Appendix III. 
30 R.S. Bacon, The Life of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone (2 vols., London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1929), I, 186, 
See also Arthur J. Marder (ed.), Fear God and Dread Nought: the Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet 
Lord Fisher of Kilverstone (3 vols., London: Jonathan Cape, 1952), I, 211-212, Fisher to Selbome, 9 
August 1901. 
31 Francis Burton, The Naval Engineer and the Command of the Sea: A Story of Naval Administration 
(Manchester: Technical Publishing Co., 1896), 4, 13. 
191 
Did you think I should tremble on the edge of my chair, bite the end of my handkerchief, 
and say, 'Yes, mum,' in an awed whisper?"32 The practice of professional engineering, 
based upon scientific and mathematical education, was a social escalator, and engineers 
were exhorted to be worthy of this elevation. As the Vice President of the Institute of 
Marine Engineering and the inventor of steam steering gear, J. MacFarlane Gray, argued: 
If engineers will aim at so conducting themselves that they are never 
spoken of otherwise as being "quite equal if not superior to the deck 
officers in their language and behaviour," and if that pertains to their 
highly intellectual calling that make themselves masters both of theory 
and the practice, the time would not be very distant when their 
importance in steamers would be fully recognised.33 
Indeed, one engineer even contended that without his profession the advances of the last 
several millennia would have been impossible. He stated "that without him [the engineer] 
we should have to revert to that stage which may be described as the stone age .... "34 One 
engineer officer advised his younger colleagues that "[a]ll classes in the Navy, and some 
out of it, seem to overlook the fact that all cannot be exactly of the same social 
standing. "35 
The claims made by engineers had considerable appeal and legitimacy in the eyes 
of a substantial portion of the British public. Although there were some failures, the 
spectacular achievements of British engineers in this period, such as the extensive railway 
network and technical wonders like the Forth Bridge, increased the prestige of the "man 
32 
"Naval Engineers," Naval and Military Record, 5 March 1903, 12. 
33 J. MacFarlane Gray, "Annual General Meeting Address," TIME, II (1890-1891), 20. 
34 W.J. Harding, "The Defence of the Realm from the Mechanical Engineer's View," TIME, XVIII (1906-
1907), 3. 
35 Fleet Engineer, "Social Status in the Navy," Naval and Military Record, 1 January 1903. 
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of science." Given the strength of the British shipping industry, which owned half of the 
world's merchant tonnage, and British shipyards, which constructed about sixty percent 
of total world carrying capacity, marine engineering was perceived as particularly vital to 
maintaining the efficiency and safety that had become hallmarks of the industry. Further, 
professional groups, such as marine engineers, had a vested interest in asserting the 
importance of their specialized knowledge and in showing that they were the guardians of 
knowledge that was critical for the preservation of a ship at sea. 
However, with the case of deck officers who were already supposedly competent 
to ensure safety of navigation, such claims encountered a snag. When called upon to 
justify referring to engineers as "engine-drivers," Admiral Sir Anthony Hoskins argued 
that he used the term 
because I think there is a very exaggerated view generally in the mind 
of the public as to the importance of these duties. The multiplicity of 
the engines and the duties connected with them, impress the public 
mind very much when they go aboard one of these vessels. But each 
engine is a very simple thing in itself generally; and, in fact, I have 
seen on board a P&O [Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation 
Company] steamer a Lascar bring a bottle of oil and lubricate some 
machinery on deck, and start a lever and hoist the cargo out himself; 
and he was driving an engine."36 
Nor was this attitude exclusive to old line officers, as Fisher himself argued: 
believe me, there is not half so much required to be a good engineer as 
to be a good gunnery or Torpedo Lieutenant. A fellow who can put 
together all the mechanism of a Whitehead Torpedo and manipulate all 
the intricacies of modem gun arrangements involving the highest 
36 BPP, "Report of the Select Committee on Navy Estimates," vol. XII, No. 142 (1888), 583, testimony of 
Admiral Sir John Hoskins. 
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practical and technical knowledge will find it simply child's play to 
manipulate engines and boilers of any ship in the Navy! 37 
At the tum of the century, when the engineer "agitation" was at its peak, the professional 
competence of the officer class of both the Army and the Navy was being questioned in 
view of the harsh realities of the South African War. As well, there was a growing anxiety 
that Britain was losing its competitive edge in markets that the country had traditionally 
dominated; as this anxiety grew it was deemed imperative by a wide swath of public and 
official opinion that Britain become a more "efficient" national comrnunity.38 
Professional engineers were m a very powerful position to demonstrate that their 
particular brand of efficiency represented the best chance for national regeneration. The 
traditional ideal of military leadership and "muddling through" were exposed as bankrupt. 
Obviously, the first step to maintain the authority of the executive in relation to 
subsidiary branches of the service was to doubt the competence of and to denigrate the 
professional term "engineer." As Hoskins' remark suggests, routine use of the phrase 
"engine driver" was a convenient technique. Also, there were frequent assertions that 
engineering was not particularly mysterious compared with the unknowable secrets of the 
sea. It was rather interesting how one officer described the imparting of this sacred 
37 Churchill College, Cambridge, Archives Centre (CCAC), Bryan Godfrey-Faussett Papers (BGGF) 2/3, 
Fisher to Godfrey-Faussett, 19 January 1903; Godfrey-Faussett was closely connected to the Prince of 
Wales and was used as a contact by Fisher to put his views across to the heir to the throne. 
38 G.R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought, /899-
/914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). 
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knowledge as if it was some sort of Masonic rite. 39 Other officers, like Gerard Noel, 
questioned the very basis of the engineering profession: 
What is an engineer? He is an ingenuous man who has acquired the 
power of utilising the forces of Nature, and, by mechanical appliances, 
bending them to his will. I say that engineering is not a new science. 
Four thousand years ago one of the greatest engineers the world ever 
saw built the great pyramid .... The executive of the Navy are all 
engineers in the sense that the Royal Engineers are engineers .... The 
executive are engineers in the broad sense of the term. I say that 
training at sea in masted ships is nothing more nor less than training in 
engineering. 40 
The systematic attacks on the basis of the authority of professional engineers were a way 
of subordinating them to the "natural" governors who inhabited the quarterdeck. 
The questions that must be answered are what engineers demanded and why many 
of their concerns were resisted so bitterly by line officers. To understand the first 
question, however, it is necessary to outline briefly the development of career paths for 
engineer officers. When steam engines were first installed in wooden hulls, manufacturers 
sent men who were not strictly naval persom1el to manage and maintain the equipment.41 
As steam power gradually became more reliable and efficient, it became imperative that 
regularized entry and warrant or even commissioned rank should be awarded because of 
the increasing skill levels required and the fact that the Navy was forced to compete in the 
39 Thursfield, "Training of Seamen," 1012-1013, comments by Captain A.C. Corry; see also, NMM, G. 
Noel Papers 5/ 13B, Noel to Commodore Atkinson, 27 July 1896. "[T]hese modern vessels do not get 
enough sea work, and a commissioned ship is much more adopted for the training in gunnery and other 
drills than for the initiation of young seamen into the secrets of a sea life." 
40 Ibid. , 992-993; comments by Gerard Noel. See also, Reginald Custance, "Naval Education: Its Past and 
Future," Blackwood's, CLX:X:VIII, No. 1080 (October 1805), 445. "The modern war-vessel is as much a 
ship as was the wooden two-decker, and the Victory was as much a machine as is the modern Edward VII." 
4 1 Penn, Up Funnel, 18. 
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general labour market for skilled men. Recognizing its importance, the Admiralty 
established the Cooper Key Committee in 1877 to investigate and make recommendations 
on the future of engineering. Two of its recommendations were to increase the social 
status of the entrants to the engineering colleges and to institute a regularized career path 
for commissioned officers.42 Such officers were given not only increased pay and 
improved titles but also integration into a single officers' mess aboard ship. By the 1880s, 
naval engineers were trained in a five-year course, and further professional training was 
available at the Royal Naval College at Greenwich. By this time a definite career path 
was laid out for engineers, complete with enhanced expertise and commissioned status. 
Still, engineering officers continued to be restrained by significant disabilities that 
did not affect their executive counterparts. First, the chances of promotion to posts of high 
responsibility were much lower. There was no possibility of achieving command of a ship 
or a squadron, or of obtaining a seat on the Board of Admiralty, and there were very few 
flag-equivalent positions. Rollo Appleyard wrote in 1900 that although there were 25,000 
members of the engineering branch, there were only nine hundred commissioned officers; 
of these, only twenty were equivalent to the rank of captain, while there were over two 
hundred executive officers of post rank.43 Even as late as 1918, when significant steps had 
been taken to improve conditions of service, promotion ratios were weighted against the 
42 BPP, "Report of the Committee Appointed by the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty to Consider the 
Best Means of Securing the Highest Mechanical Skill and Scientific Knowledge in the Management of the 
Various Engines of H .M . Ships of War and the Supply of Engineer Officers for H.M. Navy," vol. XXI, C. 
4647 (1877). 
43 Rollo Appleyard, "With But After," Fortnightly Review (April1900), 618. 
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engineers (see Table 5.2). While there were just under eleven junior executive officers for 
each captain, in the engineering branch the ratio was forty-two to one. 
Table 5.2 Promotion Ratios, Executive and Engineering Officers, 1918 
Executive Officers 
Rank Ratio 
Rear Admiral Other commissioned officers junior to Rear Admiral 1:56.4 
Rear Admiral To Captains 1:4.8 
Captain Other commissioned ranks junior to Captain 1:10.6 
E . Offi nemeer tcers 
Rank Ratio 
Engineer Rear Admirals Other commissioned Engineer Officers junior to Engineer 1:74.6 
Admirals 
Engineer Rear Admirals Engineer Captains 1:1.7 
Engineer Captains Other commissioned Engineers junior to Captain 1:42.0 
Source: PRO, ADM 1/8541 /281 , Admiralty Engineer Officers Committee Report, 1918,228. 
At the tum of the century, engineer officers were compensated for some of these 
disabilities with higher pay, new titles and automatic promotion to the rank of engineer-
commander by seniority (this compared to executive lieutenants who had to undergo the 
gauntlet of promotion by selection where perhaps only a third would reach that rank). On 
the other hand, there was a comparative advantage for engineers in seeking employment 
in civilian life that executive officers did not have. "Nowadays the lieutenants find 
themselves embarked with marine officers, surgeons, chaplains, engineers, paymasters, 
and naval instructors: all educated gentlemen of good social position, and all of them in 
receipt of greater privileges as regards pay, leave, accommodation, and service then 
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themselves."44 To make matters worse, a contributor to the United Service Magazine 
observed that: "Promotion among the lieutenants goes by selection and that means than 
those who are lucky enough to be born with interest or to be able to make interest during 
their service, generally manage to get promoted; but the majority who have to go where 
they are sent, and serve with bad or uninfluential captains, invariably fail to get 
promoted. "45 
Engineers argued that the conditions of service and the lack of opportunity meant 
that the Admiralty had great difficulty in recruiting men from the professional classes to 
man its engine rooms. The result, according to professional engineers, was that there was 
a deskilling and a lowering of the status of naval engineers. For instance, in the 1870s the 
Navy began to slash the number of junior commissioned engineers by the introduction of 
a new warrant rank known as Engine-Room Artificers (E.R.A.) in order to save the cost 
of training and pay of those performing engineering functions. 46 As the needs of the 
service grew after the Naval Defence Act of 1889, the Navy resorted to expedients to fill 
essential posts. For instance, in the 1890s the Admiralty recruited emergency service 
engineers directly from the technical colleges who were trained less extensively than 
Keyham students. D.B. Morison feared that Keyham would be placed on the chopping 
block when parents learned that they could enter their sons into the Navy from much less 
44 
"Lieutenants R .N.: Worth Their Weight in Gold," United Service Magazine, XXIV (November 1901), 
107. 
45 Ibid., 110. 
46 Penn, Up Funnel, 100. 
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expensive technical colleges.47 As a result, engmeers charged that the Navy directly 
attempted to subvert the professional status of existing engineer officers. 
Control over workspace and working conditions was of vital importance. For this 
reason Charles Johnston, a former naval engineer, condemned the Admiralty's decision in 
1900 to shift responsibility for some machinery to the control of torpedo and gunnery 
lieutenants. "It will be seen that this order takes away certain machinery and certain 
scientific weapons from the engineer and places them in the hands of officers who are not 
only not engineers, but who have had no practical mechanical education, and the reason 
assigned is one of expediency, not efficiency. "48 
One of the reasons why the Admiralty took this decision, however, was a problem 
that was similar to that which confronted the executive branch: numbers that lagged 
considerably behind demand. As a result, many prospective recruits believed that the 
responsibilities of engineer officers were inordinately heavy in comparison to 
counterparts in the merchant service. Indeed, Johnston pointed out that in the Royal Navy 
the ratio of engineer officers to ratings in battleships was 1 :21, whereas in passenger 
steamers the ratio was 1:8.49 Given the increasing complexity of warships this figure, he 
argued, was unconscionable. Hence, by not employing a sufficient number of accredited 
engineers, the Navy was risking not only the safety of crews but also the security of the 
British Isles. As one writer put it: 
47 D.B . Morison. "The British Naval Engineer," TIME, XII (1900-1901), 10-11. 
48 Charles Johnston, "The Doom of the Naval Engineer," Engineering Magazine, XXIII (September 1902), 
823-824. 
49 Ibid., 16. 
199 
How many people supposed as they gazed with pride on the splendid 
assemblage of ships at the Jubilee Review at Spithead, that every shift 
conceivable had to be made to get together enough engineers and men 
to man the engine-rooms; that the splendid array of ships was - a 
splendid array of ships, and nothing more; that it was no more able to 
safeguard the honour of the Empire than the cardboard array moved by 
the scene-shifter at a theatre! 5° 
Hence, navalist arguments were used to bolster the case of particular officers. 
The opposition of many executive branch officers to the elevation of engineers 
and other officers was based to some degree on social status. The status and authority of 
the executive were part and parcel of the unwritten contract that the Admiralty had tacitly . 
made with young officers and their parents when they entered the service at an early age. 
In exchange for certain hardships, a highly specialized education that was useful solely 
for a naval career and low initial pay, other intangible rewards, such as a reasonable 
chance of further promotion and the possibility of achieving high command, would be 
available. Social status and the marks of executive command were integral parts of the 
identification of young executive officers. The specializations and diversification of skills 
aboard ship struck at a sense of their professional and social superiority, especially for 
commissioned lieutenants and most especially for non-specialists, or "salt horse" officers, 
who had no other professional qualifications and faced an uphill battle in the race against 
"the ogre of the age limit."51 Every concession in status to the engineers became a sort of 
a zero-sum game in which the intangible rewards of junior executive officers were being 
systematically reduced. 
5° Charles Lart, "The Dearth of Naval Engineers," Nineteenth Century, XLVII (May 1900), 724. 
51 C.S. Forester, Brown on Resolution (London: Pan, 1929, 1963), 42. 
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As a result, symbols became flash points on a variety of issues that excited 
considerable comment and compelled even senior officers to express deep misgivings. 
The first was the granting of executive-style titles not just to engineer officers but also to 
medical doctors and accounting officers. As one writer commented derisively: 
But what a lot of lieutenants we shall have! To begin with, I suppose 
we shall still have the salthorse lieutenant, then the gunnery lieutenant, 
the torpedo lieutenant, the navigation lieutenant, the engineer 
lieutenant, the bo'sun lieutenant, the gunner lieutenant (and we must 
look out not to mix him up with the gunnery lieutenant), and finally 
the carpenter lieutenant. A friend of mine wants to know if we are not 
to have a walrus lieutenant, as the carpenter will feel very lonesome 
without him; and if so, whether the walrus lieutenant is to be kept 
solely for Arctic service, or is to take his turn in the engine-room with 
all the other lieutenants. 52 
The attachment to uniform and the symbolism of rank did not weaken even after 
nearly a dozen years of the combined training scheme that was inaugurated in 1902. 
When the first new scheme officers were about to receive commissions in 1913, there was 
considerable concern that existing engineer officers should have executive authority to 
ensure they could give direction to these new men who possessed executive status 
themselves. Although an order-in-council had been implemented to enable executive 
officers to be placed under the orders of non-military officers for particular tasks, 
engineers held this insufficient. 53 Before arbitrarily awarding the executive curl and 
uniforms to engineers, the Second Sea Lord, Vice Admiral Sir John J ellicoe, consulted 
senior officers of the fleet. Jellicoe was taken aback by responses, such as that put 
52 
"The New Admiralty Scheme," Naval and Military Record, 2 April1903, 2. 
53 PRO, ADM 116/1708, Memorandum by J.R. Jellicoe, 11 September 1913. 
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forward by Rear Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, who argued that it ridiculous to make 
engineers executives because they were not seamen: 
His [the engineer's] environment is one which calls for no eye training 
whatever. The condition of the elements surrounding him, except for 
differences of temperature and sea motion, are always the same. He is 
never called upon to combat the elements, or to face constantly 
changing conditions ... He wields and controls no offensive weapon 
h 54 w atever. 
The First Sea Lord, Battenberg, was mystified at the reaction of his fellow flag officers 
that he saw as an almost deliberate misunderstanding of what the Admiralty was 
attempting to accomplish. "It is solely for the purpose of effecting a workable 
amalgamation between the two sets of officers, until the older one has died out."55 Such a 
move had to wait until the return of Fisher to the Admiralty and a new Order-in-Council 
in January 1915.56 
Another grievance was that there was no seat on the Board of Admiralty for the 
Engineer-in-Chief, who had the equivalent rank of Rear Admiral (later raised to Vice 
Admiral) but lacked the authority to deal with specific engineering questions directly with 
his professional colleagues afloat. Instead, all communications had to pass through the 
hands of the executive officer commanding the ship before any papers could be sent to his 
office in Whitehall. This state of affairs was regarded as a professional affront and a 
humiliation that the head of the Engineering Branch could not have direct contact with his 
54 PRO, ADM 116/1708, Enclosure to letter by Rear Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, 1st Battle Squadron, 4 
November 1913, emphasis in original. 
55 PRO, ADM 116/1708, Minute by Battenberg, January 1914. 
56 Penn, Up Funnel, 149. 
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colleagues and professional subordinates. Even regarding promotion and advancement, 
the Engineer-in-Chief had little input because the Second Sea Lord, an executive officer, 
was in control. 57 Hence, engineers at every turn were kept under the control of technically 
unqualified executive officers who seemed determined to have a finger in every pie. 
Furthermore, the process whereby engineer officers could be held accountable for 
misconduct or violation of professional standards was completely out the hands of the 
engineering branch and, consequently, untouched by professional review. The mechanism 
for punishing officers, save for minor incidents, was through the system of courts martial. 
The problem was that Queen's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions forbade engineers, 
or any other "civil" branch officers, from sitting on these boards. 58 Although engineer 
officers frequently appeared as witnesses, they could not be involved in the system of 
generating court findings or the fixing of sentences. Indeed, an engineer officer accused 
of misconduct was to be tried by "deck officers ... who probably could not distinguish 
between a reducing-valve and a stuffing-box."59 This understandably was a grave matter 
of concern, since the mechanism of affixing wrongdoing and enforcing professional 
standards was essentially removed from the engineers, and the mark of a great profession 
was denied. Control over entry and the maintenance of standards was the chief 
characteristic of any occupational group aspiring to professional status. However, the 
57 However, an Engineering Officer Assistant was assigned to the Second Sea Lord's office, see PRO, 
ADM 1/8496/182, Appointment ofEngineer Captain W. Toop as Assistant to the Second Sea Lord, 1917. 
58 PRO, ADM 116175, Queen's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions, Chapter III. 
59 Appleyard, "With But After," 620. Indeed, after the war this was recognized by the Judge Advocate of 
the Fleet in his pushing for the extension of courts martial processes. See PRO, ADM 1/85561110, 
Memorandum by the Judge Advocate of the Fleet, 12 Aprill919. 
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agitation for engineer officers to sit on courts martial was consistently frustrated on the 
grounds that only executives had training in legal procedures. 60 
This was a rather specious argument, since executive officers in reality had little 
training in this area, a fact that led to almost constant complaints by the Judge Advocate 
General of the Fleet and even some executive officers over the handling of courts 
martial.61 While the senior officers' courses at Greenwich devoted some time to the 
handling of legal proceedings, most of the training was gained "on the job" or by a close 
reading of the Queen's Regulations and adherence to the "customs of the service." To 
argue that engineer officers were incapable of learning the same way was seen rightly as 
motivated by a desire to retain control. Only the executive branch and the class from 
which it sprang (or at least the traditions of that class) was fit to govern. One officer wrote 
that giving judicial powers to the engineers would be akin to giving such authority to 
factory owners, which he claimed would damage the integrity of the justice system.62 
Executive officers were in effect seen as adjuncts (if not actual members) of the 
British governing class. Naval officers dealt with defaulters in their own ships and 
awarded minor punishments, even though flogging had been effectively abolished. The 
"traditions of the sea" had left naval officers with all sorts of quasi-judicial functions that 
they were loath to relinquish or share. According to the Naval Discipline Act, the Board 
60 PRO, ADM 1/8620/34, Eligibility of Engineer Officers to Sit on Courts Martial. 
61 PRO, ADM 116/1202, Naval Discipline Committee, 1912; Memorandum by Lieutenant R. Bevan on 
Ship's Police. 
62 Thursfield, "Training of Seamen," 1015, comments by Captain A. C. Corry. 
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of Admiralty was the court of final appeal in naval cases and was invested with the legal 
power to have those convicted of serious crimes executed. 
Engineer officers also wished to have the power to administer minor punishments 
to the men of their own department. To paraphrase Admiral Charles Fitzgerald, since the 
Navy had become a self-propelled coal mine and had come to resemble an industrial 
workplace, industrial discipline was required. 63 Since this particular industrial workplace 
was a naval vessel, it seemed imperative that military discipline be used to maintain the 
efficiency of engine rooms. This was particularly important in dealing with stoker ratings, 
since they entered later than the men in the seaman branch, and many had been exposed 
to the "virus" otherwise known as trade unionism. Further, evidence suggests that the 
executive had great difficulty dealing with stokers in both the Portsmouth riots of 1906 
and the Zealandia mutiny of 1914.64 With the executives seemingly out of touch with the 
stokers, professional engineers aboard ship argued that they should be able to fill that gap 
because they were immediately responsible for the efficiency of their department.65 
Engineers considered it imperative that they be able to deal with disorder in their 
own departments without reference to the officer of the watch, who would often be a non-
specialist officer many years junior to the chief engineer in both age and experience. To 
engineers this seemed unduly humiliating. 
63 C.C.P. Fitzgerald, "The War Training of the Navy: A Reply to Sir G. Hornby," United Service Magazine, 
III (1891), 4. 
64 Indeed, this point was raised by Rollo Appleyard immediately following the Portsmouth disturbances. 
The Times, 12 November 1906. For an account ofthe Zealandia disturbance see PRO, ADM 156/77 and 
ADM 156/157. 
65 The Times, 12 November 1906. In a letter to the editor, Rollo Appleyard questioned Lieutenant Collard"s 
capacity to understand stokers and advocated the extension of the authority of engineers to deal with 
disciplinary infractions. 
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Thus a "Fleet," [Engineer] perhaps over fifty years of age, who has 
had thirty years' experience of managing large numbers of men, is not 
allowed the same power that a Marine Officer just out of his teens, or a 
young sub, perhaps twenty years old, or a Supplementary Lieutenant 
fresh from the merchant service, and quite unused to naval discipline -
if he happens to be the senior Executive Officer on duty- is considered 
eligible and competent to exercise. Surely the work the Engineers do 
is, in its fullest sense, executive; they must get that work done, they 
must trust important duties to their subordinates, and if, through 
inattention or carelessness, the unfortunate Engineer-in-Charge gets 
court martialled or dismissed from the fault of a man he is not given 
authority to control. 66 
Here, the engineers ran headlong into the prerogatives of the executive branch and, in 
particular, the interests and authority of junior executive officers. While they were the 
officers of the watch they represented the authority of the captain in matters related to the 
reporting of offences. Deck officers argued that there could only be one captain in a ship 
and that it would be harmful if there were two distinct lines of disciplinary power. What 
the engineers were after was a separate sphere of operations not subject to interference 
from other executive officers. However, by custom, law and precedent the captain of a 
ship was responsible for all matters pertaining to its operations. By establishing a state 
within a state, this authority would be greatly circumscribed. Further, as a minority of the 
Douglas Committee in 1905 argued: 
The centralization of authority in the Captain and Executive Officer, 
and the delegation of control of the Heads of Departments, has been up 
to the present considered the safest and best form of ship government; 
this under the present proposals would in time be converted into a 
Committee of ship management with the Captain as Chairman. 67 
66 An Engineer (Not R.N.), The Royal Naval Engineer as Student and Officer (Plymouth: James H. Keys, · 
1899), 17. 
67 PRO, ADM 116/996, Minority Report of the Douglas Committee, 1905, 38. 
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The idea of a ship's captain having limited professional authority was a violation 
of an essential part of the executive officer's training, since his competence was judged 
solely by his performance in conning and navigating a ship. However, this was not the 
way officers saw their function. While safe navigation was certainly important, it was 
generally considered less so, even though the Navigation line had been integrated with the 
executive thirty years before. Executive officers were primarily agents for exercising 
command at sea in operations requiring either the use of force or diplomacy. They saw 
themselves as, in effect; the guardians of the national interest and closely integrated into 
the British imperial system.68 
Other concerns related to titles of command. The very titles engmeers bore, 
whether Fleet Engineer or Inspector of Machinery, emphasized that they were civil 
branch officers. When the Selbome Scheme was introduced, the new engineering officers 
were to be called lieutenants (E), etc., while the old scheme officers would be called . 
engineer-lieutenants and would not be considered executives. Charles Johnston, a retired 
naval engineer, was particularly bitter in this regard. 
I sometime wonder whether the Admiralty have grown to believe -
because the present engineer officers have waited so long ... that these 
officers can be always be relied upon to mistake the shadow for the 
substance, and to accept as an unmerited concession an "unconsidered 
trifle" they may contemptuously fling to them? Unless their lordships 
do entertain some such opinion as this of the engineer officers of the 
navy, it is difficult to conceive by what line of reasoning they can have 
68 Barry Gough, "Profit and Power: Informal Empire, the Navy and Latin America," in R.E. Dumett (ed.), . 
Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism: the New Debate on Empire (London: Longman, 1999), 
62-82. 
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persuaded themselves that such a miserable burlesque of executive 
rank could be acceptable to the present engineer officers."69 
Two months earlier Johnston was even more violent in tone: 
And what does the new scheme confer upon the present engineers in the 
service? An empty title, shorn of all the privileges, the accessories and the 
authority which executive rank has heretofore conferred upon its 
possessors! - 'a thing of shred and patches!' a discreditable counterfeit 
foisted on the country as a generous concession .... "70 
Finding Johnston's argument specious, Admiral Fitzgerald argued: 
My own private opinion is that a great many of my friends amongst the 
present engineers- especially those who are gifted with a sense of humour 
- will feel nothing of satisfaction, but rather shame and humiliation, in 
adopting bogus titles which have been conferred upon them, in answer to 
the screaming of a few noisy snobs who still lurked amidst their ranks ... It 
certainly does seem strange that in this 20th century, men who are 
otherwise quite sane, are unable to see that there is nothing in a name save 
that which it indicates.71 
In a joint dissent to the conclusions of the Douglas Committee on Engineering Officers, 
Rear Admiral S.H.M. Login, Commodore C.J. Briggs and Captain Reginald Bacon 
quipped that "[i]t might be argued by the Officers of the Military Branch that to double 
their pay and make them all Baronets would, from the improvement of their position and 
the added prestige of a title, cause the men to look on them with increased respect. Nor is 
this argument one whit more nebulous than those advanced by the Engineer Officers .... "72 
69 Charles Johnston, "The British Naval Engineer Under the New Scheme," Engineering Magazine, XXIV 
(March 1903), 908-909. 
7
° Charles Johnston, "A Destructive Criticism," The Naval and Military Record, 8 January 1903. 
71 C.C.P. Fitzgerald, "The Admiralty Scheme: The New Regulations for the Entry and Training of Naval 
Officers," United Service Magazine, XXVI (March 1903), 588. 
72 PRO, ADM 116/996, Dissenting Report of the Douglas Committee, 1905, 35. 
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Still, it was rather disingenuous to argue that executive officers did not care very 
much for titles, since rank was one of the psychic benefits of a naval career. Indeed, when 
he was a young boy Andrew Cunningham playfully imagined himself as a full admiral 
and from there took a fancy toward naval service.73 Nor did this concern cease even when 
an officer had spent nearly a lifetime in the service. After the war, for example, a group of 
officers who had not been promoted campaigned aggressively for elevation to flag rank 
without an increase in pay since they thought their prospects of employment and social 
position outside the navy were so much better as rear admirals than captains. The 
Admiralty denied their request because it would tend to cheapen the title. If so much 
energy was expended in trying to achieve higher rank, was it not perhaps questionable to 
claim that the title was merely functional?74 As a sort of final stab at the "agitators," one 
officer charged that their constant badgering and airing of grievances was causing 
problems with recruitment, since no one wanted to join a profession that was constantly 
complaining. 75 
There was also a concern that the values of a mechanical profession such as 
engineering would infect the executive officer corps. If everything was subjected to 
natural laws of mechanics, and if life was reduced to mathematical calculation, it would 
strike at a significant portion of military command. As one writer put it: 
73 Andrew B. Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey: The Autobiography of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount 
Cunningham of Hyndhope (London: Hutchinson, 1951 ), 13-14. 
74 PRO, ADM 118714/175 Submission for Flag Rank for Axed officers, 1923. See also Admiral Edward 
Field, "The New Admiralty Scheme" The Times, 10 January 1903; where the retired admiral attempted to 
define the term "admiral" from the original Arabic to mean "chief of the sea" and hence to emphasize the 
importance of command. 
75 
"Against Common Training," United Service Magazine, XXVI (February 1903), 472. 
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Where human life and enormous amounts of valuable property are at 
stake, it is the bounden duty of all concerned, whether owners or 
otherwise, to insist on every possible precaution being taken to 
minimize the risk; therefore, any appliance or arrangement which in 
any way tends to this desideratum demands careful and prompt 
consideration. Political economists tell us that every loss, whether of 
life or proferty, is a national loss, and is not confined to the 
individual. 7 
In this worldview, military command, killing an opponent or risking one's own 
destruction as matters of professional training were of lesser importance. For instance, 
this same argument was used in the 1860s when the Admiralty investigated the 
integration of the Master (or Navigation) branch into the executive. Many officers had 
reservations because they perceived that the principal duty of the master was to ensure the 
safety of his ship rather than to take risks.77 
In the words of Cyprian Bridge, m his commentary on the construction of 
Dreadnought, the first all-big-gun battleship in 1906: 
Until we put the treatment of inert material in its proper place, and 
make study of naval warfare the first demand on a naval officer's 
attention, our present methods, with all their intolerable costliness, will 
continue. A knowledge of naval warfare cannot be acquired, like a 
knowledge of Esperanto, by attendance at occasional lectures. Instead 
of spending most of his time dabbling with material, the Naval Officer 
should devote his attention so thoroughly to considering the problems 
of war that a knowledge of them will permeate his whole being.78 
76 J.D. Churchill, "Marine Engine Governors, and the Benefits Derived from Them," TIME, I (1889), 5; See 
also "The Status of the Engineers," The Fleet, VI (1910), 10. "It is only by a most broad-minded view of the 
duties of a captain of a warship that we can disabuse our ideas of his importance as the director of the ship 
on its course, rather than as the director of its internal economy, and so discover that the best captain of a 
warship is not the one who has spent his life on the bridge looking over the waters, but who is the captain of 
the details of his ship." 
77 W.F. Martin, Respecting the Abolition of the Masters as a Class of Officers in the Navy (London: 
William Ridgeway, 1866), 3. 
78 
"Material Versus Knowledge in Naval Warfare," The Times, 2 March 1906, 4. 
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Moreover, the advent of steam marked in many ways the death of traditional 
seamanship. Although there was much nostalgia surrounding sails and yards, the 
argument for their preservation was motivated more than that. As Admiral Bridge argued, 
"I can say ... that we are a long way past the age of sentiment. I doubt whether there is 
much sentiment left in a man after he has been a year or two first lieutenant of a ship."79 
Indeed, this "sea sense" was fundamental to the survival of Great Britain as an 
independent power: "Other nations have risen in their tum, such as the Portuguese, 
Spanish and Dutch, on their sea power, and the ability and courage of their seamen; but 
fell away as soon as they failed to maintain this 'Sea Spirit.' We shall also fall if we have 
not got men enough inured to the sea. "80 
Traditional seamanship was valued not merely because executive officers admired 
the beauty of fully rigged sailing vessels. Although many people thought (and still think) 
that "tall ships" were special, there was more to their attachment. The social and 
professional role of sails and masts served not only as a mechanism for training but also 
as a way of establishing the professional status of the executive officer. This extended 
even to the quality of voice that officers allegedly gained from sail training. 81 
79 Thursfield, "The Training of Seamen," 997; comments by C.A.G. Bridge. 
80 D.J. Munro, The Roaring Forties and After (London: Sampson, Low, Marston & Co., 1929), 99; see also, 
"Musings without Method," Blackwood's, CLXXXV, No. 1120 (1909), 280-281. "Moreover, there is 
another reason why our Navy had lost something of the advantage which once belonged to it. That which in 
the old days was called 'seamanship' and which set us beyond the reach of France and Spain, has now been 
replaced by a mechanical skill, in which other nations may reasonably expect to equal us. Every new 
invention every artifice, which decreases the importance of personal skill and bravery, even if they are 
adopted instantly by our Navy, helps our enemies to overtake us ... " 
81 PRO, ADM 144/22, Admiralty Circular, 13 December 1905. Expressing concern that officers landed for 
shore duty were unsatisfactory in their capacity to give verbal orders, the lack of sail training was blamed. 
"It appears probable that this defect in the executive qualities of the younger officers is largely due to the 
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By undercutting that fundamental function threatened the social role, the growth 
of steam engineering not necessarily of the ship's captain but of inferior commissioned 
officers. As the editor of the Spectator wrote in 1890: 
In Captain Marryatt's days, the main stress of ... duty at sea fell on the 
First Lieutenant. Even if the drunken, sea-sick crew obeyed orders 
better than he expected, he was always in a fever of anxiety lest yards, 
masts, ropes, or blocks might fail under the strain of actual service .... 
Now the First Lieutenant has an easy berth, and the heavy duties fall 
upon the Engineer officer. Down below the waterline, among rods and 
levers, steam and fire, darkness and din, he labours to get something 
like their nominal speed out of the engines. 82 
While the ship's captain remained in overall control, the sphere of responsibility seemed 
to close in on JUmor officers. The mechanical aspect of the profession was bitterly 
resisted as unworthy of those destined to lead the fleet into battle. Hence, when 
Commander A. C. Dewar attempted to reduce the command function of the navy to a form 
ofTaylorism gone amok, he was regarded as not quite "sound."83 
Traditional seamanship was valued as the mark of the professional executive 
officer. Indeed, the most important examination for any midshipman was in that field. 
Only when a young man had it could he advance to the rank of acting sub-lieutenant and 
proceed to become a lieutenant. Further, performance on this exam could gain young 
officers substantial seniority that in future could lead to more rapid promotion than their 
disappearance of masts and sails and the consequent extinction of the necessity for hailing aloft." Indeed, 
officers could be held back from promotion due to this cause as in the example of Commander H.M.C. 
Festing. See ADM 7/930, Summary of Commanders" Records, 48. Similarly Commander Gerard Bromley 
was held back from promotion. "Has a defective voice which in my opinion would render him unfit for 
command of a large masted ironclad." ADM 7/929, Confidential Commanders Book. 
82 
"What our Naval Engineers Must Do," The Spectator, LXV (2 August 1890), 142-143. 
83 PRO, Board of Education Papers (ED) 12/305, paper "On Certain Aspects of Organisation" by 
Commander AC Dewar, 1917, 20. 
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term mates. Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon recalled at least one captain who refused on 
general principle to award a first-class certificate on the grounds that no midshipman ever 
born deserved such an accolade. 84 
Seamanship was a way of asserting the authority and validity of the executive 
officer class. In the age of sail the vast bulk of a warship's crew comprised seaman either 
aloft or below handling the great guns, and a liberal dose of marines. The specialized 
members of the crew, the idlers, though important, were comparatively few in number, 
and even the most skilled were mere warrant officers and very clearly under the authority 
of every line officer. 
Further, there was the element of uncertainty, almost a seeking of the so-called 
"real experience" by which officers and men would challenge the forces of nature in the 
handling of ships under canvas. 85 And that danger did exist, as Admiral Sir George 
Ballard recalled service as a midshipman in the late 1870s: 
I well remember the sickening horror with which as quite a youngster I 
first saw a blue-clad human figure whirling down with an awful rush 
from a hundred and fifty feet above the deck and striking violently .... 
overboard ... to sink from sight instantly and forever. I suppose that it 
was because it happened in cold blood and unexpectedly that it made a 
deeper impression on my mind at the time than the sight of hundreds 
falling under bullets and spears which I was destined to witness 
afterwards. 86 
84 R.S. Bacon, A Naval Scrap Book, 1877-1901 (London: Hutchinson, 1940), 85. 
85 Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace: Modernism and Anti-Modernism and the Transformation of American 
Culture, 1880-1920 (New York: Pantheon, 1981), 103-107; see also, "Musings without Method," 
Blackwood's, CXCV, No. 1181 (April 1914), 580-581. "Science was the tyrant of the nineteenth century. It 
attempted to place the whole realm of human thought and human activity under its iron heel. So highly 
successful was its tyranny that it became a fashion, the worst of autocrats. All the arts clamoured to be 
admitted within the fashionable circle." 
86 George Ballard, "Admiral Ballard's Memoirs, pt. II," Mariner's Mirror, LXII, No. 1 (1976), 32. 
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Just how important the seamanship examination was considered to be was 
evidenced by Frederic Dreyer's publication of a guide for midshipmen.87 Seamanship as a 
skill was seen as the hallmark of the professional executive officer. Admiral of the Fleet 
Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby (known as "Uncle Geoff') wrote: "But the other quality - the 
care and the resource- I think can be distinctly traced to the teaching of the sails. Look at 
their teaching; how the attention is wrapt in enlisting them to help us on our way, and 
elude all that may endanger them or the ship that carries them."88 Hornby was no diehard 
reactionary; in fact, he placed a high value upon the professional execution of duties. In 
the words of Fisher, "Admiral Hornby ... never allowed a fool within a mile of him!"89 
Training in seamanship also helped to teach young boys to become manly in the face of 
discomfort at an early age.90 
In a similar fashion, another officer pointed to the beneficial aspects of traditional 
seamanship because it increased the spiritual and physical power of its practitioners: 
These are the men we want, for a man who is a smart active sailor, 
holding his life as it were in his hand, and treating the risk as a 
bagatelle, so that he may excel others in ability and feats of smartness 
aloft, will be equally fearless and active at his gun. Contrast such a 
man, muscular, active, long-winded, deep-chested, fearless and daring 
to a degree, with a new raised man, round-shouldered, relaxed, with no 
87 Frederic Dreyer, How to Get a First Class in Seamanship: A Guide for Midshipmen of the Royal Navy 
(Portsmouth: Griffin & Co., 1900). 
88 Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, "The War Training of the Navy- I," United Service Magazine, I (August 1890), 
476. 
89 Marder ( ed.), Fear God and Dread Nought, I, 256, Fisher to Selbome, 24 July 1902 
90 J.K. Laughton, "Naval Promotion Arithmetically and Historically Considered," RUSI, XXIV (1881), 555, 
comments by Vice Admiral Selwyn. 
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lasting powers, slow of mind and body, unused to danger, and chary of 
himself: they bear as much comparison as a recruit does to a smart 
colour-sergeant. 91 
Seamanship was valued because it defined a naval officer in a way that was patently not 
mechanical and did not conspire to reduce naval officers to mere "executive" 
instruments. 92 Seamanship involved the development of independence, the skill of 
command and the successful management of the collective efforts of subordinates. 
The progress of the engineering profession within the naval establishment was, to 
say the least, problematic. Although the Admiralty found it possible to integrate the 
aspirations of other professions with only a small amount of fuss, the problem of the 
engineering branch was of an entirely different order. The chief problem was not 
technical education, or even mechanical skill, because the executive branch had adopted 
many of those facets in the 1860s and 1870s. After all, the Britannia system, the Royal 
Naval College and the advent of the great specializations in Gunnery, Torpedo and 
Navigation were based on scientific and technical education. Further, a whole battery of 
re-examinations and investigative committees through the half-century or so were based 
around finding a balance between scholastic education and practical training of naval 
officers in an era of increasing technological complexity. This ought to have put paid to 
facile arguments that the old sea dogs hated engineering merely because it was new. The 
practice of engineering was not at issue, for as one officer argued, the idea of 
91 
"BO" Gunnery Officer, A Few Words About our Navy (London: Edward Stanford, 1867), 16. See also, 
F.T. Bullen, The Passing of the Sailing Ship," The Spectator, 7 May 1910. "All hands shorten sail! Oh yes, 
that was the order; but thirteen men, at least they called themselves men, just couldn't or wouldn't, and 
didn't do anything, but get in the way and shiver with fright." 
92 James Goodenough, "The Preliminary Education ofNaval Officers," RUSI, XV (1871), 339-340. 
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manipulating the forces of nature for the good of humanity was as old as civilization 
. lf93 1tse . 
The problem was not engineering per se but the professional engmeers who 
visibly appeared to be threatening the authority of the executive officers while aspiring to 
their own social elevation. In their bid to raise the status and authority of professional 
marine engineering, the Board of Admiralty was going to be the obvious target of 
agitation because it was one of the largest employers of professional marine engineers in 
the country. If a major victory could be scored for the profession in the Navy, it would 
greatly strengthen the hand of engineers in all related industries. Further, the Admiralty as 
a public department should have been uniquely vulnerable to this form of agitation 
because it spent so much of the government's money, employed so many people, and 
could be cross-examined in Parliament and the press. Also, technical developments that 
were obvious even to casual observers made it clear that the expertise of professional 
engineers was crucial to national security. And in view of the experience of the officer 
class in the Army in the South African War, the senior service was naive if it considered 
itself immune from the same type of criticism.94 Moreover, since the Board of the 
Admiralty was effectively domirlated by executive officers, it was apparent that this also 
meant an attack on the prerogatives of the military branch. Hence, to increase the status of 
engineering meant dealing with the Admiralty, which had the authority to establish 
entrance standards and to enact regulations of service for its engineers. 
93 Thursfield, "Training of Seamen," 992-993, comments by Gerard Noel. 
94 See, M.V. Brett (ed.), Journals and Letters of Reginald, Viscount Esher (4 vols., London: Ivor Nicholson 
and Watson, 1934), II, 183-184. "Our difficulty is that our lawyers and physicians are professional men, but 
until quite lately our soldiers have been amateurs- and soldiering a pastime and not a 'business."' 
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Executive officers were uncomfortable with suggestions that came close to 
asserting that engineers and their machinery could solve all the problems faced by the 
Navy. First, naval officers disliked the notion that navies existed solely to fight other 
navies; and second, they feared that mechanistic determinism would deprive commanders 
of individuality and reduce naval affairs to a sterile, depersonalized endeavour.95 
Executive officers knew, even if they did not express it very well, that there was 
something more to carrying out the duties of a naval officer than looking after machinery. 
The so-called "sublime" aspects of the naval profession - history, strategy and tactics -
had roles to play in reasserting the importance of individual judgement. Moreover, the 
advent of the staff system of command enabled commanders to integrate complex and 
complicated machinery without undue delay. 96 
The ultimate solution to the engineering problem in the R.N. was the obliteration 
of the professional engineer. The mechanism by which this was to be accomplished was 
the new scheme of entry and education put forward as the Selbome Scheme in December 
1902.97 The Scheme was designed to offer common entry and training to all three 
combatant branches of the officer corps, the executive, engineers and marines. In essence, 
the engineers would become part and parcel of the executive. To some in the professional 
95 Gerard Noel, "The War Training of the Navy," United Service Magazine, III (1891), 375 "The most 
important part of war-training, both for officers and men, is to initiate them into the mysteries of 
seamanship; a matter not understood by any who have not experienced the working part of sea-life. 
Seamanship is the science which enables its possessor to effectively combat the elements under all 
circumstances, and it is the want of it which renders the ordinary landsman helpless on board ship when any 
difficulty occurs." 
96 Arthur J. Marder (ed.), The Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond . 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1952), 89. 
97 BPP, "Memorandum dealing with the Entry, training and Employment of Officers and Men of the Royal 
Navy and of the Royal Marines, December 1902," vol. LXI, Cd. 1385 (1903), 677. 
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engineer community, this was a positive step since they had been attempting to distance 
themselves from workingmen for decades. Elevation to equality with the executive came 
at the price of no longer being able to use the Admiralty as a whipping boy. It also meant 
cutting off the existing supply of engineering officers at a critical time in the Navy' s 
expansion. In the end, the latter problem would destroy the Scheme's goal of complete 
integration of all three branches. 98 
98 Robert L. Davison, "The Selbome Scheme: A Study in Failure," paper presented to the Society for 
Military History Annual Meeting, Bethesda, MD, May 2004. 
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Chapter VI 
The Reinvention of the Officer Corps 
The country pays for the navy, and has the right to demand the best 
men for the best berths. Surely, then, it is an injustice to the heavily-
burdened taxpayer, and to our glorious traditions that matters should 
be allowed to remain as at present. Sons in law and nephews of peers 
have no right when they enter a profession to be jumped over the 
heads of other sons who cannot boast of titled relations. 1 
My brain was crammed with dull facts, it became sodden as a 
saturated sponge, and as a result my memory deteriorated about 80%. 
Fortunately this lifted the safety valve, the million and one futile facts 
dropped out like mud through the bottom of a dredger, and the brain, 
after some years, at last became free to think again. Imagination and 
mental elasticity ... were fortunately not assassinated; but they had a 
narrow escape. 2 
One response of the executive officer corps was to cast about for visible marks of 
legitimacy while simultaneously attempting to secure the older foundations of authority. 
As has been demonstrated in chapters four and five, the legitimacy of the executive's 
leadership was under pressure, and new ways had to be found to shore up their position to 
convince the general population that they could be trusted to perform their professional 
tasks in the era of steam and steel. Claims of authority had to be based upon sources other 
than birth, social position or some sort of mystical affinity for the sea. The key, then, was 
to co-opt the most visible aspects of modem middle-class professionalism in such a way 
that naval officers would carry out their duties with minimal interference from other 
professions, meddling politicians and their associates in the press. 
1 
"Promotion in the Navy," The Naval and Military Record, 5 March 1903. 
2 Churchill College, Cambridge, Archives Centre (CCAC), R. Drax Papers (DRAX) 1121, Rough Notes on 
Education, 1918. 
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The first mechanism was the gradual shift to a more centralized Admiralty control 
over entry and promotion than hitherto existed. 3 Further, criteria for selection for 
promotion and entry were to be based on quantifiable educational qualifications and 
competitive examinations. Although safeguards were introduced to ensure that only the 
most "suitable" entered the service, there was no doubt that the Admiralty required 
specific professional attainments for entry to the quarterdeck. Gradually, as power 
became concentrated in the hands of the Admiralty administration, there was a gradual 
tightening of regulations regarding promotion and education that became more apparent 
after the tum of the century. Promotions based solely on patronage were abolished or at 
least curtailed so much that they became a mechanism to promote officers who would 
have been advanced in the ordinary course of affairs. Also, the flow of promotion and the 
career expectations of officers became more regularized, and they were compelled to 
follow prescribed career patterns designed to advance only the visibly most able. Even the 
most sacrosanct "right" of captains to be promoted to rear admiral by seniority, though 
not abolished, became greatly circumscribed.4 
The second mechanism was the advent of scientific education and the 
development of the Royal Navy's educational institutions that had been virtually 
nonexistent prior to the 1850s. Where in former times a boy could enter the service 
directly with a nomination from a senior officer or the First Lord and a simple test, now 
an entire battery of examinations in everything from French to steam engineering was 
3 N.A.M. Rodger, "Officers, Gentlemen and Their Education, 1793-1860," in Edward Freeman ( ed. ), Les 
Empires en Guerre et Paix, 1793-1860: Journees Franco-Anglaises d"histoire de Ia Marine, Portsmouth, 
2 3-26 Mars, 1988 (Vincennes: Service Historique de la Marine, 1990), 139-140. 
4 Great Britain, Public Record Office (PRO), Admiralty Papers (ADM) 1/8370/65, Retirement and 
Promotion of Officers, 1914. 
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mandatory. After entrance, a full course of study was introduced in the cadet training 
ship, Britannia, and other courses were carried out in the seagoing fleet. When a 
midshipman completed three years of service afloat, he tried his seamanship examination 
and took the sub-lieutenants' courses at Greenwich. If he was particularly able he might 
be selected to study for the designation of torpedo or gunnery officer, which entailed 
another year of schoolwork. For a time, even officers who had been selected for 
promotion to commander were forced to pass a qualifying written examination. 
Advancement and seniority could be helped or retarded on the basis of examinations in 
which each officer competed against his fellows to gain an additional few months of 
seniority. All of this occurred in the space of a generation: Fisher's entrance examination 
consisted of reciting a few lines and jumping over a chair, while his protege, the future 
Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, recalled in his autobiography that in the course of his career 
he had written sixty-seven examinations. 5 
These examinations and the education system in general were .geared increasingly 
toward mathematics and the sciences. As in modem industrial operations, mathematics 
provided the basis of a scientific education that would equip naval officers with the skills 
required to cope with the ever-changing face of naval affairs. 6 Ships and weapon systems 
were rendered obsolete within a decade, and it seemed that the only constant was the use 
of mathematics, which provided the intellectual foundation of all modem developments in 
technology and organization. The Admiralty presumed that if officers possessed an 
5 R.S. Bacon, A Naval Scrap Book, 1877-1900 (London: Hutchinson, 1940), 71. 
6 J.K. Laughton ''Naval Education," Journal of the Royal United Services Institution (RUSJ), XXVI (1882), 
361, comments by Gerard Noel. 
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intensive knowledge of this "Queen of the Sciences" it would guarantee the capacity to 
manage and control these scientific developments. Further, a quantifiable and readily 
measurable scale of professional intellectual capacity was welcomed as a way of 
buttressing the status and authority of executive officers. The ultimate expression of this 
trend was the "Christmas-box" in the form of the new scheme of entry and training of_ 
officers in 1902.7 The Selborne Scheme was an attempt at the virtual annexation of the 
Engineering Branch and a frank admission that naval officers were to become something 
more akin to uniformed scientists than heirs ofNelson's band ofbrothers: 
In the old days it sufficed if a Naval Officer were a seaman. Now, he 
must be a seaman, a gunner, a soldier, an engineer, and a main of 
science as well. It is not only that machinery driven by electric, 
hydraulic or steam power is every year becoming more complicated in 
character and multiplying in form, and that therefore a more extensive 
education in applied science is necessary for specialised officers, but 
in various ways the need for a more general scientific training has 
become apparent. 8 
However, there was considerable disquiet throughout the executive concerning the 
value of mathematical education as carried out in Britannia, the Royal Naval College, 
Vernon and Excellent. Many critics, while conceding the importance of a solid foundation 
in mathematics, argued that the system seemed content to produce the appearance of such 
7 C.C.P. Fitzgerald, From Sail to Steam: Naval Recollections, 1878-1905 (London: Edward Arnold, 1916), 
262 . 
8 Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers (BPP), "Parliamentary Papers, Memorandum Dealing 
with the Entry, Training and Employment of Officers and Men of the Royal Navy and of the Royal 
Marines," vol. LXI, Cd. 1385 (1903), 677. 
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instruction without graspmg its substance. 9 Officers were crammed with theoretical 
education, especially at the Excellent, without relating it to the practice of the naval 
profession. The result was a group of officers whose education left them less suited to 
taking a wider view of naval affairs than was perhaps optimal. Further, the importance 
placed on specialization was questionable, since it created an elite within the corps that 
was comprised of technicians rather than sea officers. Specialist officers spent 
considerable time not only training but also in administrative tasks aboard ship and in the 
Admiralty. Such officers spent only a year or so as ordinary watch-keeping lieutenants 
before beginning to specialize, and their duties aboard ship precluded them from standing 
watch or handling the tasks of an ordinary officer. 
From the start, many officers had misgivings about the use of examination results 
and mathematics, since there was no way to quantify the importance of command or the 
personality of the commander. Mathematics did little to train officers to handle the 
unexpected, taught almost nothing about the handling of a naval force and did less to 
teach a young officer to manage and inspire subordinates. As we shall see in the 
following chapter, command was transformed as it too became scientifically based. 
Entry and Promotion 
In common with other government departments, the Admiralty was from time to time 
criticized for "jobbery" and corruption in the awarding of contracts, appointments and 
9 United States, Congress, Senate, Congressional Papers, James R. Soley, "Report on Foreign Systems of 
Naval Education," Senate Executive Documents, 46th Congress, 2nd Session, U.S. Serial Set # 1884, 
ExecutiveDocumentNo. 51 (1880), 89. 
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promotion of its civil staff, as well as for the close connection of appointments to the 
political currents of the day. The most visible example of this jobbery in the nineteenth 
century was the executive officer corps, which dominated the professional side of the 
Board of Admiralty, held prestigious commands and status within the naval service and in 
general comprised the most visible members of the establishment. 10 It was axiomatic, but 
true, that naval officers were entered and promoted on the basis of patronage and the 
shameless use of social and political connections. As we saw in chapter III, such interest 
was crucial to secure advancement when there was a glut of officers on the list all looking 
for employment. Yet despite Michael Lewis's apt distinction between what he 
considered "interest" and graft, and Admiral Sir Edmund Fremantle's argument that such 
advancements were beneficial, the perception of the general public was that this group 
progressed at public expense. 11 The more the officer corps convinced the public of the 
importance of the Navy and the higher the naval estimates became, the more it became 
imperative to provide a firmer foundation for the executive with promotion and selection 
by merit. 
However, quick-fix solutions that merely forbade the most obvious forms of 
patronage were problematic. Regularized patterns of entry and promotion had to be 
maintained to give officers reasonable prospects in a fashion that had the mantle of 
legitimacy. This meant the entire system had to be overhauled, with a move toward 
10 Christopher Dandeker, "Patronage and Bureaucratic Control: The Case of the Naval Officer in English 
Society," British Journal of Sociology, XXIX (1978), 302-303 . 
11 Michael Lewis, The Navy in Transition, 1814-1864: A Social History (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1965), 49-51. Fisher himself used to argued that favouritism was the foundation of efficiency since the 
officer preferred would be careful not to demonstrate that their superior had not made a mistake in 
advancing him over his fellows. 
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including mandatory retirement combined with actuarial calculations to ensure a good 
supply of officers fit to perform their duties. 
The first mechanism was the use of entrance exams, as a competitive tool to give the 
appearance that candidates not only possessed the basic educational qualifications for 
Britannia but also that only the best boys would be selected. However, the competition 
had the appropriate safeguard of compelling all boys to secure a nomination for entry 
from the Admiralty or from a senior naval officer. The Order-in-Council of 1869 required 
that all cadets try an entrance exam administered by the Director of Education at the 
Admiralty. From 1882 to 1902 the Civil Service Commission (CSC) administered these 
examinations. Generally speaking, twice as many nominations were made available as 
spaces in the training ship, so competition was limited. The system was also hobbled by 
the existence of several exceptions. Five annual nominations were reserved for the sons of 
officers who had died while on active duty in either the army or navy; several more were 
for the sons of colonial gentlemen; and several were also earmarked for the merchant 
training establishments, Worcester and Conway. 12 Although these candidates had to pass 
a qualifying exam, they were immune from the competition rules. In this way, the fears of 
Sub-Lieutenant Reginald Tupper that unregulated and indiscriminate entry would be 
adopted were eased. 13 
The system of limited competition set the stage to combine the worst features of the 
competitive system while ensuring that only a select minority could hope to gain a 
12 PRO, ADM 116/75, Queen's Regulations, 1893. 
13 Reginald Tupper, "On the Best Method of Providing the Best Officers and Men for the Royal Navy," 
RUSI, XXVI (1882), 330. 
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commission. The Navy was still addicted to early entry, which resulted in twelve- and 
thirteen-year-olds taking competitive examinations because it was considered imperative 
that the lads go to sea by the age of sixteen. Since the regular schools generally did not 
teach the appropriate curricula, parents often enrolled their sons in a "crammer" to 
prepare them for the examinations. These schools were not only fairly expensive but also 
widely considered to do a grave disservice to the cadets, for being "crammed" tended to 
overwork them and to impart only the capacity to pass exams rather than real education. 14 
After the advent of the Selbome Scheme in December 1902, the limited competition 
was replaced by a new system. The existing line officers that still controlled entry to the 
entire service placed more, not fewer, barriers to naval command. First, all candidates for 
cadetships had to present themselves before a selection committee chaired by an 
executive flag officer who was attended by a representative of the First Lord and a 
headmaster of one of the great public schools. All potential cadets were then interviewed 
and evaluated for their fitness to become officers and tried a qualifying exam to confirm 
their educational status. When the exam attracted some unfavourable comment, the 
Admiralty was compelled to release two Blue Books describing its methods. 15 Moreover, 
14 BPP, "Selection of Candidates for Nomination as Naval Cadets- Reports of Members of the Interview 
Committee," vol. LUI, Cd. 1962 (1904), Memorandum by the Director of Naval Education, 488. See also 
G.L. Morley, "Our Crammers and Failures: By a Military Student," United Service Magazine, IV (June 
1892), 300. "The crammers have been called a necessary evil, but the evil is the result of the severe 
competition ... In such a struggle, the carefully-trained alone can win, and the crammers have brought the 
art of training unpromising competitors to a science." 
15 BPP, "Selection of Candidates for Nominations as Naval Cadets Reports of Members of the Interview 
Committees," vol. Lill, Cd. 1962 (1904); "Selection of Candidates for Nominations as Naval Cadets -
Further Reports of members of the Interview Committees," vol. XL VIII, Cd. 2450 (1905). 
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smelling a hint of ''jobbery," the Civil Service Commission refused to administer the 
16 
exams. 
Further, the interview process gave the committee the opportunity to test the minds 
and manners of young men. In the words of the editor of The Spectator, "(i]t is this alone 
which makes an owner, who has nothing but performances and the stud-book to go by, 
willing to adventure thousands of pounds for one yearling, while he would not offer as 
many pence for another. In the case of human colts, we must conclude the same law holds 
good."17 Still, members of the interview committees were more sanguine in their 
approach and couched the criteria to give the appearance that class bias was minimized 
and that instead the examination had a "scientific" authority. The candidates first were 
rated according to a set of criteria, and each was assigned a letter grade depending upon 
his suitability, for example A+, B-, C, etc.) Table 6.1, below, shows the results for the 
1903 selection. 
Table 6.1 Results of the 1903 Selection Committee 
Group Class Number 
Fit A+ 12 
A 36 
A- 33 
Doubtful B+ 50 
B 72 
B- 33 
Unsuitable C+ 6 
c 31 
C- 5 
Total 278 
Source: BPP, "Selection Committee 1904," 502 
16 PRO, ADM 1/7711, Civil Service Commission to Admiralty, 13 January 1903. 
17 
"The School Boy and the Admirals," The Spectator, 1 April1905, 472. 
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Furthermore, the committee members were careful to avoid the use of class 
criteria, since in the words of James Gow, the Headmaster of Westminster College, "The 
function of the examiners was to form an estimate of the TOTAL ENERGY -
intellectual, physical and moral- of each candidate." 18 A.C. Benson, a former headmaster 
ofEton, wrote of the June 1904 committee that 
In the first place I tried to observe the boy's physique, his character, 
his general bearing, his self-possession, and his savoir faire; moreover 
I endeavoured to gauge what his social environment had been. I do not 
think that too great stress ought to be laid on this latter point. But I 
may say that I believe that there are two kinds of ... breeding; there is 
a real inferiority of tone which can hardly be disguised, even in a boy 
who has been brought up under favourable social influences, and there 
is also a superficial deficiency in manners, betraying itself in bearing 
and pronunciation, which could be very soon eliminated under 
improved conditions.19 
While maintaining control over entry into the corps, the executive branch 
managed to rig the appearance of objective authority in keeping with the political and 
social atmosphere. Entry gradually shifted to a system based on a scientific examination 
of the cadets according to widely accepted professional standards, while at the same time 
reinforcing the traditional bias in the system. 
In the later part of the nineteenth century a systematic and organized career 
structure for executive naval officers was introduced for the first time. This career 
structure attempted to move away from promotion based on patronage to one more in 
keeping with the general trend of merit in education. Although as early as in the first part 
18 Ibid., 502. 
19 BPP, "Reports of Departmental Committee Appointed to Consider Certain Questions Concerning the 
Extension of the New Scheme ofTraining for Officers of the Navy," vol. LXX, Cd. 2450 (1906), 455 . 
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of the eighteenth century there were regulations for the various ranks of the service, not 
until later in the nineteenth that the Admiralty managed to impose career patterns. As we 
saw in chapter IV, the legacy of the Napoleonic wars was an enormous surplus of 
officers; there was no mechanism to clear the lists by forced retirements due to the vested 
interest of several thousand gentlemen who possessed the King's commission. The 1870 
Childers retirement scheme, which imposed mandatory retirement on the basis of age and 
non-service, marked the point at which career patterns came under direct Admiralty 
control. At the same time, specific regulations were introduced to tighten qualifications 
for advancement. An officer was generally required to serve certain lengths of time at sea 
in each particular rank prior to receiving promotion. There were also attempts to impose 
some regularity on the advancement of officers, if only to lower expenditures.20 
Moreover, until blockages in promotion were rectified, there was no way to eliminate 
promotion by patronage. Often the only way to prepare a reasonably young admiral to 
serve when he reached the flag list was to advance him rapidly in the lower lists. 
The Admiralty found gradually through various studies that only careful 
management of the executive officer lists would produce a corps that was able to rise to 
the occasion in the event of international conflict but that also kept half-pay or retirement 
benefits in check. Part of the problem, in the view of the government and many 
professional officers, was the age of admirals, since they advanced to flag rank strictly by 
seniority. To limit costs associated with the flag list, the number of officers on that list 
was strictly limited, but only half would be employed in the event of general 
2° For instance in 1869-1870 active service officers cost the Exchequer £764,000 in full pay, half pay 
£723,000 and pensions £793,000. 
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mobilization. As we shall see below, the preservation of patronage and special 
promotions enabled these younger men to reach post rank at an age where they could 
afford to wait until they reached the top of the seniority list and still be spry enough for 
active command. These were seen as abuses that permitted the elite to push their relations 
and friends at the expense of less connected brother officers. 
As naval education became more detailed and expensive it was necessary for the 
service to extract considerable work from officers when they were in junior ranks. This 
was especially true in the case of the torpedo and gunnery officers who became the elite 
of the service; such officers had to be convinced that their special qualifications would 
not unduly weaken their claims to promotion.21 Further, as the fleet expanded and the 
pressure on the lower lists became greater, the Admiralty proved reluctant to increase the 
size of the lists dramatically since such a move would weaken the chances of the average 
officer to gain promotion and later increase the non-effective charges to the naval 
estimates. Too rapid promotion and packing the lists full of officers did nothing to ensure 
that they were employed on a consistent basis. With naval command and technology 
changing so quickly, the Admiralty and the Cabinet considered it bad for the efficiency of 
the corps for officers to sit on the beach in the vain hope of employment while taking up 
space on the active list: 
Any system, therefore, which tends to lessen the experience and 
employment of officers, any system that tends to lay them up like 
ships in ordinary, is a misfortune as injurious to themselves as it is to 
21 This argument was used against the elimination of the Master class of officers by Captain John Fulford, 
who argued that if the masters were in the same career path as the normal executive, their special skills 
would be lost as soon as they were promoted to more valuable posts. BPP, "Copy of the Report of the 
Admiralty Committee on the Position of Masters in the Royal Navy," vol. XLVII, No. 109 (1866), 183. 
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the public. And while the object should be kept steadily in view, of 
affording as frequent employment and as much promotion as the 
national interests will admit, it should be borne in mind, that though 
promotion may be the life blood of the service, promotion without 
employment is the death-warrant of the sailor.22 
On the other hand, officers had to be assured of a flow of promotion that did not stagnate 
to the point where they would lose interest in a naval career and leave the service or, even 
worse, lose their zeal. 23 Hence, the Admiralty had to regulate the officer lists tightly to 
ensure a reasonable flow of promotion, to restrain the growth in costs and to ensure the 
efficiency of the naval service. 
The primary target was the highly visible and blatant forms of patronage that 
thrust officers with no obvious qualifications beyond social and political connections 
ahead of their fellows. It increasingly became apparent that these promotions, often 
outside the control of the Admiralty and contrary to ideas of merit or fairness, had to go to 
the wall. Serving flag officers had the privilege of a haul-down promotion on 
relinquishing their post; generally the practice was that the flag lieutenant (the admiral's 
personal assistant) would be promoted to commander. Officers to advance the careers of 
sons and nephews as well as those of their friends used this privilege. 
As late as the 1860s, these promotions were considered normal. In regard to haul-
down promotions, the Walpole Committee concluded, "the evidence shows that though 
22 BPP, "Papers relating to the Retirement and Promotion of Naval Officers," vol. XLII, No. 251 (1860), 
517. 
23 
"Zeal in the Navy," United Service Magazine, XXVI (1903), 331. "Most of us are very human; some few 
are impelled to do their duty in spite of everything, and even at times, and in rare cases, to their own 
detriment; but in the minds of most ofus the EGO [sic] looms very large indeed, and our incentive to work 
is the reward to be gained. Some strive for pieces of ribbon, and others for pounds, shillings and pence; but 
the main idea of all is to obtain promotion, and this is their primary incentive to zeal. It follows logically 
that when promotion is barred, zeal, which at the best is more or less exotic, becomes an attenuated plant." 
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these promotions have often been conferred on relatives and friends, yet there is no 
reason to think they are not given to deserving officers." The committee also put forward 
the notion that special promotions by overseas commanders-in-chief benefited the 
service: they were "not merely to be considered as a reasonable compliment to Flag 
Officers, but as a means of encouraging young officers to so conduct themselves as to 
deserve the good opinion of those who are placed over them. They are the legitimate 
patronage of officers in command, and the selections of late years are said to have been 
very good. " 24 
The elimination of haul-down promotions meant that by 1914 there would be no 
officers on the active list who had received such promotions to commander. By contrast, 
in 1899 there were twenty-five officers on the active list who had received such favour; 
among them Admirals of the Fleet Algernon Lyons and Frederick Richards, and Admirals 
M. Culme-Seymour, Edmund Fremantle and J.O. Hopkins. In fact, Charles Beresford had 
received not only a haul-down promotion but also another in consequence of serving in 
the Royal Yachts. 25 But even promotion in the Royal Yacht Squadron was gradually 
made solely to officers who had been earmarked previously for advancement.26 
24 BPP, "Report from the Select Committee on Navy Promotion and Retirement," vol. X, No. 501 (1863), 
97, memorandum by Rear Admiral the Earl of Lauderdale 
25 James Bramble, Promotion and Retirement of Flag Officers of the Royal Navy, 1899 (Portsmouth: 
Holbrook and Sons, 1899), 25 and 37. 
26 PRO, ADM 116/2080, Half Yearly Promotions, 1920, minute by Winston Churchill, 1912. "The Practice 
of according special promotion to Officers for services of this character is not desirable ... In this case a 
pleasant cruise with the added honour of attending Their Majesties had been made the occasion for a reward 
for a wholly unsuitable purpose and prejudicial to the interests of other Officers doing hard work on regular 
service." See also PRO ADM 118632/162, "Lieutenant Commander Ralph Neville Recommended for 
Special Promotion- Suggestion that Royal Yacht Promotion be Discontinued in Future, 1922." 
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Promotion of officers became highly regularized and lists were published every 
June and December according to the vacancies that opened. Furthermore, promotion 
became more tightly controlled from the centre as officers were instructed for the first 
time to make regular reports on the performance of subordinates. 27 Although there were 
concerns that this was tantamount to espionage, officers generally accepted the system. 
As well, promotion, especially from commander to captain, was increasingly important, 
since if an officer received sea time as a captain he was virtually guaranteed promotion to 
rear admiral on the active list. Hence, the First Naval Lord, in addition to regular service 
records,28 kept an entry book to track commanders approaching the zone ofpromotion.29 
Moreover, financial pressures and the possibility of a Great Power conflict, which 
was taken increasingly seriously from the late 1880s, also conspired to ensure a flow of 
promotion and a stable and predictable career path for officers. This had the benefit of 
reducing the blockages of promotion that existed at all levels of the officer establishment, 
but especially in the lower ranks. A series of actuarial reports and Admiralty committees 
showed that the issue was not merely numbers. The real problem for these committees 
was the distribution of officers. Since advancement was considered a primary motivator, 
they considered it imperative that regular promotions should be somewhat predictable. 
Indeed, the Childers plan for retiring officers in 1870 put forward a scheme that not only 
prescribed the number of officers and retirement regulations but also set a mechanism that 
27 National Maritime Museum (NMM), G. Noel Papers (NO E) 5/13B, Earl of Selbome to Gerard Noel, 31 
March 1903. Selbome asked Noel to establish a confidential evaluation of officers advancing to flag rank. 
28 These records are to be found in PRO, ADM 196. 
29 PRO, ADM 7/929, Confidential Commanders" Book, 1879-, comments in these books varied from 
Commander Henry Rose being described as "a vg. sailor and a charming gentlemanlike person" to 
Commander Alfred Warry "zeal- none. Was so inert an officer I could not recommend for advancement." 
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imposed a certain structure on promotions. Special promotions based on patronage were 
gradually stopped. 
By the tum of the century, a stable career pattern had been laid down and 
promotions were adjusted to fit certain "zones." For instance, officers expected that they 
would serve a minimum often years as lieutenants before they could reasonably expect to 
be made commanders. This predictability of promotion had the added advantage of 
permitting more officers to take specialist courses and fulfil those special duties before 
they would start hankering for promotion. This enabled the Admiralty to extract the 
maximum amount of work from them and to recoup the expensive training and education 
given to specialists. Generally speaking, the "zone" of promotion was set from 
approximately ten to fourteen years of seniority. Once an officer passed that point or 
reached a certain age, his chances for promotion were slim. 30 
Immediately before the war, Winston Churchill, then First Lord began to clamp 
down on some of the more blatant problems. For instance, he decided to place more 
stringent rules on the awarding of good service pensions and aide de camps rather than 
handing them out merely by seniority. 31 The jealousy surrounding these awards was a 
continual problem; Rear Admiral Doveton Sturdee complained to Captain Alan Everett, 
the Naval Secretary to the First Lord, that some of his captains had been passed over for 
these prizes. Frustrated, Everett responded: 
30 PRO, ADM 1/8370/65 Report on Supply of Officers, April1912, Table II Highest, Lowest and Average 
Age Of Officers Promoted to Ranks of Rear Admiral, Captain and Commander, 1894-1911. 
31 PRO, ADM 1/8385/195, Good Service Pensions, Memorandum by Charles Walker, 18 December 1913. 
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I have been in this office long enough now to become convinced that, 
since every one person who may be preferred results in at least two 
others being profoundly discontented, it really be conducive to a 
happier state of affairs if they abolished all ADC's and GSP's, and 
most other honours, and confine awards to those only who "deliver the 
goods."32 
Promotion to flag rank became problematic for the officer corps as well, since the 
Royal Navy was unique in that captains progressed to rear admiral on the basis of 
seniority.33 Flag rank, even on the retired list, meant a dramatic increase in pay as well as 
prestige. Retired or even half-pay on the flag list permitted an officer to live well and to 
be able to take his place in the social and political world if he chose. Although the 
Admiralty possessed the power to promote any officer, that power had been used only 
sparingly during the previous century. Considerable pressure was placed on the 
Admiralty, since the fact that an officer did fairly well as a captain did not necessarily 
imply that he would be a successful admiral. As early as 1848, it was suggested 
unsuccessfully that every third flag promotion should be made on the basis of selection.34 
The issue was raised again before the Walpole Committee, where it was firmly rejected 
because the current system seemed to work and it would cost too much money to 
compensate captains who were deprived of their chance on the flag list. 35 
32 PRO, ADM 116/4600, Aides de Camp and Good Service Pensions: Appointments and Awards to Eligible 
Officers, 1914-1942; Rear Admiral Alan Everett to Vice Admiral Doveton Sturdee, 30 May 1917. 
33 Subject to qualifying sea time in command of a warship. 
34 BPP, "Report from the Select Committee on Navy Promotion and Retirement," vol. X, No. 501 (1863), 
79. 
35 Ibid., 81. 
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This issue was brought forth anew during the proceedings of the 1902 Goschen 
Committee, where it was pointed out that one of the logjams in the system was promotion 
by seniority. Witnesses consistently argued against it, but as the Report concluded: 
Selection would destroy the brotherly feeling amongst Captains which 
now exists; it might tend to produce jealousies which would hamper 
the zealous co-operation of Officers in joint operations. It might lessen 
that spirit of independence, and readiness to express their views 
without any fear of incurring the displeasure of the authorities, by 
which they are now animated. It might induce a spirit of self-
advertisement and a less generous appreciation of the merits of 
Officers serving under them. 36 
The most prominent dissenter was Admiral Sir Michael Culme-Seymour, a former private -
secretary to the First Lord, who considered such arguments specious and believed that 
witnesses before the committee expressed perhaps more concern for the interests of the 
officer than for the country as a whole: 
There is in my judgment nothing in any of the points brought forward 
except the last; the feeling of loyalty in the Service is far too strong for 
any tear of jealousy, or for any brotherly feeling to be destroyed, but 
there is something in the fear that the best men might not always be 
selected. 37 
Nor was Seymour the only officer to feel this way. Captain Prince Louis of Battenberg 
wrote to Fisher in the same year: "Now the only one who has the right to be employed is 
36 PRO, ADM 116988, Goschen Report, xv. 
37 PRO, ADM 116988, Dissenting Memorandum by Culme-Seymour in Goschen Report, xxx_However, 
other officers were less confident of assertions of the band of brothers . Charles Dundas, An Admiral's 
Yarns : Stray Memories of 50 Years (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1922), 159. "The band of brothers that we 
have all heard so much about never existed in any fleet that I served in." 
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the best man, and the rights of the second best man can only be considered when the 
former is incapacitated. "38 
Just how strongly promotion on the basis of seniority was desired by some, in 
opposition to Battenberg and Culme-Seymour, was demonstrated over twenty years later 
when thirty-six captains were forced to retire and thereby deprived of flag rank even on 
the retired list.39 One officer "suffered horribly from the commonness of the title Captain" 
and was required to furnish a reference from a station master when he wished to send 
milk into London from his farm. 
I explained ... that I was not an ordinary Captain, but a Captain, Royal 
Navy,- but apparently he had been had before by so-called Captains, 
and instead of a Captain, Royal Navy, being the best possible 
reference that anyone could give or require, I had to lower myself and 
-what is much worse- the Service, by giving in and sending him a 
reference that would carry weight. 40 
Senior officers regarded promotion as a right, even though the Admiralty did not view it 
as such. Although the principle of promotion to flag rank by seniority remained until after 
1945, in reality selection was increasingly employed. The shadow remained, but selection 
became by force of circumstances the order of the day. 
Promotion to flag rang became restricted after 1902, in the first instance because 
Admiralty officials recognized that just because an officer was promoted did not mean he 
would be employed on the flag list, since the Admiralty was free to select any officer it 
38 CCAC, J.A. Fisher Papers (FISR) 112/86, Captain Prince Louis of Battenberg to Fisher, 28 July 1902, 
emphasis in original. 
39 The "Geddes Axe" refers to the dramatic reduction in the Active List pushed forward by the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Sir Eric Geddes, at the conclusion of the war. Hundreds of officers were removed from 
the list in order to reduce government expenditure. See S.W. Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars (2 
vols., New York: Walker and Co., 1968), I, 125. 
40 PRO, ADM 1/8714/175, A Submission by Captains, 1927; experience of Captain "J." 
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chose to fill certain appointments. Moreover, the Admiralty possessed the authority to 
deny promotion to any officer guilty of "ungentlemanly" behaviour or who had refused 
an appointment. The problem with promotion by seniority was that there was a certain 
period of time that a rear admiral could occupy a space on the active list before he had 
been there for a number of years or had reached the age limit. This had a tendency to slow 
down promotion in the lower ranks and to swell the flag list with officers the Admiralty 
considered unsuitable for active service. 
In the spring of 1914, this situation reached the point where the Admiralty 
obtained an Order-in-Council that gave it the power to compel officers to retire as they 
reached the top of the captains' list.41 The permanent secretary, a civilian, would inform 
an officer that he would receive a step in rank if he retired at his own request. Otherwise, 
he was threatened with being cast out as a captain. Senior captains objected to such letters 
even though they were forced to accept retirement. These officers were particularly upset 
over the use of threatening language from a civilian secretary.42 
In order to save valuable officers, the Admiralty resorted to obtaining special 
orders-in-council to promote men who had not completed their sea service requirements 
when they reached the top of the captains' list. For instance, David Beatty and Rosslyn 
41 PRO, ADM 118370/65, Retirement and Promotion of Officers 1914, Order in Council of March 1914. 
Further, there was considerable pressure to abolish the "soul-killing" seniority system in favour of 
promotion. See "Business, R.N.," Daily Mail, 26 July 1917. 
42 PRO, ADM 1/8521/105, Letters of Appreciation for retiring flag officers 1918, Rear Admiral Alan 
Everett to Oswyn Murray, 2 April 1918; Everett expressed the opinion that officers being compelled to 
retire should receive a nicer letter than the one commonly circulated: "After all it is rather a wrench leaving 
the active service after about 35 years and since the individual has reached the top of the Captains' list he 
cannot altogether have been a failure. At any rate he has spent his working life for the good of the Country 
and his conge should be made as graceful as possible." 
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W emyss, both future First Sea Lords and Admirals of the Fleet, were retained on the 
active list in this fashion.43 
In essence, although promotion by seniority for flag officers was preserved, the 
power of the Admiralty was enhanced to the degree that in practice promotion was by 
selection; the system merely fixed the time at which an officer would be selected for 
retirement or retention. Even during the war, however, the Admiralty seemed reluctant to 
interfere with the principle of seniority: a number of captains down the seniority list were 
appointed to positions normally given to flag officers and were appointed commodores 
until they reached the top.44 During the war, the Admiralty began to use acting rank as a 
way to bypass this problem, much like the Army's brevet system. 
Education 
Scientific education based on mathematics was not just an attempt to cram the most 
information into an officer's head but was intended to teach him to think in a coherent 
and organized manner.45 The Admiralty recognized as early as the 1860s that the 
education of officers had to be placed on a more scientific basis. Again, one of the 
problems was the conflict between the "practical" and "theoretical" education of cadets. 
This was rendered particularly problematic by the widely accepted necessity of entering 
43 PRO, Treasury Papers (T) 1111192, Admiralty to Treasury, 17 November 1909. The Admiralty attempted 
to save the career of Beatty; in the cases of Rosslyn Wemyss, Ernest Troubridge and Somerset Calthorpe-
Gough, see PRO, ADM 1/8028, Sanctioning Promotion of Certain Officers to Flag Rank, 26 June 1908. 
44 Examples included Reginald Tyrwhitt, William Goodenough and Roger Keyes. 
45 John Knox Laughton, "Scientific Instruction in the Navy," RUSI, XXVI (1882), 231. 
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officers into the service at a young age. The Shadwell Report of 1870 summed up this 
dilemma: 
It follows from this that previous school training of Cadets destined for 
the Naval Services having much more extended, they must, as a rule, 
be better grounded in all appertaining to book learning and have 
received a greater amount of mental training, must be better qualified 
to enter on more advance studies, and to improve their general and 
special education. On the other hand the system of entry at an earlier 
age, which, as a rule, has always been the practice of the British Navy, 
insures the obtaining a supply of young officers at a time when their 
minds being docile and plastic and their habits and modes of thought 
yet unformed they can be more easily inured to the peculiar habits of a 
sea life, be more accustomed to its unavoidable privations, and 
occasional hardships, be trained up in attachment to their profession, 
and be induced to adopt it heartily, as their vocation in life. Early entry 
into the Service is therefore associated with all the traditions of the 
Navy, is in accordance with its historic recollections, and is in unison 
with the general tone of feeling on the subject.46 
The struggle between these two imperatives dominated the discourse on naval 
education until after the Second World War, when the service decided to enter officer 
cadets after they had completed their secondary education. Regardless, such education 
was imperative as the Rice Committee observed: 
Both the habit of accurate reasoning, and the possession, for practical 
purposes, of considerable scientific attainments, are so important to 
naval officers, that it is most desirable they should receive, when 
young, a thorough grounding in those subjects without which a 
knowledge of the higher mathematics cannot afterwards be acquired.47 
46 BPP, "Report of the Committee on the Higher Education of Naval Officers," val. XXV, C. 203 (1870), 
844. This dilemma was apparent even before the advent of the Britannia system, see Walter Devereux, 
Suggestions for Improving the Position of the Officers of the Royal Navy with Some Remarks on the 
Constitution of the Board of Admiralty (London: Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 1855), 5. 
47 BPP, "Report of the Committee Appointed by the Admiralty to Inquire into the System of Training Naval 
Cadets on Board H.M.S. Britannia," val. XV, C. 1154 (1875), 354-355. 
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Hence, the committee could not recommend the extension of the Britannia course, since 
it would inordinately delay young men from getting their early sea service. As a result, 
subjects like History, Grammar, and Literature were eliminated from the examinations, 
although Latin was retained. 48 
In Britannia, out of a total of 35 Yz hours of instruction a first-term cadet had 1 OYz 
hours of instruction per week in mathematics, including 2 Y4 of arithmetic, three of 
algebra, 1 Yz of Euclidean geometry and 3V-t hours of trigonometry (see Table 6.2).49 
Table 6.2: Arrangement of Hours H.M.S. Britannia, 1875 
Subjects Term 1 Term2 Term3 Term 4 
Algebra 2 2 4* 4* 
Geometry 3 3 
Plane Trig 5 5 
Spherical Trig 6 6 
Charts and Instruments 3 3 
Physical Geography 2 - - -
Astronomy - 2 - -
Physical Science - - 2 2 
Geometric Drawing 1 1 - -
Steam - - 2 2 
French 4 112 4Y2 3Y2 3Yz 
Drawing 3 3 - -
History Geography and English 3 3 - -
Seamanship 3 112 3Y2 3Y2 3Yz 
Optional Studies - - 4 4 
Source: BPP, "Report of the Committee Appointed by the Admiralty to Inquire into the System of Training 
Naval Cadets on Board H.M.S. Britannia," vol. XV, C. 1154 (1875), 326; Schedule II Arrangement of 
Hours. 
Notes: In the third and fourth terms this four-course section was split between Algebra, Geometry and Plane 
Trigonometry. 
At the gunnery and torpedo schools, mathematical subjects consumed the bulk of the 
officers' attention, as Table 6.3 shows. 
48 Ibid., 355. 
49 Ibid., 354. 
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Table 6.3 - Training of Gunnery and Torpedo Lieutenants 
H.M.S. Excellent (Gunnery) 
Hour Mon Tue Wed Thurs Fri Sat 
9-12 Mathematics Mathematics Mathematics Mathematics Mathematics Mathematics 
12-1 Chemistry Physics Mathematics Physics Chemistry -
2-4 Mathematics Fortification - Fortification Mathematics -
H.M.S. Vernon (Torpedo) 
Hours Mon Tue Wed Thurs Fri Sat 
9-12 Mathematics Mathematics Mathematics Mathematics Mathematics Mathematics 
12-1 Chemistry Physics Drawing Physics Chemistry -
2-4 Physics Chemistry - Chemistry Physics -
Source: BPP, "Report of the Committee Appointed by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to 
Inquire into and Report on the Education ofNaval Executive Officers," vol. XIII, C. 4885 (1886), 331. 
The Royal Naval College at Greenwich was founded specifically to increase the 
educational qualifications of officers. As an Admiralty circular declared, "My Lords 
desire, by the establishment of the College, to give executive officers of the Navy 
generally, every possible advantage of scientific education; but no arrangement will be 
made at all prejudicing the all-important practical training in the active duties of their 
profession."50 Given the shortcomings of the Britannia system and the attempt to teach 
mathematics and other subjects to midshipmen in the active fleet, it was found by an 
investigative committee in the 1870s that young officers were not well equipped to pass 
the difficult examination for lieutenant. Further, it became apparent that the scholastic 
skills of the acting sub-lieutenants deteriorated in the three years after they left Britannia. 
"It is unsatisfactory that these young officers, after being six years at sea, mostly under 
naval instructors, and after half-yearly examination on board ship, should have to recover 
at the College the knowledge which they carried with them when they left the 
50 BPP, "Greenwich Hospital (Royal Naval College), Admiralty Minute," vol. XLII, No. 32 (1873), 602. 
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Britannia."51 Indeed, John Knox Laughton considered that these officers' grasp of 
mathematical subjects had reached the desired level before they had entered the service. 
" . .. and as a rule they have so utterly forgotten what they have learnt in her [Britannia], 
that it would be difficult to say they ever had learnt anything."52 
This was the result of an education system that grasped only the shadow of a 
mathematical education without the substance. It is tempting to think that the service used 
this system to give only the appearance of an up-to-date education. In one sense this was 
true, since it proved difficult to demonstrate to serving senior officers (who trained young 
officers afloat) that theoretical mathematics was a worthwhile pursuit for officers. Indeed, 
much depended on the commitment of officers in the ships to support the embarked 
instructor as well as to ensure that young midshipmen received adequate schoolwork. 
Some officers were very supportive and permitted the instructor to use his day cabin for 
instruction, while others thought it more important that their young charges prove 
themselves by performing the actual duties of an officer. In particular, they believed that 
midshipmen would learn more by shadowing their superiors in the performance of their 
duties. Also, small boat work would give them practical experience of command and the 
responsibility of handling seamen. Midshipmen would often take the cue from their 
officers in how much effort was put into scholastic work. Sometimes, naval instructors 
gave up, as Admiral Dundas noted: "He [the Naval Instructor] just let us do as we liked, 
so we had school in the gunroom. We did about a half an hour's arithmetic, then decided 
51 BPP, "Report of the Conunittee Appointed to Inquire into the Establishment of the Royal Naval College, 
Greenwich," vol. XXI, C. 1733 (1877), 422. 
52 Ibid., 477; testimony of J.K. Laughton. 
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that we had had enough, cut for a cocktail all round and close the shop."53 Many officers 
throughout the century that being a schoolboy and an officer at the same time was 
unsatisfactory frequently pointed it out. Much depended on the instructor, and many 
young men were at a substantial disadvantage if their schoolwork was not up to standard. 
The logical place to begin the professional revolution of the executive officer 
corps was the elimination of the Master class of officers. Masters were the group 
originally appointed by warrant to oversee the condition of a vessel and to perform 
navigational duties in conveying a vessel from one port to another. These men often were 
highly skilled and by the middle of the nineteenth century had reached gentlemanly 
status. The Master was also a commissioned officer. 
The experience of the Navigation Branch, when combined with the experience of 
the U.S. Navy in amalgamating engineering and command functions, provided ample 
precedent for the extension of executive responsibility and the elimination of specialist 
branches of service. The virtual annexation of the Navigation line into the executive laid 
the groundwork for the Selbome Scheme of December 1902. Instead of Navigators being 
semi-executive holdovers from the seventeenth century, lieutenants and commanders (N) 
would perform their specialist tasks, much like gunnery and torpedo lieutenants. 
Originally, the Navigation specialization was performed by the Master branch, 
which was a warrant rather than a commissioned rank. There was also an incongruous · 
situation where masters were held equally responsible with the vessel's captain for the 
loss of or damage to ships running aground or in collision with other vessels . Various 
courts martial throughout the nineteenth century bear this out. While the Master class of 
53 Dundas, An Admiral's Yarn, 53. 
244 
warrant officers bore a great responsibility, they had no power and were inferior even to 
the most junior lieutenant, regardless of their experience or abilities. Also, there were 
precious few promotions to be won and little provision for retirement. Senior officers 
expressed much concern that officers relied too heavily on their masters due to imperfect 
knowledge of navigation and pilotage, and there were cases where commanding officers 
refused to put to sea in the absence of the master.54 
The Admiralty decided as a result of a committee report to abolish the specialist 
Navigation line; remaining officers would be granted naval ranks prefixed by the term 
"staff' (hence staff commander) until they gradually retired. This was done to reassure 
officers that these men, though of executive rank, were no threat to their career prospects 
and that such officers (staff commanders) were definitely subordinate to every officer of 
the rank of lieutenant and above, even though they were eligible for command. As 
Admiral W.F. Martin wrote in 1866: 
Nevertheless the other executive officers will indeed have a genuine 
grievance to complain of, if the two branches should be amalgamated. 
The additional competitors for the few prizes, for which they have 
been encouraged to hope, will swamp them. No more Admirals and 
Captains would be wanted; yet the ranks they rise from would be 
greatly increased in numbers. Of course promotions may be made to 
bear any ratio to admissions to the Service; but occupations and 
commands are limited ... The pretensions therefore of the Masters are 
not only without foundations, but with regard to other officers their 
injustice is transparent and extravagant.55 
54 BPP, "Navy Officers and Seamen - Remarks on Mr. W.S. Lindsay's paper by Rear Admiral B.J. 
Sulivan," vol. XLIV, No. 238 (1870), 706. 
55 W.F. Martin, Respecting the Abolition of the Masters as a Class of Officers in the Navy (London: 
WilliamRidgeway, 1866), 12-13. 
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Another argument that was put forward asserted that smce this function required 
specialized skill, it was best to have senior officers perform it. The problem with the best 
and brightest regular lieutenants was that they were seeking promotion so quickly after 
gaining their commission. 56 
Another argument frequently made was that by eliminating this branch, 
honourable employment would be denied for those whose means did not permit them to 
enter the quarterdeck in a regular fashion. 57 As we have seen, similar arguments were 
often heard regarding the Selbome Scheme nearly forty years later. However, the real 
reason for the proposed amalgamation was a deeply held concern that regular line officers 
were not as familiar with the duties associated with conning and navigating a ship. 
Further, if the professional duties of an executive officer included seamanship, then such 
an officer should be able to perform this duty. The Eliot Report of 1866 concluded that: 
We would remark than an opinion prevails that the system of 
entrusting the navigation and pilotage of H.M. ships to a separate class 
is apt in some degree, to engender indifference or inattention to those 
particular duties in the lieutenants and other officers of the main 
executive branch ... The usual argument is favour of the change is, that 
by throwing the work and responsibility of navigation and piloting on 
the lieutenants and other officers of that branch of service, a more 
general acquaintance with these special duties would be imparted to 
those who may subsequently be called upon to command H.M. ships, 
and that captains would become more apt and practised in those duties 
than they are at present. 58 
56 BPP, "Copy of the Report of the Admiralty Committee on the Position of Masters in the Royal Navy," 
vol. XLVII, No. 109 (1866), 183, minutes of evidence of Captain John Fulford. 
57 Ibid., 13. 
58 Ibid., 157. 
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The establishment of this line of specialist officers leaves us with some 
unanswered questions. Why was it so much simpler and painless to tum masters into line 
officers when twenty-five years later it was so much more difficult to afford similar 
treatment to engineers? First, there was a fundamental difference in role of the two. 
Navigating officers were deck officers, which meant that their duties, such as seamanship 
and ship handling, were intertwined with the primary qualification of a commanding 
officer. Navigators could be executive specialists and still retain the "eye" of a seaman 
and the practical aspects of command at sea. Indeed, after abolition ex-Masters were still 
commanding despatch and auxiliary vessels. Second, the Masters' claims for 
improvement entailed no upheaval in the paradigm of naval command. Navigation duties 
could readily be seen as part and parcel of the duties of line officers and posed no threat 
to the warrior ethic since it could not be demonstrated that navigators intended to replace 
the executive line. Third, and most important, there was no great external pressure placed 
on the Admiralty by lobby groups aimed at the improvement of navigators. This was 
entirely the opposite of the situation with the engineers. By the 1890s well funded, 
powerful engineering societies advocated the cause of naval engineers as a way of 
furthering the cause of the entire profession. 
Still, it is important to recognize that the abolition of the Navigation line was 
regretted by elements within the Navy. Captain C.C.P. Fitzgerald systematically attacked 
the abolition and set about to demolish the arguments put forward by the Eliot Committee 
during a RUSI lecture in 1901. Countering the argument about the lack of opportunity for 
high command by the navigators, Fitzgerald argued "[i]t seems ridiculous therefore to call 
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it a hardship that a man could not wm a pnze which was never offered to him."59 
Fitzgerald's comments, however, were equally directed at engineers, as he attempted to 
deconstruct the reasons for the elimination of the old Master class. The year 1901 marked 
the height of agitation for revising the terms of service for engineering officers. By 
effectively destroying the precedent, Fitzgerald sought to place a well-directed hole in the 
arguments of the agitators. 
The ultimate expression of this trend was the introduction of the new training 
scheme in December 1902 in the House of Lords by the First Lord of the Admiralty. 
Cadets intended for the three combat arms of the Royal Navy would enter through the 
same process and be trained together until they specialized as commissioned lieutenants. 
Prior to 1902, officers for all three branches entered separately. Executives passed 
through Britannia at the age of thirteen or fourteen and then went to sea, while engineers 
entered at a later age and passed through the Royal Naval Engineering College at Keyham 
in Devonport and Marine officers entered later still and were raised like army officers 
after they had had received a full public school education. Cadets intended for all three 
branches would receive a nomination from a selection committee at the age of twelve or . 
thirteen and then try a qualifying examination that would ensure that their education had 
been sufficient. All would then proceed to the new Royal Naval College at Osborne on 
the Isle of Wight for a two-year course, followed by two more years of instruction at the 
new college at Dartmouth that replaced the old Britannia. 
59C.C.P. Fitzgerald, "The Re-establishment of a Separate Navigation Line in the Royal Navy," RUSI, 
XXXV (October 1901), 1069. 
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The problem of integrating engineering into the Royal Navy had been vexing, and 
it became increasingly so as the prominence and size of that department increased 
dramatically. Various attempts were made by the Admiralty to improve the stature and 
education of these officers, such as the Cooper Key Committee of 1877 that had 
attempted to ensure that future commissioned officers in this branch would indeed be 
gentlemen. Moreover, the advent of Engine Room Artificers (E.R.A.) as a warrant rank 
during this period limited the growth of commissioned officers and permitted those who 
were left to have greater status. Nonetheless, agitation for the improvement of the stature 
of these officers had increased to such a level that Fisher and his allies realized that a 
reorientation was required. In this light it is possible to argue Fisher's scheme was not 
revolutionary at all since it merely accomplished what the officer corps had been moving 
toward for the previous forty years. Not only would executive officers be technically 
proficient in the manipulation of weapons and ships, but the same body of officers would 
effectively run the entire ship from keelson to topmast with no other profession to stand 
in its way. 
The executive and the gradual extinction of an entire class of officer had bought 
off the engineer agitation with the annexation of engineering functions. The old scheme 
entries would be phased out by 1907-1908. As one writer put it: 
One of the most remarkable feature of the engineer agitation - which 
by-the-by, has led to the new regulations - seems to have escaped the 
attention of the critics, viz. that the engineers have committed hari-
kari! They and their friends on shore have succeeded in practically 
debarring their class from entering the navy as officers, they can now 
only enter as ERAs with the off-chance of becoming officers ... 60 
60 Watchman, "The New Admiralty Scheme," The Naval and Military Record, 2 April 1903, 2; see also, 
Carylon Bellairs, "The New Naval Scheme," Brassey's Naval Annual (1903), 188-189. 
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As the author of the scheme, Fisher thought that future engineering would be greatly 
simplified because turbines and oil would lessen the size of engine-room complements 
and leave the executive in command of the entire field: 
... believe me, there is not half so much required to be a good engineer 
as to be a good gunnery or Torpedo Lieutenant. A fellow who can put 
together all the mechanism of a Whitehead Torpedo and manipulate all 
the intricacies of modem gun arrangements involving the highest 
practical and technical knowledge will find it simply child's play to 
manipulate engines and boilers of any ship in the Navy! 61 
But even from the advent of scientific education in the service there was disquiet 
about its implications and considerable back-pedalling over "theoretical" education. Four 
years after the founding of the Royal Navy College in 1877, the Gordon Committee 
postulated: 
But it must be remembered that to a large class of minds mathematical 
or analytic reasoning is entirely foreign. The use of the higher 
mathematics, especially, as a tool is never thoroughly grasped by them 
- never grasped in a form to be afterwards applied. Such minds are 
deficient in that power of abstract reasoning which the use of 
mathematical symbols implies, or they cannot attain any facility in 
their manipulation. Now, it must be admitted that the technical duties 
of a seaman and of a naval officer - if we leave out of consideration 
the more abstruse problems connected with nautical astronomy, 
navigation, shipbuilding, and gunnery, with which comparatively few 
naval officers can ever be called upon to deal - necessitate but a 
limited knowledge of mathematics, and that an intelligent 
apprehension of the principles on which the technical rules of the 
61 CCAC, Bryan Godfrey-Faussett Papers (BGGF) 2/3, Fisher to Godfrey-Faussett, 19 January 1903. 
Godfrey-Faussett was closely connected to the Prince of Wales and was used as a contact by Fisher to put 
his views across to the heir to the throne. See also D.K. Brown, The Grand Fleet: Warship Design and 
Development, 1906-1922 (London: Chatham, 1999), 22. It was found in 1908 that a destroyer equipped 
with oil ftred boilers not only offered cheaper, more powerful and more efftcient power but also halved the 
complements of engine rooms. While the coal ftred Beagle was crewed with ftfty-eight offtcers and men in 
the engineering department, the Defender required only twenty-four. 
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profession are founded may be obtained with a good knowledge of 
arithmetic, and the elements of algebra, geometry, and trigonometry. 62 
The more the naval officer corps went down the road of technical education and 
training, the more disquiet was engendered among officers. Although such concerns have 
been used as evidence of the reactionary nature of the corps, this has been distorted. 
Indeed, the officer corps was merely reflecting middle- and upper class concerns over 
whether a reliance on machinery and mechanical models could solve human problems. 
Military organizations were particularly vulnerable to this sort of thinking because of 
their reliance on the personal element and leadership in battle. From the time steam power 
and industrial processes first came to the Navy, the executive was chary about its 
implications. In particular, there was a strong reaction against the specializations. Admiral 
Kenneth Dewar argued: "Gunnery is essentially a practical and common-sense subject, 
but specialization had created vested interests and erected barriers between it and the rest 
of the Service. The gunnery schools surrounded it with a thorny zariba of theory and 
useless learning which the non-specialist could only surmount by a long and arduous 
process of initiation."63 
This disquiet was further exposed by the loud protests over the Selborne Scheme 
and the extension of the privileges of engineering specialists after the Douglas Report of 
1905. The most prominent criticism put forward in regard to the Scheme was over the 
lengthening of the education courses and the increased focus on engineering work in the 
62 BPP, "Report of the Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Establishment of the Royal Naval College, 
Greenwich," vol. XXI, C. 1733 (1877), 436. 
63 Dewar, The Navy from Within , 58. 
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colleges. Reactionaries and relatively professional individuals alike argued that the new 
Scheme was wrong in continuing to cram "useless" theory into the already over-stuffed 
brains of cadets. Moreover, contrasts were often drawn between those young men who 
had been trained in masts and sails and those who sought their experience between the 
pages of a book. Since the naval profession could not, in their view, be reduced to a 
mathematical formula, further attempts would not lead to greater efficiency. 
Indeed, the attempt to create a jack-of-all-trades was the problem, and many 
commentators thought it good if all future cadets were geniuses. The reality, however, 
was that they were not. Commander Reginald Plunkett in the first number of The Naval 
Review summed the difficulty. 
We need to produce, if possible, an almost Napoleonic type in which 
character and intellect are both trained and developed to the highest 
degree. But the difficulty is this, that character and intellect require 
totally different training, and the development of one, at all events as 
done in the present day, is often detrimental to the other. At one end of 
the scale you get, say, the Rugby international, to whom the art of war 
and quadratic equations are equally abhorrent; a good fighting man, 
but intellectually undeveloped. At the other end of the scale you get 
the eminent professor, who is an expert in differential calculus, but 
perhaps has no more character than a sheep. 64 
Moreover, a mind crammed with facts that had been shaped by rote was less 
efficient than a mind that had not been so stuffed. 65 Another commentator argued, 
"Slowly, but surely, a spirit of critical intelligence is arising that demands better direction, 
less lost time and motion, greater work economy."66 Another noted "[t]here is also the 
64 R. Plunkett, ''Naval Education," Naval Review, I (1913), 26-27. 
65 Ibid., 29. 
66 K.G.B. Dewar, "The Training ofNaval Officers," Naval Review, I (1913), 313. 
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insidious and well-known danger, that continuous work with machinery and material 
militates against the development of certain faculties which are essential for command."67 
A third opined that "[t]he last generation set up a system ofpsuedo-scientific education as 
the great cure-all, this generation pins its faith to engineering and comforts itself with the 
shibboleth that every officer must be an engineer."68 
As we have seen, the officer corps gradually moved toward the modem 
conception of professionalism with selection, promotion and education based on visible 
qualifications. A stable career pattern based on stages of training and qualification had 
been put forward, and the basis of promotion had undergone a revolution. Officers could 
now generally expect to serve a dozen or so years as lieutenants before advancement, and 
specific duties were closely associated with promotion. Examining officer records that 
increasingly included items such as inventions and technical innovations can see that 
specialist training and special skills were highly regarded.69 
The greater the technical advance of the industrialized Navy, the greater the depth 
and attention of executive officers. Performance on examinations and excellence in 
routine functions became of paramount importance. There seemed to be less and less 
room for independence of character and thought as officers conformed to the same set of 
assumptions and the same criteria to obtain advancement. 
However, there was considerable uncertainty about and suspicion of "theory," and 
the corps seemed unwilling to buy into the notion of technical education. The result was a 
67 
"Letter to the Editor: The Training ofNaval Officers," Naval Review, I (1913), 281. 
68 Dewar, "The Training ofNaval Officers," 306. 
69 PRO, ADM 196/45, Service Record of Admiral Sir Reginald Drax. 
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mixture of systems that did neither very satisfactorily. For all the attention lavished on the 
idea of individual character and practical experience, Andrew Gordon showed that most 
officers seemed satisfied with mechanistic patterns and felt constrained from asking too 
many difficult questions.70 Even with the advent of modem history, as we will see in the 
next chapter, officers were not convinced. 
70 Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command (London: John Murray, 
1996), 595-596. 
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Chapter VII 
History as a Tool for Control 
It is now accepted with naval and military men who study their 
profession that history supplies the raw materials from which they 
are to draw their lessons, and reach the working conclusions. Its 
teachings are not, indeed, pedantic precedents; but they are the 
illustrations of living principles. Alfred Thayer Mahan 1 
A man cannot get on without his heart, but we do not dethrone the 
brain from its functions of thinking and planning, will and volition, 
nor is it likely that we are going to undermine the directive power 
of the navy because the heart of a ship is mechanism. 2 
History, as we are well aware, often serves to reinforce existing forms of social power. 
Longevity of institutions and their "historic" place in a community are frequently 
sufficient to secure continued existence despite social and political change. The survival 
of monarchies, which have outlived their original political function in Europe and 
elsewhere, are cases in point. Further, the historical record can be distorted to blend 
history and mythology to provide legitimacy for institutions and the continued status and 
authority of social groups. While a deliberate falsification of the record is easily detected, 
the subtle influence of power still plays a dominant role in prioritizing fields investigated 
and deeming what is worthy of being evaluated. On the surface, the "scientific" history of 
the nineteenth century asserted its adherence to objective truth, but self-imposed 
limitations on the avenues of inquiry narrowed the focus and served the interests of 
entrenched political and social power. 
1 A.T. Mahan, From Sail to Steam: Recollections of Naval Life (New York: Harper & Row, 1907), 282. 
2 Carylon Bellairs, "The Navy and the Engineer," Monthly Review, VII (June 1902), 37. 
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As it developed at the end of the nineteenth century, its practitioners deliberately 
placed naval history as a servant of the existing social and political arrangements with the 
Royal Navy. By asserting its search for historical "principles" and by making claims of 
objectivity in the examination of past conflicts, it reinforced the power of the executive 
elite. The power of command and the authority of the commander were emphasized by 
asserting the vital importance of decisive battle and claiming that the very existence of the 
state might depend on the throw of metaphorical dice on the day of Armageddon. 
Moreover, this history focussed on the power of the state and the importance of policy. 
As Commander Alfred C. Dewar argued: 
[i]t is the function then of naval and military history to emphasize that 
he will not have an opportunity of testing his theories unless he 
remains master in his own house. Schleswig-Holstein was averse to 
militarism and now supplies soldiers to fight for the militarists of 
Prussia. The war history of a nation is an essential part of its 
d . 3 e ucatwn ... 
All other factors and personnel were to be strictly subordinated to the will of the 
commander, thus enhancing the social and political power of the executive branch as the 
only segment of the Navy competent to carry out those functions. As Dewar argued in 
1917, "[t]he object of history should be in the first place to assist the statesman and the 
departments of state. In another aspect, naval history is the station bill of the navy."4 
History, as the Navy's station bill, told everyone that their position was subordinate to the 
commander. 
3 A. C. Dewar, The Significance of Naval History (Rams gate: S.R. Wilson, 1916), 3-4. 
4 Great Britain, Public Record Office (PRO), Board of Education Papers (ED) 12/305, A.C. Dewar, "On 
Certain Aspects of Organisation" (1917), 18-19; see also, National Maritime Museum (NMM), K.G.B. 
Dewar Papers (DEW) 4/ Pt II, Lecture on Historical Method, 6 June 1919. 
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Moreover, this "scientific" history gave legitimacy to the power and position of 
the executive in its claims to leadership by demonstrating that such assertions had an 
"objective" foundation. Since arguments for executive dominance based on traditional 
seamanship, class or social position were increasingly insecure, a scientific basis for 
command was most welcome. At the same time, this "scientific" approach allowed 
conceptual space for the intangibles of character and the spiritual aspect of command.5 
The result was the best of both worlds: the authority of the executive was enhanced, and 
yet the freedom of initiative and the intangible aspects of personal character were not 
diminished. History as both a science and an art was an immensely powerful tool to 
reinforce existing social relationships within the service and to assert the legitimacy of the 
line officer corps in its continued dominance of the naval establishment. 
As a subsidiary aspect, this history was used to educate younger officers not only 
to acquire the power of command but also to reinforce their self-confidence in an age of 
profound social and technological change. The best example of this can be seen clearly in 
Jon Sumida's recent analysis of the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan, where Sumida 
effectively demonstrates the importance Mahan placed on combining art and science to 
educate future officers for the United States Navy.6 It is clear that reinforcing these 
traditional values in a coherent and intellectually respectable fashion would confirm the 
leadership of the corps and ensure its legitimacy in the wider world. Indeed, this modern 
5 Alfred T. Mahan, "The Writing of History," Atlantic Monthly, XCI (March 1903), 289. Indeed, Mahan 
draws close comparisons of the moral imperatives of religion with the construction of historical principles. 
"To communicate to others that which one's self has acquired, be it much or little, be it money or any other 
form of human possession, is not only a power, but a duty." 
6 Jon Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer 
Mahan Reconsidered (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). See also, Mahan, "Writing of 
History," 292-293. 
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approach was especially important when such officers were required to interact with other 
government departments. Through the agency of history, officers were to be trained to 
hold their own as professional sea officers and to learn to attack contemporary problems 
coherently and consistently. As the naval officer and historian Captain Herbert Richmond 
wrote in a private letter, "I have no desire to make Historians of Naval Officers; but I 
have every desire that Naval Officers should be capable of using history in an intelligent 
manner, understanding how to analyse it, what is applicable and what is not. Mere 
archaeological history is of no interest to me."7 
On the other hand, "objective" history and expounding the principles of command 
could be, and often were, regarded as threats to the independence of individual senior 
officers because their conduct, whether on manoeuvres or in actual operations, would be 
exposed to criticism not merely by their seniors but also by a collection of comparatively 
junior and highly educated officers who lacked the experience or rank to fill positions of 
high command themselves. 8 The problem was that there were many officers and civilians 
who took the Navy's interest in scientific investigations of the past seriously and went in 
directions that were distinctly uncomfortable. Moreover, this approach opened the 
7 NMM, DEW 34/, Richmond to Dewar, 10 January 1911. See also C.R. Markham, "On the Advantage of 
Forming Collections at Greenwich with a View to Supplying the Means of Studying the Origin and Gradual 
Development of Various Branches of Naval Science," Journal of the Royal United Services Institution 
(RUSI), XXXV (1891), 281. "The faculty of imagination, more or less developed, and more or less 
cultivated, exists in the mind of almost every human being. There can be no wisdom in neglecting or -
ignoring it. In the education of a naval Officer it is serviceable in assimilating the teachings of naval history. 
It not only arouses feelings of emulation, and of love for a noble profession, it also excites a thirst for 
knowledge which will not fail to seek satisfaction by study, but which can never be quenched." 
8 PRO, Admiralty Papers (ADM) 203/69, Indeed, Captain E. Astley-Rushton warned budding staff officers 
to beware of how they disagreed with their chief. "We are very careful to make the point that too frequent 
disagreement means loss of influence. Everyone tires of the man who is always taking the opposite view." 
Also, W.C.H. Snell, "A Few Remarks on Naval Strategy," RUSI, XXXI (1887), 57. Lieutenant Snell was 
very careful to assuage those who "will consider it presumptuous for an Officer of my standing to write on _ 
a subject so important." 
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possibility of criticism by junior officers through the press or in the pages of The Naval 
Review after its founding in 1913; it also laid the foundations of the naval war staff in the 
Admiralty that would centralize command, training and doctrine. The most extreme forms 
of staff advocacy were the schemes advanced by the Dewar brothers, Kenneth and Alfred, 
which would threaten to reduce command to a form of "scientific management" 
comparable to that of large industrial enterprises. 9 
Historical Principles 
They think of me as a historian only, and don't know my views, nor 
why I study History. They can't see that I use it as a means of learning 
something about strategy, and not as an end itself- in fact, that I am 
very adverse from teaching History, but want it studied as a mental 
gymnastic ... 10 - Rear Admiral Herbert Richmond 
Extracting lessons from history was not a new idea. Indeed, Roman historians had 
illustrated the importance of ideals through studying the history of the Republic. The 
ancient Hebrews were admonished through the scriptures to recognize the vital 
importance of their relationship to Jehovah. In Renaissance Florence, Machiavelli 
deduced principles from the past to compile a treatise for rulers. And in sixteenth-century 
Italy Montecouli devised a way to deduce principles of military conduct that would 
9 PRO, ED 12/305, "On Certain Aspects of Organisation." See also K.G.B. Dewar, "Executive Command 
and Staff in Naval Warfare," Naval Review, I (1913), 40; "The principles of modem military command are 
of the greatest importance to naval officers, because they are equally applicable to their own service. In 
preparing for anything so uncertain as war on the sea, a great deal of work and energy must always be 
misdirected, and anything that reduces wastage and misapplication, increases the amount of useful work to 
a far greater extent than anything that merely adds to the stock of existing energy." See also A. C. Dewar, 
"The Re-organisation of the Naval Staff, 1917-1919" Naval Review, IX (1921), 185. 
10 Arthur J. Marder (ed.), Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1952), 359. 
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ensure that those who commanded military forces would have a deeper understanding of 
the nature of war. 11 
What was different about the historical principles of the late nineteenth century 
was their marriage to positivist science and the argument that such principles were valid 
regardless of time and place. The unique nature of historical events and their context 
became irrelevant to the men who devised military strategy: history ironically became 
ahistorical in order to serve the ends of military and naval leadership. Alexander the 
Great, Horatio Nelson, Stonewall Jackson or Lord Kitchener could be compared without 
considering the changing circumstances of over two thousand years. Hence, Mahan did 
not bother to attempt to deal with naval warfare before 1660, and Colomb dismissed pre-
seventeenth century seaborne warfare as mere "cross-ravaging" that was not naval at al1. 12 
Since history was intended to provide lessons for the modem warrior, there was little 
concern with understanding the limitations of administrative capacity or any cultural 
constraints that limited the choices available to pre-modem leaders. 
Naval history thus focussed increasingly on the importance of the decisive battle 
because that was where the "principles of war" were most obvious. The importance of 
concentrating force at a decisive point; the centrality of the offensive; the imperative of 
securing lines of communication; and the necessity of having clear objectives were all 
illustrated through studying battles. A cursory reading of Mahan, combined with a lack of 
thought about naval war, convinced officers that naval preparations and staff work were 
11 Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001 ), 15-26. 
12 Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (1890, New York: Dover 
Publications, 1987), 90; and P.H. Colomb, Naval Warfare: Its Ruling Principles and Practice Historically 
Treated (1891, 2 vols., Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), I, 22. 
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mere clerical functions that were necessary only to prepare the ground for the entrance of 
the "great man." In the Royal Navy, what staff system existed before 1912 merely 
collated information from the Intelligence Department and the Mobilization Division. 
Once the fleet had been mobilized and dispatched, no one was quite sure what to do with 
it. 13 As Fisher wrote in 1902: "For fear of our plans leaking out, we make no plans at all! 
(That's the plain truth!) 'Wait till the time comes' is the motto, and the 'time will come' 
(like the Day of Judgment!) all of a sudden, and there will be no time then for repentance 
or anything else!"14 Further, performance on the field ofbattle emphasized the aspects of 
command that fit in well with the traditional claims of officers that the spiritual and 
intangible dimensions were what mattered. If the goal of naval power was, as Sir 
Reginald Custance believed, to overthrow the power of the enemy through battle, the 
importance of the command element was maintained and extended. 15 
The principles of war legitimized the executive branch by reassuring the general 
public that naval officers grasped the essential nature of their profession and were fit to 
lead the naval establishment. This was particularly important in Britain around the turn of 
the century. In the fmal quarter of the century it became readily apparent that Britain had 
lost its commanding lead as the foremost industrial power. Moreover, the "new 
imperialism" in the 1880s was characterized both by a dramatic increase in the naval 
13 Marder (ed.), Portrait of an Admiral, 92. In discussion with Richmond, Churchill said that "[n]ow that we 
have our war, the next thing is to decide how we are going to carry it on.'" 
14 Churchill College, Cambridge, Archives Centre (CCAC), J.A. Fisher Papers (FISR) 113/95, Fisher to 
Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, 16 March 1902. 
15 Reginald Custance, War at Sea: Modern Theory and Ancient Practice (London: Blackwoods, 1918), 3; 
"The end or military aim is primarily to destroy, or to disarm, or to neutralise the action of the enemy's 
armed force , whether on land, at sea, or in the air." 
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strength of other significant powers and overseas imperial expansiOn of countries as 
diverse as the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Japan and Belgium. All these 
nations save the latter built powerful navies that were potential strategic threats to British 
communications and commerce, if not to the home islands themselves. Maintaining the 
larger fleet after the passage of the Naval Defence Act increased the level of funding for 
the Royal Navy and expectations about its performance. Periodic war scares emphasized 
that the traditional doctrine of the Navy might not be enough to preserve the 
independence of the United Kingdom. As early as the 1840s politicians and publicists was 
argued that the battle fleet was no longer a sufficient strategic defence of the home islands 
once steam bridged the channel and led to the construction of vastly expensive 
fortifications around the coast. 16 In addition, novels and serials routinely dealt with 
overseas invasions. One was Erskine Childers' The Riddle of the Sands, in which 
yachtsmen accidentally stumbled across a German invasion fleet preparing to assault 
Britain. 17 In essence, a doctrine (or at least a justification) had to be developed to reassure 
the public that naval defence was the same as it had always been. 
Historically derived strategic principles of the kind postulated by A.T. Mahan, 
P.H. Colomb and Julian Corbett provided a partial antidote to such pressures. Claiming 
that strategic principles derived from historical study were immutable and eternal, they 
attacked the pre-occupation with technologies that appeared to threaten the very basis of 
naval power. The advent of mines, torpedoes and submarines threatened the 
16 Donald M . Schurman, The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 
1867-1914 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 17-19. 
17 Erskine Childers, The Riddle of the Sands: A Record of Secret Service Recently Achieved (1903; reprint, 
New York: David McKay Co., 1977). 
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comparatively vulnerable capital ship. 18 In particular, British battleships with slow-firing 
heavy guns were easy targets for the fast and handy torpedo boat. Steam-powered fleets, 
while no longer at the mercy of the wind, were now more heavily dependent on a ready 
supply of coal and other supplies. Wireless and cable telegraphy overturned many of the 
older command arrangements. In other words, history, at least on the surface, had few 
lessons to teach naval officers because the operation of fleets and the function of officers 
had undergone such rapid and irreversible transformations. As Fisher wrote to Joseph 
Chamberlain in 1900: 
As regards the naval war, "history is a record of exploded ideas," 
because steam and wireless telegraphy have changed all the 
conditions. . . The central episode of the greatest naval battle ever 
fought was that of Nelson in the very climax of Trafalgar. .. He was 
walking up and down the quarterdeck of the Victory having a yam 
with his Captain! He had got his ships alongside those of the enemy 
and nothing more to do, and then it became the sailors' battle, but now 
it's the Admiral's battle. All is worked from the conning tower. You 
press a button and off go the torpedoes. Another electrical signal fires 
the guns and third works the engines, and so on, and the sailors know 
but little of what is going to happen next, and therefore the "teachings 
of history'' have no value for us ... 19 
Even Alfred Thayer Mahan when he began his famous Influence series wondered about 
the possible uses of naval history to modem officers: 
When I was first asked to lecture on Naval History at our War College, 
I proposed to myself at once the question, 'How shall I make the 
experience of wooden sailing ships, with their pop-guns useful in the 
naval present?' The first reply was: 'By showing the tremendous 
18 See, James Goldrick, "The Problems of Modem Naval History," in John B. Hattendorf (ed.), Doing 
Naval History: Essays Toward Improvement (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1994), 14. 
19 Arthur J. Marder (ed.), Fear God and Dread Nought: The Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord 
Fisher of Kilverstone (3 vols., London: Jonathan Cape, 1952), II, 165, Fisher to Joseph Chamberlain, 10 
November 1900. See also, CCAC, M.P.A. Hankey Papers (HNKY) 4/7, Viscount Esher to Hankey, 15 
March 1915. 
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influence Naval Power, under whatever form, has exerted upon the 
Course of History;' the second, as I went on with my studies was: 'By 
showing that the leading principles of war received illustration in the 
old naval experience, just as they did in land warfare under all its 
various phases during the past twenty-five centuries. ' 20 
The study of history was thus a way of imposing order on the changed 
circumstances and of regulating and controlling policy. Further, it asserted that 
technological determinism could not be an effective basis for naval power and that policy 
had to conform to political and strategic needs. These principles of war continue to have 
currency even in the modem world; indeed, the works of Corbett and Colomb are still in 
print and have inspired a spate of contemporary treatises on naval strategy that are still 
rooted in history. 21 
What was the nature of these principles of war? They were held to be of universal 
application, and commentators such as Colomb went so far as to describe them as 
"immutable laws."22 Yet many officers were distinctly uncomfortable with the word 
"law" because it tended to reduce the importance of human judgement and because the 
intellectual exercise of thinking through the application of principles was their crucial 
contribution. Historical study and imagination were to be disciplined by thinking through 
the various situations with which past commanders were faced. Using the case method as 
20 Robert Seager and Doris Maguire (eds.), The Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan (3 vols., 
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1975), II, 9; Mahan to W.H. Henderson, 5 May 1890. 
21 For an example, see Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 1986); and James F. Dunnigan, How to Make War: A Comprehensive Guide to Modern Warfare for 
the Post-Cold War Era (3rd Edition, New York: William Morrow & Co., 1993), 16-21; and Colin Gray, 
Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History (London: Frank Cass, 
2002), 9. 
22 Colomb, Naval Warfare, I, 39. 
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advocated by the German staff school system (and modem business schools), the officer 
would learn to apply principles of action instinctively and to use his judgement 
confidently in stressful and urgent situations. 23 In other words, commonplace phrases like 
"concentration of force," "security" and "economy of force" were not to be memorized or 
become dogma that would compel officers to conform rigidly to clockwork actions. To do . 
so, officers such as Herbert Richmond argued, was the great mistake of the eighteenth 
century, when the Fighting Instructions had imposed a tactical straight-jacket on British 
admirals which led to indecisive actions in the great wars against the French. 24 "Those 
who view tactics as a kind of glorified target practice, in which they have merely to 
follow the track of the next ahead, suffer from a lack of imagination. Their stereotyped 
plans will be quickly paralysed by the insistent and violent threat of death, and they will 
be very liable to rout and panic on realising their mistake and consequent lack of 
training. "25 
Historical principles, then, were not useful exclusively to the commander-in-chief 
or to the admiral commanding a fleet. Instead, it was useful for all executive officers to 
have a grasp of strategy and tactics to enable them to use their own professional 
judgement in situations where obeying orders would be detrimental and there was no time 
to consult higher authority. Training in judgement and initiative was to provide a more 
effective substitute for the loss of sail training that supposedly ingrained independence of 
23 K.G.B. Dewar, "Executive Command and Staff in Naval Warfare- I," Naval Review, I (1913), 36-37. 
24 Dewar, Significance of Naval History. In more recent years, this judgement has been subjected to 
considerable revision; see John Creswell, British Admirals of the Eighteenth Century: Tactics in Battle 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1972); and N .A.M. Rodger, "Image and Reality in Eighteenth-Century Naval 
Tactics," Mariner 's Mirror, LXXXIX, No. 3 (2003), 280-296. 
25 K.G.B. Dewar, "Executive Command and Staff in Naval Warfare- III," Naval Review, II (1914), 2. 
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action and quickness of resource. In this way it represented a great advance over the 
previous preoccupation with mundane ship management. This training also was intended 
by leading reformist officers and their allies to be for every executive officer. Each officer 
would be able to exercise his own initiative, while those unfit to do so would be sidelined. 
What was intended was a form of "orderly chaos" where judgement would conform to 
certain norms and expectations but would not unduly deprive the officer of bounded 
initiative. In other words, the principles that derived from history would gel into doctrine 
that would animate the entire executive branch but not tie it to a few "buzz" words that 
were imperfectly understood.26 
History and derived principles were effectively encapsulated in Corbett's Some 
Principles of Maritime Strategy and its precursor, the so-called "Green Pamphlet." 
Relying on his vast historical knowledge, Corbett stripped maritime warfare to its 
theoretical foundations by exploring the various methods to achieve strategic goals 
through the use of naval power. Moreover, he provided the language of command to 
British policy makers and officers and defined that lexicon in a coherent fashion. Terms 
such as "major and minor strategy'' and "concentration of force" were all reconsidered. 
This re-examination forced officers to rethink the aphorisms that appeared to be based on 
nothing more than analogies to the experience of a foxhunt or the parade ground.27 
Historical study, as we have seen above, was not undertaken for its own sake but 
was to serve professional goals that not only would make the officer corps more effective 
26 Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 
xxix; and Marder ( ed. ), Portrait of an Admiral, 48-49. 
27 CCAC, CHAR 13/12, Churchill to H.H. Asquith, 15 August 1913. 
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and efficient but also remove doubt about the professional competence of naval officers. 
In his attempt to cajole officers into a consideration of the use of strategic theory in the 
execution of their duties, Corbett wrote: 
The truth is that the mistrust of theory arises from a misconception of 
what it is that theory claims to do. It does not pretend to give the 
power of conduct in the field; it claims no more than to increase the 
effective power of conduct. Its main practical value is that it can assist 
a capable man to acquire a broad outlook whereby he may be the surer 
his plan shall cover all the ground, and whereby he may with greater 
rapidity and certainty seize all the factors of a sudden situation. 28 
In other words, the purpose of such study was to enhance the power of command and to 
ensure that the professional task of the officer corps - the planning and execution of war 
plans - was performed in the most effective fashion. These principles, when combined, 
digested and organized into strategic and tactical doctrine (NOT dogma), would enable 
the officer corps to act as a single community animated with the same spirit as Nelson and 
his band of brothers. Although officers like Custance were suspicious of doctrine imposed 
from above (especially one that seemed to eschew battle, as did Corbett's), others 
regarded it as necessary as long as checks were introduced to encourage officers to think 
through the issues. 29 
Also, since military decisions were required to be much more rapid and often 
could be based only on a partial view of the situation, historically-minded officers 
considered it imperative that certain operational "rules" were followed to ensure the 
28 Corbett, Some Principles, 3-4. 
29 PRO, Cabinet Papers (CAB) 1/31, part III, "Remarks on the Report of Admiral Slade's Committee on the 
War College," 1913. Custance argued, "But what if the thought is not sound? In that case will not the 
College prepare defeat rather than victory?" 
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accomplishment of the strategic object. Since this was the case, and since many situations 
could not be easily corrected once a decision had been made, A. C. Dewar argued: 
Great stress is therefore placed on the word of command and on 
authority, not because officers are obsessed with the idea of discipline, 
but because discipline is necessary in times of crisis and in war. This 
tradition of the importance of smartness and of authority (a tradition 
essential to the highest human efficiency whether in peace or war) is 
nursed in the fighting services because it is essential to success in 
war.3o 
Standardized doctrine also served to ensure that the attention of the high command was 
directed toward issues in proportion to their importance. The best use was to be made of 
both men and materiel. "In preparing for anything so uncertain as war on the sea, a great 
deal of work and energy must always be misdirected, and anything which reduces 
wastage and misapplication, increases the amount of useful work to a far greater extent 
than anything which merely adds to the stock of existing energy."31 
Historically based principles were of great significance to the executive officer 
corps. First of all, such work demonstrated that the experience of the Royal Navy prior to 
the advent of steam and torpedoes was relevant to the predicament that Britain faced at 
the turn of the century. As Mahan argued in The Influence of Sea Power upon History in 
1890, while the application of strategic and tactical thought were profoundly affected by 
changes in technology, the essential truths of handling military forces to carry out their 
functions were unaltered. 32 At the same time that Mahan asserted that some aspects of 
30 Dewar, Significance of Naval History, 1-2. 
31 K.G.B. Dewar, "Executive Command and Staff in Naval Warfare," Naval Review, I (1913), 40. 
32 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 9. 
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strategic thought were immutable, naval affairs became relatively stable. Once the basic 
outline of the battleship, cruiser and destroyer forces were shown to reprise the former 
roles accorded to the ship-of-the-line, the frigate and the gunboat, the strategic and 
tactical function of each element as defined by Corbett could be effectively integrated 
into a general theory of maritime warfare. 33 
Modem British naval officers were the heirs of Nelson and of a tradition that 
stretched back several centuries. When the experience of officers in previous wars was 
made relevant to the present, it only reinforced their importance. These experiences 
provided more than mere idols to be worshipped, they were invaluable resources in the 
"scientific" investigation of the nature of command. Furthermore, the emphasis on the 
human aspect of war, even in a highly technical environment, was considered the most 
important lesson. In addition, the relevance of this material tended to reverse the 
"narrowing" of the professional environment caused by the corps' adaptation to its new 
environment in the second half of the century. Many justifications of the authority of the 
officer corps in the 1870s and 1880s rested on the technical skills of handling a warship 
under sail. Indeed, one of the things most admired about Admiral Sir Gerard Noel, the 
persistent advocate of sail training, was that he was the last officer to sail an ironclad into 
an anchorage in the face of an adverse wind, tacking no fewer than thirteen times in rapid 
succession. In the same way, the best and brightest officers quickly realized that the most 
rapid avenue of advancement was specialization in either the torpedo or gunnery branches 
that were highly mathematical and scientific in their approach. For instance, the gunnery 
school at H.M.S. Excellent was particularly suspect since it was associated with mindless 
33 Corbett, Some Principles. 
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drill coupled with mathematical study of very little use aboard ship.34 Moreover, as 
described in chapter IV, officers at sea became more specialized and more engrossed in 
their daily professional duties in order to ensure that their division or ship would win the 
approval of their superiors. Even the technical training pushed through by Fisher and 
Percy Scott after the turn of the century seemed devoted to a mechanistic and unrealistic 
form of battle practice that demonstrated only the skill of gunnery lieutenants and gun 
crews to hit floating targets.35 
The training of officers seemed to direct them down a narrow path, a problem 
with which every education committee had struggled. As the training of the naval officer 
became more technical and specialized, and since the general education of an officer 
essentially ended at the age of twelve or thirteen, many officers feared that connections to 
the broader British society, particularly that segment that made decisions, would be lost. 36 
In the words of Commander Reginald Plunkett, "[i]nstead of the brain being an active and 
productive machine, a thing of vast constructive power, we try to make it a cross between 
a museum and a lost property office."37 The power of expression and the capacity to 
argue cogently about state policy and naval strategy could only be imparted by a liberal 
education. Naval officers, if trained in history, would be in a strong position to be the 
vital links between political decisions and executive actions, in the process justifying their 
34 K.G.B. Dewar, The Navy from Within (London: Gollancz, 1939). In marked contrast, the torpedo school 
H.M.S. Vernon was much more relaxed; see E.N. Poland, The Torpedomen: H.M.S. Vernon's Story, 1872-
1986 (London: E.N. Poland, 1993), 26. 
35 For a contemporary view of this problem, see St. Barbara, "Fool Gunnery in the Navy," Blackwood's, 
CLXXXIII (February 1908), 308-316. 
36 Dewar, The Navy from Within, 13-19; PRO ADM 116/1288, Custance Committee on Edcuarion, 585. 
37 R.Plunkett, "Naval Education," Naval Review, I (1913), 28. 
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dominance on the Board of Admiralty. In the opemng article of The Naval Review, 
Captain H.W. Richmond wrote that "[a] lawyer, in reply to an officer who cut short an 
argument on naval policy and could only be understood by a naval officer, said: 'I am a 
lawyer, sir, and we lawyers make it our boast that we can understand anything, provided 
it is intelligently explained. "'38 
Indeed, even the traditional professional justifications of seamanship and the 
handling of ships of war were to be secondary to the art of command derived from 
history. 
The struggle between the military and nautical sides - between the 
conduct of war and seamanship- has always existed, and in the nature 
of things must ever continue. During peace, war is usually forgotten, 
and seamanship assumes undue importance. The conduct of war then 
becomes predominant, and seamanship is found to be only a necessary 
and important handmaid, of which men learn to take what is 
essential. 39 
The apparent incapacity of the officer corps to fulfil the function of strategic forethought, 
as evidenced by Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson's dreadful performance before the Committee 
of Imperial Defence at the peak of the Agadir Crisis of 1911, forced politicians to ram 
through changes in the composition of the Admiralty with the institution of a naval 
staff.40 History also contributed to the efficiency of the corps when it regularized and 
38 H.W. Richmond, "Introductory," Naval Review, I (1913), 14. 
39 [R. Custance], "The Naval Officer: Past and Future," Blackwood's, CLXXVIII (December 1905), 735. 
40 When the two service chiefs were called before the Committee of Imperial Defence to discuss available 
options in the event that France and Germany went to war, the Army presented a lucid and realistic plan for 
the deployment of a force to the continent. On the other hand, Admiral Wilson's scheme was best described · 
as incoherent. 
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smoothed out the process of collecting, processing and applying information that could 
make the difference between operational successes and failures. 
Hence, history provided a relevant, practical and authoritative basis for the 
reconstruction of the executive officer corps because it could be used to advocate and 
defend policy while also providing flexibility to commanders. A scientific system of 
command and scientific principles of war also served to keep other professions at bay. If 
the ultimate goal of naval warfare was to win battles, the continuation of executive 
dominance was not merely advisable but necessary. Indeed, the principles of command 
and the employment of technology had to be kept separate. As Herbert Richmond wrote 
of the courses at the War College before the war: 
A great wave is at present in progress, due largely to the writings of 
Corbett, and to discussions at the War College. A new view of what 
war really means is taking shape. Men are beginning to see that it's not 
just a simple matter of one fleet forming a line ahead & fighting 
another fleet; and that victory does not necessarily lie with the biggest 
ship, the heaviest armed one of the most numerous fleet. 41 
While recognizing their importance, this view also placed the technical sciences 
into an intellectual framework that not only required a broader context but also defined 
those who practised them as subordinates. By providing an intellectual construct that 
asserted the relevance of the experiences of the great commanders of the age of sail, the 
cultural and intellectual traditions of the command function could be shown to be decisive 
in producing the great victories that established the reputation of the Royal Navy. 
Methods of propulsion were of secondary importance, as Admiral Sir Reginald Custance 
explained: 
41 NMM, RIC 7/1, Richmond to W.H. Henderson, 23 July 1913. 
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The working of the sails or machinery is entirely secondary to 
questions which govern the fighting- to tactics, to strategy, to the 
discipline and spirit of the crews, and, in fact, to all that is embraced 
under the general term, "conduct of war." In these fundamental matters 
the change in the motive power has not introduced any alteration in 
. . 1 42 pnnc1p es. 
Seamanship no longer legitimized the executive branch but instead was subordinated to 
command. Strategy, tactics and the "higher" aspects of the naval profession were offered 
as replacements. The intellectual foundation for these aspects was history itself. By 
examining the records of the past, historians could provide a means for a redefinition of 
naval command. 
The difficulty was convincing other officers of naval history's importance. The 
first problem was persuading them that it was more than mere propaganda that could 
buttress imperial policy and enhance naval estimates. The enormous technological 
changes that were occurring during this period raised questions about the experience of 
previous generations. Warships were no longer powered by sail but were now dependent 
on a steady supply of coal. Moreover, highly professional and skilled engineers in any 
case managed them. Naval warfare was also more intense, and technological appliances 
bore little relation to anything that had existed even in the previous half century. As for 
the ships themselves, they were often obsolete only ten years after they had been 
completed. For instance, H.M.S. Dreadnought, the first all-big-gun battleship, was · 
completed in 1906, was obsolete by 1918 and had already been superseded by two 
generations of capital ships, with yet another generation on the stocks. 
42 (R.Custance] , "Naval Education," Blackwood 's, CLXXVITI (October 1905), 447. 
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Furthermore, naval officers were concerned primarily with what they considered 
"practical;" training or education that smacked of theory was suspect unless an obvious 
utility could be discerned. On the other hand, applied mathematics and applied sciences 
demonstrated that the executive branch was modernising itself and was in the running to 
keep engineers out of matters connected directly to the employment of weapons. 
Specialist officers in the gunnery and torpedo branches were in essence the engineer 
officers of the executive line. Further, these branches were stepping-stones to promotion 
and advancement. 
The struggle to demonstrate the practicality of history as a tool for command 
began quite early. John Knox Laughton, in a lecture before the Royal United Services 
Institution, argued that 
the study of naval history ... is very much neglected by Naval Officers, 
but I find also that an idea that the history of the past contains no 
practical lessons for the future, and it is therefore merely a useless 
branch of scholarship, daily gathers strength, and is, indeed, put 
prominently forward by those, whose opinions on purely technical 
questions have a just claim to our respect. The object which I have 
now in view is, distinctly, to combat this idea; to urge the use, 
advantage, and importance to Naval Officers of the study of naval 
history; to show that it contains lessons of the gravest meaning; which 
are not to be got at without labour; to address you as reading and 
thinking men, rather than as active and energetic Officers; thought the 
qualifications necessary for the one develop and strengthen those 
which guide the other; and the intelligence cultivated by study may 
fashion itself into a living and terrible thunderbolt of war. 43 
This message, however, gained acceptance only by fits and starts, and it was a 
constant struggle to convince officers that history was a practical tool for executive 
43 J.K. Laughton, "The Scientific Study of Naval History," Journal of the Royal United Services Institution 
(RUSI), XVIII, No.79 (1874), 508. 
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officers. In the active fleets, in particular, it was difficult to convince either junior or 
senior officers of this. Herbert Richmond, for example, once engaged in a heated 
discussion with the flag captain of the Channel Squadron over the use of historical 
knowledge in evaluating strategy.44 Even after the war, an article in The Naval Review 
took the form of two officers discussing the nature of naval history and its practical 
purposes. The author assured fellow officers that historical sense could be combined with 
practical skills, "No, sir, on the contrary it is very good for the Service. For he won't be 
round-shouldered, he won't wear specs, probably he can play rugger, and at the same 
time can do quite a lot of History."45 Even at the War College, which supposedly was the 
home of historical research, one gifted officer was dismissed as "too historical" and 
concerns were expressed about his suitability for command as a result.46 Lieutenant 
General Douglas Haig, who argued that issues of practicality could only be known in 
active conflict, however, issued the trump card: 
Again, almost all aspects of the art of war are "theoretical" in time of 
peace; they only become "practical" when the actual killing begins. 
The practical man is the man with a strong imagination, able to realise 
the difference between the artificial conditions of peace and the 
(probably) real conditions of war; between the things which will 
44 Marder ( ed.), Portrait of an Admiral, 49-50. Indeed, concern over the utility of history assumed more 
general proportions. For an ironic commentary see, Mercator Anglicanus, "A Plea for the Abolition of All 
Learning," Blackwood's, CLXXVIII, No. 1072 (March 1905), 398. "History is of no service to anybody 
save to the novelist, a poor foolish creature, whose existence is just tolerable because he can send us to 
sleep after a hard day in the city." 
45 G.W.W. Hooper, "Is History any Good?" Naval Review, IX (1921), 338. 
46 PRO, ADM 203/99, Confidential Records of Officers Attending the War Course; comments were in 
reference to Lieutenant Alfred C. Dewar who attended the Spring 1908 session. 
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matter and those which will not: and who therefore concentrates his 
efforts on the former, to the exclusion of the latter.47 
Even though officers like Arthur Wilson protested that manoeuvres at sea closely 
replicated war conditions, such claims rang distinctly hollow.48 The published accounts in 
the Parliamentary Papers bore little resemblance to wartime conditions. For example, in 
the manoeuvres of 1900 one of the contending Admirals went merrily on his way 
extracting "ransoms" from various ports as he cruised around the British Isles.49 
Similarly, the battle practices of gunnery departments often consisted of dreadnoughts 
firing at targets towed sedately by warships. Yet some continued to consider the study of 
history of limited utility. 
The problem of the "practical" nature of history was exacerbated by the way in 
which history was taught at the War Course and was beginning to be taught in the Staff 
College just before the outbreak of war. History was made a small part of the curriculum 
of both courses, but much more attention was given to the study of international law and 
courts martial. Furthermore, history was taught by the lecture method, which was not the 
best way of forcing officers to think, especially when the lecturers were civilians. When 
Julian Corbett lectured at the course his reception was rather mixed.50 Although 
47 CCAC, Chartwell Papers (CHAR) 13/26, Notes on the Slade Report, February 1914, 9. See also Seager 
and Maguire (eds.), Letters and Papers of Mahan, III, 577-582, "Practical Words- An Address Delivered 
at the Naval War College," September 1892. 
48 CCAC, CHAR 20/21, Memorandum on Naval War Staff, 30 October 1911. 
49 Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers (BPP), "Naval Manoeuvres, 1897," vol. LIV, C. 8803 
(1898), 605 . 
50 Schurman, Education, 150-151, relates how Corbett's lectures had a tendency to become rather long-
winded and obscure. 
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Richmond asserted the importance of Corbett's influence on the younger generation, 
others were not so certain. One officer referred to the distinguished historian as a 
"blithering ass" and wondered why the Admiralty had not severed its ties with him.51 
More senior officers were suspicious of his close connections to Fisher and were doubly 
suspicious of his strategic doctrine, which sought to circumscribe offensive strategy and 
assigned a relatively low priority to battle. Nor did it help when he caustically described 
such a policy: "You might as well try to plan a campaign by singing 'Rule Britannia. "'52 
At a 1993 conference Peter Stanford summarized this in a single sentence: "I am afraid 
the navy thought of Corbett as the fellow who made everything so complicated and didn't 
really want us to shoot it out with the Germans."53 Richmond also noted Rear Admiral 
Henry Oliver's objection to Corbett: "This prejudice against laymen writing on naval 
subjects dies very hard, if indeed it does at all. It is responsible for a great deal of the 
lamentable strategy of this war."54 
51 CCAC, R. Drax Papers (DRAX) 1114, H. Wake toR. Plunkett, 22 October 1909. Another officer wrote in 
1911 that "[ f]or some years Mr. Corbett in the process of lecturing in the RN War College, pennitted 
himself the indulgence of offering his audience his own views on the correctness or otherwise of the 
strategy adopted by naval officers in the past. His audience had usually treated his amateur excursions ... 
goodnaturedly; nevertheless his presumption has been resented, and he has apparently been deaf to the 
polite hints thrown out to him." Quoted in Gat, History of Military Thought, 490. 
52 Eric Grove, "Introduction," to Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, xxix. 
53 Peter Stanford, "Discussion of the Papers Written by Dr. Jon Sumida and Dr. David Rosenberg," in 
James Goldrick and John Hattendorf ( eds.), Mahan is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the 
Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond (Newport, Rl: Naval War College Press, 
1993), 192. See also, CCAC, J.A. Fisher Papers (FISR) 1/3, Captain Christopher Cradock to Fisher, 9 May 
1902; "I think Mr. Corbett writes like many others- like the 'globe-trotter' who writes a book in a three 
week acquaintance with a Country and then sets himself as an Authority." 
54 Marder (ed.), Portrait of an Admiral, 156, diary entry, 26 April 1915; see also NMM, RIC 16/2, 
Commonplace Book, "The Amateur Strategist," n.d. "The professional sea officer has a superlative 
contempt of the 'amateur critic,' when subjects of strategy or tactics are under discussion and the amateur 
critic's ideas do not coincide with his own; when they do coincide, the critic is called 'this distinguished 
writer."' 
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Social and Professional Uses 
The practitioners of scientific naval history prided themselves on producing objective 
accounts of past operations in order to extract universal principles of war. To execute this 
function successfully, historians were required to be at least nominally objective. Gaining 
insights through biased or misread evidence would be counter-productive because they 
would create "false positives" that might in turn lay down false pathways. Indeed, the 
pioneers in the field warned against facile or biased interpretations on just those grounds. 
History required hard and laborious study if the correct interpretation of the past was to 
be discerned. Assertions about the accuracy of an argument could be rigorously re-
examined and perhaps even challenged on the basis of evidence that could be brought to 
bear on the question. 
The types of questions asked were not driven by archival evidence but were 
devised in response to political, social and professional requirements. What were the 
principles of war to be derived from the historical record but a means to increase the 
stature and the efficiency of the executive branch? To a great degree the only questions 
asked related to the appraisal of the actions of past executive officers in combat or to the 
connection between state policy and naval strategy. History was a tool both to educate 
young officers and to buttress the importance of the executive. 
If naval policy was about arranging and deploying forces to wm a decisive 
engagement, the command element was obviously the most vital aspect. After all, 
commanders not only organized and commanded forces in battle but also were the crucial 
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link between the political and the operational in the formulation of strategy. Here was a 
readily constructed argument for executive primacy. 
The problem with using history in this way was a number of influential 
individuals in and out of uniform appeared to ascribe far too much weight to its benefits. 
History was an interesting tool to many senior officers because it buttressed their claims 
to authority. The problem with the search for "objective" principles is that they could not 
be completely controlled by those in power since the archives could also be used to 
challenge the intellectual complacency of the officer corps and to question decisions 
taken by a commander or the Board of Admiralty. Further, as naval history became 
popular, an increasing number of people became conversant enough with it to challenge 
professional pronouncements. As well, objective truths or principles could be used to 
challenge discipline in the service. Officers who had studied history and its application to 
the art of command were a special challenge. Indeed, in early staff training great stress 
was laid upon the tact and discretion of staff officers lest they overstep their bounds. 
Admiral Sir Barry Domvile, himself an able staff officer, argued that 
they have brought evils in their train. Filled with enthusiasm, they 
have shown a tendency to organise everything they can lay their hands 
on. This has led to an over-centralisation of authority ... Why think, 
when everything is done for one by a willing Staff?55 
The emphasis on command and its exercise also served the political and social interests of 
the executive branch. Both the doctrine of decisive battle and the widely held belief that 
55 Barry Domvile, Look to Your Moat (London: Hutchinson, 1937), 228. 
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Britain's national existence was dependent on the performance of those in command on 
the bridge buttressed the executive branch's claim to supremacy. 
Thus, the naval history pioneered by Mahan and Laughton was extraordinarily 
useful for a number of reasons. First, history based on rigorous research techniques 
provided a ready-made pool of experience upon which naval officers could base their _ 
command decisions. The so-called "principles of war" derived from such research would 
enhance the power of command and make its exercise more effective and efficient. This 
was regarded as especially important, since future wars were increasingly expected to be 
quick and decisive. Moreover, the fate of the nation might ride on the performance of the 
officer corps. 
Second, naval history placed command on a scientific basis and, along with the 
use of the developing social sciences, contributed to making the pretensions of the 
executive intellectually respectable.56 Arguments based on aristocratic privilege or social 
stature were no longer sufficient. If command could be tied to principles of behaviour it 
would be provided with yet another form of legitimacy. 
Third, history, as did command, could bridge the gap between the sciences and the 
humanities. As the navy became atomized into various specializations, there was a danger 
that individual character and initiative would become irrelevant. Teaching historically-
based principles could help to provide conceptual space that acknowledged the 
contribution of individual officers. Moreover, it legitimized personal development for 
both senior and junior officers. The staff system was an attempt to institutionalize a blend 
of art and science directly into the command structure in the Admiralty and afloat. Staff 
56 For an example of this, seeR. Plunkett, "The Psychology of War," Naval Review, I (1913). 
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officers were expected to use their training and intellectual capacity to think through 
problems, develop their own opinions and present them rationally and coherently. 
Finally, historically derived justifications for the command element helped to 
assert the power of the executive vis-a-vis its professional competitors. If the goal of 
naval power was the decisive battle, the executive was the only branch qualified for 
command. Moreover, with the historical/intellectual school's influence, materiel was 
reduced to being merely the means to an end. Development of weapons and equipment 
had to be strictly subordinated to the needs of strategy. The development of larger and 
more expensive ships and certain technologies also had a tendency to create vested 
interests, a trend that was to be resisted. 57 Further, the principles of history fed directly 
into the scientific organization of command. "The laws whereby nature enables any form 
of life to make a successful struggle for existence are identical with the fundamental 
principles of organization unconsciously employed by the born organizer, and are as 
obvious in the latter as were the principles of strategy to Julius Caesar in his first 
campaign. "58 
History, then, served as a social and professional tool to buttress the position of 
the executive officer corps. Yet it was also a way of criticising their professional 
competence; as the command element was reduced to principles, history provided another 
weapon to challenge the decisions of senior officers and sometimes even the Admiralty 
itself. 
57 Andrew Gordon, Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command (London: John Murray, 1996), 
590-591. 
58 G.P. Orde, "The Science of Organisation," Naval Review, II (1914), 396. 
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Chapter VIII 
Journals and Staffs: Organizational Change 
But genius is rare, and cannot be reckoned on. Its place must be 
supplied in ninety-nine cases out of one hundred by the trained and 
disciplined mind. 1 
It is positively alarming that we should be dependent for victory on the 
idiosyncrasy of an Admiral! 2 
As a result of changes in the political, social and cultural climate after the tum of the 
century, a new basis for the authority of the executive class as a profession had to be 
devised. As we saw in Chapter VI, steps were taken to overhaul the education system and 
procedures for selection and promotion. Yet the very justification for the existence of the 
executive branch needed to be placed on a firmer intellectual and social foundation than 
mere "character" and tradition. To argue that the British naval officer possessed some 
form of mystical connection to the sea no longer sufficed. The Boer War demonstrated to 
the Army and the nation at large the weakness of leadership that emphasized the 
development of character and discipline without a grasp of organization and the so-called 
"higher" aspects of the art of war. 3 The exercise of command had to be restructured and 
placed on a scientific basis. In the words of Sir Charles Dilke: 
It is sometimes said that we have done well hitherto without a 
department of General Staff, and we shall do as well in the future. The 
1 Richard Haldane, "The Training of the Mind for Modem War," Naval Review, VII ( 1919), 11. 
2 Churchill College, Cambridge, Archives Centre (CCAC), J.A. Fisher Papers (FISR) 1/3/90, J.A. Fisher to 
the Earl of Selbome, 25 February 1902. 
3 Indeed, this concern extended to commerce; see Richard Haldane, "Great Britain and Germany: A Study 
in Education," Monthly Review, V (November 1901), 38. "Our middle classes find their position threatened 
by a new commercial combination. They have been forced to realise that courage, energy, enterprise are in 
these modem days of little more avail against the weapons which science can put in the hands of our rivals 
in commerce, than was the splendid Dervishes against the shrapnel and the Maxims at Omdurman." 
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answer is, that war has become much more complicated than it used to 
be and that all the Great Powers have discovered the absolute necessity 
of much more study and preparation than was known before. When we 
compare 1870 with 1866, and 1866 with 1859, and above all when we 
contrast Continental preparations for mobilization and concentration at 
the present moment with even the arrangements of 1870, we cannot 
but draw the moral that it is mere folly to assert that an organization 
which was sufficient for war purposes in old days is sufficient now.4 
Two methods were implemented to make this ambition a reality. The first was the 
establishment of a Naval War Staff at the Admiralty in 1912 and the replication of that 
organization in the seagoing fleets; the second was the publication, beginning in 1913, of 
The Naval Review under the editorship of Admiral W.H. Henderson. The purpose of these 
two reforms was not only to make command arrangements more efficient and to lessen 
the "transaction costs" associated with the nature of war but also to retain the 
individualism and intangible qualities associated with traditional leadership. In other 
words, like the use of history, the staff and a journal was to bridge the gap between 
mechanical efficiency and individualism, while imagination and character were to be 
harnessed to an institutional structure. The Naval Review was a method to foster the 
legitimacy of this new organization, as it was purposely designed to act as a forum for 
advancing the ideas and arguments of all officers, regardless of rank or experience. 
Acting as an autonomous agent of reform with the unofficial endorsement of the 
Admiralty, it provided a way to legitimize the staff system and to diffuse ideas to promote 
reform. Further, it was a mechanism that was supposed to be above the rough and tumble 
of partisan politics and to demonstrate to prominent politicians like Balfour, Haldane and 
4 Charles Dilke, "Our War Organization of the Future," United Service Magazine, I (1890), 7. 
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Churchill that many up-and-coming young officers were neither completely devoid of 
thought nor slavishly trailing in the wake of their superiors.5 
Both these reforms, however, were problematic for the officer corps. The staff 
appeared to threaten the very basis of the individual responsibility of the commander. 
Indeed, as one author put it, this would present the problem of not having the "individual 
it would be fair to shoot or hang in the event, say, of the perpetration by their Lordships 
of some fatal piece of folly."6 Even if his orders were obeyed, he would be dependent 
upon a corps of wiseacre "intellectual" officers of an elite branch to translate his orders 
into action. In particular, mid-grade officers, already smarting from the limitation of their 
authority aboard ship with the curtailment of executive authority, would be subject to 
orders generated by lieutenants and junior commanders. Many officers feared that, like 
staff officers in the German army, these men might become laws onto themselves and run 
roughshod over not merely their colleagues but also their superiors.7 Further, there were 
concerns that such specialist officers would become so divorced from the sea that they 
would lose their skill as "practical" men and take refuge in the world of abstract thought. 
Another school of thought, argued most prominently by Arthur Wilson, held that staff 
command was suited only to armies; as navies worked in such a radically different · 
5 This was particularly attractive to governments since advice tendered by the Naval Staff could effectively 
demonstrate to the public and the press that they had not ignored the needs of national defence to the serve . 
party interest. See, for example, "The Balance of Power in Europe: Its Naval Aspect," Blackwood's, CXLIII 
( 1888), 280. 
6 
"A Naval General Staff," United Service Magazine, Ill (1890), 461. 
7 John Leyland, "Naval War Staffs," Brassey 's Naval Annual (1912), 112. 
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environment, such methods not only were unnecessary but also dangerous.8 Also, secrecy 
of plans could easily be compromised the more widely the plan was diffused, and 
confidential material and opinions concerning the capacity and character of the 
commander might become a topic of discussion in the wardroom and be leaked. Finally, 
there was a knotty constitutional problem regarding the position of the First Lord and the 
Board of Admiralty. Proposals for reform envisioned that the staff was to be under the 
direct supervision of the First Sea Lord, while the responsibilities of the staff would quite 
obviously touch upon areas under the supervision of the other Sea Lords. Further, the 
authority of the Board was more along the lines of a cabinet of ministers than a 
government department. How was the collective responsibility of the naval members of 
the Board to be maintained when one member possessed all the responsibility of 
command and the staff? Moreover, there was deep concern that obstruction could be 
expected from the Admiralty's civil staff that was the nexus of communication between 
the fleet and Whitehall. 9 
The difficulty surrounding The Naval Review was about control over content and 
editorial direction. Despite complaints of persecution by some of the founders, the fact 
remained that the Review was well received not only by the Admiralty but also by 
Cabinet ministers. Indeed, in 1911 the Admiralty nearly began co-publishing a journal 
with the Army under the editorship of Captain Mark Kerr, but negotiations with the 
8 CCAC, Chartwell Papers (CHAR) 21120, Memorandum by Admiral Sir Arthur K. Wilson, October 1911. 
See also Great Britain, Public Record Office (PRO), Cabinet Papers (CAB) 1/31, pt. 2, Notes on Sir A.K. 
Wilson's Memorandum on Staff, 1 November 1911. Wilson argued that such as a system would · 
dangerously interfere with the capacity of the commander to conduct operations as he saw fit. 
9 Great Britain, Public Record Office (PRO), Cabinet Papers (CAB) 1131 , pt.2, Memorandum by G. Ballard, 
1911. 
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Treasury fell apart. 10 Some officers were uncomfortable with the anonymous nature of the 
journal and the lack of authority over the editor. As W.H. Henderson was a retired 
admiral and seemed rather careful in the first two volumes of the journal, this problem 
seemed well in hand. However, during the war Jellicoe alleged that an article in The 
Review divulged secret information, and the journal was eventually suppressed for the 
duration of hostilities. 11 Henderson attempted to find ways to maintain it but continually 
hit the stone wall of Admiralty intransigence. Blaming J ellicoe, Henderson embarked on a 
public campaign that criticized the Admiralty machinery through the newspapers. The 
rejection of Admiralty control and the maintenance of the anonymity of contributors were 
considered crucial to its usefulness. 
The way in which the executive branch attempted to deal with the challenges of 
technology and the apparent gap between the traditional culture of command as it existed 
in the nineteenth century and the cold realities of competing professionalisms was to 
professionalize the art of command by introducing scientific principles. The principles 
advanced by the Prussian General Staff, in combination with modem forms of "scientific 
management" as put forward, for example, by Frederick Winslow Taylor at the tum of the 
century promised to elevate command over and above other groups while at the same 
time providing a rational intellectual and professional basis for its exercise according to 
professional values. 12 Transaction costs, or what Clausewitz called "the friction of war," 
10 PRO, Admiralty Papers (ADM) 1/8318, File on proposed combined Army-Navy Review, 1911. 
11 PRO, ADM 1/8423/157, Censorship of The Naval Review, 1915. 
12 Frederick W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (1911; reprint, Norcross, GA: Engineering 
and Management Press, 1998). 
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were reduced as far as practicable by the entire organization running as a smooth machine 
to transform the will of the commander into the successful conduct of operations. 13 
The first institutional mechanism was the establishment of the Naval War Staff, 
which finally took shape after Churchill came to the Admiralty in 1911, along with its 
antecedents, the War Course and the Department of Naval Intelligence, which had started 
in the 1880s. The second mechanism was the circulation of professional knowledge and 
the advocacy of professional standards on a wider basis than merely among those who 
had passed through the War Course, who were destined to participate in the specialized 
staff courses in the junior ranks or who had gone to the Army's Staff College at 
Camberley. To reassure all officers that these new specialist staff officers were not merely 
another elite, professional knowledge and the staff command system had to be diffused 
through the ranks. This process of generating discussion, diffusion and debate was to be 
accomplished by establishing a professional journal which invited officers not merely to 
read what was produced by a minority of naval and civilian experts, but to take up the pen 
themselves and make contributions to their service. 
Hence, for those attempting to integrate the staff system it was imperative that it 
have legitimacy in the eyes of the officers. But it was equally important that at least a 
cadre should be at the forefront of command reorganization to limit the interventions of 
civilians, especially an exuberant First Lord in the person of Winston Churchill. Both 
were to work hand in glove. Staff training was also vitally important to standardize 
conduct and procedures and to lessen "transaction costs." Officers working in a 
systematic fashion would ensure that no vital detail was neglected in the fulfilment of the 
13 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (1823 ; reprint, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 119-122. 
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wishes of the commander, while at the same time relieving their superior of all the 
needling day-to-day details. Hence, the staff system did not impair the culture of 
command but extended its reach and amplified the power of the commander. 
Furthermore, not only should an effective staff system be more efficient but also it 
must avoid infringing upon the initiative of the commander. While the staff officer was to 
act as an adviser, he in no way could limit the prerogative of the commander to make 
decisions and give executive directions. To ensure this, great pains were taken not only in 
official memoranda but also in the specialist training courses where officers were 
repeatedly told that humility and tact were essential qualifications for their future role. 14 
This was indeed imperative to guarantee that the use of staff resources would be 
maximized and that senior officers would be reassured of their status. 
An important part of the system was to provide procedures and standardized 
command responses while at the same permitting the exercise of individual initiative. 
Shortly after the establishment of the staff in the Admiralty, Churchill deemed it 
imperative that the structure in Whitehall should be duplicated in the staffing 
arrangements of active commands and that the Admiralty should directly assign staff 
officers. As an Admiralty memorandum put it, "[t]he aim of the following notes is to 
suggest on broad lines a scheme of organization for naval staff duties afloat, with a view 
14 PRO, ADM 203/69, Royal Naval College, Session 1924-1925. See also CCAC, R. Drax Papers (DRAX) 
1121, H.W. Richmond to W.H. Henderson, c.l913 . "We must avoid as much as we can incurring the 
reproach of being a Society of Superior Beings who can lecture their fellow officers." 
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that no action which can be foreseen in time of peace shall be lost sight of in the outbreak 
of war, while relieving the various C. in C.'s of any anxiety regarding minor details." 15 
The starting points were the so-called principles of war gleaned from the historical 
record, as we saw in Chapter VII. Historical research and the evaluation of the conduct of 
others were invaluable tools in the formation of doctrine and a standardized theory of 
maritime war. In the words of Kenneth Dewar: 
Experience of modem naval warfare being extremely limited, and the 
methods of command of our admirals in the eighteenth century never 
having been fully elucidated from a staff point of view, it is necessary 
to seek in military history, where the subject has been exhaustively 
investigated, some principles which will guide us in a further 
treatments of the purely naval point ofview.16 
Staff advocates also believed that a systematic and "scientific" approach to . 
problem solving was of paramount importance. For instance, an article in The Naval 
Review sought to teach officers to evaluate situations according to set criteria. 17 The effort 
was two-fold: to save time and to be clear and conform to a standardized formula. 18 
Immediately after the war, Captain Barry Domvile laid down a distinct procedure for staff 
planning. 19 
15 PRO, ADM 1/8377/120, Memorandum by Rear Admiral Ernest Troubridge, 18 October 1911. 
16 K.G.B. Dewar, "The Executive Command and Staff in Naval Warfare- I," Naval Review, I (1913), 33. 
17 L. Halliday, ''Notes on Appreciating a Situation," Naval Review, II (1914), 186-202 and 305-321. 
18 Ibid. 
19 PRO, ADM 118588/81, War Plans Headings- Guide for Drawing Up Plans for Future Wars, June 1920. 
See also PRO, ADM 118628/120, Memorandum re. War Plans and Staff by HW Richmond, 29 July 1921. 
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The Staff 
Adequate preparation for war is the only guarantee for the preservation 
of the wealth, natural resources and territory of a State; and it can only 
be based upon an understanding firstly of the probable dangers that 
may arise, secondly of the best general method of meeting them as 
taught by the principles to be deduced from the events of history, and 
thirdly of the most efficient application of the war material of the era. 20 
The introduction of the Naval War Staff in 1912 was in many respects the 
culmination of a process that had accelerated at the end of the nineteenth century and 
encompassed not merely armies and navies but also large multi-unit, professionally-
managed corporations. In late nineteenth-century industry and commerce these large 
corporate structures became increasingly complex and quite impossible for one man or 
even one family to oversee effectively. Strategic planning and policy had to be divided 
from line management to ensure that the company could adjust to long-term trends. A 
standardized system that permitted managers to understand and regulate the behaviour of 
subordinates was required. Hence, it should not be surprising that perhaps the largest 
single employer in the United Kingdom - the Admiralty - should be struggling with the 
exact same managerial revolution as had radically altered the world ofbusiness.21 In order 
to lessen the "transaction costs" of naval defence, both in terms of finance and the 
unnecessarily high losses in the event of war, it was imperative that naval officers be able 
to demonstrate that they were entitled to the positions they held as executive officers. 
20 PRO, CAB 17/8, Memorandum by Captain G. Ballard, 1911. 
21 PRO, ADMl/8558/ 133, the necessity of the Naval Staff under peace conditions, 1919. "The idea of a 
Staff is not purely naval or military. A Staff of some sort is found in every business of any size, and it is not 
too much to say that the principle underlying the Naval Staff will be found incorporated in some form or 
another in all large industries." 
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The duty and power of naval command had to be regulated precisely because the 
very existence of the British state and the empire might very well depend on decisions at 
a crucial point in a decisive battle against a resolute opponent. When Winston Churchill 
referred to Admiral Sir John Jellicoe as the only man "who could lose the war in an 
afternoon,"22 he was merely underscoring the importance not only of the officer 
commanding the British fleet but also, albeit implicitly, of a system that ensured that the 
officer would perform his functions in a regularized fashion. The defence of the nation 
was too important merely be left to the discretion of a single man. Command had to be 
regulated by some "scientific principles" to have a wider legitimacy outside the naval 
service. Indeed, naval officers who had emphasized the idea of the importance of the 
Navy had exposed themselves to closer examination of the structure of the service and the 
competence of officers. 
From a functionalist perspective, the prerequisite for an effective structure to 
regulate and minimize "transaction costs" was the centralization of power and authority at 
the centre of the organization and the enhancement of its capacity to govern and regulate 
the rest of the structure.23 The central governing mechanism of the Royal Navy was the 
Board of Admiralty, which had an organizational history that extended back to the 
seventeenth century. However, only in the last decades of the nineteenth and the first 
decade of the twentieth century did the Board increased its power to regulate the 
operation of its outlying "subsidiaries" headed by senior officers engaged in day-to-day 
22 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911-1918 (abridged and rev., London: Thornton Butterworth, 
1931), 589. 
23 See, William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 3-20. 
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activities. The Admiralty had moved slowly to regulate the entry, training and retirement 
of officers throughout the nineteenth century, and it continued to centralize power 
administratively. Yet the real leap forward was the set of structural changes that gave the 
Board greater effective control over daily operations and the exercise of operational 
command. 
Agitation for a naval staff was rooted in a deeper cultural and technological 
problem. In the past the Admiralty had been primarily an administrative structure, and its 
capacity to intervene in operations was severely limited. Whilst in the Napoleonic wars 
the Admiralty had employed a semaphore signalling system between Whitehall and 
Portsmouth, and during the middle decades of the century it had used the telegraph, there 
remained no way of ordering the movement of naval forces in real time until the advent of 
wireless telegraphy in the 1890s and 1900s. In the words of A.J.L. Blond, "[p]rior to 1900 
the Admiralty lacked the staff, resources, expertise and, above all, the communications to 
function as an operational command centre. "24 
With the threat of torpedo attacks on the fleet in port, the barrier of the English 
Channel now seemed more of a bridge. The Boer War had also thrown doubt on the 
professional competence of the Navy to protect the British Isles from overseas invasion. 
This security concern was raised to the point that several parliamentary and cabinet 
inquiries were held. 25 Further, the advent of steam had accelerated the pace of naval 
24 A.J.L. Blond, "Technology and Tradition: Wireless Telegraphy and the Royal Navy, 1895-1920" (PhD. 
Diss ., University of Lancaster, 1993), 180; see also "Musing Without Method," Blackwood 's , CLXXXV, 
No. 1120 (1909), 280. 
25 For example, Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Parliamentary Papers (BPP), ''Notes 
supplied by the Admiralty for the Use of the War Office," vol. XLVIII, Cd. 5539 (1911), 735. "Taking all 
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warfare and made close control over forces ever more imperative. Moreover, the 
increased cost of naval forces and the human resources required meant that neither could 
be frittered away lightly. Lastly, the influence of the decisive naval battle seemed to 
mould the thinking of naval officers and others in the direction of believing that a 
decisive victory at sea would determine not only the future of the British empire but the 
survival of the state itself. Indeed, one officer wrote in the autumn of 1914 that "A 
thousand years scarce serve to form a State; an hour may lay it in the dust. "26 
The formation of the Naval Intelligence Department in the 1880s laid the 
foundations for the staff system. This body was created to collect and collate information, 
to act as a clearing-house for the distribution of intelligence and to serve as an adviser to 
the Board in matters affecting policy. Charles Beresford put the notion of a full naval staff 
system forward in the aftermath of the 1885 naval scare that found the Admiralty 
unprepared. 27 When Admiral Sir John Fisher became First Sea Lord in 1904, a revised 
distribution of business in the Admiralty gave him enhanced power over strategic 
dispositions and laid the effective foundations for the establishment of a staff. All matters 
pertaining to the readiness of the fleet were made the direct responsibility of the naval 
officer holding that post.28 
these facts into consideration, he would probably decide as the Admiralty have done, that an invasion on 
even the moderate scale of 70,000 men is practically impossible." 
26 R. Plunkett, "With the Grand Fleet 10/10/14," Naval Review, IT (1914), 311. 
27 PRO, ADM 116/3106, War Organisation, 1886. 
28 BPP, "Order in Council of 10 August 1904: Designations of the Various Members of and Secretaries to 
the Board of Admiralty and the Definition of the Business to assigned to Them," vol. XL VIII, Cd. 2416 
(1905), 163. 
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In the two decades before 1914, certain technological and geopolitical changes 
had occurred in British naval affairs. First, the fleet had been increasingly concentrated in 
Home waters where the Admiralty had more direct authority in its management. This fed 
into the Fisher-Beresford dispute of 1907-1909 in which Beresford claimed the position 
of "Admiralissimo" in home waters where, as an independent commander-in-chief, he 
had considerable freedom to make plans in line with broad Admiralty directives. 29 This 
doctrine was deemed to be inappropriate, as an Admiralty memorandum made clear: 
It has often been contended by a certain school of naval critics that in 
war time the whole of the naval forces in home waters ought to be 
placed under the direct control of one Admiral, who should be the 
Commander-in-Chief afloat, and that, once hostilities had commenced, 
this officer should not be interfered with in the execution of the plan of 
action he had previously arranged, or might choose to modify 
according to circumstances, as seemed to him most desirable ... This, 
however, is a contention that never could be accepted, though, no 
doubt, in earlier days a qualified form of such power was often 
. d 30 perm1tte ... . 
After all, the Admiralty was the only authority directly responsible to Parliament. 
The relations between Fisher and serving senior officers were strained severely by 
this nearly systematic centralization of power at the expense of the other Commanders-in-
Chief. Admiral Sir Gerard Noel, the Commander-in-Chief of the China Squadron, had to 
be restrained from tendering his resignation when the last battleship on his station was 
withdrawn as a result of Fisher's redistribution scheme.31 The Commander-in-Chief 
29 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Age of Fisher, 1904-
1919 (5 vols., London: Oxford University Press, 1961-1974), I, 92-93 . 
30 PRO, ADM 116/3018, Printed Memorandum, 4 August 1908 
31 Sydney Fremantle, My Naval Career, 1880-1928 (London: Hutchinson, 1949), 113-114. 
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North America and West Indies Station found that his residence in Halifax had been sold 
without his notification, and he had consequently lost some personal property. 32 Even 
loyal friends of Fisher suspected his intentions. Prince Louis of Battenberg, for example, 
thought that Fisher had deliberately weakened the strength of the Channel Squadron just 
to spite Beresford. 33 This was comparatively minor compared to the enormous press 
campaign carried out by Admiral Sir Reginald Custance and Sir William White in calling 
for an inquiry into the dictatorial nature of Fisher's reign that began in 1907. "Sir John 
Fisher is the Board of Admiralty incarnate and whether in the domain of naval strategy, 
naval construction, naval administration, his voice is the only voice that counts."34 Calls 
for limitations on the power of the First Sea Lord were echoed in The Morning Post and 
The Spectator. 
Until a proper control is exercised over him, as over other servants of 
the State, by our rulers, and until common-sense and prudence are 
made to prevail even over expert opinion, the perils which we are 
pointing out will continue. To be quite plain, Sir John Fisher is one of 
those men whom predominant influence and absolute power render 
reckless. Power has gone to his head. 35 
Fisher's position was hampered by the fact that although he had centralized power 
in the hands of the First Sea Lord, he had made little effort to extend the staff system of 
command or to regularize the system at the Admiralty. As a result, Fisher's actions were 
32 E. Marjorie Moore (ed.), Adventure in the Royal Navy: The Life and Letters of Admiral Sir Arthur 
William Moore (Liverpool : E.M. Moore, 1964), 107. 
33 Mark Kerr, Prince Louis of Battenberg: Admiral of the Fleet (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1934), 
225-226, Battenberg to Admiral Sir George King-Hall, 24 February 1909. 
34 Civis [Sir William White], The State of the Navy in 1907: A Plea for Inquiry (London: Smith, Elder & 
Co., 1907), 11. 
35 
"A Position of Peril," The Spectator, 6 July 1907. 
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regarded as a power grab in which he only seemed interested in extending his personal 
reach through official fiat or through members of the so-called "Fishpond."36 Only after 
the Beresford Inquiry, when the Cabinet virtually insisted on the formation of a Naval 
War Staff, did Fisher move to create what he called a "War Council."37 This Council was 
at best a poor substitute because it was comprised of officers, such as the Head of the War 
College, who were not resident in London. Herbert Richmond, for one, was unimpressed: 
"It is the most absurd bit of humbug that has been produced for a long time .... The 1st Sea 
Lord remains supreme & imposes his crude strategical ideas on the nation. "38 Rear 
Admiral Ernest Troubridge, though offering a more balanced perspective, was equally 
damning: "In practice it is understood that the War Council never meets at all. The plans 
exist only in the head of the First Sea Lord, and it is doubtful if the details are worked out 
to give effect to them. "39 
Not only had geopolitical constraints compelled the Admiralty to direct its 
energies almost solely toward the possibility of a great power conflict, especially with 
Germany, but changes in the capacity of central authority in the Royal Navy were 
36 For an example, see CCAC, F.C.D. Sturdee Papers (SDEE) 1/17, My Service Connections to Lord 
Fisher. While Sturdee was Chief of Staff (COS) under Beresford in the Mediterranean, Fisher asked him to 
keep the First Sea Lord apprised ofhis chief's activities. 
37 BPP, "Report of the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence to Inquire into Certain 
Questions of Naval Policy Raised by Lord Charles Beresford," vol. LIV, No. 256 (1909), 303; and PRO, 
ADM l/8377/120, "The Organisation of a Naval War Staff,"1909. 
38 Arthur J. Marder (ed.), Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1952), 62, diary entry, 27 October 1909. 
39 PRO, ADM 1/8377/120, The Necessity for Co-ordinating Staff Work Afloat, 18 October 1911, 
Memorandum by Rear Admiral Ernest Troubridge, original emphasis. 
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underlined by the growing importance of wireless communication. An official Admiralty 
memorandum stated: 
The advance of wireless technology has been so great and so rapid that 
an entirely new development of strategic organization becomes 
imperative. With the present installation it is possible to receive 
information and to transmit orders over a large area from the 
Admiralty ... The result of this enormous advance is that the Admiralty 
are compelled to assume the responsibility for the strategic movements 
of the fleet in a far more complete manner than ever was formerly 
practicable. 40 
Hence, control would be further vested at the centre. This underscored the power of the 
Admiralty not merely to set strategic policy and administration but also to act as a central 
headquarters with the power and capacity to manage and co-ordinate forces in such a way 
as to centralize command decisions. 
Furthermore, in the Navy afloat the tactical and strategic environment in which 
officers were expected to conduct operations had become increasingly complex. While 
admirals in the 1880s could content themselves with clock-work manoeuvres, where one 
central brain co-ordinated the movements of ships, there was now a third dimension in the 
form of locomotive torpedoes. Just before the outbreak of war in 1914, dirigibles and 
aeroplanes extended the possibilities even further. With the enhanced capacity of torpedo 
fire and the previously unused capability of heavy artillery, tactical battle space (to use a 
modem term) had expanded exponentially. 41 While at the tum the century, experts 
calculated that ranges of action would not exceed 4,000 yards; by 1916 the 5 th Battle 
Squadron opened fire accurately on the lead elements of the German High Seas Fleet at 
40 PRO, ADM 116/3018, Printed Memorandum "Wireless Telegraphy in War," 4 August 1908. 
41 PRO, ADM 116/862, Slade Report on Royal Naval War College (1913), 7. 
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over 23,000 yards.42 Furthermore, battle fleets dramatically increased in size, not merely 
by the addition of more capital units but also through the multiplicity of scouting cruisers 
and the destroyer screen. Tactical and strategic co-ordination tested the limits of the 
capacity of an individual commander to cope with dispositions and organization. Admiral 
Sir John Jellicoe, the able commander of the Grand Fleet from 1914 to 1916, worked 
himself ragged attempting to co-ordinate all these elements. Obviously, alternative 
command arrangements were necessary to relieve the commander of routine, and the 
devolution of command authority had to permit the initiative of subordinates in harmony 
with stated intentions. While political pressure existed for such changes, the physical 
environment with which officers had to contend had changed dramatically as well. 
Consequently, the element of time was critical; fleets now moved at great speed 
and "decisive" action could occur with a rapidity that forbade an officer from taking too 
much time to make a tactical decision. With the complication of forces and the 
compression of time, alternative arrangements and a more advanced form of management 
were required. As Commander Reginald Plunkett put forward in The Naval Review: 
A point worthy of note is that many of us find it difficult to realise the 
supreme importance of TIME in modem Naval operations. Even in 
Napoleon's day his knowledge of the value of minutes was the 
foundation of much of his success. But now, the time to spare between 
receipt of information and necessary action is comparable to that of a 
railway signalman who sees an express rounding a curve and knows 
that the line is blocked a mile ahead. There are many cases in modem 
war where a few seconds of time wasted may cause the loss of a 
thousand lives. When, for instance, a signal requires some ship to tum 
round and go to the support of another engaged by the enemy; to delay 
two and a half minutes before turning will bring her into action five 
42 Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command (London: John Murray, 
1996), 113. 
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minutes late. What results may not be produced by five minutes of 
modem gunfire?43 
More than this, however, the existence of a naval staff was regarded as a mark of 
professional standing and self-respect among many officers. Lord Esher emphasized this 
in a letter to Winston Churchill in which he argued that the staff system would "transfer 
the centre of strategical gravity from civilians to sailors."44 Operational and other orders 
from the Board were transmitted to the Fleet through the Secretariat, and orders were 
signed by the civilian (except for the brief service of Rear Admiral Sir George Tyron in 
the 1880s) Permanent Secretary. If operational command were to operate directly from 
the Admiralty, it was imperative that officers in uniform execute this function. 
Yet many officers had an uneasy feeling that the "intellectual capital" to run a 
staff organization was lacking.45 The higher aspects of command were almost entirely 
neglected, and the training that did exist at the War Course at Portsmouth was 
unsatisfactory. This course, started in 1900, was to operate as a voluntary program to 
provide senior officers with a deeper grasp of their command responsibilities. But there 
was pointed criticism of any attempt to get beyond the nuts and bolts of organization and 
to delve into war plans. Rear Admiral Charles Ottley, the D.N.I., criticized the Director of 
the War College for going beyond his mandate: "the instant he left the terra firma of past 
experience and established historical fact, and launched out upon the uncharted sea of 
prophecy concerning the conduct and plans for potential wars of the future, he was 
43 R. Plunkett, "With the Grand Fleet {10/10/14)," Naval Review, II (1914), 311. 
44 M.V. Brett (ed.), Journals and Letters of Reginald, Viscount Esher (4 vols. , London: Ivor Nicolson & 
Watson, 1934-1938), ill, 72; Esher to Winston Churchill, 13 November 1911. 
45 Dewar, The Navy From Within, 154. 
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mistaking his functions and dangerously exceeding his duty."46 Officers attending the 
War Course should be taught 
the simple bed-rock facts of the system on which the British Fleet will 
be administered, victualled and stored in war ... They should not be 
encouraged to 'Mind high things' such as secret plans of campaign for 
possible wars with other powers ... but should condescend to matters of 
lower degree; how to plan an intelligent (and subordinate) but 
necessary and useful part in furthering the smooth mobilization and 
efficient conduct of the ship or fleet on which they may be called to 
serve in war.47 
Before proceeding further, it is important to consider exactly what a staff system 
of command offered the Royal Navy both at Whitehall and in the fleets. As one officer 
wrote in 1919, the role of the staff was three-fold: first, to collect and keep to hand 
information needed by a commander to make a decision; second, to work out detailed 
instructions about how to carry out the desires of the commander; and third, to ensure that 
training was carried out according to the doctrine approved by the commander. 48 Hence, 
the naval staff was to co-ordinate and execute the will of the commanding officer and was · 
in no way intended to subvert command functions or to initiate operations. At the 
Admiralty, staff functions included the co-ordination of procurement, logistics and 
facilities to carry out or prepare for operations and the co-ordination of strategy and 
policy with other organs of state, including the other armed services and government · 
departments. The staff also existed to put forward operational plans, training programmes 
46 PRO, CAB 17/6, Notes of a Conversation between Ottley and Fisher, December 1909. 
47 PRO, CAB 17/6, C. Ottley and Fisher, December 1909. 
48 PRO, ADM 1/8558/133, the Necessity of the Naval Staff under Peace Conditions, 8 May 1919. 
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and strategic and tactical doctrine. In other words, it existed to co-ordinate command-and-
control arrangements for the entire service. 
In the aftermath of the German victories over Austria in 1866 and France in 1870-
1871, Prussian-style general staffs came to be regarded as a sort of a magic potion to co-
ordinate, plan and execute massive military operations that could gain a decisive victory 
in a short period of time. Located at a central headquarters well behind the lines, general 
staffs sifted through intelligence reports, co-ordinated troop movements and provided 
essential command-and-control links With detached armies. Against an opponent not 
blessed with such a system, decisive victory could often be achieved expeditiously. 
However, in naval affairs, staffs came a little later, although not nearly as late as in 
Britain. When the Japanese laid the foundations of their naval establishment at the end of 
the nineteenth century, they copied nearly everything British down to the outright 
purchase of major warships from British shipyards and the laying of the foundation stone 
for Etajima from the Royal Naval College. Yet two things the Japanese did not copy were 
British-style education and British-style command arrangements, both of which they 
found wanting. 49 
War at sea, officers like Wilson claimed, was entirely different than military 
operations. Ships were relatively self-contained, rendering them free from lines of supply 
for weeks at a time. Moreover, the commanding officers were generally embarked and 
hence part and parcel of the entire package. In essence, every naval unit was part of the 
first line. Further, many held that intellectual training was of only limited utility for the 
49 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese 
Navy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 25-31. 
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realities of warfare. 5° As Fisher wrote to Arnold White in the aftermath of the Boer War, 
"it is a wonderful comparison that we should spend 50 per cent less on the Navy than on 
the Army in developing our intellectual equipment, and 25 times less than is spent on the 
German equivalent to the British Navy, which is their Army!"51 
The event that most forced the pace of creating a naval staff was the performance 
of Arthur Wilson at the Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.) meeting in response to 
the Agadir Crisis of 1911. While the Army presented Cabinet with a detailed and credible 
plan of action, the Navy's plan was extraordinarily vague and amateurish. Reginald 
McKenna, then First Lord, appeared unable to impose reform on the unwilling service. 
"Tug" Wilson, of course, was an arch-centralizer and had no inkling of the proper use of 
subordinates, unlike either Fisher or even Beresford. As Battenberg wrote to Selbome in 
1904, "Beresford and Wilson are, I take it, our two Naval leaders -practically the only 
ones until men like Lambton, May etc, come on. Beresford trains the Flag Officers and 
Captains under him, but Wilson does not. .. "52 
The inauguration of Naval Staff reform was problematic because it was not 
merely a case of appending a few extra officers to Whitehall. A drastic change in the 
culture of the officers corps was required, especially among senior officers, to make use 
of the staff, not just at the Admiralty but also at sea. Most of all, officers advocating the 
50 Indeed, even the most intelligent and gifted officers recognized the limited usefulness of intellectual 
achievement. See, Hubert Grenfell, "The Best Method of Providing an Efficient Force of Officers and Men 
for the Navy," Journal of the Royal United Services Institution (RUSJ), XXVI, No. 115 (1882), 301. 
51 Arthur J. Marder (ed.), Fear God and Dread Nought: The Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord 
Fisher of Kilverstone (3 vols., London: Jonathan Cape, 1952-59), I, 263, J. Fisher to Arnold White, 8 
August 1902. 
52 Kerr, Prince Louis of Battenberg, 178, memorandum to Lord Selbome, June 1904. 
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reforms emphasized that the full power of the Cabinet and Parliament had to be used to 
overcome opposition, whether from senior officers or the civil staff of the Admiralty. 
Captain George Ballard, the D.N.I., argued that "[t]he great point on which a firm stand 
must be taken is that is being done by the Government. If that is so no opposition can 
stand in the end."53 Similarly, in the view of Ottley, "[t]he idea of a War Staff is 
acceptable enough to most men. But- if it is to be a real reform - the concrete thing will 
of necessity upset a lot of venerable and antiquated customers. "54 The slowness to 
implement the reforms and the tentative approach to staff command led some officers to 
level criticisms that the entire experiment was designed merely to allay the fears of senior 
officers, as if to say "'it is all right, don't be frightened, this is only a dreadful innovation 
for 'time of war,' probably there won't be a war at all, but we are putting up this 
arrangement just in case there might be one."55 
In his memorandum of January 1912 on the staff system, Churchill was quick to 
indicate that he did not intend that a specialist cadre of staff officers would monopolize 
crucial appointments at the Admiralty and that officers so posted would not lose their 
practical "edge" or the power of leadership and command. 56 Further, there was an attempt 
53 PRO, CAB 1/31 , pt.2, Memorandum on Staff, October 1911. 
54 PRO, CAB 1/31, pt.2, Rear Admiral Charles Ottley to Churchill, 13 November 1911. 
55 W.P. Koe, "Some Observations upon the Naval Staff System," Naval Review, XII (1924), 665. 
56 As early as 1870, Major Alfred Jones, V.C. attempted to reassure officers of the value of staff officers 
even though they appeared less than heroic. Alfred Jones, "On The Education of Staff Officers," RUSI, 
XIV, No. 59 (1870), 272, "What are the duties of the Staff Officer? His hands, it is true, are void of 
trophies, his lips are not blackened by gunpowder, and the sword which hangs at his side has rested in its 
scabbard perhaps all through the action; but he has been seen at daybreak among the skirmishers engaged in 
drawing a rapid sketch of the enemy's position." 
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to reassure the senior leadership that no diminution of the authority of flag officers was 
contemplated: 
Naval war is at once more simple and more intense than war on land. 
The executive action and control of fleet & squadron Commanders is 
direct and personal in a far stronger degree than that of Generals in the 
field, especially under modem conditions. The art of handling a great 
fleet on important occasions with deft and sure judgement is the 
supreme gift of the Admiral, and practical seamanship must never be 
displaced from its position as the first qualification of every sailor. 57 
Hence, staff command neither entailed the extinction of the wamor spirit nor the 
establishment of a special corps of highly favoured officers who would divide the 
executive branch into different segments.58 Capable officers deemed suitable for 
command in the higher ranks would be sent to receive such training as to enable a certain 
breadth of view. This thinking about staff officers did not change during the war. In 1920, 
the shoulder strap introduced as part of the uniform of staff officers was abolished. 
According to the docket on the issue, the Fourth Sea Lord in 1917 thought it "[m]ost 
undesirable that the Staff should become in any way alienated from the General Service 
Officers and considered a class apart. "59 
The safety of the proposed staff system was that the officer responsible for 
heading it was a Chief of Staff who was to operate under the direct supervision of the 
57 PRO, ADM 203/70, Memorandum by the First Lord on a Naval War Staff, 1912. 
58 John Leyland, "Naval War Staffs," Brassey's Naval Annual (1912), 112. "Certain safeguards were and 
are necessary, such as that of protecting the Navy from the danger of the rise of a distinct and privileged 
class of officers for whom commands and appointments would be reserved. Such a result could have no 
other effect than to weaken the spirit of comradeship in the Fleet and to discourage a large class of 
deserving and meritorious officers." 
59 PRO, ADM 118583/44, Proposal to Abolish the Shoulder Strap for Staff Officers, March 1920. 
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First Sea Lord, the officer charged under the 1904 Order-in-Council with the preparation 
of the navy and executive command over all naval forces. Further, he would be a Flag 
Officer and hence have held a responsible command at sea. Moreover, there would be no 
restriction on the First Lord or First Sea Lord from consulting any member of the staff 
without consultation with the Chief of Staff. "This Direction is essential to prevent that 
group of evils which have always arisen from the "narrow neck of the bottle" system."60 
Although Churchill's efforts may seem revolutionary, they were not. Nothing was 
done to alter the constitutional authority of the Board of Admiralty, and no real alteration 
in the system of command was implemented. The staff became yet another battleground 
in the fight over executive dominance. Once the naval staff had been established, 
Churchill constantly oversaw its activities and freely commented on its shortcomings. The 
First Lord closely observed the results of exercises and staff activities. Churchill was 
particularly unimpressed by the performance of the Director of Operations during the 
1912 fleet manoeuvres. In an unsent letter to Battenberg, the First Sea Lord, Churchill 
wrote: "Paragraphs 2 and 3 on the same page are a confession of bankruptcy and an 
appeal by the War Staff to the cruiser flag officers to help them solve a problem upon 
which the War Staff are dumb." He went on to emphasize that the results of the war 
games needed to be analyzed systematically, if only because of the expenses associated 
with pay, victualling and fuel. 61 
60 Ibid. 
6 1 CCAC, CHAR 13/ 13 , Winston Churchill to First Sea Lord, 27 September 1912. 
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Churchill was also constrained by several factors . First, of course, was the 
Treasury, and the second was the obduracy of the senior officers. In a post-war article on 
the development of the naval staff, Ballard recounted that one or the other of these two 
sources scotched many of the policies needed during the war. 62 
In addition, the pressing issue of the shortage of officers reared its ugly head. As 
one officer advised Churchill, it would be an excellent idea for every lieutenant to pass 
through a course at the War College during his first four years of service. Despite the 
concentration of the fleet in home waters and the consequent relative ease of getting 
officers to Greenwich, "[i]t is, however, impossible to carry out this suggestion for some 
time to come as it would mean that an average of 30 Lieutenants would be constantly 
under training. We cannot spare any further number of Officers for courses under present 
conditions unless ships are paid off. "63 Further, the authors of the staff system tried to 
integrate the concept of scientific regulation with personal leadership. 
Nothing in the work of this division ... will relieve Flag Officers from 
their present duties and responsibilities in the training of the 
commands. But henceforward continuity and uniformity will be 
preserved by a central direction and co-ordination, which gathers up 
and authorises the established conclusions, without restricting 
reasonable initiative. It is no answer to the advocates of such a 
Division, to say that War Training is given by the Commanders-in-
Chief and that war training is in the department of the First Sea Lord. 
The Commanders-in-Chief change repeatedly and with them their 
personal instruction changes, very often without leaving a trace 
behind. The First Sea Lord cannot possibly prepare manuals of tactical 
and strategic instruction. This work can only be done by a regular 
department at work. "64 -
62 G.A. Ballard, "The Naval War Staff, 1912-1914," Naval Review, XII (1924), 454. 
63 PRO, ADM 1/83771118, Memorandum on Slade Committee, 5 April1914. 
64 PRO, ADM 118377, War StaffTraining ofNaval Officers, 1914. 
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However, the staff seemed focussed merely on the initial preparation of war plans, and 
there seemed to be no thought about the necessity to manage and co-ordinate a conflict 
that might stretch for years and require the entire resources of the community. As Fisher 
wrote to Churchill in 1911: 
The Naval War Staff 
The Object to be attained 
All the resources of every portion of the British Empire - Naval, 
Miltary, Commercial, Financial, Diplomatic, Social, Political, to be co-
ordinated and concentrated (like boiling down an Elephant into a tea 
cup!) for putting Pressure on the Enemy in the first 24 hours of the 
war.
65 
In the initial flurry of memorandums, it was suggested initially that all officers undergo a 
course in strategy, tactics and staff work, but the realities of maintaining the fleet on a 
virtual war footing made this impossible. As Battenberg minuted, "I fear the dearth of 
Officers will only permit of a very small beginning to be made in short courses for 
Lieutenants. "66 In 1911, when the details of the staff system were being hammered out, 
Admiral Bethell suggested the establishment of two grades of staff officer, with the lower 
taking a four-month course and the senior completing a thirteen-month programme. 
Battenberg disagreed: "I do not agree with these proposals on principle, but as we do not 
possess the number of officers required under this scheme, it is hardly worth 
discussing. "67 
65 CCAC, CHAR 13/2, Fisher to Churchill, 6 November 1911, original emphasis. 
66 PRO, ADM 1/8377/ 118, Minute by Battenberg on the Slade Report, 9 May 1914. 
67 PRO, ADM 1/8377/ 120, Minute by Battenberg, December 1911. 
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When the staff system was to be extended beyond the Admiralty to the fleet as a 
whole, the issue of numbers of qualified officers re-surfaced.68 The war course at 
Portsmouth was not sufficient, since it was designed mainly for seniors and very few 
lieutenants took it. As Ernest Troubridge, the first Chief of Staff, commented: 
These establishments are not utilized to the fullest advantage. At 
present that are educational establishments where officers go who have 
nothing better to do, while they are awaiting an appointment to a ship 
&c. The more brilliant officers, who ought to gain by a course of study 
there, usually get sea appointments and pass them by. 69 
According to Admiral Sir Edmund Fremantle, much of the prejudice surrounding 
naval staff afloat arose from the rather poor reputation of captains of the fleet in the age 
of sail. Captains of the fleet were post captains or possibly junior flag officers serving as 
the Admiral's advisers without the responsibilities of commanding the flagship. Several 
of them were considered much too cautious, and the precedent of Nelson acting without 
one seemed to lessen the importance of the position: 
That in a large fleet some senior staff officer is required there can be 
no doubt, and in the French and in most foreign navies the admiral's 
staff is much larger than in ours, but it is recognized that the directness 
of command, which is so important in naval matters, is liable to be 
impaired by a too numerous and influential staff, and in the British 
Navy there has always been a strong prejudice against a captain of the 
fl 70 eet. .. 
One of the chief opponents to the staff system was the sitting First Sea Lord, 
Arthur Wilson. Wilson's performance at the C.I.D. meeting in 1911 provoked 
68 PRO, ADM 118377/ 120, Memorandum on the Report of the Slade Committee, 1914. 
69 PRO, ADM 1/83771120, Memorandum "The Necessity for Co-ordinating Staff Work Afloat," 18 October 
1911 , emphasis in the original. 
70 Edmund Fremantle, The Navy As I have Known It (London: Cassell, 1904), 125-126. 
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considerable consternation among the Cabinet, and this rapidly led to a change in the First 
Lord and the ascension of Winston Churchill. Possessing a high level of ambition and 
energy, as well as a reforming streak, Churchill was determined to impose his will on 
Admiralty "colleagues." He took nothing for granted, had a critical view of everything the 
Navy did and constantly "interfered" in the professional sphere of naval officers. While 
committed to the Navy's welfare, he was equally determined that senior officers should 
be compelled to justify their policies. Examples of his interference even on petty details 
included, for instance, paying an official visit to the battle cruiser Lion when he asked an 
officer a rating's name and then cross- examined the man to make sure his name was 
what the officer said.71 Also, when inspecting the cadets at Osborne, he commented 
forcefully on the need to annihilate an opponent, much to shock of the commandant and 
the cadets themselves. 72 These peccadilloes were minor compared with the other policies 
he pushed, and he was already considered suspect as a renegade Tory and because of his 
apparently close relationship to the radical Chancellor, David Lloyd George. Other 
policies aimed aggressively at reforming the officer corps and the Naval Staff, and his 
advocacy of the Mate Scheme and lower deck reform struck at the very heart of the 
competence and exclusivity of the executive officer corps. 
The staff system was bitterly resisted by many officers for several reasons. First of 
all, it was perceived as having been pushed by Liberal politicians who were not generally 
respected in the naval service. That an "amateur" like young Winston Churchill imposed 
71 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, I, 254. 
72 Max Arthur (ed.), The True Glory: The Royal Navy, 1914-1939 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1996), 
33-34, recollections ofNaval Cadet Charles Drake. 
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them was regarded as a slap in the face to officers who had served for decades. Moreover, 
it seemed to attack the competence of senior commanders by saddling them with officers 
who had been to college and would be patched directly into an existing staff system 
aboard ship. As the system would be extended to the fleet at large to replicate and 
standardize decision-making, it would sap power from flag officers . It would not only 
remove the patronage a flag officer had in selecting officers for his personal staff but also 
make it possible for officers selected from the staff college, who were possibly unknown 
to the flag officer, to be assigned to his ship. Before these reforms were applied, 
appointments were generally rubber-stamped by the Admiralty. The change was justified 
by the need for a systematic, organized system that could function apart from the 
personality of the commander and by the need to regulate matters because of the frequent 
changes in commander in chief. 73 Central control was to be extended further by the 
creation of a Training Division to co-ordinate the training and doctrin~ of the entire fleet 
under the direction of the Admiralty staff. 74 The problem, of course, was that there was no 
consensus on strategic or tactical doctrine upon which to base directions. One way to 
solve that problem of both establishing doctrine and providing a corrective mechanism, as 
we will see in the next section, was the establishment of The Naval Review, which was 
completely unconnected to the power structure of the service and was independent from 
Admiralty influence except insofar as the Board could forbid serving officers from 
73 PRO, ADM 1/8377, War StaffTraining ofNaval Officers, April1914. 
74 PRO, ADM 118377, Memorandum "Development ofthe Admiralty War Staff," April1914. 
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contributing (as it did in 1915) or exercise censorship (as it did in the spring of 1915 and 
again in 1919).75 
A second mechanism involved the officers themselves. As more of them acquired 
specialized training as staff officers with plenty of "theoretical" training, often as juniors, 
they might be placed in a situation where they might lecture his chief on the "principles of 
war." This concern was brought up in the testimony of officers before the Slade 
Committee of 1913, although their views were quickly disposed of in its report. "It has 
been stated in evidence that great exception is taken to young officers going to sea with 
W.S. [War Staff] against their names, and then presuming on the strength of this to lay 
down the law to their seniors ... If such cases have occurred they are attributable to the 
officers themselves being unsuited to Staff work ... "76 In his critique of the Report, 
however, Douglas Haig was less concerned, asserting that "after all as long as the law laid 
down is sound it matters comparatively little whence it comes."77 Haig concluded that the 
problem was so urgent that it was vital for reforms to be instituted as quickly as possible, 
arguing: "But whatever its object, some time must elapse before its influence can begin to 
be felt - and in the meantime we should, presumably, be careful to steer clear of any 
wars."
78 This was also a problem in the aftermath of the Fisher- Beresford dispute, during 
which Fisher had been accused of "espionage" on senior officers. When he was First Sea 
Lord, Fisher had encouraged junior officers to write him personally about conditions in 
75 PRO, ADM 1/8423/157; and PRO, ADM 156/185. 
76 PRO, ADM 116/862, Slade Report on War College, 1913, 12. 
77 CCAC, CHAR 13/26, Notes on Slade Committee, February 1914, 13. 
78 Ibid., 36. 
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the various squadrons and fleets. 79 Not only was it possible that a wiseacre junior officer 
would be placed in a situation of criticising his chief but also that- this officer might be an 
agent of Admiralty "espionage" to check up on a commander-in-chief. Senior officers 
also feared that this corps of officers would receive special favour from London and 
hence not be under the sway of the patronage of the flag officer. This was not an idle 
concern during the Fisher years. 8° Further, many saw this as evidence of the Admiralty 
attempting to centralize power in its own hands. 
Other senior officers in a squadron would also resent staff officers since they 
would be placed in a situation that they would be drafting orders in the name of the 
commander. Senior executive officers, captains and commanders, already subject to the 
limitations on their authority outlined in the previous chapters, would be receiving orders 
from their juniors. This was complicated by the Admiralty's attempt to remove the 
consideration of rank in selecting staff officers. As David Beatty wrote, "[i]t would be 
fatal if the value of the opinions of the several members of the Staff were officially 
assessed in direct proportion to the amount of gold lace on their sleeves."81 Beatty argued 
that staff should be organized in such a way that an officer filled a certain role regardless 
of rank or seniority and specialized staff officers would be graded by their training -
without reference to practical experience, rank nor seniority. Consequently, officers like 
79 R.S. Bacon, The Life of Fisher of Kilverstone (2 vols., London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1929), II, 110-111; 
the most infamous case was that of Captain Reginald Bacon in 1906 who had served as Fisher's Naval 
Assistant was a battleship captain in the Mediterranean Fleet under Beresford. In private letters, Bacon had 
expressed criticism of Beresford. 
8
° Fisher was frequently accused of foisting his favourites onto the staff of senior officers in order to keep 
tabs of their activities. See, Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, I, 76-87. 
81 PRO, CAB 1131, pt.3, Memorandum, Naval War Staff, 1911. 
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Wilson argued that the Navy afloat would have little but contempt for these officers: "The 
Service would have the most supreme contempt for any body of officers who professed to 
be specially trained to think. There is no Service where there is more thinking done but 
officers are judged by what they can do when afloat. "82 
Consequently, the staff course was to assist m providing an antidote to the 
inappropriate conduct of staff officers. Indeed, two of the most important skills taught 
were tact and humility. 
We are all entitled to our own opinions, and it may be in the interests 
of the Service that we should express those opinions when they differ 
from those of our Chief, but what we have to ensure is that such 
differences of opinion are never divulged to others whom they do not 
concern. The Staff advises and the Command decides, and, that 
decision having been made, it is the job of the Staff Officer to 
eliminate any idea of disagreement that there may be from his mind 
and throw himself whole-heartedly and loyally into the task of 
transmitting that decision into execution. 83 
Since officially and culturally it was assumed that the officers who had a multiple stripes 
on their sleeves were more experienced and efficient than inferiors, this was a hard pill to 
swallow. Not only did the staff system threaten the prerogatives of senior officers in the 
exercise of command but also the importance of rank and seniority. 
The idea of having a staff was also resisted because many believed that there was 
an intellectual and cultural need to differentiate naval officers from their army 
counterparts.84 As was explained in chapter V, the art of seamanship was given an 
82 CCAC, CHAR 21121, Memorandum by Admiral Sir Arthur K. Wilson, 30 October 1911. 
83 PRO, ADM 203/69, Introductory Lecture on Staff Work by Captain E. Astley-Rushton, 1924. 
84 Cynthia F. Behrman, Victorian Myths ofthe Sea (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1977), 57-76. 
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inordinately high status in the training and thought of naval officers. An emphasis on 
seamanship demonstrated the importance of the command element and worked to 
centralize power and authority in such a way as to place near dictatorial authority in the 
hands of the captain. A naval officer, trained to handle the perilous sea, was deemed to 
possess judgement, skill and daring; any move to circumscribe his authority was suspect 
and was seen as politicising the service. The cult of "practical" sea training created the 
atmosphere of centralized control, as Major G.S. Ollivant explained in 1914: 
Here we have a system evolved by, and suited to, the specialized 
conditions of a peculiar and particular organism - a battleship. The 
small close order compact armies of the time of Frederick the G~eat 
were units of a roughly analogous nature, and we find, as might be 
expected, somewhat similar methods employed for controlling them. 
Under different conditions, those methods proved useless and failed. 85 
Arthur Wilson was even more of an arch-centralizer than Fisher, and he jealously 
guarded his personal power to make war plans to ensure secrecy. The proto-staff that 
Fisher established in 1909 called the War Council ceased for all intents and purposes to 
exist after Wilson became First Sea Lord in 1910.86 Pointing to the differences between 
the conduct of operations in the Army and Navy, Wilson argued that the staff system was 
intended to impose a structure devised for the Army onto the Admiralty. Since naval 
vessels, unlike armies, were self-contained and self-propelled, their commanders had little 
concern for lines of communication. Wilson held that organization in the exercise of 
command was comparatively simple for naval forces. Further, as navies were at sea and 
85 PRO, CAB 31/1, Memorandum by GS Ollivant, 25 May 1914. 
86 Herbert King-Hall, Naval Memories and Traditions (London: Hutchinson, 1928), 218; "As it was, under 
Sir John Fisher it [the War Staff], like the seed sown on stony ground, flourished for a time, and soon after, 
under Sir John's success, under Sir Arthur Wilson, it withered and died, for, whereas, Sir John suckled the 
infant on skim-milk, Sir Arthur denied it even that nourishment, and starved it to death." 
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constantly experiencing war-like conditions, a department devoted to speculative thought 
was superfluous. "The Navy has learned by long experience thoroughly to distrust all 
paper schemes that have not been submitted to the supreme test of trial under practical 
conditions by the Fleet at sea ... "87 
Much of this opposition was recognized by a former D.N.I., Rear Admiral 
Edmond Slade: "They miss the main point, which is not how an army or a fleet is to be 
moved, but why it is to be moved at all."88 Slade argued that Wilson's ideas conflated the 
roles of command and supply, a situation that did not meet the need that the staff had 
been intended to fill. In fact, a primary preoccupation of all the advocates of the staff 
system of command, from Spencer Wilkinson onwards, was the necessity to separate 
routine functions from the higher aspects of direction.89 Naval officers in this period were 
not generally renowned for the efficient use of staff resources, since staffs were generally 
small and few senior officers had been effectively trained to use them. For these reasons it 
is not surprising that by 1914 the system failed to live up to expectations. As Richmond 
commented in January 1917, "J ellicoe is wholly ignorant of the meaning of the word 
'staff or of staff work. He, like Leveson, imagines that it is clerical work, writing 
minutes & so on. "90 
In some respects, therefore, Wilson was right all the way down the line. The staff 
became what he had envisioned in 1911: a mere auxiliary carrying out routine functions. 
87 CCAC, CHAR 21/20, Memorandum by Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, October 1911. 
88 PRO, CAB 1/31, pt 3, "Proposed Draft Memorandum to Issued to the Board," 1911. 
89 Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of the Navy (London: Constable, 1895). 
90 Marder ( ed. ), Portrait of an Admiral, 229. 
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This was especially the case when the Admiralty tried to direct a global war effort with 
what was, in some respects, a pre-industrial command structure. Some reformers had 
regarded the Naval Staff as a kind of"magic bullet;" once the reforms had taken hold, the 
problem would largely fix itself. But the problem the corps ran into was the limitations in 
the education of naval officers that nearly precluded them from adopting a view wider 
than the constellation of shipboard life which had been promoted throughout the final 
decades of the nineteenth century. Indeed, the policy of making staff officers merely 
another specialized group and a sort of uniformed vested interest left things in a rather 
parlous state. The "principles of war" training advocated by the Slade Committee in 1913 
did not really address the emphasis on material matters. As Haig observed, 
Speaking generally these initial paragraphs suggest the idea that in 
order to have an efficient body of officers it is only necessary to bring 
"the principles of war" to the attention to the naval officer's notice 
every now and then - "at successive periods" - instead of insisting that 
his every thought and action throughout his career is based on them. 91 
At the War College, lectures placed a heavy emphasis on matters such as 
international law and court martial procedures, with history added as an afterthought. To 
make matters worse, the College was not considered to be of great importance by either 
the Admiralty or officers themselves : officers were regularly taken off the course in 
favour of sea commands and on occasion men who were not intended for further 
employment were sent to Portsmouth at full pay as a form of compensation to ensure that 
"Buggins" got his share. Only with the establishment of the Staff College did this change. 
The focus of training switched to attempting to get officers to think for themselves and to 
91 CCAC, CHAR 13/26, Notes on the Report on the Corrunittee on the Organization and Training on the RN 
War College, February 1914. 
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take responsibility for learning subjects outside their purview as JUmor officers.92 
Attempts at getting officers to study "voluntary" subjects had not been terribly successful 
in the past, as the different education committees had discovered. Hence, it was unlikely 
that a group of brilliant officers would quickly be able to apply staff methods at the 
Admiralty. There was simply not enough time. In other words, the entire culture of the 
service needed to be readjusted to value staff work and "intellectual" pursuits. Despite the 
best intentions of some officers and the civil leadership of the Admiralty, it was 
impossible to impose this change from above in a short a time. 
Indeed, Churchill was so unimpressed with the intellectual abilities of senior 
officers that he wrote an extraordinary letter to Asquith when it came time to replace 
Ernest Troubridge as the first ChiefofStaffin 1913. Troubridge had to get his sea time or 
be passed over for promotion to Vice Admiral. "I have now made the acquaintance of all 
the principal officers of the Navy serving at home, and I am sorry to say that I cannot fmd 
one who possesses fully the qualities necessary for this most important post."93 
The war staff system was required afloat as well as at the Admiralty. Staff officers 
in the fleet commands had to work in concert with the staffs of squadrons and divisions. 
Further, Churchill argued that the individual commander-in-chief must not be permitted 
to organize the staff in his own fashion. The highest authorities alone must establish staff 
organization. Further, a manual was to be prepared to ensure universal procedures for 
92 PRO, ADM 203/69, Memorandum by Vice Admiral, Royal Naval War College, 12 January 1912. 
93 CCAC, CHAR 13/12, Churchill to Asquith, 15 August 1913. 
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writing operational orders, collecting intelligence information, and establishing supply 
systems. 
Such Manuals never supersede individual judgment in emergencies 
and can never be pleaded in defence of unsuccessful operations. They 
are indispensable, however, if a common body of doctrine, considered 
and accepted by the service as a whole, is to take the place of the 
present loose, uncertain, and anarchic methods.94 
In the event of a senior commanding officer being superseded suddenly, a common 
language and command method need to be preserved. Considering the rapid turnover of. 
officers in the years before the war, this was especially critical. 95 
There were also some questions as to whether the bulk of the Navy's semor 
officers were hostile to the staff system. The problem came back again to the shortage of 
officers and the inability to drag them away from sea duty to undergo the requisite staff· 
training. As Battenberg wrote in 1914, "I fear the dearth of Officers will only permit of a 
very small beginning to be made in short courses for Lieutenants." But he added in red 
pen that the training course, "[t]his seems to me to be vital to the efficiency of the 
Navy."96 
Haig criticized the Staff Training Course in February 1914 and directed an attack 
on the idea that staff training was "theoretical" as opposed to practical. 
Again almost all aspects of the art of war are 'theoretical' in time of 
peace; they only become 'practical' when the actual killing begins. 
The practical man is the man with a strong imagination ... The most 
dangerous enemies of any fighting machine in time of peace are not 
94 CCAC, CHAR 13/22b, Churchill to First and Second Sea Lords, 31 August 1913. 
95 CCAC, CHAR 13/29, Churchill to Battenberg, 2 February 1914. 
96 PRO, ADM l/8377/ 118, Memorandum on Military Education and war staff training, 9 May 1914. 
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the 'theorists' who imagine things, but the men who either have no 
imagination at all or whose imagination leads them off on illogical ... 
1. 97 mes. 
The education of staff officers was radically different from any curriculum put 
forward in the history of the service. For the first time the Admiralty embraced the idea of 
promoting freedom of thought and discussion without regard to rank or experience. This 
prepared the ground for another reform, the introduction of The Naval Review. Indeed, at 
the War College in 1912 a group of officers under the loose leadership of Captain Herbert 
Richmond, and heavily influenced by the work of Julian Corbett, sparked off The Review. 
Once this freedom of expression was granted and officially endorsed, it was impossible to 
arrest. The Review gave space to junior officers to advance fresh ideas and methods. 
Indeed, many senior officers saw it as a safety valve that would restrain dissidents from 
writing in the popular press. In the words of Admiral Sir Arthur Moore: 
Strong views on many of the subjects are held by many young officers 
who do not wish to come into conflict of opinion with the senior 
officers, & by means of the Review they should be able to avoid doing 
so and yet give the benefit of fresh thought... at the same time the 
experience of the older men will be conveyed to them in a kindly 
manner that will steady their judgements and develop their 
reasoning. 98 
97 CCAC, CHAR 13/26, Notes on the Report of the Committee on the Organisation and Training of the 
Royal Naval War College, February 1914 by Douglas Haig, 9. 
98 Royal Naval Museum (RNM), Naval Review Papers (NRP), Admiral Sir Arthur Moore to Henderson, 27 
February 1913. 
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The Naval Review 
One of the fundamental problems affecting the development of the staff system was the 
adoption of strategic and tactical doctrine across the Navy. Since the new staff would in 
essence be the brain of the service and would inculcate it, regardless of the particular 
commander, it was imperative that some sort of check be introduced to ensure that 
doctrine would proceed along the correct lines. Indeed, disagreement over strategic 
doctrine between the so-called historical and the materialist schools brought about the 
explosion that required the development of the staff. Moreover, it was vital that the staff 
not become merely an organ for an aggressive First Sea Lord to impose his will on the 
rest of the Navy. Some mechanism was required to act as a check and to ensure that the 
legitimacy of doctrine could be upheld, questioned or rejected in a forum of impeccable 
professionalism with an absence of malice or axe grinding. One such forum was The 
Naval Review. Although James Goldrick has argued that the initial goal of the Naval 
Society was to educate junior officers rather than to challenge doctrine or policy, there 
was more to it than this. 99 While Goldrick might well be correct, at least in part, the 
message officers took from this publication was to take nothing for granted and to 
develop their own critical faculties. Hence, it provided the intellectual tools and space to 
discuss ideas that were formerly the preserve of senior officers. As many of the junior 
officers were future staffers, they would be in positions of influence. The Review was 
99 James Goldrick, "The Irresistible Force and the Immovable Object: The Naval Review, the Young Turks, 
and the Royal Navy, 1911-1931," in James Goldrick and John Hattendorf(eds.) Mahan is Not Enough: The 
Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond 
(Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1993), 83. 
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unconnected to the power structure of the Navy, and its content was initially subject only 
to the discretion of the editor, Admiral William H. Henderson, and a select group of 
officers who acted as a sort of editorial committee. These included Richmond and 
Commanders Reginald Plunkett and Kenneth Dewar. 
The Review was to provide a vehicle not merely to amplify or expound ideas and 
policies for the staff or the First Lord but for officers regardless of rank or experience to 
put forward their ideas before their peers. As Richmond wrote in his diary: "Mais lorsque 
l 'on dis cute, if n y a plus ni superieur, ni inferieur, ni titre, ni dge, ni nom: rien ne compte 
que fa verite, devant elle tout le monde est ega/."100 Officers were encouraged to write 
and were treated kindly by Henderson, who resolutely defended the principle that all 
contributions could be anonymous.101 Furthermore, The Review, unlike RUSI, was 
independent of Admiralty funding; the subscribers bore the full cost of editing, printing 
and shipping. Henderson carried out the editorial work in his London home and office 
expenses were minimal. Initial subscriptions were £1, but as membership grew it were 
possible to cut the cost to ten shillings. 
Henderson was careful to use his political and social contacts to further the 
interests and subscription base of the journal and to ensure that it received at least official 
notice by senior officers. By March 1915, membership included three Sea Lords, the 
Director of Naval Intelligence, Jellicoe and his staff, Beatty, four of the five rear admirals 
100 Marder ( ed.), Portrait of an Admiral, 20; diary entry from March 1911. "But during discussion, there is 
no superior, no inferior, no rank, no age, no name: nothing counts but truth and before that everyone is 
equal." 
101 Indeed, the authorship of the articles of The Naval Review from 1913 to 1931 was unavailable until the 
publication of a list in Mahan is Not Enough in 1993. 
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of cruiser squadrons, four of the s1x home port commanders, four foreign station 
commanders, and Churchill and s1x prominent civilians, including three Cabinet 
ministers. 102 In an undated letter to Prime Minister Asquith, Henderson wrote that "[i]t 
[The Naval Review] is one of the results of your action in encouraging the formation of a 
Naval War Staff, and is essential if our Command in War is to be able to compete with 
that of other nations who pay more attention to these matters than we ... have done." 103 
Total membership reached 1000 by rnid-1915. 104 
The Review was to provide a mechanism to correct command and administration 
in a way that made it safe to contribute and safe for the Admiralty to take on board its 
suggestions. Its rules of anonymity protected individual writers from official or other 
reprisals and also protected the authorities from immoderate and partisan criticism by the 
fact of its restricted circulation. Aside from prominent civilians like Cabinet Members, 
and individuals such as Julian Corbett, it was open only to active service officers of either 
the Army or Navy, and members were cautioned to take proper care of their copies and to 
ensure that no material was used as a form of political propaganda or appeared in the 
press. 
Members are therefore requested to undertake that they will take 
proper care of their copies, that they will not allow them or their 
contents to be communicated to any person not eligible for 
membership or to the Press; and that they will take every 
precaution against their being available or used for any political or 
propagandist purpose. 105 
102 RNM, NRP, Membership List, March 1915. 
103 RNM, NRP, Henderson to Asquith, n.d. 
104 Goldrick, "Irresistible Force," 89. 
105 
"Regulations of The Naval Review," Naval Review, I (1913), bold in original. 
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The purpose of The Review from the outset was to debate broad aspects of policy and to 
refrain from the discussion of materiel or technology. Hence, it was meant to act as a 
secure forum in which to question and to suggest policy reforms while ensuring, as far as 
possible, that it remained free from political intrigue and preserved the freedom of 
contributors. 
Officers at the leading edge of reform constantly complained that the Admiralty 
was out to get them. In fact, there is little evidence that this was so. However, a certain 
chill seemed to come over the Navy during the war as secrecy became much more 
stringent (and continued to be so after the war). For instance, the detailed reports on the 
Navy that were published in the Parliamentary Papers suddenly ceased after 1918. The 
chill in the atmosphere was likely designed to preserve the reputation of the Navy, and the 
executive branch in particular, when the Admiralty was fighting for every farthing in the 
annual estimates. Indeed, Richmond complained bitterly, "there is no channel at all in 
which an Officer can express his ideas except the R US!; and that is so under the heels of 
the Admiralty that is of very little use."106 The situation was also complicated, as Captain 
Henry Shore indicated, by the fact that London was not the centre of naval activity, which 
made it difficult for officers to participate. A more fruitful location would have been 
Portsmouth. 107 
106 NMM, K.G.B. Dewar Papers (DEW) 34/, Richmond to Dewar, 13 June 1911. 
107 Henry Shore, "Mental Sterility Afloat," United Service Magazine, XXXII (March 1906), 613. 
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From the 1860s onwards, the Journal of the Royal United Services Institution 
provided opportunity for even relatively junior officers to contribute to policy 
discussions, subject to Admiralty control. Indeed, the contents of RUSI throughout the 
nineteenth century provide a rich source for the historian. Further, the publication of 
post-lecture discussions gives insight into the thinking of the officer corps. However, after 
the Fisher reforms in 1904, R US! fell silent on core naval affairs, and in view of the 
controversies afflicting the service, the editorial committee elected to shift the focus away 
from controversial topics. Pressure was applied by Fisher to have R US! take a more low-
key approach. Further, there does not appear to be a single discussion at which Fisher was 
present or contributed. Other luminaries of the service, like Charles Beresford, Gerard 
Noel and P.H. Colomb, were regular attendees at such lectures. RUSI was dependent to 
some degree on Admiralty funding, and pressure from Whitehall, subtle or otherwise, 
could not be ignored. 108 
The Admiralty also had complete control over any information in a lecture or 
paper written by naval officers on the active list. Since RUSI was in the legal sense a 
publication, active officers had to submit papers through their commanding officers to the 
Admiralty for vetting before approval for publication. Controversial topics could 
therefore be suppressed quite handily. An example of this involved Caryl on Bellairs, who 
had in 1893 submitted a paper for RUSI that the Admiralty had deemed unsuitable for 
publication. This decision led to questions about Admiralty policy in Parliament, where 
108 Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 4th ser., vol. CLXXII (1907), col. 1090. The 
Admiralty made a financial contribution of £375 per annum and articles submitted for publications were 
vetted by the Admiralty which, of course, meant Fisher in this period. 
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Thomas Gibson Bowles, M.P. for King's Lynn, asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Admiralty, U. Kay-Shuttleworth, why permission had been denied after Bellairs had 
gained the approval of Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton to go forward with his paper. 
Of course, Kay-Shuttleworth refused to answer other than to say that Bellairs had been 
refused on the grounds of Article 682 of the Queen's Regulations, which gave the 
Admiralty the authority to suppress any paper submitted for publication by an active 
officer. 109 A Gold Medal paper written for RUSI in 1913 by K.G.B. Dewar on the 
development of a naval staff was also suppressed. 
An officer who wrote an unorthodox paper or questioned Admiralty policy was 
exposed to possible retribution when the half-yearly promotion lists were drafted or an 
issue arose over where an officer was to be posted. The unparalleled bitterness of the 
feuds within the Navy at the time muzzled debate and discussion. This was why the 
founders of The Naval Review and Henderson steadfastly maintained the anonymity of 
contributors to that journal. Even under severe Admiralty pressure to identify the author 
of a critical article about the Goeben fiasco, Henderson refused to reveal his name. Rear 
Admiral F.W. Kennedy eventually claimed responsibility, thereby earning the enmity of 
the Board. It was indeed remarkable how far the Admiralty would go to defend the 
reputation of an Admiral who no longer had one. 110 
109 Debates, 4th ser., vol. XIX (1893), col. 644. 
110 RNM, NRP; and PRO, ADM 156/178. The proceedings against Kennedy were based on a complaint by 
Admiral Sir Archibald Berkeley Milne who had been Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet in 
1914. Kennedy had written his article immediately after the event and had deposited a copy in his bank in 
the event of his death. See, Brian Schofield, "'Jacky' Fisher, H.M.S. Indomitable and the Dogger Bank 
Action: A Personal Memoir," in Gerald Jordan (ed.), Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century, 1900-1945: 
Essays in Honour of Arthur Marder (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 66. 
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As Richmond wrote Henderson in July 1913, when the latter had suggested 
offering a membership in the Naval Society to the First Lord: 
I think you might point out that you have the advantages in finding out 
what the thoughts of the rising generation is, which are not possessed 
by the officers on the active list with whom he comes in contact. 
THEY don't hear the ideas that are simmering among the younger 
men. A great wave is at present in progress, due largely to the writings 
of Corbett, and to discussions at the War College. 111 
The idea of the formation of a professional journal for naval officers was not new in 
1912. RUSI had been publishing a monthly journal since the mid-nineteenth century, and 
various other commercial service papers continued to appear. The problems with the 
commercial journals such as the United Service Magazine and the Naval and Military 
Record were that they had become too political in their orientation, plus the rancour left 
over from the Fisher era weakened their capacity to act as honest brokers. Further, since 
they were publications, officers could not freely write for them under their own names 
without Admiralty permission. R US! itself was increasingly barren of naval topics, as the 
Admiralty exerted pressure by not permitting certain officers, such as Bellairs and Dewar, 
to speak. 1 12 
111 NMM, H.W. Richmond Papers (RIC) 711, Richmond to Henderson, 23 July 1913. 
112 A perusal ofthe issues of RUS!from 1900 to 1914 reveals a distinct lack of naval topics compared to the 
earlier period where officers like P.H. Colomb, Gerard Noel, C.C.P. Fitzgerald, Richard Vesey Hamilton 
and other were constantly to be found. See also PRO, ADM 1/8317, Memorandum on Publications, 2 
March 1912: "For some years no encouragement whatever had been held out to Naval Officers to express 
their views on general questions & as a consequence very few officers on the active list have written papers 
for the service magazines or taken part in the lectures & proceedings of the RUS Institution ... " Even after 
the war, RUSI seemed to have difficulty attracting naval officers to make contributions, see RNM, NRP, 
"The Status of the Naval Society and its Naval Review," by Captain T. Dannreuther, 1922. 
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In the 1870s a brief attempt was made to introduce a paper exclusively by and for 
junior officers under the editorship of Lieutenant Hubert Grenfell, but it quickly folded 
when it failed to gain a wide audience in the corps and incurred the displeasure of the 
Board. 113 According to Captain T. Dannreuther, he was asked by Fisher to establish a 
correspondence paper for junior officers in 1902, but as a junior lieutenant he considered 
it improper. 114 When the Army General Staff was created, a journal entitled The Army 
Review, designed as a forum of discussion for all officers, was published under its 
auspices. But it was not intended as a regular publication, rather as a printed 
correspondence society with a closed circulation. In similar fashion, when Winston 
Churchill established the Naval War Staff it was suggested that a joint Army and Navy 
review be published; the naval editor was to be Captain Mark Kerr, Assistant to the 
Admiral Commanding Reserves. However, the discussions came to naught, even though 
the Admiralty managed to extract £250 from the Treasury when Kerr argued for an 
additional £50 per annum. The Admiralty wanted an active list officer to act as an editor 
so that effective control over the journal's content could be maintained and refused to 
seek additional monies from the Treasury on the grounds that Kerr might shortly be going 
to sea, where it would be impossible to exercise editorial control. "A strict censorship on 
the hands of a responsible Officer would be a sine-qua-non, in view of the large number 
of highly confidential naval subjects ... " 115 At any rate, it was obvious that the 
commitment of the Admiralty was minimal. As Colonel Charles a Court Repington, the 
113 The Journal of the Junior Professional Naval Officers' Association. 
114 RNM, NRP, Memorandum by Dannreuther, 1922. 
115 PRO, ADM 1/8317, Memorandum by Rear Admiral David Beatty, 14 February 1912. 
327 
editor of The Army Review, wrote to the Admiralty, "I quite see that from your point of 
view it will be easier to put the thing through if it can be shown that it costs nothing, but 
really, with the combined estimates of 71 millions, a charge of a few hundred pounds for 
the improvement of the higher leading & for the development of intellectual progress 
seem to me not worth cavilling at." 116 
What happened instead was that a group of middle-level officers studying at the 
War College at Portsmouth, under the loose direction of Captain Herbert Richmond, 
decided to establish a correspondence society quite independent of the Admiralty. They 
quickly gained the attention and services of Admiral William H. Henderson, who in the 
1870s had been a member of the Junior Naval Officers Professional Association (JNPA), 
which had itself sponsored a journal, and who realized that if such a forum were to 
survive it required a much wider audience than merely junior officers. Henderson wisely 
sought to use his contacts in the upper reaches of the service and politics to read and 
support the enterprise. The foundations of the journal rested on a complete separation 
between the Admiralty and editorial content. Initially this posed little difficulty, and the 
popularity and appeal of the journal dramatically increased its influence. 
The pre-war volumes of The Review relied on contributions from a relatively 
small number of prolific authors. Of the thirty-four articles in the first volume, either 
Henderson or members of his unofficial board including Herbert Richmond and Reginald 
Plunkett wrote fifteen. Gradually, however, the authorship base was widened. 117 Indeed, 
116 PRO, ADM 1/8312, Colonel Repington to Vincent Baddeley, March 1912. 
11 7 Goldrick and Hattendorf(eds.), Mahan is Not Enough, 342-343. 
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in the first decade more than lieutenants wrote one third of the articles, a significantly 
greater number than any previous service journal since the Junior Naval Officers' 
Professional Association's journal in the 1870s. Only occasionally did officers so junior 
grace the pages of R US! or any of the other papers. While some officers saw The Review 
as a threat, for the most part the official attitude was that it acted as a safety valve that did 
no harm. Still, there was some concern that confidential information would leak from the 
journal to the press, or worse, to the Navy's potential rivals. The Superintendent at 
Chatham, Captain H. Dalton, though, expressed the opinion that it was impossible for The 
Review to function without discussing matters that should not be permitted in print. 118 
After the war began in 1914, it did not take long for the editor of The Review to 
run afoul of the Admiralty over some of the material that was printed. In a series of 
articles discussing the Falklands episode of December 1914, 119 sparked by a complaint by 
Jellicoe, the Admiralty outlined its concerns in an interview between the Secretary, Sir W. 
Graham Greene, and Henderson at the end of May 1915. The Secretary was concerned 
that since some members of the Society were civilians, there would be considerable 
difficulty in controlling access to the material. Indeed, in a later communication, it was 
noted that there were eleven civilian members, but that all were either current or former 
Cabinet members, ex -naval officers or senior secretarial staff in the Admiralty. 120 
118 RNM, NRP, Captain H. Dalton to Henderson, 22 June 1913. 
119 In December 1914, a squadron under the command of Rear Admiral Doveton Sturdee caught a German 
force under Admiral Grafvon Spee off the Falkland Islands. 
120 RNM, NRP, Henderson to Graham Green, 4 June 1915. See also PRO, ADM 1/8423/157, Censorship of 
articles for The Naval Review Magazine, October 1915. 
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Conclusion 
The process whereby the executive officer corps attempted to redefine itself in a fashion 
acceptable to the rising concerns of middle-class professionals was amply demonstrated 
by the institution of a Naval War Staff in 1912 and the foundation of a professional 
journal for executive officers in that same year. Their point of origin was not a 
coincidence. Both institutions were a response to the changing demands of the naval 
officer's workplace. Similarly, both institutional changes were widely resented, and some 
regarded them merely as tools to reassert the professional competence of the executive 
branch in the face of concerted criticism inside and outside the naval service. However, 
both the foundation of the staff and the appearance of The Naval Review went beyond 
merely supporting the pretension of the executive elite. While accepting executive 
predominance, forward- thinking officers pointed out that position had to be earned by 
extending formal professional qualifications to traditional command and authority within 
the service. If science and scientific history were to be the cornerstones of a strategy to 
retain primacy, it had to be made real and provide enough social, cultural and intellectual 
currency to win acceptance in wider British society. 
The resistance of the older generation of officers was based on the assertion of 
traditional command (although it was of fairly recent origin) and was no longer tenable in 
a navy that was undergoing revolutionary change, not merely in machinery and 
technology but also in its internal social arrangements. It was no longer thought to be 
adequate to consider command the natural prerogative of a gentlemanly elite, and the 
concept that officers were "born and bred" was under increasing attack in an age when 
the power of the landed establishment was being shaken to its core. The capitulation of 
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the Lords, Irish Home Rule and the Unionist revolt demonstrated that the old order was 
evolving into a new paradigm in British politics and society. Aspirations and assertions of 
the power of command had to be accompanied by structural changes that acquired 
legitimacy outside the naval service. The increased popularity and deep concern over the 
development of naval policy redoubled pressure on the executive branch to be worthy of 
trust. More money could be spent and more dreadnoughts could be built, but that money 
and the will to construct such a fleet came at a high price. Increased oversight and a 
developing chasm between the reality of a changing Britain and the traditional officer 
corps had to be reconciled with the concrete security needs of the nation. Traditional 
views of command were the first casualty in this cultural shift. But traditional command 
was merely wounded, and it survived beyond the Great War, albeit in a highly modified 
form. These reforms put the officer corps on notice that to pursue policies and to preserve 
institutional peculiarities in defiance of evolving trends was a road to weakened authority. 
Two key elements in the self-conscious professionalization of the executive 
officer corps in the years between the resignation of Fisher and the outbreak of war in 
1914 were the struggle over the establishment of a Naval War Staff and the publication of 
The Naval Review as a forum for free discussion between naval officers, regardless of 
rank. Both were in some respects threats to the established order. The Naval Staff did not 
threaten traditional-minded executive officers because of its efficiency or because it was 
new and therefore of dubious importance. Instead, the staff system was widely resented 
because it implied a circumventing of command and a reduction in the power of the 
commander. It threatened, in the minds of many, to turn the commander from the 
conductor of naval operations into a mere cog in the machine of British naval policy. 
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Moreover, this change was very much in step with the development of professional 
management in large industrial enterprises. The same sorts of difficulties in British 
industry in developing these new managerial methods also served as barriers to the 
grafting of staff systems onto the Royal Navy. The desire for personal responsibility and 
for personal control over the allocation of resources hampered the change to 
managerial/staff organization. 121 The personal connections which were so important in 
maintaining the stability and cohesiveness of the naval officer corps began to break down 
not only with the growth in the size of the Navy but also with the nearly geometric 
growth in complexity. The staff system was an attempt to subject strategic planning to 
management and reflected a switch from personal rule to collective management. 
The Naval Review was also seen as a threat to the competence of senior officers. 
All commissioned officers, regardless of rank and with complete anonymity, could 
challenge the views of the senior men in the Navy. Such a journal threatened to expose 
professional weakness. It also provided an avenue for dissent that could be widely 
disseminated throughout the service, that one was beyond the control of hierarchy and the 
Admiralty administration. Indeed, once war was declared in 1914, it did not take long for 
protests to reach the ears of the Admiralty regarding the impropriety of The Naval 
Review. In 1915, at the instigation of Jellicoe, the journal was suppressed until the end of 
the war, and thereafter the Board of Admiralty officially controlled it. Nonetheless, The 
121 See Alfred D. Chandler, "The Growth of the Transnational Industrial Firm in the United States and the 
United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis," Economic History Review, 2"d Series, XXXIII, No. 3 (August 
1980), 396-410. 
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Review, in its capacity as a mechanism for discussion, was a necessary contribution to the 
fi . 1· . f h N 122 pro esswna 1zatwn o t e avy. 
122 See, Allan R. Millett, The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the United States Army, 1881-
1925 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), 4-5 . "If there is to be criticism and doubting, it must be 
internalised by formal peer-group action or subtle informal sanctions." 
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Chapter IX 
"Auxillium ab Alto"1 - The Experience of War 
War is not a very exhilarating business when we have no confidence in 
the high command. 2 
I am getting in the habit of writing perhaps more freely than I ought to. 
I write in haste, sometimes with no knowledge of a situation beyond 
our own view of it, so if I write too much please make allowance for 
my Celtic temperament. I know that you will use them, as I write 
them, only for the good of the Service - or rather for the good of the 
Country, which comes before the Service. 3 
In his February 1914 critique of the Slade Report, Douglas Haig expressed deep unease 
with the capacity of the Admiralty and its nascent War Staff to manage and direct major 
combat operations. Indeed, he concluded his memorandum by arguing that while 
proposed reforms put forward by the Committee to redress this defect were being 
implemented, " ... we should, presumably, be careful to steer clear of any wars."4 Yet 
barely six months later the country was engaged in the greatest conflict in its history. 
Unfortunately for the executive officer corps, Haig's ominous assessment was 
accurate. Even though the Navy was largely successful in the execution of its strategic 
tasks in securing British maritime communications and restricting those of its opponent, it 
was a near thing. Indeed, in the crucial year of 1917 the Admiralty seemed paralysed in 
1 E.C. Talbot-Booth, The Royal Navy: Some Account of Her Manners, Customs and Privileges (London: 
Sampson, Low & Co., 1942), 513, motto ofH.M.S. Kellett, "Help from upon High." 
2 National Maritime Museum (NMM), K.G.B. Dewar Papers (DEW) 33/, K.G.B. Dewar to Richmond, 8 
June 1916. 
3 NMM, H.W. Richmond Papers (RIC) 7/4, R. Plunkett to Richmond, 18 December 1914. 
4 Churchill College, Cambridge, Archives Centre (CCAC), Chartwell Papers (CHAR) 13/26, Notes on the 
Report of the Slade Report by Douglas Haig, February 1914. See also John Terraine, "The Training of 
Naval Officers: Lord Haig's Notes on the Report of the Committee on the Naval War College, 1913," 
Journal of the Royal United Services Institution (RUSI), CIX (1964), 362. 
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the face of unrestricted submarine warfare. All the preparations before the war, including 
the construction of the Grand Fleet's much-vaunted dreadnoughts, seemed futile. The 
Admiralty's incapacity to use existing naval assets in an effective manner, its inability to 
defend British commerce on the high seas, and its administrative and operational 
incompetence also triggered a crisis of confidence. This lack of trust in the capacity of the 
Admiralty and its staff to conduct operations was expressed in the press and through the 
War Cabinet. However, most seriously of all, the Admiralty lost the effective confidence 
of comparatively junior executive officers. This culminated in the embarrassing dismissal 
of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, arguably the most distinguished officer on the active list, 
from his post as First Sea Lord in December 1917.5 
The war provided an even more severe test for the executive officer corps than the 
rough and tumble of reform in the decade prior to 1914. The argument that naval officers, 
by virtue of a lifetime of service, were uniquely qualified to exercise the power of 
command had long provided the trump card that kept interlopers away from professional 
matters. Not only had officers been trained "scientifically" in the use of the technical 
means of sea power but also by virtue of historical principles they understood the ends of 
such power wielded on behalf of the community. Further, to buttress their claims to such 
authority, and consequently a large proportion of state finance, the officer corps had 
emphasized the decisiveness of sea power. All the claims to status had to be made good in 
August 1914. An officer corps might serve several political and social roles in a 
community, but its position was assured only by its capacity to provide efficient 
5 See S.W. Roskill, "The Dismissal of Admiral Jellicoe," in W. Laqueur and G.L. Mosse (eds.), 1914: The 
Coming of the First World War (New York: Harper, 1966). 
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leadership in war. This lay at the heart of the three-way contractual relationship between 
the state, the community and the officer corps that has been a recurring theme in this 
dissertation. 6 As long as the corps demonstrated its prowess through the successful 
conduct of operations, its status and power was assured. In the case of the Royal Navy in 
the Great War, however, this happy arrangement did not last. Not only did the naval war 
prove to be an immense disappointment professionally for the corps but it also shook the 
community's confidence in its competence. 
First of all, the expectations by officers and the general public of a quick and 
decisive campaign were dashed when the crucial clash did not come, and the battle that 
was fought nearly two years later off Jutland had unsatisfactory results. Beatty's battle 
cruisers were severely mauled and Jellicoe was unable to press his advantage in support 
of the Battle Cruiser Fleet. The dreadnoughts were also powerless to halt the submarine 
campaign that nearly strangled the British war effort. Moreover, in the opening months of 
the war, Jellicoe felt compelled to shift the "all-powerful" Grand Fleet around the British 
Isles because its bases were not secure. The Dardanelles campaign and a host of other 
costly blunders exposed the incompetence of many officers, several of whom had been 
identified as top-flight flag officers before the war. For instance, a former chief of staff at 
the Admiralty and a former director of the War College were directly involved.7 
6 Jan Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-
Military States, 15 00-165 0 (London: Routledge, 2002), 4-5 . 
7 Rear Admiral Ernest Troubridge was a former Chief of Staff who was tried by court martial for cowardice 
in the face of the enemy, a capital charge, for the escape of the German battle cruiser Goeben in August 
1914 and Vice Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly was a former director of the War College who was disgraced by 
the loss ofthe battleship Formidable in the Channel in the early morning hours of 1 January 1915. 
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Moreover, the administrative and command arrangements in the Admiralty were 
inadequate to deal with the realities of modem naval warfare. While organizing and 
fighting a major war, the Admiralty was constantly restructured to meet growing and 
shifting demands. This situation was complicated by constant changes in leadership on 
the political and professional levels, as the Navy went through four Cabinet ministers and 
five First Sea Lords between October 1914 and December 1917.8 Even more critical than 
those changes, the executive officer corps effectively lost control of the agenda at the 
Admiralty as administrative changes, especially in the critical year of 1917, were imposed 
by the War Cabinet. Further, one of the highest professional administrative posts on the 
Board of Admiralty, the Third Sea Lord and Controller, was given to a civilian railway 
executive, Sir Eric Geddes, who was granted the rank of Vice Admiral by special Order-
in-Council.9 Later in 1917 Geddes was appointed First Lord and set about reorganizing 
the Admiralty in defiance of the opinion of its professional members. 
The constant changes in Admiralty command organization also did little to inspire 
confidence. As Arthur Pollen remarked, the naval war seemed to lurch from one crisis to 
the next. Each seemed to result in a change in either the post of First Lord or First Sea 
Lord and sent public and political confidence even lower. 10 In October 1914, as a result of 
operational failures, a perceived incapacity to handle Winston Churchill, and because of 
his German ancestry, Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg was forced to tender his 
8 See Appendix I. 
9 Public Record Office (PRO), Admiralty Papers (ADM) 118489/122, Order in Council granting Vice 
Admiral rank to Sir Eric Geddes, 1917. 
10 Arthur H. Pollen, "Four Years ofNaval War," Land and Water, 8 August 1918. 
337 
resignation. 11 Due to the failure of the Dardanelles campaign in the spring of 1915 Fisher, 
who had replaced Battenberg, resigned and brought Churchill down with him. In 
December 1916 Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, the First Sea Lord, and Arthur Balfour, the 
First Lord, resigned and were replaced by Jellicoe and Sir Edward Carson. In July 1917 
Carson was moved upstairs to the War Cabinet by Lloyd George and replaced with Eric 
Geddes. Finally, in December 1917 his deputy, Rosslyn Wemyss, succeeded Jellicoe. 
Dissatisfaction with the direction of the Admiralty and the Navy in general became 
widespread in the aftermath of Jutland and reached critical proportions after the 
resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917. By failing to inflict 
decisive damage on the German High Seas Fleet and the inability to staunch the 
submarine campaign, the senior leadership of the executive officer corps effectively lost 
control of strategic policy and the structure of command in Whitehall. Spiralling losses 
and the despondency of the First Sea Lord triggered systematic attacks in the press, deep 
apprehension within the War Cabinet and, perhaps most damaging of all, and a rebellion 
among officers in the fleet. This distrust of the Admiralty machinery resulted in the 
imposition of a civilian controller, the restructuring of the Staff three times, the dismissal 
of the Secretary, Sir William Graham Greene, and fmally the removal of J ellicoe himself 
in December 191 7. 
11 In 1917, Battenberg renounced his German title and was created the Marquess of Milford Haven. Also, in 
a similar fashion to the Royal Family, his surname was changed to a more English-sounding one, 
Mountbatten. See, PRO, ADM 118490/132, Prince Louis of Battenberg - Relinquishing of Titles and 
Question ofNew Titles, 1917. 
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The crux of the problem appeared to be the Admiralty, which was identified as the 
"Augean stable" that required a Hercules to sort out. 12 Although in the first two years of 
the war disaffection between the fleet and the Admiralty seemed to grow, in reality it was 
little different from the tensions that had existed between operational commanders and the 
administrative centre in the past. Certainly, the relationship between the Admiralty and 
Beresford when he was Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet was considerably less 
cordial than that which existed between, say, Jellicoe and the Admiralty when the former 
was commander of the Grand Fleet. 
The reason for the loss of confidence was that the professional leadership of the 
executive officer corps had failed, or was perceived to have failed, in the execution of its 
core function: the exercise of command at sea. Whatever the changes in conditions of 
service, the authority of leadership in combat remained a fallback position, but the war 
exposed these claims as dubious. The Navy failed tactically at Jutland, strategically at the 
Dardanelles, and most seriously was unable to deal with the menace of German 
submarines. In 1917 the leadership of the officer corps had lost the initiative in the 
organization of the command function in the Admiralty and effectively lost the political 
battle in Whitehal1. 13 Professional expertise that was supposed to be ensured by tighter 
regulation, higher educational qualifications, courts martial and finally a professional 
review, were exposed as hollow. This left a group of mid-grade officers who had been 
12 NMM, RIC 7/4, R. Drax to Richmond, 8 May 1917. 
13 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Age of Fisher, 1904-
1919 (5 vols., London: Oxford University Press, 1959-1974), IV; and A. Temple Patterson, Jellicoe (2 
vols., London: Macmillan, 1969), 184-189. 
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aware of many of the defects before the war profoundly frustrated, and as they were 
deprived of a means to influence policy. 
The Admiralty also lost the confidence of powerful sections of the press, m 
particular the Northcliffe papers, such as the Daily Mail and The Times, as well as 
commentators, such as Arthur Pollen, who co-edited the journal Land and Water with 
Hillaire Belloc. As the war was brought home with the institution of rationing in 1917, 
the Admiralty was subjected to unprecedented scrutiny in everything from strategy, to 
promotion rules and organization. Unused to dealing with the press and impatient with 
publicity, Jellicoe had no effective response and lacked Fisher's skill at feeding 
information to favoured correspondents. Indeed, the Admiralty attempted to censor 
Pollen, and J ellicoe .obtained a legal opinion on whether a libel suit could be levelled 
against the Daily Mai/. 14 
Finally and perhaps most seriously, the Admiralty effectively lost the confidence 
of many officers in the fleet, especially the intellectuals centred on Herbert Richmond. 15 
These officers were not shy about using their press and political contacts to push 
structural reforms that they believed were necessary. With the tacit support of more senior 
officers, including David Beatty, they felt justified in going outside the chain of command 
to put forward ideas to save the situation from what they saw as disaster. In Richmond's 
14 PRO, ADM 116/1805, Correspondence of Geddes, October 1917. See also Patterson (ed.), Jellicoe 
Papers, II, 223-225. 
15 Barry Hunt, Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, 1871-1946 (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 1982), 25-39; James Goldrick, "The Irresistible Force and the Immovable Object: The 
Naval Review, the Young Turks, and the Royal Navy, 1911-1931," in James Goldrick and John B. 
Hattendorf (eds.), Mahan is not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian 
Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1993), 83-102; and 
Donald Schurman, The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867-
/914 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 127-129. 
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words, "I hate this slavish habit of naval officers & this false idea of loyalty, which is 
generally not loyalty at all, but cowardice." 16 
The War 1914-1916: The Outbreak of War and Expectations 
When Britain declared war on Germany in August 1914, the Royal Navy was already 
mobilized. Many naval officers seemed rather mystified at the immediate causes of the 
war, as Midshipmen Harold Hickling later related in his autobiography: 
I had never heard of the Archduke nor did I know where Sarajevo was; 
I thought the skipper was pulling our legs. All sorts of heads of state, 
crowned or otherwise, had been bumped off but no one had gone to 
war about it. But he was right; the next day Austria declared war on 
Serbia and soon ultimatums were being handed round the chancelleries 
of Europe like writs during a Wall Street slump. 17 
Still, for the most part the executive branch welcomed the war in the belief that a quick 
and decisive victory in the North Sea would remove the threat of the German High Seas 
Fleet. In this estimation they were not alone, since the general public expected that 
modern technology and efficient mobilization would quickly ensure victory. As The Daily 
Mail reported on 6 August: 
All yesterday London was waiting to know what might be happening 
in the North Sea. Men and women would stop at their work to sketch 
little maps and talk eagerly of the probable disposition of the fleets. On 
the marble-topped tables of restaurants the same maps would be found 
- clumsy outlines of the coasts of Britain, Holland, Denmark and 
Norway. 18 
16 Arthur Marder (ed.), Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1952), 23 7, diary entry, 13 March 1917. 
17 Harold Hickling, Sailor at Sea (London: William Kimber, 1965), 15. 
18 
"Waiting for the Sea Fight," Daily Mail, 6 August 1914. 
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All the navalist propaganda which had been force- fed to the nation over the 
previous two decades, along with a facile reading of Mahan, created expectations of a 
rapid campaign that would result in the fleet destroying its opposite number in pitched 
battle. The problem, as Wolfgang Wegener wrote after the war, was that the North Sea 
was strategically dead once both the British and the Germans stood on the strategic 
defensive. 19 By controlling the exits of the North Sea at Dover and Scapa Flow, the RN 
effectively cut off German maritime communications without battle. 
Not only had the officer corps failed to educate the general public that naval 
victories were not merely won but required work, it also failed to educate itself about the 
ends of naval power as opposed to the means. When the great sea battle failed to 
materialize and the Grand Fleet spent most of its time riding at anchor or conducting 
periodic sweeps, it was profoundly disappointing. Frustration was rife in both the Grand 
and Battle Cruiser Fleets over the inaction. It did not take long to blame someone for the 
trouble, as David Beatty wrote to his wife in September 1914: 
This roaming about the North Sea day after day with no prospect of 
meeting an enemy vessel I think is the heaviest trial that could be laid 
on any man, added to the which the anxiety of the mine or submarine 
always present provides a situation which requires the highest forms of 
philosophy to compete with, to prevent it from clouding one's 
judgement. Here have I the finest striking force in world, 6 Battle 
Cruisers and 6 Light Cruisers, and for all we can do, they might be 
Thames barges ... We can never do anything because we are never in 
the right place. Who at the Admiralty is responsible for one's 
movements I do not know, but it is not the CinC. He concurs with me. 
Not a word of this to a soul. I must not criticise. It is most improper, 
19 Wolfgang Wegener, The Naval Strategy of the World War (1929, reprint, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 1989), 37. 
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but my digestion, under continual disappointments, is giving way and 
my temper is becoming damnable."20 
Public frustration grew as the army fought while the Navy seemed to be floating 
aimlessly awaiting the appearance of the High Seas Fleet. In late November, Roger Keyes 
vented his spleen over public expectations. 
People won't realize, though we all do, that we may take a real knock 
in one place without being able to inflict much loss in return. Dorothy 
says quite a lot of people say - Pity the Navy isn't doing better -
Where would we be without it! I quite admit we ought not to have lost 
ANY of those cruisers, all the same if my people had been in their 
place and had had the targets they have had the bag would have been a 
large one. If critics would take a big map and play a war game- say 
with 20 cruisers to catch the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau under rules as 
to visibility- coal, stores, etc. they would realize what it meant. 21 
Further, once the fleet had gone to its war stations, the High Seas Fleet did not 
come out to fight and German communications were cut, there was the constant urge to 
use British naval strength for some offensive purpose?2 As Balfour wrote to Jellicoe in 
January 1916: 
Have you, by the way recently given much thought to a possible naval 
offensive against Germany in the Baltic or elsewhere? I know the 
subject was much in your thoughts at one time; but I am not aware 
whether you have recently been following it up. I hope we should get 
home some old battleships soon from the Mediterranean; and the 
young men of your Fleet might devote themselves to a war game in 
which these might serve as some of the pieces.23 
20 W.S. Chalmers (ed.), The Life and Letters of David, Earl Beatty (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1951), 
176, Beatty to his wife, 21 September 1914. 
21 Paul Halpern (ed.), The Keyes Papers (3 vols., London: Navy Records Society, 1972), I, 53, Keyes to his 
wife, 21 November 1914. 
22 Indeed, Jellicoe referred to such pressure as "the six monthly agitation for a naval offensive." See 
Patterson, Jellicoe, 185. 
23 British Library, Jellicoe Papers, Add. MSS. 48992 folio IV, Balfour to Jellicoe, 17 January 1916. 
343 
Further, the war shook naval officers' entire value system and exposed it to ridicule and 
attack. Courage under fire and the honourable warrior spirit were exposed as fraudulent. 
As Gordon Campbell related on a visit to the Western Front, in 1917 after he had won his 
Victoria Cross: 
The inhumanity and stupidity of war faced one in all directions. A road 
map for guidance was useless. Villages ceased to exist. Trees had been 
withered, and even graveyards had been used for trench lines and 
vaults as dug outs. I think if more people had seen some of these 
sights, they would realise the desirability of trying to avoid future 
wars. 
Campbell reported feeling almost ashamed of his VC. 24 Of course others, like Captain 
Walter Cowan, reportedly enjoyed leaves on the Western Front hoping to see action that 
had eluded him while commanding a battle cruiser in the North Sea.25 
As an operations centre, the Naval Staff at the Admiralty was unequal to the task 
of co-ordinating the naval war. Indeed, as soon as the war broke out it ceased to carry out 
its functions as laid down in the orders-in-council that had established it. The Sea Lords 
became heads of department, and co-ordination between those departments became 
increasingly difficult. As the Dardanelles Commission concluded in 1917, the function of 
the Board was relegated to the background when it met with decreasing frequency after 
the outbreak of the conflict. 26 
24 Gordon Campbell, Number Thirteen (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1932), 107. 
25 Lionel Dawson, The Sound of the Guns: Being an Account of the Wars and Service of Admiral Sir Walter 
Cowan (Oxford: Pen in Hand, 1949), 138-140. 
26 Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Parliamentary Papers (BPP), "First Report of the 
Dardanelles Commission," 431. While in 1913 the Board met twenty-four times, between August 1914 and 
May 1915 it met only twelve times, and in November 1915 a collective minute to the First Lord (then 
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The mobilization of the entire stock of British resources to prosecute the Great 
War exposed the War Office and the Admiralty to complex and difficult problems. Not 
the least of these was the recruitment, training and integration of hundreds of thousands 
of hostilities-only ratings and officers into the Royal Navy. From baseline strength of just 
under 150,000 men, the Navy had expanded to over 400,000 by the end of the war, yet 
significantly only 188,000 were regular service personne1.27 Even essential services, such 
as the education of young regular officers, were completely disrupted and led to the 
dispatch of these officers to the University of Cambridge.28 The discipline and education 
of young midshipmen in the fleet was unevenly supervised, leading to the runaway 
growth of bullying and other forms of abuse in the gunroom messes.29 This reached the 
point where J ellicoe as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet issued a circular ordering 
officers to enforce discipline more rigorously. After further incidence of indiscipline in 
the gunroom mess in 1917, a Board of Inquiry was convened under Captain Kiddie of 
H.M.S. Revenge, which concluded that inexperience had been a source of complaint for 
reserve midshipmen: 
The Midshipmen, R.N., have entered and brought up together under 
the discipline of older Cadets and Cadet Captains during their training 
at Osborne and Dartmouth are more accustomed to be taken charge of 
and to receive orders from Officers only slightly older than 
themselves, and they are also familiar by hearsay with Gun Room 
Arthur Balfour) by the junior members of the Board expressed discontent with the dominant position of the 
First Lord and First Sea Lord. 
27 PRO, ADM 1/8592/ 131B, Memorial for the Treasury of Personnel Passing through the Royal Navy, 
1914-1918. 
28 PRO, ADM 118563/203, Naval Officers to be Educated at Cambridge, 1919; and S.W. Roskill, "The 
Navy at Cambridge, 1919-1923," Mariner 's Mirror, XLIX, No.3 (1963), 178-193. 
29 PRO, ADM 156/2 1, Report of Bullying in Grand Fleet Battleships, 1916. 
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procedure; whereas the Midshipmen, R.N.R. come into the Service 
ignorant of the traditions and customs of the Service and of the Gun 
Room.30 
The customs of the service could not possibly be at fault. Other midshipmen 
trumped up a false charge of homosexuality against an unpopular sub-lieutenant.31 
Maintaining discipline proved to be difficult because young midshipmen were permitted 
to run riot while on shore leave and to behave in a discreditable fashion. Two officers 
were charged with disorderly conduct after cursing and threatening the owner of a cinema 
in Invergordon, but they were merely deprived of seniority.32 The lack of an enforced 
training programme and supervision over the gunroom mess in heavy ships was another 
indication of the shortage of regular officers and exposed a serious weakness in the 
officer training system in times of hostilities. 
With the large wartime requirement for officers, skilled ratings and warrant 
officers, standards of discipline and deference to regular line officers declined. This was 
particularly the case with reserve and hostilities-only personnel. who accounted for the 
tremendous increase in courts martial against commissioned officers during the war years. 
Whereas in 1910-1913 only 187 officers and 619 ratings were tried, during the war the 
numbers rocketed to 1128 and 1029, respectively. Only just over 300 of the officers 
charged were regular line officers; and the remainder were reserves. 33 Despite the strain 
30 PRO, ADM 156/21 , Captain Kiddie to Vice Admiral, 1st Battle Squadron, 13 January 1917. 
3 1 PRO, ADM 156/156, Case ofSub LieutenantJohn Turner, 1917. 
32 PRO, ADM 156/151 , Court Martial of Midshipmen, 1915. 
33 PRO, ADM 1/8556/110, Memorandum on Court Martial Procedure by the Judge-Advocate of the Fleet, 
12 April 1919. 
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of war, naval officers had to spend an almost unprecedented amount of time dealing with 
legal proceedings. Further, in the case of many reserve officers dealing with the naval 
service, familiarity with the workings of the regular executive branch bred contempt and 
intense criticism.34 In defence of their privileges, particularly in the junior ranks, regular 
officers were more careful of their status; service in auxiliary squadrons was to be 
avoided.35 
Executive command in the Admiralty was exercised through the War Staff Group 
that Churchill established at the outbreak of war. Its membership included the First Lord, 
First Sea Lord, Chief of Staff and Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson. This group had no real 
organization and tended to reflect the personality of the dominant member, usually 
Churchill. Hence, command decisions were effectively separated from both the Board and 
the Naval Staff. Every single member of the War Group, save Churchill, were generally 
unenthusiastic about the naval staff system and seemed quite unable to fathom the 
benefits that might accrue. Wilson, who had been brought back as an unpaid adviser, 
opposed the naval staff from the start, and his removal from the post of First Sea Lord 
was a direct result of that opposition. Fisher, despite his frequent advocacy for a staff 
system, thought it excellent for everyone but himself. As he told Corbett at one point 
when the historian pressed him on the issue of staff command, "An effete First Sea Lord 
34 Sydney Moseley, The Fleet from Within: Being the Impressions of a R.N V.R. Officer (London: Sampson, 
Low, Marston & Co., 1919), 11-12. 
35 PRO, Ministry of Transport Papers (MT) 23/688, Case of Lieutenant Commander J.A. Rogers, RNR, 
1916. Commander Rogers in a rather peremptory fashion ordered a regular RN officer about at Le Havre 
and the regular officer lodged an official protest. 
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would be the very devil."36 Henry "Dummy" Oliver, the Chief of Staff, was a rigid 
centralizer who liked to keep control in his own hands, especially when he should have 
been the linchpin that connected the staff to the operations committee. 37 
Matters were made worse by a combination of secrecy and an apparent 
willingness to sacrifice operational commanders in order to shore up the reputation of the 
Admiralty. In the series of disasters that afflicted the Navy in the first months of the war, 
Admiralty orders were at least in part complicit. In particular, the treatment of Rear 
Admiral Ernest Troubridge after the failure to catch the German battle cruiser Goeben in 
the Mediterranean contained a warning that operational commanders would be held 
responsible despite inadequate direction from London.38 
The Admiralty's dispositions often left commanders afloat in parlous situations. 
After the loss of Cradock's squadron off Coronel in November 1914, Beatty bitterly 
opposed the needless withdrawal of battle cruisers to hunt down von Spee.39 Although 
two vessels were sent to the Falklands, two others were sent to the Caribbean in the event 
that the Germans attempted to use the Panama Canal to break into the Atlantic. This left 
36 CCAC, J.A. Fisher Papers (FISR) 114/191, J.A. Fisher to Julian Corbett, 22 December 1905. See also 
CHAR 13/2, Fisher to Churchill, 6 November 1911. "Of course the advantage of a Naval War Staff is that 
the country ain't ruined if you have a d-d fool as First Sea Lord. If you have a Barham as First Sea Lord 
he will dominate the War Staff. It never signifies anywhere whether you have a Board or a Committee - the 
ablest man runs the show!" 
37 Hunt, Sailor Scholar, 45; Admiral Sir Henry Oliver recounted the difficulties of keeping up with "two 
stupid old men and one raving lunatic." 
38 See, "The Question ofNaval Courts Martial," Blackwood's, CXCVII (April 1915), 530-537. 
39 Indeed, faulty dispositions left Rear Admiral Christopher Cradock in such a state that he was completely 
inferior in strength to von Spee. H.W. Richmond who was serving as Assistant Director of Operations at the 
Admiralty blamed Doveton Sturdee, the Chief of Staff. Marder (ed.), Portrait of an Admiral, 131; as did 
David Beatty: Bryan Ranft (ed.), The Beatty Papers (2 vols., London: Navy Records Society, 1989), I, 174. 
348 
Beatty's battle cruiser squadrons seriously weakened in the event of a sortie by the High 
Seas Fleet. As one officer on his staff wrote: "I look on it as verging on lunacy among 
those who have not had opportunity to study naval strategy, and little better than treason 
in those who have."40 
It was also brought home to many officers that the upper echelons of the officer 
corps were not fully up to their jobs. Many of the operational fiascos were ordered by 
officers thought to be the best representatives of the naval profession. Rear Admiral 
Ernest Troubridge had received command of the Mediterranean cruiser squadron after he 
had served as the War Staffs first Chief of Staff from 1912 to 1914. Admiral Sir Lewis 
Bayly had served as the Admiral President of the Royal Naval War College at Portsmouth 
before going to the Channel Fleet and presiding over the loss of Formidable on New 
Years' Day of 1915. Rear Admiral Archibald Moore misread a signal from Beatty's 
flagship, Lion, which had been compelled to drop out of line due to heavy damage, and 
permitted Hipper's battle cruisers to escape. 
Industrialized warfare invariably results m the death and ma1mmg of large 
numbers of individuals. The Royal Navy and the other services recognized that their 
activities in war entailed killing and losses. By the necessity of going to sea, naval 
officers risked their lives in peacetime as well as war. Hardly a Britannia term did not 
suffer the loss of several members through accident, sickness or action. Indeed, the old 
naval toast, "a bloody war and a sickly season," recognized that the deaths of others could 
and did often result in the advancement of the survivors. In the case of the Great War, the 
Royal Navy's manpower losses were relatively light compared to the massive losses 
40 NMM, RIC 7/4, R. Plunkett to Richmond, 7 January 1915. 
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sustained by the British Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.) on the Western Front. Indeed, in the 
entire four years of war, the Navy suffered not many more losses that the Army 
encountered on the first day of the Battle of the Somme (see Table 9.1). 
Table 9.1- Royal Navy Losses, 1914-1918 
Casualties Officers Men Total 
Killed in Action 2059 20128 22207 
Died of other causes 394 10926 11320 
Wounded in Action 805 4072 4877 
Wounded non Action 313 313 
Prisoner ofWar 179 726 905 
Interned 44 227 271 
Missing 15 32 271 
Total casualties 3496 36,424 40,165 
Source: PRO, ADM 1/8592/131B, Return on Manning during the War, September 1919. 
Among those killed were three flag officers, nineteen captains, forty-one commanders 
and 310 lieutenants.41 
What was disconcerting, however, were the meaningless casualties suffered as a 
result of a carelessness that appalled the general public and utterly frustrated officers 
humiliated by the perceived incompetence of others. The continuous loss of highly 
trained and skilled officers and ratings shook the confidence of the corps, especially when 
there seemed to be no countervailing benefit. In September 1914, three armoured cruisers 
steaming slowly in the Broad Fourteens in the North Sea were torpedoed within an hour 
41 PRO, ADM 10/ 16, List of Obituaries ofNaval Officers dying between 1903 and 1933. 
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by a solitary German submarine killing nearly a thousand men. Included in the crew were 
a large number of midshipmen who had been mobilized from Dartmouth and sent to sea. 
On New Years' Day 1915, the battleship Formidable was torpedoed steaming at less than 
ten knots while steering on a steady course with the loss of hundreds of lives. Not even 
the most basic anti-submarine measures were undertaken. By mid-November of 1914 the 
Navy (including Marines and reserves) had already lost over 4000 men (excluding 
officers) on active service.42 Admiral Lord Charles Beresford was dismayed, as he wrote 
to Admiral W.H. Henderson, "I quite agree with you; the Navy will lose confidence in its 
leaders if Officers and men are murdered with no particular object whatever. .. I would 
send a whole squadron of battleships to certain death to win an action by another attack, 
but would not risk the life of one man without there being an object to attain."43 
Richmond wrote in response to the loss of Formidable "[i]t looks like some lunacy of 
Bayly's. So I should expect it to be. The man has no judgement, is as obstinate as a mule, 
and is too stupid to convince. "44 
The Battle of Coronel, where Cradock's squadron was destroyed, was also a 
profound shock. After the action Midshipman Harold Hickling in Glasgow recalled: 
I prefer not to dwell on the next 48 hours. Never have I known the 
Captain, officers and men of a ship so closely knit, bound closely 
together in the misery of our common tragedy. The Royal Navy of 
42 PRO, ADM 1/8403/429, Report on Number ofRoyal Naval and Royal Marine Personnel killed up to 17 
November 1914; a further 3500 would be added at Coronel alone later that same month. 
43 NMM, W.H. Henderson Papers (HEN) 2/2, Beresford to Henderson, 18 January 1915. 
44 Marder (ed.), Portrait of an Admiral, 134; diary entry 4 January 1915. Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, a former 
commandant of the Portsmouth War College, was Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet and was the 
flag officer present on 1 January 1915. It is interesting to note that General Charles Gordon was Bayly's 
maternal grandfather; "Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly," Dictionary of National Biography 1931-1940, 54. 
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which we were so proud defeated in the first major engagement of the 
war by the Imperial Navy of upstart Germany; not just defeated but 
almost annihilated, and in a few minutes, without as far as could be 
seen inflicting any damage whatsoever on the enemy. Individually and 
collectively we were humiliated to the very depths of our beings.45 
Even Doveton Sturdee's revenge off the Falklands in December had a dark side, as 
Richmond wrote: "I confess it makes me sick that this consequential blunderer [Sturdee] 
should get the credit, when the keels of 5 good ships and some 3500 men lie to his 
account. "46 
One of the available mechanisms that existed as a safety valve and a source of 
new professional ideas was The Naval Review. While The Review was originally intended 
to serve as an educational tool for junior officers, it began after the outbreak of war to 
provide a venue to digest the war experience. In the words of Herbert Richmond, The 
Review could evaluate the war experience even at the cost of "undeserved reputations. "47 
But it was not long before the journal ran afoul of the Admiralty for allegedly disclosing 
confidential information relating to the Falkland Islands operations against von Spee.48 
In May 1915 Admiral Henderson had an interview with the Admiralty Secretary, 
Sir William Graham Greene, during which the latter displayed a telegram from J ellicoe 
complaining that The Review had revealed information of use to the enemy, including 
details of Admiralty orders, bases and concerns over civilians having access to the 
45 Hickling, Sailor at Sea, 51. 
46 Marder (ed.), Portrait of an Admiral, 131; diary entry, 13 December 1914. Sturdee had been serving as . 
Chief of Staff at the Admiralty when strategic dispositions had placed Cradock in a very difficult position. 
47 NMM, RIC 7/1, H.W. Richmond to W .H. Henderson, 11 February 1919. 
48 Royal Naval Museum, Portsmouth (RNM), Naval Review Papers (NRP), Graham Greene to Henderson, 
14 May 1915. 
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information.49 Henderson mounted a spirited defence, informing the Secretary "the 
objections made by Sir J. Jellicoe were frivolous. I could only infer that there was some 
other cause for his doing it." To be fair to Jellicoe, he was under considerable strain as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet and had been extraordinarily upset (as had been 
Beatty and his staff) about the detachment of three battlecruisers to hunt down von Spee 
in the South Atlantic. Any move to divulge British operations outside the North Sea 
might prejudice his own fleet operations. When this was debated within the Admiralty, 
Oswyn Murray concluded that "[i]f the Chief Censor [Rear Admiral Douglas Brownrigg] 
is right in describing the articles as a 'mass of valuable secret information,' it is quite 
clear that NO precautions ought to be regarded as adequate: the magazine ought to be 
suppressed at once. "50 Murray, however, could not fathom what information could be of 
possible use to the enemy. 51 
Henderson carried the issue even further in July but still could not understand 
Jellicoe's objections. 
There might well be 2 or 3 paragraphs that some particular officer 
would disapprove of, just as there are liable to be paragraphs daily in 
the Press that certain individuals would dislike, but as long as they are 
facts and are part of the history of the operations of the war, and fair 
comment for a useful purpose there can be no possible utility in trying 
to suppress them. I am sure you will agree with me that silence, 
suppression of facts, or legitimate descriptions are harmful to the 
Service and merely defeat the ends of those who try to enforce it. 52 
49 RNM, NRP, Notes on an Interview with Sir W. Graham Greene, 27 May 1915. 
50 PRO, ADM 118423/157, Censorship of The Naval Review, 1915, minute by Oswyn Murray, 22 June . 
1915. 
51 Ibid. 
52 RNM, NRP, Henderson to Graham Greene, 22 July 1915. 
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Jellicoe also complained to the Admiralty about the publication of confidential 
material in The Naval Review about Coronel. As Richmond testily noted in his diary: 
A telegram came in this morning from Jellicoe saying that the May 
number of The Naval Review contained a lot information which would 
be useful to the enemy. He referred particularly to accounts of the 
movements of ships in the beginning of the war and to papers giving 
hints of experience in the Falkland Islands Battle. This is 
extraordinarily childish. 53 
The French apparently published the opening movements of their armies at the beginning 
of the war. Captain Herbert Richmond argued, "but our Admirals, jealous as usual of our 
officers knowing anything, believe that the proceedings of a few cruisers 6 months ago 
are of such importance that they cannot be divulged. It is puerile." Jellicoe advocated 
having The Review either censored or closed down entirely for the duration of the war. 54 
Dewar wrote to Henderson: 
I think it most unnecessary and unjust. There is not a word in the pages 
mentioned which could be of the slightest assistance to the enemy. 
Once censorship begins you do not know where it will end. The 
Admiralty will probably endeavour to carry it on in peacetime and the 
utility of The Naval Review will disappear. Thousands of men have 
been killed and the war prolonged owing to out faulty system of 
Admiralty administration & the lack of any war training for officers. 
Only publicity and criticism will alter that after the war. 55 
Henderson in turn wrote to the Admiralty, attacking Jellicoe's argument that The Review 
could not be trusted to maintain secrecy because the Society had civilians among it 
53 Marder (ed.), Portrait of an Admiral, 157; diary entry, 12 May 1915. 
54 Ibid. 
55 RNM, NRP, K.G.B. Dewar to Henderson, 8 June 1915 . 
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members. He provided a list of the non-naval members, including A.J. Balfour, Austen 
Chamberlain, Julian Corbett, Graham Greene, Sir Edward Grey, Lord Haldane, Lord 
Selbome and Lord Sydenham, all of whom had access to all sorts of Government 
secrets. 56 Nonetheless in October, The Review was formerly suspended by the 
Admiralty. 57 
Henderson continued to collect material for the Review because the intention was 
to resume publication after the conclusion of the war. His London house became a 
clearing-house and a sort of a precursor to the modem think-tank as he acted as a crucial 
link between younger officers, the press and the politicians. 58 
Perhaps the most traumatic event for the executive branch was the Battle of 
Jutland. On 31 May 1916, the long-awaited clash between the Grand and High Seas 
Fleets took place. Although twice outmanoeuvred by Jellicoe's battle squadrons, Scheer 
was able to escape. To make matters worse, severe losses were inflicted on Beatty's battle 
cruisers, and magazine explosions destroyed three. This was intensely frustrating to 
officers, as Lieutenant Stephen King-Hall related after the war: "I felt I wanted to burst 
into tears, hit somebody, or do something equally foolish."59 The sense of frustration at 
failing to bring the High Seas Fleet to decisive action seemed to call into question the 
strategic and tactical doctrine of the Grand Fleet and raised questions about the capacity 
of the sea-going fleet. 
56 PRO, ADM 1/8423/157, Henderson to Admiralty, 4 June 1915. 
57 RNM, NRP, Graham Greene to Henderson, 13 August 1915 
58 Hunt, Sailor-Scholar, 56-57. 
59 Stephen King-Hall, North Sea Diary, 1914-1918 (London: Newnes, 1919), 160. 
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It must be recalled that many officers were killed in the battle, including some 
who were very junior. According to information released by the Admiralty at the time, 
over 150 executive branch officers were killed.60 Among those killed were the two flag 
officers, Arbuthnot and Hood, but also several captains and many midshipmen and 
lieutenants. A number of those killed were also the sons of naval officers with the 
influence to have their sons attached to the Battle Cruiser Fleet, including Midshipman 
Malcolm Harris, the youngest son of Admiral Sir Robert Harris; Lieutenant Commander 
David Douglas, the son of Admiral Sir Archibald Douglas; and Midshipman John Scott, 
the eldest son of Admiral Sir Percy Scott.61 
This situation was further magnified by the Admiralty's maladroit handling of" 
Jellicoe's despatch, which the press took to indicate that the Grand Fleet had suffered a 
defeat. If the best commanders in the Navy could not perform up to expectations, 
something was seriously wrong with the system. Moreover, a visible split opened 
between the officers and men of the Battle Cruiser and Battle fleets. Lord Louis 
Mountbatten, then a midshipman in H.M.S. Lion, remembered many years later the 
prevalent feeling of superiority of the battle cruiser personnel. "This came, I gathered, 
from having a small, brainy but over-cautious man like Jellicoe as the Commander-in-
Chief; obviously he was not a real fighting leader like our beloved Beatty."62 Hence, there . 
was a developing weakness in the faith in Jellicoe's leadership. Moreover, his tendency to 
60 
"Casualties at Jutland," The Times, 5 June 1916. 
61 
"Officer Losses," The Times, 5 June 1916. 
62 Louis Mountbatten, "The Battle of Jutland," Mariner's Mirror, LXVI, No.2 (1980), 101. 
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centralize tactical control in his own hands became crucial after December 1916 when he 
became First Sea Lord after Henry Jackson. 
All the disagreements, unnecessary losses and professional in fighting between the 
autumn of 1914 and the end of 1916 could be contained. Indeed, in many ways these 
disputes were no more serious than those in the old wars. In the age of sail powerful 
disagreements had wracked the Navy.63 Even Jutland, as bitterly disappointing as it was, . 
did not fracture the service until after the Board of Admiralty and the professional officers 
lost confidence in the wake of the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare and the 
Admiralty's inability to address heavy losses to British shipping. 
At the same time that the Allied cause was wavering, with Russia wracked by · 
internal revolt and the French army being bled white, the sure shield of the British 
empire, the Navy, had confessed its professional failure. This was the heart of the matter. 
Despite the fight with other professions and the insecurity of the officer corps, their core 
competence of exercising command at sea had remained. Yet with the advent of an · 
entirely new type of naval war the corps was unable to cope with the changed 
circumstances. Despite the best efforts of Jellicoe and some of the officers he brought 
with him when he became First Sea Lord, no appreciable dent had been made in shipping 
losses. Indeed, the measures Jellicoe attempted to put in place, such as a specialized anti-
submarine division of the naval staff, failed to stop the losses. Only one mechanism was 
resisted as defensive: the convoy. While the staff division under Rear Admiral Alexander 
Duff was working to further technological advances to defeat the U-Boat menace, there 
63 For example, the case of the dispute between Admirals Lestock and Matthews in the aftermath of the 
Battle of Malaga in 1744. See John Creswell, British Admirals in the Eighteenth Century: Tactics in Battle 
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972), 62-80. 
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seemed to be no connection to the core of the problem. It was only quite by accident that 
one of Duffs assistants, Commander Reginald Henderson, uncovered the problem's true 
nature.64 
That the primary difficulty the Admiralty faced operationally in the year 1917 was 
the unrestricted submarine campaign against British and neutral shipping is uncontested. 
The submarine provided a threat that had not been anticipated, and the Admiralty found _ 
itself at a loss to deal with its implications. The arming of merchantmen and the 
independent routing of vessels seemed reasonable propositions if submarines operated by 
prize rules that compelled them to surface and give warning prior to sinking a vessel. 
However, the rules had changed at the end of 1916 when the German high command _ 
calculated that by pursuing an unrestricted campaign it could knock Britain out of the war 
before the United States could effectively intervene. In the process, one of the 
Admiralty's key assumptions was rendered irrelevant. 
In the first three months of the unrestricted campaign U-Boats sunk nearly four 
million tons of British shipping, while British yards produced a mere half million tons in 
the same period. 65 The shipping situation was so grave that the Government was forced to 
buy up shipping all over the world, institute rationing, adjust labour policy and re-
examine overseas commitments to save tonnage. If losses had continued it was doubtful 
that Britain could have remained in the war. 
64 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, IV, 150-151; Paul Halpern, A Naval History of World War I 
(London: University College London Press, 1994), 355. 
65 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, IV, 65 and 103. 
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Even more frightening than the loss of valuable shipping was the Admiralty 
reaction to it. Even before Jellicoe was appointed First Sea Lord, a November 1916 report 
argued that the only solution to the submarine menace was "palliation."66 Despite 
Jellicoe's efforts to re-organize the naval staff, very little of a positive nature occurred. 
Indeed, in April 1917 Britain lost almost 900,000 tons of shipping in a single month. 
Jellicoe's reaction was brutally frank: 
The real fact of the matter is this. We are carrying on this war ... as if 
we had the absolute command of the sea. We have not - and have not 
had for many months ... It is quite true, of course, that we are absolute 
masters of the situation as far as surface ships are concerned, but it 
must be realised . .. that all this is quite useless if the enemy's 
submarines paralyse, as they do now, our lines of communications. 
History has shown time after time the fatal results of basing naval or 
military strategy on an insecure line of communications. Disaster is 
certain to follow, and our present policy is heading straight for 
disaster and it is useless and dangerous in the highest degree to ignore 
the fact. 67 
Jellicoe went on to press for limitations on Britain's overseas commitments to ensure that 
there was enough tonnage to continue the essential campaign in Flanders and to transport 
supplies to France and Italy. Jellicoe's policies could not have come at a worse time, 
since Prime Minister Lloyd-George was engaged in a running battle with the General 
Staff and the Commander in Chief of the B.E.F. over the direction of the war.68 
When Jellicoe's pessimism turned to despondency he began to appear to be an 
obstructionist. As he buried himself further into routine work and fretted over the 
66 Patterson (ed.) , Jellicoe Papers, II, 144-149. 
67 PRO, ADM 118480; see also Patterson (ed.), Jellicoe Papers, II, 261 , Aprill917, original emphasis. 
68 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, IV, 202-206; and John Terraine, Douglas Haig: The Educated 
Soldier (London: Leo Cooper, 1990), 319-325. 
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direction of the naval war, the First Sea Lord became increasingly impatient with the 
politicians' constant suggestions for offensive measures. He had even less patience with 
the efforts of junior officers to put forward ideas, as he wrote in response to what he 
called the "six-monthly'' agitation. "In these circumstances it would be quite useless for a 
comparatively junior officer without a knowledge of available vessels to put forward 
proposals for an offensive. It would merely waste the time of the more senior members of 
the War Staff in examining these proposals."69 Interference by politicians, especially 
Lloyd George and Eric Geddes, was also anathema to Jellicoe. The problem was that 
Jellicoe lacked the stature and personality to assert his views. Moreover, his legitimacy 
was challenged from both within and without the service. 
Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, the Deputy First Sea Lord whom Geddes had 
appointed to relieve J ellicoe of some of his vast responsibilities, found his position 
impossible. In fact, he was given no work to do. Wemyss cornered the First Sea Lord on 
this issue in early December 1917 and demanded to know whether J ellicoe trusted him. 
Jellicoe responded that he had complete confidence in his subordinate " ... but he could 
see no way towards shifting any of his responsibilities on to me, since such would not be 
legal. My reply was that it was, legally a matter for the First Lord, and that if he chose to 
appoint certain duties to me, the procedure would be constitutionally correct. Sir John did 
not agree."70 Jellicoe exemplified the awful majesty of the post he held and failed to 
realize that in modem total war, complete responsibility could not devolve onto a single 
69 Patterson (ed.), Jellicoe Papers, II, 168, Jellicoe to Sir Edward Carson, 7 June 1917. 
70 Victoria Wemyss, The Life and Letters of Lord Wester Wemyss (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1935), 
364. This quotation is an excerpt from Wemyss's unfinished memoirs. 
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man. The truth was that J ellicoe nearly broke himself attempting to uphold the War Lord 
position that Fisher had previously arrogated onto himself. He was also apparently 
suffering from a couple of chronic medical conditions that may have affected his 
judgement. In January 1918, Fisher, now head of the Board of Inventions, ordered the 
best physicians available to treat Jellicoe.71 It did not matter whether Jellicoe's critics at 
the Admiralty had a point; the point was that he had become the problem. 72 
The heavy losses and self-confessed inability of the Admiralty to cope with this 
new type of warfare deprived the professional leadership in the service of their legitimacy 
in the eyes of the War Cabinet, the general public and, most important, the officer corps 
itself. Some began to wonder openly whether the army could win the war before the navy 
lost it. As losses mounted and the navy's response continued to be inadequate the service 
lost stature. At the end of April 1917, Lloyd George personally visited the Admiralty to 
discover what methods the Naval Staff intended to implement to staunch the losses. The 
Prime Minister was convinced that J ellicoe was spending too much time on day-to-day 
issues and routine work. 
I consider it of the utmost importance that the First Sea Lord should be 
relieved of as much detail as possible, and Admiral Sir John Jellicoe 
quite agreed in this view, and stated that he had been endeavouring to 
obtain this relief ever since he took over his present post. One obstacle 
to this, which Sir John J ellicoe mentioned, was that unless he exercises 
his personal initiative and drive he could not obtain the material he 
required sufficiently quickly. This is obviously wrong, and it is of the 
utmost importance that the Admiralty should be so organised that the 
71 CCAC, CHAR 2/92, Fisher to Winston Churchill, 30 January 1918. 
72 Donald Schurman, "Admiral Sir John Jellicoe," in Malcolm Murfett (ed.) The First Sea Lords: From 
Fisher to Mountbatten (Westport CT: Praeger, 1995), 109. 
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First Sea Lord is entirely free from the necessity of devoting his 
attention to the supply of materie/.73 
The level of interference, opposition and political pressure on the Admiralty led Sir 
Edward Carson, the First Lord, to write Jellicoe an extensive memorandum urging the 
establishment of a separate planning division within the Naval Staff. 
I have observed that a good deal of criticism has lately been levelled 
against the Admiralty on the ground that no offensive operations with 
a specific objective are from time to time undertaken; and in 
conversation with the Prime Minister and other members of the War 
Cabinet, it is clear to my mind that this criticism has given rise to a 
good deal of dissatisfaction in many quarters with the present 
administration of the Admiralty. 74 
Carson went on to contend that it was irrelevant whether this criticism was justified; the 
fact that it had currency meant that the Admiralty had to take steps to ensure that the 
Navy was seen to be doing something. Carson argued for the creation of a special 
offensive measures section under the direction of the Director of Operations to be solely 
responsible for operational plans and to free Jellicoe of some administrative duties. This 
section was to be headed by two or three captains and a commander who would have 
access to all information. The plans conceived by this section were to be examined by the 
Chief of the Naval Staff in the presence of the First Lord.75 
Jellicoe was less than impressed with the agitation for offensive operations. 
73 PRO, Cabinet Papers (CAB) 63/20, Note by the Prime Minister of his Conference at the Admiralty, 30 
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I have been informed that the Prime Minister sent for Captain 
Richmond (I assume in connection with this proposition), and it is 
probable that this was done at the instigation of Colonel Hankey. I do 
not make any comment on this interference with Admiralty 
administration by Colonel Hankey if I am correct in my assumption, 
but, if Captain Richmond is likely to be suitable in other respects, I 
think that he would probably be useful at the Admiralty, and therefore 
suggest his appointment as a preliminary step.76 
Jellicoe was particularly irked by the misperception that it was strictly the responsibility 
of senior members of the War Staff to initiate offensive operations. Furthermore, with 
resources stretched to the limit, it was impossible to believe that the appointment of more 
officers was a panacea. "In these circumstances it would be quite useless for a 
comparatively junior officer without a knowledge of available vessels to put forward 
proposals for an offensive. It would merely waste the time of the more senior officers of 
the War Staff in examining these proposals.''77 
Considerable resentment was expressed toward Geddes when he came to the 
Admiralty, first as Controller and then as First Lord. Part of this was because although he 
was not a professional officer, he was made a vice admiral by a special Order-in-
Counci1.78 Even after Lloyd George left the Admiralty to its own devices, the admirals 
were not convinced of the need to follow through on the items discussed. "[E]ven then the 
76 PRO, ADM 118489/118, Jellicoe to Carson, 9 June 1917. 
77 Ibid. 
78 PRO, ADM 118489/122, Order-in-Council, 13 June 1917. Geddes was especially unpopular after the 
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Board were like the son in the Scriptures who was told to go and work in the Vineyard 
and replied, 'I go,' but went not."79 
Facing pressure from within the state machinery, Jellicoe also identified the 
press as an opponent of the Admiralty. He believed that there were several ways in which 
newspapermen attacked his position. The first was political, as they twitted Carson, and 
by extension J ellicoe, over Ireland. The second was in the form of Arthur Pollen in Land 
and Water, who criticized the Admiralty for not accepting his fire control system. Indeed, 
Jellicoe refused Pollen permission to distribute pamphlets in the fleet regarding gunnery 
practices: " ... my reason being that I knew that it would give rise in the minds of young 
and inexperienced gunnery Lieutenants to feelings of unrest with the present methods, 
which produced, with the assistance of Dreyer - whilst I was in the Grand Fleet most 
astonishing results." The third centre of dissent had to do with Custance, who in J ellicoe' s 
view should have "collapsed years ago- in view of the disproof of all his pet theories."80 
Along with questioning the professional competence of the Board came concentrated 
attacks from papers such as The Daily Mail, which were aided by a group of mid-grade 
officers under the loose leadership of Richmond who were determined that the structure 
of the Admiralty had to be overhauled dramatically. It would do no good merely to give 
the old people new titles; instead, a clean sweep was necessary. 
What was new about this challenge was not only the close connection between 
these officers and the political press but also the officers' indifference to and even support 
79 CCAC, S.W. Roskill Papers (ROSK) 3/22, N. Leslie to Lord Maclay, 14 February 1933. 
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of concentrated editorial attacks against their supenors on the Board of Admiralty. 
Indeed, Commander Plunkett, perhaps the most politically astute of these officers, 
concluded, "on the whole they appear to have drawn upon their heads that type of 
criticism which they have justly merited."81 Journalistic attacks were also welcomed by 
these "Young Turks" because they raised the possibility that they as a "despised and 
rejected minority" could save the nation, even to the point where some officers were 
prepared to fall on their swords.82 Further, the press campaigns were regarded as 
necessary not only to preserve the strength and prestige of the Navy but also to save the 
country from disaster. Indeed, Captain Drax argued that The Daily Mail had performed a 
national service in its "publish the tonnage" campaign in the summer of 1917. Still, a 
twinge of regret remained when Drax observed "[i]t is a pathetic thing to descend to the 
lowest forms of journalism in our efforts to save the Country from disaster. There seems 
to be no alternative. "83 
The criticism of Jellicoe was also intensely personal. Arthur Pollen to some 
degree blamed Jellicoe (who was at the time Director of Naval Ordnance) for the Navy's 
failure to adopt his fire control system and was dismayed by the results at Jutland.84 It . 
was an open secret that the suppression of The Naval Review was done at the instigation 
of Jellicoe while he was at the Grand Fleet, a move that profoundly irritated Admiral 
81 CCAC, R. Drax Papers (DRAX) 1/16, Drax to Peter [illegible], 1 May 1917. 
82 CCAC, DRAX 1116, Drax to Horace Plunkett, June 1917. 
83 NMM, DEW 2/, Drax to Henderson, 29 August 1917. 
84 See Jon Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-
1914 (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 
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Henderson and his friends. One such ally, Lord Northcliffe had made a nmsance of 
himself at the Admiralty in the spring of 1917 when German aircraft dropped bombs near 
the press baron's home on the Isle of Thanet. On a visit to the Admiralty, Northcliffe 
complained of the inadequacy of air defences, a charge to which Jellicoe objected, stating 
that the defences were the best they could be. In response, Northcliffe wrote to Sir 
Edward Carson "I know that Sir John Jellicoe is wrong. I hope that he is not misleading 
you on other matters."85 Carson, of course, was irritated with the aspersions cast on 
Jellicoe's character. Although Admiralty censors had quashed stories in the Daily Mail, 
attacks on Jellicoe in October of 1917 reached the point where he sought the advice of the 
Attorney General, F.E. Smith, as to whether legal action could be taken against the 
newspaper. 86 
Things were not made any easier within the officer corps, either. First, old man 
Fisher was still casting covetous eyes at the Admiralty and subjecting everyone to his 
biting observations from his lofty perch at the Board of Invention and Research. 87 On at 
least one occasion, Fisher had attempted to get Reginald Hall fired as Director of Naval 
Intelligence because of a perceived personal slight.88 Of course, this may have been 
aggravated by Hall's role in Fisher's ouster in May 1915. By early 1917, Fisher had 
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grown much more virulent in his correspondence and once even refused to discuss his 
master plan for dealing with submarine losses until he had been restored at the head of the 
Admiralty. 89 When J ellicoe wisely dissented at the possibility of working with Fisher, his 
old mentor was furious, writing to Carson that 
I can take no part in anything that subverts Jellicoe, but I told him to 
his face yesterday that, had I known 13 years ago that he would have 
sold me by giving up the Grand Fleet, I never would have had 
anything to do with him .... Although I've not forgiven him (and never 
will, as I told him yesterday) yet I've sent him a Plan for dealing 
effectively with the German Submarine Menace. If he don't like it, 
th ' d t "t "90 ere s an en o 1 .... 
Despite Fisher's attempts at resurrection and periodic agitation m Parliament and the 
press, he was not a serious threat. Moreover, Fisher had no legitimacy within the officer 
corps, especially after his infamous conduct in May 1915 when he had effectively 
deserted his post and given Asquith an ultimatum.91 
Yet it was an entirely different matter with a group of comparatively junior 
officers who had considerable support within the leading elements of the service afloat, 
including from Beatty, who had succeeded J ellico_e. at the Grand Fleet. They were 
untainted by anything to do with Fisher and had more to offer than the mere assertions 
that sprinkled much of his communications. They offered concrete plans and ideas to get -
the Admiralty out of the professional quagmire in which it had become entrapped. 
89 PRO, CAB 21/7, Memorandum on Submarines by Fisher, 31 March 1917. 
90 PRO, CAB 21/7, Fisher to Carson, 1 February 1917. 
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Inside the Service there was a group of officers who were aggrieved with Jellicoe 
because of the failure at Jutland, his decision to suspend The Naval Review and his 
systematic failure to come to grips with the submarine menace. But the personal element 
was comparatively minor. These officers did not attack Jellicoe because they disliked him 
but because they were convinced that doing so was the only way the naval staff could be 
made effective. To break the rules of discipline was a last resort that was conceived as a 
desperate move to save the situation. 
These officers had been critical of the Admiralty administration and harboured 
dreams of seeing themselves in positions of authority. Indeed, they adopted an almost . 
messianic role. As one of them wrote in 1917, "[w]e must tum at last to that despised and 
rejected minority who have studied war seriously before war began and really know how 
it ought to be run." Only they could offer systematic solutions to the Navy's problems as 
Drax wrote to a friend: 
I have long hoped, and I believed it to be right and proper, that we 
should continue to muddle through on amateurish lines, paying a 
colossal price, incurring colossal losses but winning through in the end 
by virtue of those many and very fine British qualities which even the 
stupidest... possess in full measure. I still hope it may be so.92 
One of these officers was Captain Reginald Drax, who had been Beatty's flag 
commander and who after his promotion to post rank commanded the cruiser Blanche 
that was attached to the Grand Fleet. Drax had extensive political contacts through his 
uncle, the M.P. Horace Plunkett, and Arthur Pollen. In a memorandum he asked his uncle 
to pass along to the First Lord (which was forwarded to Maurice Hankey in the CID 
92 CCAC, DRAX 1/16, Drax to Peter?, Enclosure "The Admiralty", 1 May 1917, original emphasis. 
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Secretariat), he laid out the case for the officers' interference in the professional 
leadership of the Board. Citing necessity as a rationale, "[t]hese younger officers had 
been utterly impotent, for the sole reason that their seniority was not sufficient to carry 
adequate weight."93 Plunkett, however, did not take his nephew's claims at face value, 
and after bouncing the ideas off Hankey, challenged his arguments. Both Beatty and 
J ellicoe, he asserted, had been promoted without reference to seniority, and RN officers 
were superior in performance to either their Italian or French counterparts. He also noted 
that Jellicoe invited ideas from both Beatty and Tyrwhitt. 
Drax responded to his Uncle's prodding: 
Let me confme it to one man J------. He enjoys the applause and 
confidence of King & Country. What can I or what will history say 
against him?" This: defence of Scapa, evacuation of the North Sea, 
loss of Audacious, holding the Battle Cruiser Fleet in port, failure to 
support the BCF at Hartlepool, Jutland ... He is an ultra-materialist and 
is obsessive and overwhelmed with detail.94 
In other words, Drax wanted to place the strategic command on a professional footing and 
to reassert the authority of the executive branch by placing command on a scientific basis. 
These officers were not foolish enough to stick their necks out to push for a 
revolution without establishing close contacts with the levers of power inside and outside 
the service. Within the service this group of intellectual officers had at least the tacit 
support of David Beatty, Reginald Tyrwhitt and Roger Keyes. Beatty, as Commander-in-
Chief of the Grand Fleet, held the most prestigious and important sea command. Two of 
the most important members of the Young Turks, Richmond and Drax, were captains in 
93 CCAC, DRAX 1116, Drax to Horace Plunkett, 20 June 1917. 
94 Ibid. 
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the Grand Fleet, and the latter was a former flag commander in Beatty's battle cruiser 
days. Another of these intellectuals, Roger Bellairs, was a staff officer. Despite Beatty's 
encouragement to Jellicoe in dealing with the politicians, there is strong evidence that he 
remained in close contact and sympathized with their efforts. It is rather difficult to 
believe that one of his captains would be discussing Admiralty administration with the 
Prime Minister without his being aware of the substance of the discussions. Indeed, 
Richmond reported to Beatty the substance of his conversation with both the Prime 
Minister and the First Lord when he returned to the Grand Fleet in June.95 For instance, in 
March 1918, after the palace revolution, Drax asked Beatty to use his influence to have 
Richmond appointed Director of Training and Staff Duties. "To make certain of victory 
now we must eliminate the errors of the past and arrange, at the eleventh hour, to commit 
blunders no more. How is this to be done? Here also, I come to 'King Charles' head'; so 
let me apologise & stop."96 Beatty also frequently made use of advice tendered by 
Richmond while he was in the Grand Fleet and discussed at length the defects in 
Admiralty organization. Further correspondence survives between Drax and Beatty's 
Secretary, Frank Spikemell. In addition, Beatty's wife was in contact with Arthur Pollen 
and fed information to him throughout 1917.97 As for Roger Keyes and Reginald 
Tyrwhitt, they were dissatisfied with Admiralty policy and had led an agitation to have 
Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon removed from his post at Dover. 
95 Marder ( ed. ), Portrait of an Admiral, 261-262. 
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Furthermore, there was energetic use of contacts outside the service. Lieutenant J.M. 
Kenworthy had contacts with Lord Northcliffe, and it was through the agency of the latter 
that he gained an interview with Lloyd George on the state of the naval situation.98 Also, 
Admiral Henderson had contacts with Lord Milner, a member of the War Cabinet. 
For these officers, however, press agitation was but a means to an end. Arguing 
that no great reforms were ever made without some form of public outcry, they tried to 
force those in power to respond to their critiques. Although there was a tendency to blame 
the politicians, they had only "stepped in to fill the mental vacuum which existed at the 
Admiralty. "99 
A combination of backroom manoeuvring and the ruthless use of press contacts 
enabled these young officers and their allies to arrange interviews with the War Cabinet 
and the Prime Minister himself. Carson was dismissed as being a captive of his 
immediate professional advisers. 100 The situation was especially grave in the spring of 
1917, when Henderson started writing letters to members of the War Cabinet, including 
the Prime Minister and Lord Milner. The ploy worked, and Henderson managed to obtain 
an appointment with Milner and by the first week in June had set up an interview between 
the Prime Minister and Richmond. The result of the latter was that Dewar was assigned 
by the Prime Minister to write weekly summaries for the War Cabinet. This 
understandably engendered deep resentment among the Sea Lords; when an opening 
98 J.M. Kenworthy, Sailors, Statesmen and Others (London: Rich & Cowan, 1933), 72-81. 
99 NMM, DEW 33/, Dewar to Richmond, 7 May 1916. 
100 NMM, DEW 33/, Dewar to Richmond, 1 July 1917. A judgement confirmed by Marder, Dreadnought to 
Scapa Flow, IV, 54-56. 
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occurred, orders were cut to send Dewar off to the East Indies as Executive Officer of a 
. . h . 10 1 
crmser w1t no engmes. 
Things got worse for J ellicoe and the Admiralty in general as Henderson 
continued to hammer at the Navy's leadership in print as well as in private letters to the 
Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet. As the Admiral wrote: 
A new and better sort of brains are required if the war is to be brought 
to a successful conclusion or if we are to avoid disaster. The existing 
heads are incapable of organizing the Admiralty on lines that can 
effect this... and are discredited both in strategical, tactical and 
administrative sense; what is worse, brought up in a school which 
despises the politician and always tries to hoodwink him, as they have 
done in the case of the War Cabinet and are therefore unworthy of 
confidence. 102 
Further, Henderson announced that the Admiralty was unlikely to act on its commitment 
to look for areas of offensive action. He concluded that there was only one officer who 
could devise such plans: Richmond. 
Later in June, Henderson wrote to Milner that the major flaw in the system was 
the Admiralty's unwillingness to hold courts martial to clear the air. 
The reply is a very simple one, it is because they abrogated under 
irrelevant excuses the time honoured custom of our forefathers to 
investigate all losses and failures by a Court Martial sitting in public, 
which would have elicited the TRUTH, apportioned blame when 
proved, caused the elimination of the unfit and their gradual 
supersession by those who were proving themselves capable. 103 
10 1 NMM, DEW 33/, Dewar to Richmond, 12 September 1917; "I have to very careful. I am looked upon as 
' an exceedingly dangerous person!! ' Be careful not to associate my name with anything." 
102 NMM, HEN 2/5, Henderson to Lloyd George, 23 June 1917. 
103 NMM, HEN 2/5, Henderson to Milner, 29 June 1917. 
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Three days later, Henderson again wrote to Milner, enclosing a critical article he was 
proposing to send to Land and Water. Milner, careful to reply through the hands of his 
secretary, refused cornrnent. 104 
In late June, Drax wrote a draft memorandum, which he considered sending to the 
Prime Minister, outlining the discontent in the Fleet with the Admiralty. Although the 
document was never sent, it provides insight into the thoughts of those revolutionaries 
who attempted to change the direction of naval policy in the summer and fall of 1917. 
You probably know me well enough to believe that I have no axe to 
grind and no enmity to gratify. In making to you a detailed statement 
of the case as it now is I am actuated only by the urgent needs of the 
State, and for this reason I can keep silent no longer, though the 
chance of your doing good on this information may be sadly remote. 
For nearly 3 years now, a number of our younger naval officers who 
have studied war scientifically in days of peace, have been looking on 
with horror and amazement at the successive blunders of our 
Admiralty administration. Needless lives have been sacrificed, 
millions of pounds have been thrown away, and the fundamental 
principles of Strategy and Tactics have been violated again and again. 
These younger officers have been utterly impotent, for the sole reason 
that their seniority was not sufficient to carry adequate weight. It may 
perhaps be urged in reply that they are only a clique of cranks whose 
ideas are no more use than anyone else's; but it can be proved that 
practically every one of our successive disasters and misfortunes have 
been foretold by one or more of these officers and in various cases 
have been put forward officially, either verbally or in writing, only to 
be contemptuously rejected ... 105 
Drax identified three key problems that led to the situation the Navy faced. First, 
m the century after 1815 a faulty system of education, which he claimed crushed 
104 NMM, HEN 2/5, Henderson to Milner, 1 July 1917; and H.C. Thornton to Henderson, 2 July 1917. 
105 CCAC, DRAX 1116, Unsent Memorandum, 20 June 1917. 
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individual initiative and imagination, was permitted to become entrenched. He further 
claimed that there had been no proper study of the art of war among flag officers. 
In fact the intellectual development of our Admirals at the present day 
is remarkably similar to that of our Generals at the time of the South 
African war, and for precisely the same reasons. There are of course 
brilliant exceptions like our CinC and Commodore Tyrwhitt, but these 
are isolated cases based on learning quickly from the teaching of war 
or on having evaded some part of that deadening peace routine which 
crushed out the brains of the majority. 106 
While he wisely was chary of providing specific examples of dunderheads and 
Captain Blimps, he left it to his reader to fill in the gaps. Indeed, Drax blamed no 
particular individual for the system because "[t]hey are merely the victims of a vicious 
system and that deplorable defect in the English temperament, hereditary lack of 
imagination." The younger officers brought to the Admiralty during the war had become 
co-opted by the system; as an antidote, Drax urged the immediate replacement of many of 
the "naval rulers." But it was difficult to finding replacements who would possess the 
confidence of the fleet were few in number. Drax nominated W emyss to replace J ellicoe 
and recommended the establishment of a small committee centred around Richmond and 
Dewar to oversee the reconstruction of the Admiralty machinery. 107 
The loss of confidence in the legitimacy of the Jellicoe regime resulted in a letter 
by Geddes to the First Sea Lord on Christmas Eve 1917: 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
After very careful consideration I have come to the conclusion that a 
change is desirable in the post of First Sea Lord. I have not, I can 
assure you, arrived at this view hastily or without great personal regret 
and reluctance. I have consulted the Prime Minister and with his 
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concurrence I am asking to see the King to make this recommendation 
to him. The Prime Minister asks me to tell you that in recognition of 
your past very distinguished services he proposes to recommend to His 
Majesty that a peerage should be bestowed upon you. I have thought 
that you would prefer me to convey this decision to you in writing but, 
should you wish to see me, I shall of course be at your disposal at any 
time. My regret at having to convey this decision to you is the greater 
in view of the very cordial personnel relations which have existed 
between us throughout. 108 
The immediate result was that Wemyss replaced Jellicoe as First Sea Lord. A temporary 
crisis among the remaining Sea Lords was averted, and they were persuaded to stay on. 
Jellicoe went on half pay and was not employed again. 
Conclusion 
The experience of the Great War was profoundly traumatic for the RN's executive officer 
corps. Before 1914, forces associated with the ongoing revolution in naval affairs had 
exerted considerable pressure on naval officers. Despite these forces that altered and 
indeed, even challenged, the status of executive officers, self-confident assertions about 
the corps' fitness to command remained untested. That changed with the outbreak of war 
in 1914. Professional officers were faced with a conflict dramatically different from what 
had been expected. The war presented innumerable tasks that did not involve exercising 
command from the bridge of a man-of-war. For these demands, officers were not well 
prepared. The result was intense frustration, and the claims made by officers were 
108 PRO, ADM 116/1807, Sir Eric Geddes to Jellicoe, 24 December 1917. See also Patterson (ed.), Jellicoe 
Papers, II, 246. 
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exposed to searching criticism not merely from outside the profession but also from 
within. 
The incapacity of the Admiralty machinery and the senior executive officers to 
deal with the reality of industrialized warfare caused a crisis of confidence that was not 
confined to Parliament or public opinion but also extended into the corps itself. To 
preserve the integrity of the officer corps and its professional status, this group of 
comparatively junior officers, with the backing of the fleet commanders, thought it 
imperative that they intervene to save the situation. Since mechanisms to correct errors 
and officers who were unfit for their posts did not exist, the Admiralty leadership was 
systematically by-passed. Suspicions before the war that the senior leadership was not up 
to scratch were confirmed after 1914. 
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Chapter X: 
Conclusion 
I should like to suggest for the possible inspiration of some great 
painter that on June 4, 1916, practically all the chiefs of the Grand 
Fleet were together lending themselves to pictorial representation. I 
refer to the memorial service for the men who lost their lives in the 
fleet action. Thirty-five men were buried on that occasion. The bleak, 
windswept hillside, the lines of coffins covered with Union Jacks, the 
wall of men surrounding the graveyard on the Island ofHoy, the stern, 
weather-beaten faces of the senior officers still showing the strain of 
the action, all made a picture which I, for one, will never forget. 1 
But one wonders whether the world is any the better for it. We all live 
in an appalling age of destruction, and there is no knowing where it 
will end. Men now strive to destroy whole nations, and it looks as if 
they will not be satisfied till they can invent some means of blowing 
up the entire universe. 2 
This dissertation has attempted to deal with pressing personnel issues that were a constant 
source of difficulty for Admiralty administrators in a period of naval expansion from the 
1880s to the end of the First World War. Further, the fact that this expansion was in part 
due to the development of foreign naval forces and that technological uncertainty was rife 
meant that the recruiting and training of adequate numbers of officers was a very 
uncertain enterprise. Changes in technology and organization had very senous 
ramifications, not merely on Britain's economy, or in the force structure of the Royal 
Navy, but also at its most fundamental level of the social and intellectual development of 
the officer corps, men who were expected to wield this instrument of state power. While 
1 
"Naval Portraiture," The Times, 20 May 1921; 'Long Hope' was commenting on the famous portrait of all 
the senior RN officers of the Great War in number 5 uniform in the Admiralty Board Room (which is 
currently displayed in the National Portrait Gallery at Trafalgar Square, London) and argued that the above 
portrayal would have been more appropriate. 
2 Charles Dundas, An Admiral's Yarn: Stray Memories of 50 Years (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1922), 21-22. 
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traditional historiography has tended to divide British officers into reformers and 
reactionaries, the reality was that a paradigm shift was under way as the corps struggled 
for its continued pre-eminence and to redefine itself in view of social and technological 
change. 
The trials and tribulations of the so-called "second industrial revolution" at the 
end of the nineteenth century had a tremendous impact on the British ruling elite. This 
was particularly so in the case of the leadership of the Royal Navy, which was arguably 
the first government department in Britain to be forced to confront the dramatic changes 
in technology and organization. While earlier in the century, and indeed as far back as the 
eighteenth, the Board of Admiralty (and the Navy Board prior to 1832) managed the 
largest industrial enterprise in the country, if not the world, the challenge grew more 
daunting as steam engineering replaced sail. Whereas the officer corps headed and 
commanded a service that required the co-ordination of various resources, the technical 
trades of the late Victorian Age required considerable theoretical and mathematical 
instruction, and many, especially the mechanical trades, made the transformation to 
professional status. Moreover, the types of materiel and services required by the naval 
service grew dramatically with the advent of iron and steel hulls, steam power, breech-
loading guns, electrical fittings, armour and torpedoes. This required an organization not 
only to co-ordinate supply, construction and production but also to manage the demands 
of competing occupational groups, including the executive officer corps. Moreover, it 
presented the officer corps with the task of commanding these divergent social and 
professional forces at sea while fighting a constant rearguard action to defend its 
privileges and status. 
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At every tum these privileges and the status of the executive branch were 
challenged by the organizational and technological demands of an industrialized navy. 
Even the fundamental justification of the status of line officers, traditional seamanship, 
was permanently altered by the advent of steam and the associated professionals who 
managed the engineering departments in the sea-going fleet as well in shore 
establishments. Although steam had been introduced much earlier in the century, it was 
only by the late 1880s that masts and yards began to disappear permanently from the 
main fleets, even from detached squadrons. The locomotive power of the fleet was no 
longer directly controlled by deck officers. As the size and significance of the engineering 
branch grew, there was a corresponding demand for the improved status of the engine 
room department and a consequent diminution of the power of executives, particularly 
junior officers. Although engineers or other officers had no interest in supplanting the 
executive branch in the overall command of a vessel, they wanted to carve out 
occupational space not directly responsible to executive officers below the status of the 
ship's commander. These other professions were invading the occupational and social 
space of junior officers as wardrooms filled up with highly educated non-executive 
officers. Moreover, because of the Navy's need to attract these highly skilled and · 
educated professionals, greater prospects of pay and promotion were held out to them. 
When junior executive officers received no increases and struggled to make do on limited 
means, with high fees as well as more limited promotion prospects, it was not surprising 
that considerable resentment was engendered. 
Political and social changes at the tum of the century also impacted on the overall 
influence of the executive officer corps. After the 1870s, the collapse of agricultural 
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mcomes and an increased electorate weakened aristocratic government. 3 Although the 
officer corps was generally not populated by large numbers of the high nobility, many of 
the most senior officers who descended from the gentry or poorer nobility were under 
considerable economic and political pressure. Even though the majority of officers were 
from the professional middle class, the executive officer corps took on and reflected the 
values of the aristocracy. The corps was by its very nature a gentleman's occupation with 
values that were widely regarded as being of the highest order. Values such as honour and 
gentlemanly bearing were not mere adornments to the officer class but were considered 
absolute requirements. In the case of the British navy, the executive branch could 
sometimes act as a social escalator which permitted sons of professionals a chance to 
reach the upper echelons of society and influence within the existing socio-political 
arrangements of British society. These officers were therefore not anxious to have the rug 
pulled from underneath them. The advent of the new "vulgar" plutocracy also was seen as 
a socio-political threat. Some of this resentment spilled over into an anti-Semitism which 
was by no means unique to the officer corps.4 
Even changes that on the surface seemed to enhance the stature of the profession 
were problematic. In the case of the Royal Navy, the increased size and complexity of the 
fleet may be counted as a bureaucratic and professional triumph since more ships and 
more money meant greater resources and opportunities for officers charged with the 
responsibility of command. However, the dramatic expansion also meant increased 
3 David Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 3 7-
53. 
4 Churchill College, Cambridge, Archives Centre (CCAC), W. Wemyss Papers (WMYS) 2/6, Reflections of 
Trafalgar. See also Barry Domvile, From Admiral to Cabin Boy (London: Boswell, 1947), 81. 
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pressure on the educational infrastructure required to furnish officers who were fit to 
command complex boxes of machinery. It also placed stress on the numbers of officers 
required, particularly in the junior ranks, increased the number of highly-skilled and 
educated lower-deck personnel and led to explosive growth in competing professions, 
most especially engineers. Moreover, as navalist propaganda gained currency among the 
electorate, and as more resources were demanded from the state to maintain the naval 
establishment, the naval service was subjected to greater scrutiny. 
The response of the executive was problematic and rather confused; for this 
reason it has generally eluded close examination. In the historiography of the Royal Navy 
in this period, the discourse has generally revolved around stereotyped images of 
revolutionaries and reactionaries. The argument is that the corps, dominated by old 
gentlemen, was intent on maintaining its privileges and traditions with no regard for 
social and professional change. This is a distortion. The example of Charles Fitzgerald 
was a case in point. While Admiral Fitzgerald willingly accepted technology and the 
consequent changes, he was still highly critical of Fisher's new training scheme. Also, 
Lord Charles Beresford has been portrayed as a reactionary despite his advocacy of staff 
command and his general approval of the Selbome Scheme and reform in general before . 
his conflict with Fisher. 
On a deeper level than mere personalities, there was a divided response to the 
drastic changes in naval and professional affairs. This split reaction was represented in the 
so-called materialist and historical-intellectual schools of thought. The conventional and 
logical response to these dramatic changes and the questioning of the professional 
competence of the executive officer was the integration of scientific education and the 
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advent of technical specialization. In essence, the executive naval officer would be 
expected in the future to be fully conversant with emerging technologies and would spend 
the bulk of his time carrying out technical duties. The Britannia education system and the 
foundation of the R.N. College at Greenwich, as well as the extension of specialist lines 
in the executive, were indicative of this trend. Specialist lines in various fields virtually 
turned executive officers into technical experts and the Torpedo and Gunnery 
specializations became valuable stepping-stones to promotion. A glance through the lists 
of officers passing through Excellent and Vernon provides a veritable who's who of the 
flag list. 
The ultimate expression of that trend was the advent of the Selborne Scheme of 
education in 1902 that integrated the training of all combatant officers of the deck, engine 
room and marines. These officers would spend the bulk of their extended college 
education in engineering sciences and mathematics and would be required to obtain 
engine room watch-keeping certificates. The intention was that all future officers would 
in effect be engineers even though not all engineers would be executives. Even though 
this amounted to a virtual annexation of engineering by the line, executive officers were 
wary of the implications. 
As naval education became increasingly technical and the officer corps tried to 
keep up with the times, there was a cacophony of protest that the essential spiritual aspect 
of command was being lost. Officers were being trained to deal with the technical 
minutiae of their duties but were losing the supposed "practicality" of former educational 
practices. The resulting system was a rather strange compromise that neither created 
efficient scientific education nor adequately trained the future leadership in the intangible 
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qualities of command, leadership, character and will. Concentration on this "practical" 
education was not a terribly effective way to train officers to command nor was there any 
professional reward for cultivating the wider or "sublime" aspects of naval leadership. 
Executive officers became so focussed on gaining high scores on examinations and 
achieving high performance on quantifiable tests, such as less-than-realistic battle 
practice, that they lost sight of the ends of naval power, which was their proper business. 
This was further complicated by a confusion of the practical and theoretical; especially 
since naval officers spent more time preparing for, rather than actually practising, their 
profession. As Douglas Haig wrote in a critique of the Slade Report," ... almost all aspects 
of the art of war are 'theoretical' in time of peace; they only become 'practical' when the 
actual killing begins. "5 
The intellectual-historical school, most visibly exemplified by officers such as 
Reginald Custance and Cyprian Bridge, attempted to assert the superiority of practical 
command over technical means. Officers holding this view were by no means reactionary, 
nor did they reject technological change per se. Among officers associated with the 
"Young Turks," who provided the younger generation of this school, the majority had 
specialized in one of the scientific branches. Herbert Richmond and Reginald Drax were 
torpedo officers, while Roger Bellairs and Kenneth Dewar were gunnery specialists. 
Recognizing the contributions of both schools, Drax wrote in 1913: 
Can we not try each to appreciate the good qualities of the other, to 
admit that one if the complement of the other, and to all agree that at 
last we should credit our brother officers with working loyally for the 
5 CCAC, Chat'twell Papers (CHAR)13/26, Notes by Lt. General Douglas Haig on the Slade Report, 
February 1914. 
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good of the Service .... The theorist and the dreamer must admit, as 
indeed they do, that it was the practical man who built the Empire; it 
was the bull-at-gate Englishman, who often made mistakes, and paid 
for them with his life, who gave heed to theory, and yet won through 
by virtue of those qualities of courage, determination, and loyalty 
which are among the noblest attributes ofmankind.6 
While rejecting the mechanistic and the routine, this school sought to incorporate 
older traditions of command into a "scientific" framework through the agency of 
historical study. Rumblings in that direction prior to the war became a full-fledged 
thunderstorm by 1917 and contributed to the removal of J ellicoe from the Admiralty. 
This revolution in command entailed the use of positivist history centred round the 
so-called "principles of war." While recognizing the importance of changing technology, . 
the proponents of history held that it was to be strictly subordinated to the ends of sea 
power. The use of the conceptual space in history for the personal element and for 
individual decision mirrored the concepts of scientific command as embodied in the naval 
staff. The staff, acting as advisors to commanders, not only collated and co-ordinated the 
flow of information but also, by instituting standardized procedures, alleviated what was 
called the "friction of war." Hence, the essential nature of the older system of command 
would be preserved while giving it an edge by marrying it to scientific organization. The 
staff system would co-ordinate technological advances by integrating them into tactics 
and strategy and ensuring that they would mesh with the ends of naval power, the 
application of decisive force at sea. The staff system also served a visible role in 
reasserting the competence of the executive officer corps in the aftermath of Admiral Sir 
6 Reginald Plunkett, "The Psychology of War," Naval Review, I (1913), 106. 
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Arthur Wilson's rather frightening presentation of the Navy's war plans during a CID 
meeting in the middle of the Agadir crisis of 1911 when France and Germany were on the 
verge of war. 7 It also presented a mechanism to defuse controversy within the service by 
institutionalizing thought revolving around strategic and tactical doctrine. In light of the 
experience of the controversies of the first Fisher regime at the Admiralty (1904-1910) 
the contribution of the staff cannot be underestimated. 
Furthermore, the near simultaneous development of staff officer training courses 
and The Naval Review provided the capacity to diffuse both the knowledge of and 
legitimacy for staff command throughout the service. They also provided an attempt at a 
self-correcting mechanism where tactical and strategic doctrine could be prevented from 
descending into dogma. Despite the promise of such a system, a nagging fear remained in 
the minds of several senior officers that the staff would further alienate general service 
officers from elite staff officers8 and that it would conspire to limit the capacity and 
initiative of commanding officers. 
The result of this process was the creation an officer corps that could speak the 
language of the modem era while continuing to justify its distinctly pre-modem form of 
leadership. It was able to do this despite nearly losing the First World War by the very 
fact of its willingness to change. When the older generation of officers seemingly failed 
to master this process, a younger one snapped at its heels. This new generation of officers 
was outraged (justifiably or not) at the failure of its seniors to meet expectations of 
7 Indeed, Wilson's performance was so shocking to cabinet that the Asquith government mustered the 
resolve to impose a naval staff on the Navy whether it wanted it or not. This resulted in the virtual dismissal 
ofWilson and the removal of Reginald McKenna as First Lord. 
8 Great Britain, Public Record Office (PRO), Admiralty Papers (ADM) 1/8496/ 185, Naval Staff Uniforms, 
1917. 
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performance and had a concrete programme of reform at hand as the war exposed all the 
fault lines in the system of education and administration. Moreover, these younger 
officers were intelligent enough to cultivate contacts with powerful voices in the press, to 
gain at least the tacit support of some forward-thinking senior officers and to attract the 
attention of members of the War Cabinet, including the Prime Minister himself. 
The conclusion of the war marked a decisive change in the culture of the officer 
corps. First of all, there was the stark realization that the Navy had not performed to the 
best of its ability in the conflict. Strategically, the submarine campaign had nearly led to 
defeat, and in tactical terms the Battle of Jutland was less than a resounding success. 
Furthermore, there was the realization that Britain would not likely enjoy such superiority 
in naval strength over a future opponent as it had over Germany. The limitations of the 
Washington Treaty of 1922 reduced the R.N. effectively to a one-power standard. 
Although in the immediate postwar years it was unlikely that Britain would become 
involved in a Great Power conflict, the services were still active in suppressing dissent 
within the Empire. 
As we have seen, professionalization, particularly in the case of military 
organizations, is a dynamic process. As circumstances changed politically, culturally, 
socially and technologically, the matrix of skills required for an officer corps to retain its 
social and professional position also shifted. As the Navy became more like a large 
modem industrial complex, and its vessels more resembled a vast coalmine than a 
traditional ship-of-war, entirely different sets of skills and education were required to 
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manage it. 9 Whereas in the age of sail the naval officer had to co-ordinate various trades 
and skills to manage a ship effectively, at the turn of the century many of these trades had 
become professions, often with higher educational standards and better work control 
mechanisms than the executive officer corps itself. That being said, the social origins 
from where the Navy drew its executive officers did not change. 
The First World War marked an essential transformation of the officer corps. 
First, although the system of half pay continued until1938 and private income remained a 
definite asset, naval officers became full-time employees of the state and were no longer 
regarded as part-time contractees to be employed for particular commissions. This meant 
that active naval officers could not seek outside employment without the express consent 
of the Admiralty and that officers were expected to devote their full attention to mastering 
their jobs. Part-time employment as a M.P. while still on the active list was no longer 
acceptable. This was also reflected in the agitation by junior officers for better working 
conditions comparable to those gained by men in equivalent civilian occupations. 
Second, the Navy in many respects became increasingly divorced from active 
politics. With the advent of the Labour Government in the 1920s, the old political 
connections to the dyarchy of the Liberals and Conservatives was broken. The Liberal 
Party was shattered and its remnants found themselves in bed with the Conservatives. 
With the wider political involvement of the population as a whole, decisions had to made 
in a more open fashion. The Navy had to justify itself in the eyes of the electorate and 
was forced to accept closer scrutiny by Parliament. Despite fears over the possibility of a 
9 C.C.P. Fitzgerald, "The War Training of the Navy: A Reply to Sir G Hornby," United Service Magazine, 
III (1891), 4. 
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Labour government after the war, when that spectre came to pass in 1924 the Navy found 
itself able to deal with the "socialists." 
Third, the Navy became increasingly accountable, not just to Parliament and the 
politicians but to a set of self-defined professional standards. Officers were increasingly 
judged on their respective merits and "toadies and lickspittles"- to borrow a phrase from 
C.S. Forester- were increasingly marginalized. 10 An example was the unpopularity of 
Frederic Dreyer after Invergordon. The Navy became increasingly aware that it could not 
afford to make sure that "Buggins" had his tum. As an institution it became more ruthless 
in weeding out surplus officers and in selecting able men to fill posts. This was made 
easier by a wider selection of officers with combat experience. Officers no longer meeting 
professional expectations increasingly found themselves unemployed or retired by the 
sheer force of circumstances, as fewer posts meant increased competition. 
Fourth, moves were made to limit professional disagreements and to keep 
divergence of opinion on the active list within limits. There was, as the evidence seems to 
indicate, a profound recoiling from the fall-out of disputes between camps of naval 
officers before, during and after the Great War. For instance, Fisher and Beresford were 
rejected because they both washed the navy's dirty laundry in public. A good example in 
the interwar period was a review of K.G.B. Dewar's The Navy from Within, which 
appeared in the pages of the 1939 volume of The Naval Review: 
Why does he so often seem to antagonize those who admire his 
intellect and value its products? Is it because in his fervent conviction 
of the rightness and urgency of his case, and in a forgetfulness that to 
slower-witted people the obvious is not so immediately obvious, he 
10 C.S. Forester, Mr. Midshipman Hornblower (1950, London: Penguin, 1992), 15. 
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perhaps seems contemptuous of the intellect of those who he imagines 
b · ?II to e reactiOnary opponents. 
Fifth, the Navy became an increasingly national institution, and not merely one 
managed by an elite. The coming of massive numbers of hostilities-only ratings and 
officers forced the Navy to develop connections outside the traditional service. The 
growth of administrative capacity and industrial relations forced naval officers to deal 
with issues larger than seamanship. Moreover, the close connections to other government 
departments and industry, such as the co-ordination of shipping and labour, led 
considerable numbers of individuals to be less than enthralled with certain aspects of 
naval life. As one R.N.V.R. officer wrote immediately after the armistice: 
All the same you know, the Navy's rotten ... It has good stuff in it but 
it wants, not reform, but revolution. The chief thing that is wrong is the 
fear of responsibility; everyone is afraid of his immediate superior and 
exerts himself chiefly in clearing his owri yardarm, and I should think 
classes must be held in selfishness and lack of consideration for 
others. 12 
Sixth, there was the growth of non-traditional arms in the Navy and combat 
experience outside the big ships of the Grand Fleet. The submarine arm, the destroyer and 
convoy forces and the Royal Naval Air Service (R.N.A.S.) became large enough that they 
could not be ignored. Many top-flight commanders in the Second World War saw action 
in places other than the Grand Fleet: Andrew Cunningham was a destroyer officer, Bruce 
Fraser was at the Dardanelles, and Max Horton was a submariner. Although the Fleet Air 
11 
"Review of The Navy From Within- I," Naval Review, XXVII (1939), 318. 
12 National Maritime Museum (NMM), H.W. Richmond Papers (RIC) 2/1, letter by unidentified R.N.V.R. 
officer, 28 November 1918. Indeed, the officer went on to mention the case of one medical officer who was 
reluctant to distribute "venereal disease preventatives" because of the religious views of the ship's captain. 
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Arm (F.A.A.) was placed under the authority of the Air Ministry, significant contacts 
remained with the Royal Air Force (R.A.F.). There was a closer connection between the 
"fleet" navy and the "bug trap" navy. 
Seventh, an awareness developed that continual improvement was not only 
positive but also mandatory. There was a realization even among hardliners that not 
everything went as well as it could have. Unless the Navy wanted to have further 
interference in its professional arrangements, it needed to set things right. 
Eighth, to borrow an idea from Samuel Huntington, officers became increasingly 
aware of the importance of having a broad as well as a specialized knowledge of world 
affairs. 13 This concern was reflected in the pattern of sending junior naval officers whose 
education had been incomplete to university for a year to gain a wider view of their 
profession. "This course is designed to broaden the outlook on life and to bring officers 
into contact at an impressionable age with University thought and University ideas." 14 If 
the executive branch existed to serve the public good, it followed logically that it must 
have an idea of what defined that good. Moreover, to secure its leadership within the 
naval establishment it had to deal with other professional men on an equal footing. By 
virtue of this technology, engineers claimed control over a significant portion of the naval 
establishment. Combined with the executive's core function of command in war, it was 
rarely practised; when it was, as in the case of the Great War, the results were not always 
satisfactory. 
13 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 8-9. 
14 Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Parliamentary Papers (BPP), "Statement of the First 
Lord ofthe Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1920-21," vol. XXVIII, Cmd. 619 (1920), 667. 
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The entire period from 1880 to the end of the Great War marked an essential 
transformation of the executive officer corps of the Royal Navy. While at the same time 
its members attempted to maintain a collective identity and the so-called "culture of 
command," there was a profound recognition of the importance of specialization and the 
consequent of executive competence. While the corps, along with the rest of British 
society, was undergoing at times uncertain and bewildering change there was a 
simultaneous search for a cultural and intellectual grounding. A framework was sought 
that attempted to address profound social, economic, technological and organization 
change in a systematic and coherent manner yet still retain the importance of the 
individual and the spiritual aspects of the military art. 
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Appendix I 
First Lords of the Admiralty 1880-1919 
The Earl ofNorthbrook 1880-1885 
Lord George Hamilton 1885-1886 
The Marquess of Ripon 1886 
Lord George Hamilton 1886-1892 
The Earl Spencer 1892-1895 
George Goschen 1895-1900 
The Earl of Selborne 1900-1905 
The Earl of Cawdor 1905 
Lord Tweedmouth 1905-1908 
Reginald McKenna 1908-1911 
Winston S. Churchill 1911-1915 
Arthur J. Balfour 1915-1916 
Sir Edward Carson 1916-1917 
Sir Eric Geddes 1917-1919 
Walter Long 1919-1921 
Source: First Lord of the Admiralty; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_ 
Lord_of_the_Admiralty; Internet; accessed 15 December 2004. 
First Sea (or Naval) Lords 1880-1919 
Sir Astley Cooper Key 
Lord Hood of Avalon 
Sir John Hay 
Lord Hood of Avalon 
Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton 
Sir Anthony Hoskins 
Sir Frederick Richards 
Lord Walter Kerr 
Sir John Fisher 
Sir Arthur Wilson 
Sir Francis Bridgeman 
H.S.H. Prince Louis ofBattenberg 
Sir John Fisher 
Sir Thomas Jackson 
Sir John Jellicoe 
Sir Rosslyn Wemyss 
Sir David Beatty 
1879-1885 
1885-1886 
1886 
1886-1889 
1889-1891 
1891-1893 
1893-1899 
1899-1904 
1904-1910 
1910-1911 
1911-1912 
1912-1914 
1914-1915 
1915-1916 
1916-1917 
1917-1919 
1919-1927 
Source: Admiralty; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Admiralty; Internet; 
accessed 15 December 2004. 
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Appendix II- Navy Strength and Expenditure 
Date Personnel Wages(£) Total Estimates(£) 
1888-9 62,400 3,214,607 13,776,572 
1892-3 74,100 3,679,589 15,266,811 
1897-8 100,050 4,696,000 22,338,000 
1902-3 122,500 5,962,000 31,255,500 
1907-8 128,000 6,869,700 31,419,500 
1911-2 134,000 7,511,500 46,204,799 
1914-5 151,000 8,800,000 53,573,261 
Source: Lower Deck, The British Navy from Within (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1916), 11 
British Government Spending 1860-1913 
£millions 
Year Gross Army and 
Spending Ordnance 
1860 69.6 14.1 
1885 88.5 18.6 
1895 100.9 17.9 
1896 105.1 18.5 
1913 184.0 28.1 
Navy Total Defence Debt 
Charges 
10.8 24.9 28.7 
11.4 30 29 
17.5 35.4 23.3 
19.7 37.2 22.8 
44.4 72.5 19.9 
Source: William Ashworth, "Economic Aspects of Late Victorian Naval Administration," 
Economic History Review 2nd Series, vol. XXII, No.3 (1969), 491. 
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Appendix III 
Parentage of Engineer Students Entering Royal Naval Engineering College, 
Keyham, 1897-1905 (Old Scheme) 
Father 1897 98 99 1900 01 02 03 04 
Naval Officers (most 8 6 8 5 4 9 4 3 
engineer officers)* 
Army Officers 1 1 1 
Marine Officers 1 
Warrant Officers RN 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Petty Officers RN 1 
Merchant Marine 1 1 1 
Civil Servants 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 
Dockyard Officers 1 5 2 1 
Clergymen 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Barristers 1 1 
Solicitors 2 2 2 
Journalists 2 
Doctors 1 1 1 
Bank Cashiers 1 1 2 2 1 
Architects 1 
School Masters 3 2 3 2 2 2 
Civil Engineers 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Managers 3 1 2 1 1 
Shipowners 1 
Tea or Coffee 1 1 
Planters 
Merchants 1 3 3 1 1 1 2 
Manufacturers 1 2 3 1 3 1 
Tailors, Drapers 1 2 4 2 2 1 
Secretaries 1 1 1 
1897 98 99 1900 01 02 03 04 
05 
7 
2 
3 
3 
3 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
05 
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Accountants 1 2 
Commercial 1 1 1 2 
Travellers 
Farmers 3 1 3 2 1 2 
Farm Bailiff 1 
Land Agents 1 1 1 1 
Brewers 2 2 2 
Builders 1 2 1 1 
Brokers 2 1 
Chemists 1 2 
Ironmonger 1 
Grocers 1 2 
Butchers 2 1 
Hairdressers 1 
Carpenter 1 
Mise 3 2 3 1 1 5 3 3 5 
Jeweller 1 
No Occupation 2 3 2 6 3 
Company Directors 3 1 
Total 34 34 41 36 44 46 20 20 42 
*Significantly, only four engineer students were the sons of executive officers and they 
were the sons of three retired lieutenants and one retired commander. 
Source: PRO,ADM 7/931 Statistics ofEngineering Students. 
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Appendix V Officers- Estimated War Needs 1920 
Ships CAPT CDR LT LT(G) LT(T) LT(N) SILT LT CDR(E) LT(E) 
(RNR) 
50 Battleships 50 50 369 50 50 50 108 45 50 100 
16 Battleships (res) 16 16 - 16 16 16 - - 16 16 
14 Battle Cruisers 14 14 70 14 14 14 16 14 14 42 
25 Armoured Cruisers 25 25 119 25 25 25 76 - 25 50 
8 Armoured Cruisers (res) 8 8 - 8 8 8 - - 8 8 
82 Light Cruisers 74 23 164 78 4 82 82 15 82 82 
8 Light Cruisers (res) 8 8 8 8 8 8 - - 8 8 
18 Torpedo Gun Boats 11 40 117 14 12 54 10 - 29 29 
2 Armed Merchant Cruisers 2 - 2 - - - - - - -
270 Destroyers + depots 
-
70 431 - - 208 65 - - 208 
11 Torpedo Boats - - 51 - - - 51 - - -
115 Submarines - - 234 - - - 153 - - -
RN Air Service 
- 9 160 - - - - - 2 6 
Retinues 3 13 41 2 8 - 10 - 3 2 
Shore Service & tenders 59 79 96 16 11 22 1 - 87 46 
5% margin 13 17 93 13 7 24 28 4 17 30 
Total 283 362 1,956 244 163 521 600 78 341 627 
Source: PRO, ADM 1/8370/65, Report on Supply of Officers, April 1912. Note (res)= reserve fleet. 
Documentary Sources 
British Library, St. Pancras 
Hugh Evan-Thomas Papers 
John Jellicoe Papers 
Bibliography 
Churchill College Archives Centre, Cambridge 
Chartwell Papers, W.S. Churchill 
John de Robeck Papers 
Reginald Drax Papers 
Frederic Dreyer Papers 
J.A. Fisher Papers 
John Godfrey Papers 
Bryan Godfrey-Faussett Papers 
Reginald Hall Papers 
Maurice Hankey Papers 
Archibald Hurd Papers 
Reginald McKenna Papers 
SW Roskill Papers 
FCD Sturdee Papers 
Wester Wemyss Papers 
National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London 
David Beatty Papers 
Ernie Chatfield Papers 
K .G.B. Dewar Papers 
William H Henderson Papers 
Gerard Noel Papers 
Herbert Richmond Papers 
Public Record Office, Kew Gardens, London 
Admiralty Papers 
Board of Education Papers 
Cabinet Papers 
Ministry of Transport Papers 
Treasury Papers 
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Royal Naval Museum, Portsmouth 
Naval Review Papers 
Queen Elizabeth II Library, Memorial University of Newfoundland 
Great Britain, Parliament, Debates 
Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers 
Great Britain, Parliament, Public General Acts 
United States, Congress, Congressional Papers 
University of California Libraries, Irvine 
Arthur J. Marder Papers 
Periodicals 
Army Quarterly 
Atlantic Monthly 
Blackwood's 
Brassey 's Naval Annual 
The Daily Mail 
Emmanuel Naval Review 
Engineering 
Engineering Magazine 
Fortnightly Review 
Journal of the Junior Naval Officers Professional Association 
Land and Water 
The Marine Engineer 
The Marine Engineer and Naval Architect 
The Monthly Review (London) 
The Naval and Military Record 
The Naval Review 
The Navy League Journal 
The Nineteenth Century and After 
The Royal Naval Warrant Officers, Journal 
Journal of the Royal United Services Institution 
The Spectator 
The Sunday Despatch 
The Times (London) 
Transactions of the Institute of Marine Engineers 
United Services Magazine 
US Naval Institute Proceedings 
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